- 21,784
- 2,957
- Joined
- Feb 17, 2007
We have to correct the ship by the next Angels series or we're in big trouble. Simple as that.
2016 MLB thread. THE CUBS HAVE BROKEN THE CURSE! Chicago Cubs are your 2016 World Series champions
- Thread in 'Sports & Training' Thread starter Started by proshares,
- Start date
- Status
- 16,006
- 4,734
- Joined
- Jan 27, 2012
Braves will make up ground vs the Nats. Keep the momentum going after sweeping the As and we'll be fine, we've been here before.
- 20,396
- 14,184
- Joined
- Jul 18, 2012
Bruh, stop playing....u had the Cal Ripken milk poster in your room. You know u were an O's fan like 75% of your fairweather fanbase up until 2005.
We accept mediocrity? Your team is 2 seasons removed from INVITING Phillies fans to the park to fill seats. All that needs to be said
Also, where are you getting 32-29?
Nats, and their fans have an inferiority complex...one which will be 100x worse since this MASN ruling was recently found in favor of the O's.
Pirates failed MISERABLY not picking up someone. They really needed another arm and it's costing them a bit.
- 6,459
- 1,841
- Joined
- Dec 5, 2008
Bruh, stop playing....u had the Cal Ripken milk poster in your room. You know u were an O's fan like 75% of your fairweather fanbase up until 2005.
We accept mediocrity? Your team is 2 seasons removed from INVITING Phillies fans to the park to fill seats. All that needs to be said
Also, where are you getting 32-29?
Nats, and their fans have an inferiority complex...one which will be 100x worse since this MASN ruling was recently found in favor of the O's.
But, I didn't. I've never been an O's fan. When I was growing up I cheered for the Cubs because my mom's from Chicago and I cheered for the Expos cause my Dad said they had the best chance of coming to VA/DC. I did like Cal, though. Adam Jones is also the homie, and Camden Yards is beautiful. Besides that, I never cared about the Orioles. Also, funny how we're "fairweather fans" when studies have shown Orioles fans to be just behind Phillies fans in that category http://www.thepostgame.com/blog/dis...-are-biggest-fair-weather-supporters-baseball
That's 4 seasons removed, actually. And what's that have to do with ya'll accepting mediocrity? Show me how ya'll didn't from '98-2011.
And I guess the record I was looking at included the Expos too. Either way, 29-21 isn't dominance.
at us having an inferiority complex. The fact that O's fans always bring that up because they aren't the only team around here anymore says it all. And the MASN dispute is ********, but there's nothing they can really do about it. All that money Angelos is raking in from the network and he has his guys spend it on Ubaldo Jimenez...the definition of mediocrity.
- 20,396
- 14,184
- Joined
- Jul 18, 2012
The definition of mediocrity is the soft toss lobs that Zimmerman throws from 3rd base to 1st. You'll probably have a Detox album drop before you see Zimmerman out of a Nats uniform. Good luck w/ that.
- 28,043
- 10,465
- Joined
- Jan 7, 2004
Should have re-acquired Burnett, or you thinking another arm?
- 6,459
- 1,841
- Joined
- Dec 5, 2008
Christ, you call that mediocre? I call that god awful
He'll be at 1B next year, so we'll have to worry about that less frequently.
- 22,885
- 2,317
- Joined
- Oct 13, 2000
- 6,459
- 1,841
- Joined
- Dec 5, 2008
7 straight wins with 3 walk-offs in a row 
Matt Williams' management of the bullpen baffles me.
Matt Williams' management of the bullpen baffles me.
- 7,884
- 2,014
- Joined
- Aug 13, 2013
I still can't believe the A's were swept by the braves. The braves, out of all teams lmao
mr marcus
Banned
- 26,572
- 5,415
- Joined
- May 3, 2010
What happened with the masn ruling?
O's milking off the nats success smh
O's milking off the nats success smh
jumpmanfromdabay
Banned
- 25,730
- 2,900
- Joined
- Jan 25, 2008
Yea cause it's so uncommon to get swept by a team over .500
- 6,459
- 1,841
- Joined
- Dec 5, 2008
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sport...476764-2733-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html
This article breaks it down. Pretty much the Nats want more money from the deal and the O's aren't willing to let that happen. What a terrible ******* contract Selig negotiated with the O's in order for the Nats to come here. They max out at 33% of their TV rights :x MASN is a pretty crappy network too.
- 7,884
- 2,014
- Joined
- Aug 13, 2013
Yea cause it's so uncommon to get swept by a team over .500
The A's getting swept by anyone is very uncommon.
- 30,498
- 5,958
- Joined
- Mar 2, 2011
Royals :x
- 60,003
- 50,896
- Joined
- Dec 14, 2004
I don't think the Orioles and Nationals are an actual rival. I have worked and met so many people in the last five years that are fans of both teams. It blows my mind when they say they root for both teams
Pirates definitely messed up.
A's and Tigers will be fine.
Pirates definitely messed up.
A's and Tigers will be fine.
Last edited:
- 7,884
- 2,014
- Joined
- Aug 13, 2013
I think madden has a point. Yes we know jester is one of the goats, but Jesus Christ he's still a divisional opponent. This whole Derek jeter retirement tour is doing the most.
- 1,227
- 92
- Joined
- Oct 20, 2012
I would agree with Maddon if it was another team and another player he was talking about. No matter what the Rays do, the Tampa area will be Yankees land. Most of the people in attendance where there to see and cheer for the Yankees not the Rays. I saw the highlights and almost everyone was wearing Yankees shirts and hats. The same thing happens when the Red Sox play the Rays in Tampa. The crowd is made up mostly of Sox fans. Basically Maddon is upset cause Yankees fans went to the game and cheered for a Yankee.
Yup. Last thing I wanna hear about is Maddon complain about anything the fans do. I thought he was behind what Price said about the fans a while back. It's whatever with anyone who complains about it.
- 28,043
- 10,465
- Joined
- Jan 7, 2004
That's my manager. After Tito, naturally.
Hanley Ramirez should play third.
Mets' Matz impresses at Double-A.
How Pitchers are Pitching to Javier Baez.
The Return of the Koji Uehara Curveball.
Mike Trout’s Other Slump.
Brian McCann Probably Couldn’t Be Given Away For Free.
Hanley Ramirez will be activated from the disabled list in a week, which means the Los Angeles Dodgers have a big decision to make. While the Dodgers are likely to cruise into the postseason, they haven't exactly locked down the division just yet. To do so, and then get to the Fall Classic, the team will need to keep Ramirez healthy. And that leads to the question: Which position should he be playing?
Let's take a look at the pros and cons for putting Ramirez at shortstop or third base:
The case for shortstop
Ramirez has been playing shortstop all season, and he has racked up more innings there than he did in either 2012 or 2013, and nearly as many as he did in 2011. In fact, aside from 98 games at third base in 2012, and 14 games at either second or third when he was first in the minors, Ramirez has played only shortstop as a professional baseball player. So it's likely that he'll be most comfortable there. And comfort might be the most important factor in keeping him healthy.
The Dodgers also don't have a great holistic replacement at shortstop. The man currently manning the position is 25-year-old rookie Miguel Rojas. Rojas has a stellar defensive reputation, but he isn't so great with the bat in his hands. In nine seasons in the minors, he has hit just .238/.305/.297. Minor league statistics are frequently far from gospel, but across such a large sample size (2,639 plate appearances), the fact that he has a smaller slugging percentage than on-base percentage when his on-base percentage is so incredibly low tells a very clear tale. And thus far, his results in the majors haven't done anything to prove that tale a mere fable.
[+] EnlargeMiguel Rojas
Harry How/Getty Images
Miguel Rojas has struggled offensively in the majors.
Among the 401 players with at least 100 PA this season, just 29 have a lower wRC+ than Rojas' paltry 53. That's 47 percent below league average, certainly not optimal, even at a defense-first position like shortstop.
On the other side of the coin are Dee Gordon and Alex Guerrero, who both should hit just fine but are at best as qualified as Ramirez to play shortstop. They might actually be less qualified. It's not a coincidence that Gordon didn't find success in the majors until he moved to second base, and Guerrero has found his home at that spot in the minors as well. We might not have enough data on Guerrero yet to say that he definitively can't play the position, but nothing in the way that he has been handled this season suggests that shortstop is in his future.
Beyond them are reserves Justin Turner and Darwin Barney. Neither has played shortstop regularly in the majors, and Turner didn't play there much in the minors either.
This leaves the Ramirez, Rojas and possibly Gordon as the realistic options at shortstop. Ramirez is clearly the best of the bunch.
The case for third base
Whenever possible, you want to make sure the players who are placed in the starting lineup excel in at least one aspect of the game. Juan Uribe plays exceptional defense, but he is now on the disabled list with an injured hamstring. That leaves Turner, who has never been exceptional in any one area before this season.
Turner is hitting the ball pretty well this season and has been drawing walks, adding to his offensive value. But Turner packs little punch. His second-half ISO is a paltry .042, which limits him to being a singles hitter. Right now, the balls he is hitting are falling for singles, but they are falling at a rate that is far out of line with his previous career performances, and banking on that continuing -- the way the Dodgers once banked on a similarly fluky performance from Luis Cruz continuing -- would be pretty foolish. In addition, Turner doesn't field all that well, so that leaves him more with the profile of a bench player.
Enter Ramirez. He might not play great defense, but he also didn't exactly create a cone of ignorance there either. The fact that third base might be less demanding on him physically also is a point in the hot corner's favor.
What does Hanley want?
Of course, we should also take a moment to consider what the player himself wants. If he is going to be unhappy at third base and is discouraged about coming to the ballpark as the result of a position switch, that could outweigh any health or team-fit benefits. Ramirez is set to be a free agent, and while most teams probably don't view him as a shortstop in the long term, he will be unable to maintain even the illusion that he can play there in the coming years if he is shifted to third base for the remainder of the season. It shouldn't be a major factor for the Dodgers, particularly if the situation is handled delicately, but it's certainly something that the team needs to keep in mind.
Verdict
This essentially comes down to two questions: What position is going to keep Ramirez the healthiest? And which do you think will last longer, Rojas' good defense or Turner's good hitting?
The answer to both questions points clearly to Ramirez's shifting back to third base, presuming, of course, that he will happily go along with the change. If he will, then the Dodgers will be able to run out their most optimal lineup, hopefully with the added benefit of keeping the brittle Ramirez on the field for the next two and a half months.
Let's take a look at the pros and cons for putting Ramirez at shortstop or third base:
The case for shortstop
Ramirez has been playing shortstop all season, and he has racked up more innings there than he did in either 2012 or 2013, and nearly as many as he did in 2011. In fact, aside from 98 games at third base in 2012, and 14 games at either second or third when he was first in the minors, Ramirez has played only shortstop as a professional baseball player. So it's likely that he'll be most comfortable there. And comfort might be the most important factor in keeping him healthy.
The Dodgers also don't have a great holistic replacement at shortstop. The man currently manning the position is 25-year-old rookie Miguel Rojas. Rojas has a stellar defensive reputation, but he isn't so great with the bat in his hands. In nine seasons in the minors, he has hit just .238/.305/.297. Minor league statistics are frequently far from gospel, but across such a large sample size (2,639 plate appearances), the fact that he has a smaller slugging percentage than on-base percentage when his on-base percentage is so incredibly low tells a very clear tale. And thus far, his results in the majors haven't done anything to prove that tale a mere fable.
[+] EnlargeMiguel Rojas
Harry How/Getty Images
Miguel Rojas has struggled offensively in the majors.
Among the 401 players with at least 100 PA this season, just 29 have a lower wRC+ than Rojas' paltry 53. That's 47 percent below league average, certainly not optimal, even at a defense-first position like shortstop.
On the other side of the coin are Dee Gordon and Alex Guerrero, who both should hit just fine but are at best as qualified as Ramirez to play shortstop. They might actually be less qualified. It's not a coincidence that Gordon didn't find success in the majors until he moved to second base, and Guerrero has found his home at that spot in the minors as well. We might not have enough data on Guerrero yet to say that he definitively can't play the position, but nothing in the way that he has been handled this season suggests that shortstop is in his future.
Beyond them are reserves Justin Turner and Darwin Barney. Neither has played shortstop regularly in the majors, and Turner didn't play there much in the minors either.
This leaves the Ramirez, Rojas and possibly Gordon as the realistic options at shortstop. Ramirez is clearly the best of the bunch.
The case for third base
Whenever possible, you want to make sure the players who are placed in the starting lineup excel in at least one aspect of the game. Juan Uribe plays exceptional defense, but he is now on the disabled list with an injured hamstring. That leaves Turner, who has never been exceptional in any one area before this season.
Turner is hitting the ball pretty well this season and has been drawing walks, adding to his offensive value. But Turner packs little punch. His second-half ISO is a paltry .042, which limits him to being a singles hitter. Right now, the balls he is hitting are falling for singles, but they are falling at a rate that is far out of line with his previous career performances, and banking on that continuing -- the way the Dodgers once banked on a similarly fluky performance from Luis Cruz continuing -- would be pretty foolish. In addition, Turner doesn't field all that well, so that leaves him more with the profile of a bench player.
Enter Ramirez. He might not play great defense, but he also didn't exactly create a cone of ignorance there either. The fact that third base might be less demanding on him physically also is a point in the hot corner's favor.
What does Hanley want?
Of course, we should also take a moment to consider what the player himself wants. If he is going to be unhappy at third base and is discouraged about coming to the ballpark as the result of a position switch, that could outweigh any health or team-fit benefits. Ramirez is set to be a free agent, and while most teams probably don't view him as a shortstop in the long term, he will be unable to maintain even the illusion that he can play there in the coming years if he is shifted to third base for the remainder of the season. It shouldn't be a major factor for the Dodgers, particularly if the situation is handled delicately, but it's certainly something that the team needs to keep in mind.
Verdict
This essentially comes down to two questions: What position is going to keep Ramirez the healthiest? And which do you think will last longer, Rojas' good defense or Turner's good hitting?
The answer to both questions points clearly to Ramirez's shifting back to third base, presuming, of course, that he will happily go along with the change. If he will, then the Dodgers will be able to run out their most optimal lineup, hopefully with the added benefit of keeping the brittle Ramirez on the field for the next two and a half months.
Mets' Matz impresses at Double-A.
The New York Mets took left-hander Steven Matz in the second round of the 2009 draft out of a Long Island high school, using their first pick that year on him. But Matz, who had a violent delivery and some elbow issues as an amateur, blew out his elbow almost immediately after signing and didn't pitch in a professional game until June of 2012. He made 21 starts last year, averaging just five innings per start and facing more than 22 batters in only one outing all season, but stayed healthy and had solid results.
This year, he's had a real breakout season, throwing harder with better control and strong enough results to move up to Double-A and become one of the team's top 10 prospects.
I saw Matz pitch at Reading against the Fightin' Phillies on Sunday evening in a game that had all the trappings of a getaway day, with hitters swinging at the first pitch and the contest ending with a called third strike that made the ghost of Eric Gregg cringe. Matz threw seven solid innings, sitting 92-95 mph all day with good tailing life, showing fringy control and below-average command. He occasionally dialed it down to 89-91 mph when he needed a strike, because at 94-95 the pitch tended to sail up to his glove side and he could not get the ball down consistently. But with that life and velocity it's going to miss a lot of minor league bats.
His changeup is ahead of his curveball; he has very good arm speed on the change with some late fading action, 82-85 mph, but barely used it until the fourth inning, which I assume was part of the plan to get him to work more on the breaking ball. That pitch, at 75-80 mph, has late downward break, but it's easy to pick up the spin and right-handed hitters were able to stay back on it and “catch” it on the way down. It's a 55 or 60 (on the 20-80 scouting scale) change, but probably a 45 curveball today given how I think major league hitters would be able to see it and adjust to it.
Matz's delivery was very rough in high school, with enough of a “head-whack” (a severe jerking of his head when he released a pitch) that a few teams weren't willing to draft him, but it's all much cleaner now, with no head violence and more deliberate, measured movements throughout. He takes a longer stride than ever now, and his arm swing is a little longer and less abrupt. He's always stayed on line well, even in high school, but now everything is more fluid and he's generating more of his velocity from his lower half. The curveball has to get better, but even more important is improving his fastball command -- and since the delivery isn't going to get any cleaner, that's a harder task for him going forward. Right now, he projects as a good fourth starter, probably a 3.75-4.00 ERA guy over 180-200 innings, assuming some small improvements in his command and breaking ball.
• Brandon Nimmo didn't have a great day, putting some weak swings on pitches from finesse left-hander Hoby Milner, who threw strikes but has below-average stuff. Nimmo gets on base at a great clip, and I believe there's still some power to come, but he has to show he can hit lefties to reach his ceiling as an everyday player.
• Second baseman Dilson Herrera at least got to show off on defense at second base -- he's going to be a plus defender there if he isn't one already -- but he was the victim of the home plate ump's “I just want to go home” call to end the game, a third strike that was a good six inches off the plate. I like everything about the Colombian-born Herrera's swing except for where he starts his hands: high and tight, above his ear and near his helmet, which creates unnecessary length from the set position to when the barrel enters the zone.
• Right-hander Hansel Robles had a near-5.00 ERA as a starter this year, but has been more effective since a move to the pen, and sat 93-96 mph in an inning of work on Sunday. He comes from a low three-quarters slot and slings the ball, so he gets on the side of a below-average slider, making it flat, and he's going to have to throw more strikes -- hard to do when he has some inconsistency in the slot and release point -- but guys who throw this hard tend to get extra chances.
This year, he's had a real breakout season, throwing harder with better control and strong enough results to move up to Double-A and become one of the team's top 10 prospects.
I saw Matz pitch at Reading against the Fightin' Phillies on Sunday evening in a game that had all the trappings of a getaway day, with hitters swinging at the first pitch and the contest ending with a called third strike that made the ghost of Eric Gregg cringe. Matz threw seven solid innings, sitting 92-95 mph all day with good tailing life, showing fringy control and below-average command. He occasionally dialed it down to 89-91 mph when he needed a strike, because at 94-95 the pitch tended to sail up to his glove side and he could not get the ball down consistently. But with that life and velocity it's going to miss a lot of minor league bats.
His changeup is ahead of his curveball; he has very good arm speed on the change with some late fading action, 82-85 mph, but barely used it until the fourth inning, which I assume was part of the plan to get him to work more on the breaking ball. That pitch, at 75-80 mph, has late downward break, but it's easy to pick up the spin and right-handed hitters were able to stay back on it and “catch” it on the way down. It's a 55 or 60 (on the 20-80 scouting scale) change, but probably a 45 curveball today given how I think major league hitters would be able to see it and adjust to it.
Matz's delivery was very rough in high school, with enough of a “head-whack” (a severe jerking of his head when he released a pitch) that a few teams weren't willing to draft him, but it's all much cleaner now, with no head violence and more deliberate, measured movements throughout. He takes a longer stride than ever now, and his arm swing is a little longer and less abrupt. He's always stayed on line well, even in high school, but now everything is more fluid and he's generating more of his velocity from his lower half. The curveball has to get better, but even more important is improving his fastball command -- and since the delivery isn't going to get any cleaner, that's a harder task for him going forward. Right now, he projects as a good fourth starter, probably a 3.75-4.00 ERA guy over 180-200 innings, assuming some small improvements in his command and breaking ball.
• Brandon Nimmo didn't have a great day, putting some weak swings on pitches from finesse left-hander Hoby Milner, who threw strikes but has below-average stuff. Nimmo gets on base at a great clip, and I believe there's still some power to come, but he has to show he can hit lefties to reach his ceiling as an everyday player.
• Second baseman Dilson Herrera at least got to show off on defense at second base -- he's going to be a plus defender there if he isn't one already -- but he was the victim of the home plate ump's “I just want to go home” call to end the game, a third strike that was a good six inches off the plate. I like everything about the Colombian-born Herrera's swing except for where he starts his hands: high and tight, above his ear and near his helmet, which creates unnecessary length from the set position to when the barrel enters the zone.
• Right-hander Hansel Robles had a near-5.00 ERA as a starter this year, but has been more effective since a move to the pen, and sat 93-96 mph in an inning of work on Sunday. He comes from a low three-quarters slot and slings the ball, so he gets on the side of a below-average slider, making it flat, and he's going to have to throw more strikes -- hard to do when he has some inconsistency in the slot and release point -- but guys who throw this hard tend to get extra chances.
How Pitchers are Pitching to Javier Baez.
Javier Baez is a player who transcends ordinary prospect-dom. Not just because he possesses extraordinary skills — also because he’s a prospect in whom fans of every team might be interested. Usually, a guy on the farm or a guy just on the roster will captivate locally, but Baez is able to captivate nationally, in a way that few young players are able. He’s not quite on the level of rookie Stephen Strasburg, for whose debut the whole country turned on TV, but people want to know what Baez is going to become. And they want to know how quickly he’s going to become it. His big swings are the hitter equivalent of Strasburg’s big fastballs.
People who are interested in baseball are interested in Javier Baez. They know more about him than they know about the average young prospect. Keeping with the theme, other teams, too, seem to know more about Baez than they know about the average young prospect. Other teams have prepared for Javier Baez, just as we have as fans, and in the early going it turns out Javier Baez has been pitched pretty much exactly as you’d expect that Javier Baez would be pitched.
Let’s watch a sequence, shall we? Baez already played on Monday, and here he is in the first inning, against Carlos Torres. A first-pitch breaking ball:
Ahead in the count, Torres came with some classic high heat:
Now Torres could do whatever he wanted, so why not go back to the well?
It might not have worked, but to this point, Baez saw a low breaking ball and consecutive high fastballs. Torres caught him in between:
Call it a cutter, call it a slider — Baez swung right through it, as he is wont to do to pitches. At this writing, he has two walks and twelve times as many strikeouts. He’s also slugging .517. About that: here’s a pitch and swing from the ninth.
That fastball missed over the middle and found a home in the second deck. Baez to this point has been true to form, with plenty of whiffs and already five dingers. He has his vulnerabilities, but he’s also capable of punishing even minor mistakes, like this slider that just wasn’t low enough:
It’s telling that the catcher called for a low slider in the dirt. It’s telling that Baez destroyed the pitch that was ultimately thrown. It’s telling, how Baez has been approached through his first two weeks in the bigs.
Baez’s extraordinary skill is his bat speed. That’s where the power comes from, and people who observe these things give Baez just about the highest of grades. Because of how quick his bat is, Baez should be able to turn on even blistering heat, but his swing his long and complicated in other ways so there’s a simultaneous belief that he could be vulnerable to fastballs in the right spots. People also question Baez’s discipline, as he might commit too early to pitches that end up unhittable. You’d think that, with a hitter like this, pitchers would be careful, and relatively unwilling to enter the zone unless forced.
Now we’ll do some math. Including Monday’s game, Baez has faced 52% fastballs or cutters. The league average is well north of 60%, so Baez is separated from the mean by a couple standard deviations. He’s surrounded by names like Wilin Rosario, Evan Gattis, and Juan Francisco.
And, including Monday’s game, Baez has faced just under 40% pitches in the PITCHf/x strike zone. The league average is close to 50%, so Baez is separated from the mean by almost three standard deviations. He actually has the lowest zone rate in either league. That includes Josh Hamilton, Pedro Alvarez, and the utterly unprotected Giancarlo Stanton.
Let’s put these together. I’ve calculated fastball-rate z scores and zone-rate z scores. Add them up, and the highest positive numbers will indicate players pitchers aren’t afraid of facing. The lowest negative numbers will indicate players pitchers want to pitch around and/or players pitchers think are willing to chase. Baez’s sample is still quite small, but still, here are the five lowest combined z scores:
Josh Hamilton, -5.0
Javier Baez, -4.7
Pedro Alvarez, -4.3
Juan Francisco, -4.1
A.J. Pierzynski, -3.6
This quickly, pitchers have adopted an extreme approach against Javier Baez. It’s one of the most extreme approaches in baseball, in terms of avoiding fastballs and avoiding the strike zone. He’s being pitched not unlike Hamilton, Alvarez, and Francisco, which means Baez arrived with a scouting report already written. It isn’t often rookies get treated like this right away.
Of all the rookie seasons we have recorded since 2008, right now Baez is looking at the most extreme careful approach. Juan Francisco shows up again, as he was pitched a little like this, but let’s compare Baez’s first two weeks to the first two weeks of a handful of other elite-level prospects from the last few years:
Player Fast% Zone%
Bryce Harper 52% 42%
Giancarlo Stanton 57% 47%
Gregory Polanco 60% 48%
Javier Baez 52% 40%
Mike Trout 69% 51%
Oscar Taveras 69% 45%
Wil Myers 54% 52%
Yasiel Puig 67% 48%
The point of comparison here would be to Bryce Harper. Immediately, Harper was pitched carefully, and he didn’t see a lot in the zone. Harper, obviously, was easy to see coming for years, so he had a reputation before he ever arrived. The same goes for Baez, although he and Harper have been pitched differently as rookies in ways more detailed than this overall glimpse. You might’ve expected Puig to get pitched like this when he first debuted, but instead against him pitchers were particularly fastball-happy. Pitchers have continued to try to find ways to consistently get him out, as Puig’s been able to make rapid adjustments.
Baez hasn’t seen many first-pitch fastballs, relative to the league average. He hasn’t seen many fastballs when ahead in the count, relative to the league average. He’s actually seen more fastballs with the pitcher ahead in the count. While Baez has an overall low rate of fastballs seen, he’s among the league leaders in rate of high fastballs seen, as that’s one of the vulnerabilities pitchers have targeted. You might be able to see that in the following chart of Baez’s pitches against:
Plenty of fastballs up and beyond. Plenty of non-fastballs down and beyond. Non-fastballs are generally supposed to be down, but Baez sees a lot of them, and he has been exposed by high heat. Half his strikeouts have come against fastballs and half his strikeouts have come against breaking balls. He’s willing to chase up, and he’s willing to chase down, and that’s something he’s going to need to work on.
But while he’s exhibited those weaknesses, he’s also exhibited an ability to crush well-intentioned pitches that don’t go where they wanted to. If you throw your high fastball, you can blow it by Baez. If you throw your low breaking ball, you can sneak it by Baez. If you don’t throw your high fastball high enough, though, or if you don’t throw your low breaking ball low enough, Baez is going to swing and he’s more likely to connect, and often when Baez connects, he connects in the way that meteorites connect with the surface of Earth. Pitchers are careful because they have to be careful. They have to be careful because Baez’s skills demand respect.
Javier Baez has been in the major leagues for two weeks. Prior to the beginning of those two weeks, there already existed a Javier Baez opposing scouting report, and we’ve seen pitchers follow along, with varying degrees of success. The second half of that statement could apply to just about anyone, but what’s remarkable isn’t just that Baez arrived with a report — it’s that he arrived with a report so extreme in its recommendations. I suppose Javier Baez can be extreme in a number of ways. I suppose that might be the most appropriate thing.
People who are interested in baseball are interested in Javier Baez. They know more about him than they know about the average young prospect. Keeping with the theme, other teams, too, seem to know more about Baez than they know about the average young prospect. Other teams have prepared for Javier Baez, just as we have as fans, and in the early going it turns out Javier Baez has been pitched pretty much exactly as you’d expect that Javier Baez would be pitched.
Let’s watch a sequence, shall we? Baez already played on Monday, and here he is in the first inning, against Carlos Torres. A first-pitch breaking ball:
Ahead in the count, Torres came with some classic high heat:
Now Torres could do whatever he wanted, so why not go back to the well?
It might not have worked, but to this point, Baez saw a low breaking ball and consecutive high fastballs. Torres caught him in between:
Call it a cutter, call it a slider — Baez swung right through it, as he is wont to do to pitches. At this writing, he has two walks and twelve times as many strikeouts. He’s also slugging .517. About that: here’s a pitch and swing from the ninth.
That fastball missed over the middle and found a home in the second deck. Baez to this point has been true to form, with plenty of whiffs and already five dingers. He has his vulnerabilities, but he’s also capable of punishing even minor mistakes, like this slider that just wasn’t low enough:
It’s telling that the catcher called for a low slider in the dirt. It’s telling that Baez destroyed the pitch that was ultimately thrown. It’s telling, how Baez has been approached through his first two weeks in the bigs.
Baez’s extraordinary skill is his bat speed. That’s where the power comes from, and people who observe these things give Baez just about the highest of grades. Because of how quick his bat is, Baez should be able to turn on even blistering heat, but his swing his long and complicated in other ways so there’s a simultaneous belief that he could be vulnerable to fastballs in the right spots. People also question Baez’s discipline, as he might commit too early to pitches that end up unhittable. You’d think that, with a hitter like this, pitchers would be careful, and relatively unwilling to enter the zone unless forced.
Now we’ll do some math. Including Monday’s game, Baez has faced 52% fastballs or cutters. The league average is well north of 60%, so Baez is separated from the mean by a couple standard deviations. He’s surrounded by names like Wilin Rosario, Evan Gattis, and Juan Francisco.
And, including Monday’s game, Baez has faced just under 40% pitches in the PITCHf/x strike zone. The league average is close to 50%, so Baez is separated from the mean by almost three standard deviations. He actually has the lowest zone rate in either league. That includes Josh Hamilton, Pedro Alvarez, and the utterly unprotected Giancarlo Stanton.
Let’s put these together. I’ve calculated fastball-rate z scores and zone-rate z scores. Add them up, and the highest positive numbers will indicate players pitchers aren’t afraid of facing. The lowest negative numbers will indicate players pitchers want to pitch around and/or players pitchers think are willing to chase. Baez’s sample is still quite small, but still, here are the five lowest combined z scores:
Josh Hamilton, -5.0
Javier Baez, -4.7
Pedro Alvarez, -4.3
Juan Francisco, -4.1
A.J. Pierzynski, -3.6
This quickly, pitchers have adopted an extreme approach against Javier Baez. It’s one of the most extreme approaches in baseball, in terms of avoiding fastballs and avoiding the strike zone. He’s being pitched not unlike Hamilton, Alvarez, and Francisco, which means Baez arrived with a scouting report already written. It isn’t often rookies get treated like this right away.
Of all the rookie seasons we have recorded since 2008, right now Baez is looking at the most extreme careful approach. Juan Francisco shows up again, as he was pitched a little like this, but let’s compare Baez’s first two weeks to the first two weeks of a handful of other elite-level prospects from the last few years:
Player Fast% Zone%
Bryce Harper 52% 42%
Giancarlo Stanton 57% 47%
Gregory Polanco 60% 48%
Javier Baez 52% 40%
Mike Trout 69% 51%
Oscar Taveras 69% 45%
Wil Myers 54% 52%
Yasiel Puig 67% 48%
The point of comparison here would be to Bryce Harper. Immediately, Harper was pitched carefully, and he didn’t see a lot in the zone. Harper, obviously, was easy to see coming for years, so he had a reputation before he ever arrived. The same goes for Baez, although he and Harper have been pitched differently as rookies in ways more detailed than this overall glimpse. You might’ve expected Puig to get pitched like this when he first debuted, but instead against him pitchers were particularly fastball-happy. Pitchers have continued to try to find ways to consistently get him out, as Puig’s been able to make rapid adjustments.
Baez hasn’t seen many first-pitch fastballs, relative to the league average. He hasn’t seen many fastballs when ahead in the count, relative to the league average. He’s actually seen more fastballs with the pitcher ahead in the count. While Baez has an overall low rate of fastballs seen, he’s among the league leaders in rate of high fastballs seen, as that’s one of the vulnerabilities pitchers have targeted. You might be able to see that in the following chart of Baez’s pitches against:
Plenty of fastballs up and beyond. Plenty of non-fastballs down and beyond. Non-fastballs are generally supposed to be down, but Baez sees a lot of them, and he has been exposed by high heat. Half his strikeouts have come against fastballs and half his strikeouts have come against breaking balls. He’s willing to chase up, and he’s willing to chase down, and that’s something he’s going to need to work on.
But while he’s exhibited those weaknesses, he’s also exhibited an ability to crush well-intentioned pitches that don’t go where they wanted to. If you throw your high fastball, you can blow it by Baez. If you throw your low breaking ball, you can sneak it by Baez. If you don’t throw your high fastball high enough, though, or if you don’t throw your low breaking ball low enough, Baez is going to swing and he’s more likely to connect, and often when Baez connects, he connects in the way that meteorites connect with the surface of Earth. Pitchers are careful because they have to be careful. They have to be careful because Baez’s skills demand respect.
Javier Baez has been in the major leagues for two weeks. Prior to the beginning of those two weeks, there already existed a Javier Baez opposing scouting report, and we’ve seen pitchers follow along, with varying degrees of success. The second half of that statement could apply to just about anyone, but what’s remarkable isn’t just that Baez arrived with a report — it’s that he arrived with a report so extreme in its recommendations. I suppose Javier Baez can be extreme in a number of ways. I suppose that might be the most appropriate thing.
The Return of the Koji Uehara Curveball.
Every pitcher in baseball has a primary pitch, and for almost every pitcher in baseball, that’s going to be some variety of a fastball. After the primary pitch, there will be an assortment of secondary pitches, numbering from one to a lot more than one. But not all secondary stuff is created or treated the same; there can be a trusted secondary pitch, or a decent secondary pitch, or a rare occasional secondary pitch. Clayton Kershaw‘s slider is a trusted secondary pitch. Tony Cingrani‘s slider is a decent secondary pitch. You have to keep your eyes peeled for the occasionals.
Plenty of guys throw them. Let’s look at some examples! Here’s Danny Salazar throwing a terrible curveball:
Here’s Brad Boxberger throwing a better curveball:
Here’s Phil Hughes throwing a rare changeup:
Guys mix things in. C.J. Wilson has toyed around with a knuckleball. Sometimes it’s just a gimmick. Sometimes it’s a test of something a pitcher has been working on in the bullpen. An occasional tends to be just an occasional, but they’re incrementally more exciting than other pitches, and Koji Uehara happens to have an occasional of his own. A year ago Uehara threw three curveballs, and they were written about, as they were his first curves in the majors since moving out of the rotation.
The curve wasn’t a great pitch for Uehara. The curve didn’t need to be a great pitch for Uehara, because he already has one of the best splitters in the world. Last year he threw all three of his curves as the first pitch in at-bats during one-sided games, I guess just to see, and he didn’t try one after July. It wasn’t something that mattered for him, but now I have news that you might care about: Uehara’s curveball has been sighted again. Definitely once, maybe twice, after more than a full year went by.
So we can get right to this. According to Brooks Baseball, Uehara this year has thrown the curve twice. It’s believed he threw his first of the season last Tuesday, against the Reds. Let’s take a look at the pitch:
Well, it doesn’t seem like a curveball. Reasons to believe it was a curve:
first pitch of an at-bat
identified as a curve by Brooks Baseball
Reasons to believe it wasn’t a curve:
one-run game!
unusually fast for an Uehara curve
not identified as a curve in our game log
didn’t move like a curve
What we know, at least, is that the pitch was bad:
And it was neither an Uehara fastball nor an Uehara splitter:
That looks like three fingers, and for Uehara, three fingers means a cutter. Uehara throws a cutter, sometimes, and it does kind of what that pitch did, so the likelihood is that, on August 12, Koji Uehara threw several pitches but zero curving pitches. Yet Uehara pitched again on Saturday. Saturday brought another suspicious pitch.
Brooks Baseball identified this as a curve. Our game log identified this as a curve. The movement and velocity match up with Uehara’s infrequent curves, and you’ve also got this being the first pitch of an at-bat in a lopsided game. As for the sign:
It seems like three fingers, but I’m almost certain it’s four fingers, and we’re forced to stop short of true certainty by pixelation. But it looks like a curveball visually, and it was a pretty good one, for that matter:
For further confirmation, Texas Leaguers comes in handy. From an Uehara 2013 PITCHf/x chart, the outlier curveballs are easy to spot:
Now here’s 2014:
Two pitches are identified as curves, but one of them stands out and the other one of them hangs near the infrequent cutters. They’re separated by six miles per hour, which doesn’t prove their differences — especially given that this isn’t a pitch Uehara has confidence in — but which does strongly suggest them. By the way, because you probably noticed it, that point above the cutters all by itself is a glitch. That’s not a separate Koji Uehara occasional. His occasional is his curveball, and from the evidence it looks like he just threw it for the first time all season on Saturday against the Astros.
Why throw it? I mean, I don’t know — this year, as last year, Uehara doesn’t need the help. He’s not going to figure anything out throwing a pitch once or twice per season. But then, one of the understood keys to happiness is variety from your routines, so toying around with a curveball might work somehow to Uehara’s psychological benefit. To put it simpler: maybe it’s just fun, and, who knows what might happen? What’s the harm, in a lopsided game in a lost season? Last year, Uehara threw a curveball and hit a batter for the first time in his major-league career. He probably didn’t want to leave it like that, so he tried it again later on and got a called strike. Maybe it’s just a very minor side project, and he’s trying to get a whiff. I’m not certain why there are occasionals — I’m just glad there are occasionals.
And the absolute most amazing thing of all? Uehara, for the first time all season, threw a curveball, and he threw it as the first pitch to Dexter Fowler to try to get a surprise strike. Fowler not only swung at the curveball — he made contact, solid contact, and lined out to deep right field. Dexter Fowler got one of the most rare pitches in baseball, and he attacked it and killed it. Which leads one to wonder: will we ever see the Uehara curveball again? On the one hand, we saw it again after the hit-by-pitch. On the other hand, maybe it’s not as surprising as it sounds like it should be. After the previous one worked out, Uehara didn’t try another curve for more than a calendar year. I’m not really sure how many calendar years he has left.
Plenty of guys throw them. Let’s look at some examples! Here’s Danny Salazar throwing a terrible curveball:
Here’s Brad Boxberger throwing a better curveball:
Here’s Phil Hughes throwing a rare changeup:
Guys mix things in. C.J. Wilson has toyed around with a knuckleball. Sometimes it’s just a gimmick. Sometimes it’s a test of something a pitcher has been working on in the bullpen. An occasional tends to be just an occasional, but they’re incrementally more exciting than other pitches, and Koji Uehara happens to have an occasional of his own. A year ago Uehara threw three curveballs, and they were written about, as they were his first curves in the majors since moving out of the rotation.
The curve wasn’t a great pitch for Uehara. The curve didn’t need to be a great pitch for Uehara, because he already has one of the best splitters in the world. Last year he threw all three of his curves as the first pitch in at-bats during one-sided games, I guess just to see, and he didn’t try one after July. It wasn’t something that mattered for him, but now I have news that you might care about: Uehara’s curveball has been sighted again. Definitely once, maybe twice, after more than a full year went by.
So we can get right to this. According to Brooks Baseball, Uehara this year has thrown the curve twice. It’s believed he threw his first of the season last Tuesday, against the Reds. Let’s take a look at the pitch:
Well, it doesn’t seem like a curveball. Reasons to believe it was a curve:
first pitch of an at-bat
identified as a curve by Brooks Baseball
Reasons to believe it wasn’t a curve:
one-run game!
unusually fast for an Uehara curve
not identified as a curve in our game log
didn’t move like a curve
What we know, at least, is that the pitch was bad:
And it was neither an Uehara fastball nor an Uehara splitter:
That looks like three fingers, and for Uehara, three fingers means a cutter. Uehara throws a cutter, sometimes, and it does kind of what that pitch did, so the likelihood is that, on August 12, Koji Uehara threw several pitches but zero curving pitches. Yet Uehara pitched again on Saturday. Saturday brought another suspicious pitch.
Brooks Baseball identified this as a curve. Our game log identified this as a curve. The movement and velocity match up with Uehara’s infrequent curves, and you’ve also got this being the first pitch of an at-bat in a lopsided game. As for the sign:
It seems like three fingers, but I’m almost certain it’s four fingers, and we’re forced to stop short of true certainty by pixelation. But it looks like a curveball visually, and it was a pretty good one, for that matter:
For further confirmation, Texas Leaguers comes in handy. From an Uehara 2013 PITCHf/x chart, the outlier curveballs are easy to spot:
Now here’s 2014:
Two pitches are identified as curves, but one of them stands out and the other one of them hangs near the infrequent cutters. They’re separated by six miles per hour, which doesn’t prove their differences — especially given that this isn’t a pitch Uehara has confidence in — but which does strongly suggest them. By the way, because you probably noticed it, that point above the cutters all by itself is a glitch. That’s not a separate Koji Uehara occasional. His occasional is his curveball, and from the evidence it looks like he just threw it for the first time all season on Saturday against the Astros.
Why throw it? I mean, I don’t know — this year, as last year, Uehara doesn’t need the help. He’s not going to figure anything out throwing a pitch once or twice per season. But then, one of the understood keys to happiness is variety from your routines, so toying around with a curveball might work somehow to Uehara’s psychological benefit. To put it simpler: maybe it’s just fun, and, who knows what might happen? What’s the harm, in a lopsided game in a lost season? Last year, Uehara threw a curveball and hit a batter for the first time in his major-league career. He probably didn’t want to leave it like that, so he tried it again later on and got a called strike. Maybe it’s just a very minor side project, and he’s trying to get a whiff. I’m not certain why there are occasionals — I’m just glad there are occasionals.
And the absolute most amazing thing of all? Uehara, for the first time all season, threw a curveball, and he threw it as the first pitch to Dexter Fowler to try to get a surprise strike. Fowler not only swung at the curveball — he made contact, solid contact, and lined out to deep right field. Dexter Fowler got one of the most rare pitches in baseball, and he attacked it and killed it. Which leads one to wonder: will we ever see the Uehara curveball again? On the one hand, we saw it again after the hit-by-pitch. On the other hand, maybe it’s not as surprising as it sounds like it should be. After the previous one worked out, Uehara didn’t try another curve for more than a calendar year. I’m not really sure how many calendar years he has left.
Mike Trout’s Other Slump.
Several unusual things happened in Sunday afternoon’s game in Arlington between the Rangers and Angels. Firstly, Huston Street blew a save, his first as an Angel. Second, Mike Trout got a hit, his first in 18 at bats as he suffers through the second prolonged slump of his otherwise Troutishly MVP-calibre season. Thirdly, Trout was caught stealing for the first time in 2014.
Given Trout’s recent inexperience in reaching base safely, one might understand his urgency to make something happen for the first time in a week. Which also explains why Rangers starter Nick Tepesch had an eye on the Angels’ centerfielder, promptly picking him off first base.
Though it wasn’t a straight steal of second base, it counts as just his 13th stolen base attempt and first unsuccessful try – that’s ten fewer than noted speedster and fellow New Jersey native Todd Frazier. A number difficult to believe for a player who gets on base 40% of the time and also successfully swiped 82 bases over the two previous seasons.
The lack of stolen bases highlights a soft spot in Trout’s game this year – he hasn’t been a particularly valuable base runner. One of the fastest players (and hardest runners) in the league, Trout’s work with his feet rates as a single run above average this season, a far cry from the two Wins he added on the base paths between 2012 and 2013. In each of those years, Trout added five runs by advancing extra bases when the ball was in play while the weighted stolen base metric values and reflects his efficient theft accordingly. This season, his UBR is essentially zero.
Given his speed, reputation, and the sheer volume of his opportunities (only four players reached base safely more than Trout this season), this result is somewhat shocking. Why is Trout suddenly less effective on the bases? Or, is Trout actually less effective on the bases, or is this just expected and normal variance?
As far as the stolen bases go, there are countless theories. Both Albert Pujols, who slots behind Trout in the Angels’ order most nights, and manager Mike Scioscia swear up and down it has nothing to do with the lumbering power hitter. One theory suggests he forced pitchers throughout the league to improve their times to the plate to keep him in check. Additionally, Trout’s been on the front end of 18 different Pujols GIDP. At the very least, it puts a significant damper on his chances to get out and run.
Explaining away a lack of stolen base urgency/opportunity is one thing, trying to understand a lack of aggressiveness when moving around on the bases on batted balls is another. Searching for answers is difficult as only the runner himself knows what kind of read he got on the ball and when or where he might have hesitated. Just as pitchers can take steps to slow his progress, outside forces beyond just his own speed can slow Trout’s progress towards the plate.
Baseball Reference tracks extra bases taken and it has Trout grabbing an extra 90 feet 56% of the time this year, down from 59% in 2013 and 65% in 2012. He’s already made five outs on the bases, the same total as 2013 but in fewer games and times on base. He scored from second base on a single 60% of the time this year, down from 75% in 2013 and 69% in 2012.
The most telling number might be his rate of scoring from first on doubles. League average in this situation sits at 41% in 2014, yet Trout has scored just twice in six tries. In his rookie campaign, Trout scored from first on doubles an amazing seven times out of eleven chances. All six opportunities came with Pujols supplying the extra base power, but they are not all created equally.
Via the magic of MLB.tv and Baseball Savant, looking back at these individual plays is simple enough. On July 29th, Pujols hit a ground rule double, keeping Trout at third against his will. A hometown scorer’s double on August 7th clouds our view, as Pujols lined the ball to left field and Dodgers’ left fielder Scott Van Slyke dropped it and threw to third base, allowing Albert to move up to second. It could easily go down as a single and error on Van Slyke, allowing Trout off the hook.
Against Cleveland in April, Pujols hit a high double off the wall with one out that might have been caught, forcing Trout to bide his time between first and second before motoring into third.
Credit Michael Bourn for planting the seed of doubt in the mind of the base runner or admonish Trout for failing to read Pujols’ liner as a sure hit, it’s up to you. The fourth instance of Trout failing to score on a double came Sunday afternoon against the Rangers.
The strangest part of yesterday’s first-to-third on a double was Trout took off running on the pitch. We know Trout picks his spots to run. Late in a one-run ballgame against a weaker opponent, Trout saw an opportunity to grab his team an extra bag so he took off on an 0-1 pitch from recently inserted-reliever Shawn Tolleson.
Trout broke for second and Pujols smashed Tolleson’s pitch off the wall in left field. Trout has to score, right? Enter Rougned Odor and Elvis Andrus.
The Rangers infield tandem went to work on Trout, turning a phantom double play that reached into the deepest recesses of the superstar’s mind. Pay special attention to the upper left corner of this GIF and notice Andrus, a seasoned practitioner of “goofy on-field antics,” gets in on the action by feigning a throw to start the imaginary double play Trout so eagerly attempts breaking up.
This is the 8th inning of a tight game and it cost the Angels a run – a key run as they went on to lose 3-2 when Street lost the ability to get anybody out for the day. It was a huge play in the game, one for which Odor and Andrus deserve a lot of credit.
Interestingly enough, one of the instances in which Trout did score from first on a double was very similar to this one. It was the infamous “eight inning arrow” comeback against Fernando Rodney and the Mariners. Trout slid into second base on a steal attempt, only to realize Pujols’ double was rattling around the right-field corner. Trout got on his horse and scored the tying run in a big game for both teams.
These examples aren’t meant to absolve Trout of any guilt in making base running blunders as much to suggest that base running, like fielding, is difficult to measure accurately no matter how granular we get. Chances are not distributed equally and there are obvious factors ignored by our rudimentary measures, which remain subject to the cruel fluctuations of chance and opportunity.
Trout hasn’t taken advantage on the bases as we expect him to, as his opposition adjusts and does whatever it can to neutralize his weapons. Trout’s numbers on the bases “suffer” this year because of a few key plays – some his doing and some not. He’s still a force of nature on the base paths requiring specific game planning by his opponents. But until he starts running as he did in the past and moving around the diamond as we expect, the defense holds the advantage.
Given Trout’s recent inexperience in reaching base safely, one might understand his urgency to make something happen for the first time in a week. Which also explains why Rangers starter Nick Tepesch had an eye on the Angels’ centerfielder, promptly picking him off first base.
Though it wasn’t a straight steal of second base, it counts as just his 13th stolen base attempt and first unsuccessful try – that’s ten fewer than noted speedster and fellow New Jersey native Todd Frazier. A number difficult to believe for a player who gets on base 40% of the time and also successfully swiped 82 bases over the two previous seasons.
The lack of stolen bases highlights a soft spot in Trout’s game this year – he hasn’t been a particularly valuable base runner. One of the fastest players (and hardest runners) in the league, Trout’s work with his feet rates as a single run above average this season, a far cry from the two Wins he added on the base paths between 2012 and 2013. In each of those years, Trout added five runs by advancing extra bases when the ball was in play while the weighted stolen base metric values and reflects his efficient theft accordingly. This season, his UBR is essentially zero.
Given his speed, reputation, and the sheer volume of his opportunities (only four players reached base safely more than Trout this season), this result is somewhat shocking. Why is Trout suddenly less effective on the bases? Or, is Trout actually less effective on the bases, or is this just expected and normal variance?
As far as the stolen bases go, there are countless theories. Both Albert Pujols, who slots behind Trout in the Angels’ order most nights, and manager Mike Scioscia swear up and down it has nothing to do with the lumbering power hitter. One theory suggests he forced pitchers throughout the league to improve their times to the plate to keep him in check. Additionally, Trout’s been on the front end of 18 different Pujols GIDP. At the very least, it puts a significant damper on his chances to get out and run.
Explaining away a lack of stolen base urgency/opportunity is one thing, trying to understand a lack of aggressiveness when moving around on the bases on batted balls is another. Searching for answers is difficult as only the runner himself knows what kind of read he got on the ball and when or where he might have hesitated. Just as pitchers can take steps to slow his progress, outside forces beyond just his own speed can slow Trout’s progress towards the plate.
Baseball Reference tracks extra bases taken and it has Trout grabbing an extra 90 feet 56% of the time this year, down from 59% in 2013 and 65% in 2012. He’s already made five outs on the bases, the same total as 2013 but in fewer games and times on base. He scored from second base on a single 60% of the time this year, down from 75% in 2013 and 69% in 2012.
The most telling number might be his rate of scoring from first on doubles. League average in this situation sits at 41% in 2014, yet Trout has scored just twice in six tries. In his rookie campaign, Trout scored from first on doubles an amazing seven times out of eleven chances. All six opportunities came with Pujols supplying the extra base power, but they are not all created equally.
Via the magic of MLB.tv and Baseball Savant, looking back at these individual plays is simple enough. On July 29th, Pujols hit a ground rule double, keeping Trout at third against his will. A hometown scorer’s double on August 7th clouds our view, as Pujols lined the ball to left field and Dodgers’ left fielder Scott Van Slyke dropped it and threw to third base, allowing Albert to move up to second. It could easily go down as a single and error on Van Slyke, allowing Trout off the hook.
Against Cleveland in April, Pujols hit a high double off the wall with one out that might have been caught, forcing Trout to bide his time between first and second before motoring into third.
Credit Michael Bourn for planting the seed of doubt in the mind of the base runner or admonish Trout for failing to read Pujols’ liner as a sure hit, it’s up to you. The fourth instance of Trout failing to score on a double came Sunday afternoon against the Rangers.
The strangest part of yesterday’s first-to-third on a double was Trout took off running on the pitch. We know Trout picks his spots to run. Late in a one-run ballgame against a weaker opponent, Trout saw an opportunity to grab his team an extra bag so he took off on an 0-1 pitch from recently inserted-reliever Shawn Tolleson.
Trout broke for second and Pujols smashed Tolleson’s pitch off the wall in left field. Trout has to score, right? Enter Rougned Odor and Elvis Andrus.
The Rangers infield tandem went to work on Trout, turning a phantom double play that reached into the deepest recesses of the superstar’s mind. Pay special attention to the upper left corner of this GIF and notice Andrus, a seasoned practitioner of “goofy on-field antics,” gets in on the action by feigning a throw to start the imaginary double play Trout so eagerly attempts breaking up.
This is the 8th inning of a tight game and it cost the Angels a run – a key run as they went on to lose 3-2 when Street lost the ability to get anybody out for the day. It was a huge play in the game, one for which Odor and Andrus deserve a lot of credit.
Interestingly enough, one of the instances in which Trout did score from first on a double was very similar to this one. It was the infamous “eight inning arrow” comeback against Fernando Rodney and the Mariners. Trout slid into second base on a steal attempt, only to realize Pujols’ double was rattling around the right-field corner. Trout got on his horse and scored the tying run in a big game for both teams.
These examples aren’t meant to absolve Trout of any guilt in making base running blunders as much to suggest that base running, like fielding, is difficult to measure accurately no matter how granular we get. Chances are not distributed equally and there are obvious factors ignored by our rudimentary measures, which remain subject to the cruel fluctuations of chance and opportunity.
Trout hasn’t taken advantage on the bases as we expect him to, as his opposition adjusts and does whatever it can to neutralize his weapons. Trout’s numbers on the bases “suffer” this year because of a few key plays – some his doing and some not. He’s still a force of nature on the base paths requiring specific game planning by his opponents. But until he starts running as he did in the past and moving around the diamond as we expect, the defense holds the advantage.
Brian McCann Probably Couldn’t Be Given Away For Free.
The August waiver period can be an interesting time, because it gives you a little bit of insight into how teams around the bigs value certain players. For example, it came as absolutely no surprise that the overpriced and under-performing Carl Crawford and Andre Ethier made it through waivers, or that Cole Hamels, Bryce Harper and Stephen Strasburg did not. It came as a bit of a surprise that Jon Niese did get through, which maybe tells you something about how other teams view his shoulder and that he’s perhaps not as valuable as Mets fans seemed to think; if the worst-case scenario is that the Mets stick you with the $16 million he has left after this year and still nobody was interested, that’s not a great sign.
For guys like Crawford, Ethier and others, their contracts were signed years ago, and obviously much has changed since then, so it’s most interesting to see how the industry reacts to players who were popular free agents just last winter, a mere eight months or so ago. While obviously not every roster move or claim is public, we know of at least one: Curtis Granderson, who signed for four years and $60 million with the Mets. Even with the desperate need for offense around the majors, Granderson, on pace for only a two-win season despite a rebound from a slow start, went unclaimed. At 33, two years off his last good season and three years away from his last great one, the risk wasn’t worth it.
This isn’t about Granderson, though; it’s about one of the other major New York signings from last winter who is off to an atrocious start in his new home and has a considerable amount of money still coming: Brian McCann, who returned from a stay on the concussion list yesterday. We don’t know if McCann has been put on waivers or if anyone would put in a claim — you imagine a rich team with catching issues like the Dodgers would at least think about it, though not necessarily do it — but isn’t it fascinating to think that if someone did claim him, the Yankees might be best off just letting him go?
I don’t even mean a trade, because McCann has a full no-trade clause, along with $68 million coming his way between 2015-18, $17 million each year. (Plus a potential 2019 $15 million option that becomes a player option if certain playing time incentives are hit.) I mean just a straight “you take him, we don’t want him any longer.” It’s not likely to happen for a variety of reasons, but the main reason is that it would require a team to actually put in a claim on him, and who can really see that happening? Almost no one. The all but certain outcome of the Yankees putting him on waivers would be 29 other teams saying, “thanks, but no thanks.”
To illustrate the depths of McCann’s struggles a bit, here he is, compared to another American League catcher:
PA BA OBP SLG BB% K% wRC+ WAR
McCann 406 .235 .291 .380 6.4 14.5 85 1.2
Catcher 2 361 .242 .303 .367 6.4 34.3 86 1.3
With the exception of the huge difference in strikeouts, these two are essentially the same player in 2014. The other catcher? Chicago’s Tyler Flowers, hardly anyone’s idea of a star. You’ll note, also, that of the 28 catchers with at least 250 plate appearances, these two rank 25th and 26th in wRC+. One of the two behind them, A.J. Pierzynski, was already DFA’d this year.
It’s not good company to be in, but let’s look a little deeper at that comparison, specifically how McCann has managed to make so much more contact than Flowers and still end up with the same production. Here’s one reason why: McCann has a .247 BABIP. Last year, it was .261. Two years ago, it was .234. Looking at his career average of .286, it seems like that’s below his normals, but looking at his last three years, it seems like the new normal. That he had a .332 mark back in 2006 doesn’t seem to hold a lot of relevance now, is the point.
Much has been made of McCann and his issues facing the shift, and that’s true to an extent. Just look at the list of the hitters with the worst batting averages on grounders:
5) David Ortiz, .153
4) McCann, .145
3) Ryan Howard, .143
2) Mark Teixeira, .138
1) Mike Moustakas, .111
Slow lefty pull hitters get shifted on, and that turns balls that may have been hits years ago into outs. News at 11, right? Except, there’s only so much blame to be put on the shift in McCann’s troubles, because this isn’t a new thing. McCann was among the most-heavily shifted players last year, too. He was among the most shifted players in 2010-11. There’s evidence that he’s seeing it more, now, but the shift alone hardly explains his up-and-down last five years of three very similar good seasons (2010, ’11, ’13, all with wRC+ 121-123) and two poor years (2012, ruined by a shoulder injury, and ’14, with wRC+ of 85 and 87). He’s always been shifted on. It’s overly simplistic to put it all on that.
Besides, McCann has been doing what he can to avoid it. His grounder rate of 33.0% is easily the lowest of his career, and he’s hit the ball in play to the opposite field 77 times after having done so only 58 times last year and 74 times in 2011, skipping the shortened 2012. He’s actually in the top 15 as far as lefty hitters going the other way; last year, he didn’t appear in the top 65. McCann is making a concerted effort to beat the shift, and it’s still not really working.
Well, there’s a few things. First, here’s an incredibly depressing list of numbers:
13.1 — 10.8 — 9.0 — 9.7 — 6.4
You don’t know what those are. I’ll tell you what they are. They’re McCann’s walk rate, declining pretty steadily from 2010 until now, where it’s less than half what it was, and this is sort of the thing: McCann’s lousy year isn’t any one thing. It’s a few small things, adding up. Giving back 30 or so free trips to first base isn’t fatal by itself, but it certainly isn’t helping. It’s not why his batting average is lousy, obviously; it is a part of why his OBP is below .300.
There’s also this: McCann’s power, which everyone figured would translate well to the short right field porch at Yankee Stadium, hasn’t come with him. It’s actually less that he’s failed to take advantage of right field in the Bronx, and more that it’s been the only thing making his homer totals look even respectable. Below, McCann’s spray chart, with only the home runs shown:
Every single one is out to right field; all but two are at Yankee Stadium. Per Hit Tracker, just one, off Craig Breslow in June, was a “no-doubter.” Only two had a “true distance” of more than 400 feet, and three of them wouldn’t have made it out of at least 27 other parks. If Yankee Stadium wasn’t his home, he might have about as many home runs as Billy Hamilton.
So there’s the conundrum, really. If McCann pulls the ball, he’ll hit into the shift far too much and generate outs. If he tries to play it smart and go to the opposite field, as he’s been trying to do this year, he won’t hit for nearly as much power, because hitting opposite field homers is generally pretty difficult for most hitters — especially a guy like McCann, who has pulled 151 of his 189 career homers. In years past, he could hit it over the shift. Now, perhaps still feeling the effects of that shoulder injury, it simply hasn’t happened.
To his credit, McCann appears to be trying to adapt, not only by going the other way, but by changing his mechanics to eliminate a toe tap from his swing in June, which has had some effect, but not enough of one. And it’s not all bad, of course, because McCann is still viewed as a positive pitch framer, and that’s not without value.
Unfortunately, McCann will need to improve considerably just to get back to being a league-average hitter, and even with how difficult it is to find offense from behind the plate, that’s not exactly what the Yankees were hoping for when they invested so much in him over the winter. A roughly two-win player, which is what he’s been for the last few years, is nice to have. It’s hard to justify that for the contract he has, though, and to get back to the original point: no, of course he’ll make it through waivers unclaimed. Leaving the Yankees wouldn’t change the shift tendencies he’s seeing; it would just take away that right field safety net. McCann and the Yankees are going to be together for a while, it seems, for better or — perhaps more likely — worse.
For guys like Crawford, Ethier and others, their contracts were signed years ago, and obviously much has changed since then, so it’s most interesting to see how the industry reacts to players who were popular free agents just last winter, a mere eight months or so ago. While obviously not every roster move or claim is public, we know of at least one: Curtis Granderson, who signed for four years and $60 million with the Mets. Even with the desperate need for offense around the majors, Granderson, on pace for only a two-win season despite a rebound from a slow start, went unclaimed. At 33, two years off his last good season and three years away from his last great one, the risk wasn’t worth it.
This isn’t about Granderson, though; it’s about one of the other major New York signings from last winter who is off to an atrocious start in his new home and has a considerable amount of money still coming: Brian McCann, who returned from a stay on the concussion list yesterday. We don’t know if McCann has been put on waivers or if anyone would put in a claim — you imagine a rich team with catching issues like the Dodgers would at least think about it, though not necessarily do it — but isn’t it fascinating to think that if someone did claim him, the Yankees might be best off just letting him go?
I don’t even mean a trade, because McCann has a full no-trade clause, along with $68 million coming his way between 2015-18, $17 million each year. (Plus a potential 2019 $15 million option that becomes a player option if certain playing time incentives are hit.) I mean just a straight “you take him, we don’t want him any longer.” It’s not likely to happen for a variety of reasons, but the main reason is that it would require a team to actually put in a claim on him, and who can really see that happening? Almost no one. The all but certain outcome of the Yankees putting him on waivers would be 29 other teams saying, “thanks, but no thanks.”
To illustrate the depths of McCann’s struggles a bit, here he is, compared to another American League catcher:
PA BA OBP SLG BB% K% wRC+ WAR
McCann 406 .235 .291 .380 6.4 14.5 85 1.2
Catcher 2 361 .242 .303 .367 6.4 34.3 86 1.3
With the exception of the huge difference in strikeouts, these two are essentially the same player in 2014. The other catcher? Chicago’s Tyler Flowers, hardly anyone’s idea of a star. You’ll note, also, that of the 28 catchers with at least 250 plate appearances, these two rank 25th and 26th in wRC+. One of the two behind them, A.J. Pierzynski, was already DFA’d this year.
It’s not good company to be in, but let’s look a little deeper at that comparison, specifically how McCann has managed to make so much more contact than Flowers and still end up with the same production. Here’s one reason why: McCann has a .247 BABIP. Last year, it was .261. Two years ago, it was .234. Looking at his career average of .286, it seems like that’s below his normals, but looking at his last three years, it seems like the new normal. That he had a .332 mark back in 2006 doesn’t seem to hold a lot of relevance now, is the point.
Much has been made of McCann and his issues facing the shift, and that’s true to an extent. Just look at the list of the hitters with the worst batting averages on grounders:
5) David Ortiz, .153
4) McCann, .145
3) Ryan Howard, .143
2) Mark Teixeira, .138
1) Mike Moustakas, .111
Slow lefty pull hitters get shifted on, and that turns balls that may have been hits years ago into outs. News at 11, right? Except, there’s only so much blame to be put on the shift in McCann’s troubles, because this isn’t a new thing. McCann was among the most-heavily shifted players last year, too. He was among the most shifted players in 2010-11. There’s evidence that he’s seeing it more, now, but the shift alone hardly explains his up-and-down last five years of three very similar good seasons (2010, ’11, ’13, all with wRC+ 121-123) and two poor years (2012, ruined by a shoulder injury, and ’14, with wRC+ of 85 and 87). He’s always been shifted on. It’s overly simplistic to put it all on that.
Besides, McCann has been doing what he can to avoid it. His grounder rate of 33.0% is easily the lowest of his career, and he’s hit the ball in play to the opposite field 77 times after having done so only 58 times last year and 74 times in 2011, skipping the shortened 2012. He’s actually in the top 15 as far as lefty hitters going the other way; last year, he didn’t appear in the top 65. McCann is making a concerted effort to beat the shift, and it’s still not really working.
Well, there’s a few things. First, here’s an incredibly depressing list of numbers:
13.1 — 10.8 — 9.0 — 9.7 — 6.4
You don’t know what those are. I’ll tell you what they are. They’re McCann’s walk rate, declining pretty steadily from 2010 until now, where it’s less than half what it was, and this is sort of the thing: McCann’s lousy year isn’t any one thing. It’s a few small things, adding up. Giving back 30 or so free trips to first base isn’t fatal by itself, but it certainly isn’t helping. It’s not why his batting average is lousy, obviously; it is a part of why his OBP is below .300.
There’s also this: McCann’s power, which everyone figured would translate well to the short right field porch at Yankee Stadium, hasn’t come with him. It’s actually less that he’s failed to take advantage of right field in the Bronx, and more that it’s been the only thing making his homer totals look even respectable. Below, McCann’s spray chart, with only the home runs shown:
Every single one is out to right field; all but two are at Yankee Stadium. Per Hit Tracker, just one, off Craig Breslow in June, was a “no-doubter.” Only two had a “true distance” of more than 400 feet, and three of them wouldn’t have made it out of at least 27 other parks. If Yankee Stadium wasn’t his home, he might have about as many home runs as Billy Hamilton.
So there’s the conundrum, really. If McCann pulls the ball, he’ll hit into the shift far too much and generate outs. If he tries to play it smart and go to the opposite field, as he’s been trying to do this year, he won’t hit for nearly as much power, because hitting opposite field homers is generally pretty difficult for most hitters — especially a guy like McCann, who has pulled 151 of his 189 career homers. In years past, he could hit it over the shift. Now, perhaps still feeling the effects of that shoulder injury, it simply hasn’t happened.
To his credit, McCann appears to be trying to adapt, not only by going the other way, but by changing his mechanics to eliminate a toe tap from his swing in June, which has had some effect, but not enough of one. And it’s not all bad, of course, because McCann is still viewed as a positive pitch framer, and that’s not without value.
Unfortunately, McCann will need to improve considerably just to get back to being a league-average hitter, and even with how difficult it is to find offense from behind the plate, that’s not exactly what the Yankees were hoping for when they invested so much in him over the winter. A roughly two-win player, which is what he’s been for the last few years, is nice to have. It’s hard to justify that for the contract he has, though, and to get back to the original point: no, of course he’ll make it through waivers unclaimed. Leaving the Yankees wouldn’t change the shift tendencies he’s seeing; it would just take away that right field safety net. McCann and the Yankees are going to be together for a while, it seems, for better or — perhaps more likely — worse.
Good article on Alex Gordon and what you should do/how you should treat WAR.
For most of the last few years, if you clicked on the Leaderboards tab here on FanGraphs, you’d find Mike Trout‘s name at the very top. Today, that is not the case, as Trout has been surpassed in 2014-to-date WAR, slipping to #2 for the first time since late April. That isn’t necessarily controversial in and of itself, as it’s not that unusual for the best overall player in the game to not rate at the top of the WAR leaderboards every season, but what is somewhat controversial is the name of the player who has usurped Trout at the top of the list at this moment.
Alex Gordon, you see, is not exactly what most people think of as a superstar. He’s a corner outfielder who is hitting .286 with 13 home runs. Among 153 qualified Major League hitters this season, he’s ranked 36th in batting average, 32nd in on-base percentage, and 53rd in slugging percentage. Even using wOBA as a better evaluator of overall offensive performance, his .357 wOBA puts him in a tie for 33rd with Neil Walker and Jayson Werth. Add in park effects, and his wRC+ of 128 falls to 39th. As a hitter, he’s basically having the same season as Matt Kemp. This is the batting profile of the guy who currently leads all position players in WAR, and for many, that simply highlights the limitations of the model.
Even sabermetrically-inclined writers who live in Kanas City think this is weird.
Love Alex Gordon as a player. A legitimate star. The idea that he's the best player in baseball this year is absurd: http://t.co/Q6Vx9l2L00
— Jeff Passan (@JeffPassan) August 18, 2014
Passan, it should be noted, is arguing against a strawman, since I haven’t seen a single person argue that Alex Gordon is “the best player in baseball this year.” For one, even if you used WAR as the sole basis for determining “best player in baseball” — and you shouldn’t do that — then the answer would be Felix Hernandez (+6.2 WAR, a half-win ahead of Gordon), so the most aggressive argument you could make is that WAR has Gordon as the best position player so far.
But really, even that is a far too aggressive interpretation, since no one has ever rationally argued that WAR is precise to the decimal point. The reality is that WAR has always been best used for grouping players of similar levels of contribution, not for arguing that a 0.1 WAR difference means that Player X is having a better year than Player Y. No one actually argues for using WAR as a precise tool to measure minuscule differences. I’d suggest that what WAR is actually saying is that Alex Gordon, so far, is having one of the best seasons of any position player in baseball this year, and I don’t think that statement is at all absurd.
First, let’s start with just the less controversial offensive component, since we already went through his hitting numbers. We noted that by wRC+, Gordon ranks just 39th among MLB hitters this season, but then again, hitting isn’t the only way to produce offensive value. We know that players convert their number of times on base into runs at different rates, and that having Jarrod Dyson reach is more likely to lead to a run for the Royals than if Billy Butler reaches.
Gordon isn’t Dyson, but he is a very good baserunner, having taken 11 extra bases and only making two outs in the process this year. Once you combine baserunning value with hitting value, we find Gordon ranks 22nd in Offensive Runs Above Average this year, better than his raw hitting marks would suggest. He’s still more of a good offensive player than a great one, but simply looking at his BA/OBP/SLG marks will undersell his contributions to run scoring.
But, of course, that isn’t why Gordon ranks #1 in position player WAR at the moment. He ranks at the top because he’s #3 in MLB in Defensive Runs Above Average, coming in at +17 runs relative to a neutral defensive player. People are rightfully more skeptical of defensive metrics than they are of offensive metrics, and we absolutely have more uncertainty surrounding Gordon’s defensive performance this year than we do his offensive performance. But rather than saying that the defensive component rating Gordon as an elite player is absurd, we should instead ask what the magnitude of the measurement error might actually be, and how that should affect our view of his performance overall.
After all, Gordon isn’t exactly a defensive schlub. He moved to left field full time in 2011, and has won a Gold Glove in every season since. While there are all kinds of problems with the Gold Glove voting, Major League managers very quickly adapted to Gordon as a terrific defensive outfielder, so this isn’t just a trust-the-numbers-over-the-eyes situation. By the Fans Scouting Report, Gordon rated as an 82 last year, the fourth best mark of any player in the entire league. People who watch Alex Gordon play defense regularly think Alex Gordon is really good at defense, so we shouldn’t be too terribly surprised that Alex Gordon ranks as a very good defender.
But this is absolutely an outlier season for him in terms of UZR, which is the defensive component of WAR. Since moving to left field full time in 2011, here are Gordon’s UZR/150 numbers:
2011: +12
2012: +12
2013: +7
2014: +27
Over the last three years, Gordon has rated as a very good defensive left fielder, rating about 10 runs per season better than the average left fielder. This year, he’s pushing close to 30 runs better than the average left fielder, which is why he ranks #1 in WAR right now and he never has before. Alex Gordon is clearly not a true talent +27 defender in left field, and some skepticism about that number is entirely justified.
But again, let’s keep in mind that even a normal Alex Gordon defensive rating would still rank him as one of the best players in baseball this year. Since moving to left field full time in 2011, he’s ranked as +30 runs above an average defensive player, which includes the positional adjustment. Even if we put no weight on more recent data and simply use a straight average of the total, we’d expect him to have a defensive rating around +6 or +7 right now; instead, he’s at +17, meaning that the bump in defensive rating this year has given him credit for about 10 extra runs, or about one win.
Subtract a win off Gordon’s total, and instead of ranking #1 in seasonal WAR to date, he falls all the way to a tie for #9. That’s the magnitude of the difference. Using an overly regressed defensive assumption, Gordon is still a top 10 position player in Major League Baseball this year. If you were a bit more reasonable in your regression and weighted recent performance more heavily than past performance, you’d end up with a weighted average defensive value of closer to +9, and Gordon would again find himself in the top five among position players in Major League Baseball.
And here’s the thing; there is absolutely no reason to assume that defensive performance is more static than offensive performance. In fact, there are all kinds of reasons to believe the exact opposite, and to expect fluctuations in defensive performance of a greater degree than we find in offensive performance.
We all generally understand that performance variance decreases as sample sizes get larger, and not just on defense. Batting average over a full season is more credible than batting average over a month’s worth of games played. We don’t freak out when Josh Harrison leads the NL in wRC+ over the last 30 days, as he does now, as we know that stuff like that happens, even with metrics with very minimal measurement error.
And the reality is that one of the primary reasons why offensive statistics are more reliable is simply because the samples are larger. Over the course of a season, an everyday player will bat 600 to 700 times, allowing much of the small sample variance to wash out in the end. On the other hand, even a very good left fielder like Gordon averages about 300 putouts per year, and most of those are routine plays that any ambulatory Major Leaguer could have made, so they have no real effect on his defensive rating.
According to the Inside Edge data here on the site, 71% of the balls hit in Gordon’s direction this year have been “Routine”, meaning that they are converted into outs 90-100% of the time. Gordon has converted 99.6% of those plays, so even that range is likely too large. These are routine pop flies that basically everyone catches. In addition, another 42 plays have been labeled “Impossible”, meaning that no one ever catches balls hit at that location, angle, and velocity. That leaves just 53 plays this season ranging somewhere between “Remote” (1-10% chance of conversion) and “Likely” (60-90%), and those are the plays that determine 100% of defensive rating.
We’re really talking about evaluating a player based on his performance on something like 50 marginal plays throughout the course of the season. It would be ludicrous to expect performance over an N of 50 to be the same every single trial, especially when the result of the play made or not made has such a large swing in run value. Making a catch on one of these marginal plays in the outfield is often times the difference between saving an extra base hit or making an out, and the gap in run value between a double or a triple and an out is worth more than a full run. With just a few 50/50 balls going one way or another, a player’s defensive performance in runs saved can vary dramatically.
Think of defensive performance as similar to home run rate. If a player hits a ball one foot shy of the wall, he makes an out; if he hits one foot beyond the wall, he creates at least one and often times more than one run for his team. A very small difference in a player’s swing can have a very big difference in the outcome, and we’re not that surprised when we see things like Chris Davis‘ HR total going from 33 to 53 to 21 over the course of the last three years. When dealing with samples this size and high magnitudes of difference for an out versus a non-out, we should rationally expect fluctuations. Single year blips may be correct, or they may not be — we don’t know for sure — but deciding that a player’s defensive rating is incorrect because it fluctuates from his prior history is a very flawed way of thinking. The cliche is wrong; defense can slump just like anything.
There is absolutely an argument to be made that Gordon’s UZR may be incorrect — though interestingly, people only ever seem to assume that numbers are too extreme, ignoring the possibility that the measurement error could also mean that his defensive rating might be too low — and if you were trying to answer the question of who “the best player in baseball” is, you’d definitely want to use multi-season regressed defensive numbers. But even using those kinds of calculations, there’s no way to get Alex Gordon out of the top 5-10 position players in MLB this year. The only “absurd” argument would be that Gordon hasn’t been one of the best players in baseball this year.
The very best? WAR can’t tell you that. But the good news is that it’s not trying to. What WAR is trying to tell you, though, is that Alex Gordon is having a great season, and you should accept that conclusion even without putting as much faith in defensive metrics as you do in offensive ones.
Alex Gordon, you see, is not exactly what most people think of as a superstar. He’s a corner outfielder who is hitting .286 with 13 home runs. Among 153 qualified Major League hitters this season, he’s ranked 36th in batting average, 32nd in on-base percentage, and 53rd in slugging percentage. Even using wOBA as a better evaluator of overall offensive performance, his .357 wOBA puts him in a tie for 33rd with Neil Walker and Jayson Werth. Add in park effects, and his wRC+ of 128 falls to 39th. As a hitter, he’s basically having the same season as Matt Kemp. This is the batting profile of the guy who currently leads all position players in WAR, and for many, that simply highlights the limitations of the model.
Even sabermetrically-inclined writers who live in Kanas City think this is weird.
Love Alex Gordon as a player. A legitimate star. The idea that he's the best player in baseball this year is absurd: http://t.co/Q6Vx9l2L00
— Jeff Passan (@JeffPassan) August 18, 2014
Passan, it should be noted, is arguing against a strawman, since I haven’t seen a single person argue that Alex Gordon is “the best player in baseball this year.” For one, even if you used WAR as the sole basis for determining “best player in baseball” — and you shouldn’t do that — then the answer would be Felix Hernandez (+6.2 WAR, a half-win ahead of Gordon), so the most aggressive argument you could make is that WAR has Gordon as the best position player so far.
But really, even that is a far too aggressive interpretation, since no one has ever rationally argued that WAR is precise to the decimal point. The reality is that WAR has always been best used for grouping players of similar levels of contribution, not for arguing that a 0.1 WAR difference means that Player X is having a better year than Player Y. No one actually argues for using WAR as a precise tool to measure minuscule differences. I’d suggest that what WAR is actually saying is that Alex Gordon, so far, is having one of the best seasons of any position player in baseball this year, and I don’t think that statement is at all absurd.
First, let’s start with just the less controversial offensive component, since we already went through his hitting numbers. We noted that by wRC+, Gordon ranks just 39th among MLB hitters this season, but then again, hitting isn’t the only way to produce offensive value. We know that players convert their number of times on base into runs at different rates, and that having Jarrod Dyson reach is more likely to lead to a run for the Royals than if Billy Butler reaches.
Gordon isn’t Dyson, but he is a very good baserunner, having taken 11 extra bases and only making two outs in the process this year. Once you combine baserunning value with hitting value, we find Gordon ranks 22nd in Offensive Runs Above Average this year, better than his raw hitting marks would suggest. He’s still more of a good offensive player than a great one, but simply looking at his BA/OBP/SLG marks will undersell his contributions to run scoring.
But, of course, that isn’t why Gordon ranks #1 in position player WAR at the moment. He ranks at the top because he’s #3 in MLB in Defensive Runs Above Average, coming in at +17 runs relative to a neutral defensive player. People are rightfully more skeptical of defensive metrics than they are of offensive metrics, and we absolutely have more uncertainty surrounding Gordon’s defensive performance this year than we do his offensive performance. But rather than saying that the defensive component rating Gordon as an elite player is absurd, we should instead ask what the magnitude of the measurement error might actually be, and how that should affect our view of his performance overall.
After all, Gordon isn’t exactly a defensive schlub. He moved to left field full time in 2011, and has won a Gold Glove in every season since. While there are all kinds of problems with the Gold Glove voting, Major League managers very quickly adapted to Gordon as a terrific defensive outfielder, so this isn’t just a trust-the-numbers-over-the-eyes situation. By the Fans Scouting Report, Gordon rated as an 82 last year, the fourth best mark of any player in the entire league. People who watch Alex Gordon play defense regularly think Alex Gordon is really good at defense, so we shouldn’t be too terribly surprised that Alex Gordon ranks as a very good defender.
But this is absolutely an outlier season for him in terms of UZR, which is the defensive component of WAR. Since moving to left field full time in 2011, here are Gordon’s UZR/150 numbers:
2011: +12
2012: +12
2013: +7
2014: +27
Over the last three years, Gordon has rated as a very good defensive left fielder, rating about 10 runs per season better than the average left fielder. This year, he’s pushing close to 30 runs better than the average left fielder, which is why he ranks #1 in WAR right now and he never has before. Alex Gordon is clearly not a true talent +27 defender in left field, and some skepticism about that number is entirely justified.
But again, let’s keep in mind that even a normal Alex Gordon defensive rating would still rank him as one of the best players in baseball this year. Since moving to left field full time in 2011, he’s ranked as +30 runs above an average defensive player, which includes the positional adjustment. Even if we put no weight on more recent data and simply use a straight average of the total, we’d expect him to have a defensive rating around +6 or +7 right now; instead, he’s at +17, meaning that the bump in defensive rating this year has given him credit for about 10 extra runs, or about one win.
Subtract a win off Gordon’s total, and instead of ranking #1 in seasonal WAR to date, he falls all the way to a tie for #9. That’s the magnitude of the difference. Using an overly regressed defensive assumption, Gordon is still a top 10 position player in Major League Baseball this year. If you were a bit more reasonable in your regression and weighted recent performance more heavily than past performance, you’d end up with a weighted average defensive value of closer to +9, and Gordon would again find himself in the top five among position players in Major League Baseball.
And here’s the thing; there is absolutely no reason to assume that defensive performance is more static than offensive performance. In fact, there are all kinds of reasons to believe the exact opposite, and to expect fluctuations in defensive performance of a greater degree than we find in offensive performance.
We all generally understand that performance variance decreases as sample sizes get larger, and not just on defense. Batting average over a full season is more credible than batting average over a month’s worth of games played. We don’t freak out when Josh Harrison leads the NL in wRC+ over the last 30 days, as he does now, as we know that stuff like that happens, even with metrics with very minimal measurement error.
And the reality is that one of the primary reasons why offensive statistics are more reliable is simply because the samples are larger. Over the course of a season, an everyday player will bat 600 to 700 times, allowing much of the small sample variance to wash out in the end. On the other hand, even a very good left fielder like Gordon averages about 300 putouts per year, and most of those are routine plays that any ambulatory Major Leaguer could have made, so they have no real effect on his defensive rating.
According to the Inside Edge data here on the site, 71% of the balls hit in Gordon’s direction this year have been “Routine”, meaning that they are converted into outs 90-100% of the time. Gordon has converted 99.6% of those plays, so even that range is likely too large. These are routine pop flies that basically everyone catches. In addition, another 42 plays have been labeled “Impossible”, meaning that no one ever catches balls hit at that location, angle, and velocity. That leaves just 53 plays this season ranging somewhere between “Remote” (1-10% chance of conversion) and “Likely” (60-90%), and those are the plays that determine 100% of defensive rating.
We’re really talking about evaluating a player based on his performance on something like 50 marginal plays throughout the course of the season. It would be ludicrous to expect performance over an N of 50 to be the same every single trial, especially when the result of the play made or not made has such a large swing in run value. Making a catch on one of these marginal plays in the outfield is often times the difference between saving an extra base hit or making an out, and the gap in run value between a double or a triple and an out is worth more than a full run. With just a few 50/50 balls going one way or another, a player’s defensive performance in runs saved can vary dramatically.
Think of defensive performance as similar to home run rate. If a player hits a ball one foot shy of the wall, he makes an out; if he hits one foot beyond the wall, he creates at least one and often times more than one run for his team. A very small difference in a player’s swing can have a very big difference in the outcome, and we’re not that surprised when we see things like Chris Davis‘ HR total going from 33 to 53 to 21 over the course of the last three years. When dealing with samples this size and high magnitudes of difference for an out versus a non-out, we should rationally expect fluctuations. Single year blips may be correct, or they may not be — we don’t know for sure — but deciding that a player’s defensive rating is incorrect because it fluctuates from his prior history is a very flawed way of thinking. The cliche is wrong; defense can slump just like anything.
There is absolutely an argument to be made that Gordon’s UZR may be incorrect — though interestingly, people only ever seem to assume that numbers are too extreme, ignoring the possibility that the measurement error could also mean that his defensive rating might be too low — and if you were trying to answer the question of who “the best player in baseball” is, you’d definitely want to use multi-season regressed defensive numbers. But even using those kinds of calculations, there’s no way to get Alex Gordon out of the top 5-10 position players in MLB this year. The only “absurd” argument would be that Gordon hasn’t been one of the best players in baseball this year.
The very best? WAR can’t tell you that. But the good news is that it’s not trying to. What WAR is trying to tell you, though, is that Alex Gordon is having a great season, and you should accept that conclusion even without putting as much faith in defensive metrics as you do in offensive ones.
- 27,111
- 14,584
- Joined
- May 2, 2012
Teams that’ve seen their playoffs odds increase the most over the past 7 days:
Royals (19.2%)
Cardinals (15.5)
Braves (14.4)
Brewers (10.1)
Royals (19.2%)
Cardinals (15.5)
Braves (14.4)
Brewers (10.1)
- Status