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2016 MLB thread. THE CUBS HAVE BROKEN THE CURSE! Chicago Cubs are your 2016 World Series champions
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Ron Washington Loves to [Bleeping] Bunt.
The Pointlessness of Signing After the Draft.
On the New Collision Rules at Home Plate.
2014 Payroll Allocation, By Position.
Area Scouting, the Home Visit and the Phillies/Wetzler Affair.
2014 Top 10 Prospects: Boston Red Sox.
The Most- and Least-Improved Teams for 2014.
Did Houston Spend Wisely This Winter?
The Surprising Reality of Brett Gardner.
The non-appendix portion of The Book is 367 pages long. Chapter 9, “To Sacrifice or Not” is 50 pages long and represents nearly 14% of the entire book. The math within may not be for everyone to read, but the information is simplified with the addition of several “The Book Says” callouts that would be easy for any reader, say a manager, to find.
Ron Washington tells us to take those “analytics on that and shove it up our [bleep][bleep]”
Washington does not like to be told how to “[bleep] manage” and wonders why people do not criticize Mike Scioscia because the Angels had a higher bunt total last season. He went on to lament to the media pool in Surprise that his team has not been a good situational hitting team and that he uses the bunt to make up for those shortcomings.
Washington deserves praise as well as criticism for his observations. He is correct about his team’s struggles in situational hitting as the Texas Rangers were in the bottom third in the league in terms of batting average and weighted on base average with runners in scoring position. He was slightly off on his recall of raw totals as Retrosheet shows the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim sacrifice bunting 37 times while the Rangers did so 45 times.
Team Sac Bunts
HOU 46
TEX 45
ANA 37
KCA 37
NYA 36
DET 35
CLE 31
MIN 29
TOR 29
BAL 27
BOS 26
SEA 26
TBA 24
OAK 22
CHA 19
In terms of execution, how did Washington perform against the [bleep] analytics of bunting?
If the opposing manager is thinking about sacrificing (with a runner on first and no outs and a non-pitcher at the pate), tell him you will gladly give the runner second base in exchange for the out.
19 times in 2013, Washington called for a bunt with a runner on first and no outs. One time, in early April, did this involve the use of a non-pitcher.
Elvis Andrus – 7 times
Leonys Martin – 5 times
Craig Gentry – 2 times
Ian Kinsler – 1 time
Jurickson Profar – 1 time
Leury Garcia – 1 time
Mitch Moreland – 1 time
Late in a close game, in a low-scoring run environment, it is correct to often sacrifice bunt a runner on first with no outs.
8 of the 19 sacrifice bunts listed above came before the seventh inning, five of which came in the first three innings of the game. One sacrifice bunt came in the third inning of a game in which the Rangers were already ahead 5-2.
Early in the game in a low run-scoring environment, it is correct to often sacrifice bunt with a runner on first and no outs. In an average run-scoring environment, you should occasionally sacrifice to keep the defense honest.
The eight early-game bunts came against the following pitcher: Roberto Hernandez, Andy Pettitte, Jarrod Parker, Anibal Sanchez, Jason Vargas, Brad Peacock, Jason Vargas and A.J. Griffin. Sanchez, arguably the best pitcher of the bunch, was the pitcher who was on the mound when the Rangers used a sacrifice bunt up three runs in the third inning.
All other things being equal, sacrifice more often with a low-walk, low-OBP hitter on deck
28 times, Washington called for a sacrifice bunt with batters hitting 1st, 2nd, or 3rd in the lineup with Elvis Andrus doing so 14 times. Andrus hit in the second spot of the lineup 116 times in 2013, with Lance Berkman and Ian Kinsler doing a majority of the work in the third spot of the lineup. Berkman had a .340 OBP and a 12.9% walk rate while Kinsler had a .344 OBP and a 8.3% walk rate.
With a runner on second and no outs, give the opposing manager the standing offer of taking an out in exchange for the runner advancing to third, unless you are tied or down by a run in the ninth inning or later.
Ten times last season, Washington called for a sacrifice bunt with a runner on second and no outs. One of them came in a tie game in the 14th inning. None of the others occurred after the 7th inning. One of them came in the first inning, and none of the bunts were by a pitcher.
With a runner on first or first and second, and no outs, the batters GIDP rate (adjusted for the pitcher) should be considered in deciding whether to bunt or not.
Let’s call this the Jose Molina rule. Molina has 62 sacrifice bunt attempts in his career, and it is not due to his deft bunting abilities. Managers call for Molina to bunt to avoid double plays in the early innings. Joe Maddon has had Molina attempt a sacrifice bunt six times before the later innings of a game over the past two seasons; five times were with no outs. Washington called for bunts in these situations 29 times, 18 of which involved batters in the first three spots in the lineup – Ian Kinsler, Leonys Martin, or Jurickson Profar. That trio grounded into 25 double plays last season, led by Andrus with 19. Andrus fits the profiles for GIDP rate, and bunts against Joe Saunders and Jerome Williams are justified while bunts against Ernesto Frieri and A.J. Griffin are not.
The return on investment that Washington is getting for his excessive utilization of the sacrifice bunt is barely above the American League Average.
Team Times Scored Sac Buts Score%
BOS 19 26 73.1%
CLE 21 31 67.7%
OAK 13 22 59.1%
MIN 17 29 58.6%
TOR 17 29 58.6%
NYA 21 36 58.3%
BAL 15 27 55.6%
TEX 25 45 55.6%
AL Average 257 469 54.8%
ANA 20 37 54.1%
HOU 24 46 52.2%
SEA 13 26 50.0%
CHA 9 19 47.4%
TBA 11 24 45.8%
DET 16 35 45.7%
KCA 16 37 43.2%
The same can be said about the return on investment for bunting as often as the Rangers do overall.
Team Times Scored Overall Bunts Score%
BOS 29 54 53.7%
CLE 33 68 48.5%
TBA 28 60 46.7%
BAL 25 57 43.9%
HOU 41 95 43.2%
MIN 28 66 42.4%
NYA 34 83 41.0%
TEX 39 96 40.6%
AL Average 433 1087 39.8%
OAK 21 53 39.6%
TOR 26 70 37.1%
KCA 35 99 35.4%
DET 28 82 34.1%
SEA 24 71 33.8%
ANA 29 91 31.9%
CHA 13 42 31.0%
Ron Washington may like to [bleep] bunt whenever he [bleep] wants to, because he does it “when Ron Washington feels like it’s necessary. Bottom line.” The original column cited the Greek chorus of bunt-loathing fans and media, which is fitting because the Greeks were known for their comedies as well as their tragedies. A wonderful comedy came in the second inning of a mid-August game against Felix Hernandez, when five of the first six batters of the inning reach safely and Washington calls for a suicide squeeze with runners at second and third.
It worked, because Profar made a phenomenal slide to avoid the tag by Henry Blanco. The ultimate tragedy in the strategy game in the play-in game against the Tampa Bay Rays when Washington had Andrus sacrifice Kinsler over to third base with one out in the eighth inning down 4-2.
The bottom line is that Washington’s belief that his excessive use of the sacrifice bunt is allowing his team to create more runs to compensate for their lack of situational hitting is mostly [bleep].
Thanks to Jeff Zimmerman for his heavy-lifting with the data mining for this article.
Ron Washington tells us to take those “analytics on that and shove it up our [bleep][bleep]”
Washington does not like to be told how to “[bleep] manage” and wonders why people do not criticize Mike Scioscia because the Angels had a higher bunt total last season. He went on to lament to the media pool in Surprise that his team has not been a good situational hitting team and that he uses the bunt to make up for those shortcomings.
Washington deserves praise as well as criticism for his observations. He is correct about his team’s struggles in situational hitting as the Texas Rangers were in the bottom third in the league in terms of batting average and weighted on base average with runners in scoring position. He was slightly off on his recall of raw totals as Retrosheet shows the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim sacrifice bunting 37 times while the Rangers did so 45 times.
Team Sac Bunts
HOU 46
TEX 45
ANA 37
KCA 37
NYA 36
DET 35
CLE 31
MIN 29
TOR 29
BAL 27
BOS 26
SEA 26
TBA 24
OAK 22
CHA 19
In terms of execution, how did Washington perform against the [bleep] analytics of bunting?
If the opposing manager is thinking about sacrificing (with a runner on first and no outs and a non-pitcher at the pate), tell him you will gladly give the runner second base in exchange for the out.
19 times in 2013, Washington called for a bunt with a runner on first and no outs. One time, in early April, did this involve the use of a non-pitcher.
Elvis Andrus – 7 times
Leonys Martin – 5 times
Craig Gentry – 2 times
Ian Kinsler – 1 time
Jurickson Profar – 1 time
Leury Garcia – 1 time
Mitch Moreland – 1 time
Late in a close game, in a low-scoring run environment, it is correct to often sacrifice bunt a runner on first with no outs.
8 of the 19 sacrifice bunts listed above came before the seventh inning, five of which came in the first three innings of the game. One sacrifice bunt came in the third inning of a game in which the Rangers were already ahead 5-2.
Early in the game in a low run-scoring environment, it is correct to often sacrifice bunt with a runner on first and no outs. In an average run-scoring environment, you should occasionally sacrifice to keep the defense honest.
The eight early-game bunts came against the following pitcher: Roberto Hernandez, Andy Pettitte, Jarrod Parker, Anibal Sanchez, Jason Vargas, Brad Peacock, Jason Vargas and A.J. Griffin. Sanchez, arguably the best pitcher of the bunch, was the pitcher who was on the mound when the Rangers used a sacrifice bunt up three runs in the third inning.
All other things being equal, sacrifice more often with a low-walk, low-OBP hitter on deck
28 times, Washington called for a sacrifice bunt with batters hitting 1st, 2nd, or 3rd in the lineup with Elvis Andrus doing so 14 times. Andrus hit in the second spot of the lineup 116 times in 2013, with Lance Berkman and Ian Kinsler doing a majority of the work in the third spot of the lineup. Berkman had a .340 OBP and a 12.9% walk rate while Kinsler had a .344 OBP and a 8.3% walk rate.
With a runner on second and no outs, give the opposing manager the standing offer of taking an out in exchange for the runner advancing to third, unless you are tied or down by a run in the ninth inning or later.
Ten times last season, Washington called for a sacrifice bunt with a runner on second and no outs. One of them came in a tie game in the 14th inning. None of the others occurred after the 7th inning. One of them came in the first inning, and none of the bunts were by a pitcher.
With a runner on first or first and second, and no outs, the batters GIDP rate (adjusted for the pitcher) should be considered in deciding whether to bunt or not.
Let’s call this the Jose Molina rule. Molina has 62 sacrifice bunt attempts in his career, and it is not due to his deft bunting abilities. Managers call for Molina to bunt to avoid double plays in the early innings. Joe Maddon has had Molina attempt a sacrifice bunt six times before the later innings of a game over the past two seasons; five times were with no outs. Washington called for bunts in these situations 29 times, 18 of which involved batters in the first three spots in the lineup – Ian Kinsler, Leonys Martin, or Jurickson Profar. That trio grounded into 25 double plays last season, led by Andrus with 19. Andrus fits the profiles for GIDP rate, and bunts against Joe Saunders and Jerome Williams are justified while bunts against Ernesto Frieri and A.J. Griffin are not.
The return on investment that Washington is getting for his excessive utilization of the sacrifice bunt is barely above the American League Average.
Team Times Scored Sac Buts Score%
BOS 19 26 73.1%
CLE 21 31 67.7%
OAK 13 22 59.1%
MIN 17 29 58.6%
TOR 17 29 58.6%
NYA 21 36 58.3%
BAL 15 27 55.6%
TEX 25 45 55.6%
AL Average 257 469 54.8%
ANA 20 37 54.1%
HOU 24 46 52.2%
SEA 13 26 50.0%
CHA 9 19 47.4%
TBA 11 24 45.8%
DET 16 35 45.7%
KCA 16 37 43.2%
The same can be said about the return on investment for bunting as often as the Rangers do overall.
Team Times Scored Overall Bunts Score%
BOS 29 54 53.7%
CLE 33 68 48.5%
TBA 28 60 46.7%
BAL 25 57 43.9%
HOU 41 95 43.2%
MIN 28 66 42.4%
NYA 34 83 41.0%
TEX 39 96 40.6%
AL Average 433 1087 39.8%
OAK 21 53 39.6%
TOR 26 70 37.1%
KCA 35 99 35.4%
DET 28 82 34.1%
SEA 24 71 33.8%
ANA 29 91 31.9%
CHA 13 42 31.0%
Ron Washington may like to [bleep] bunt whenever he [bleep] wants to, because he does it “when Ron Washington feels like it’s necessary. Bottom line.” The original column cited the Greek chorus of bunt-loathing fans and media, which is fitting because the Greeks were known for their comedies as well as their tragedies. A wonderful comedy came in the second inning of a mid-August game against Felix Hernandez, when five of the first six batters of the inning reach safely and Washington calls for a suicide squeeze with runners at second and third.
It worked, because Profar made a phenomenal slide to avoid the tag by Henry Blanco. The ultimate tragedy in the strategy game in the play-in game against the Tampa Bay Rays when Washington had Andrus sacrifice Kinsler over to third base with one out in the eighth inning down 4-2.
The bottom line is that Washington’s belief that his excessive use of the sacrifice bunt is allowing his team to create more runs to compensate for their lack of situational hitting is mostly [bleep].
Thanks to Jeff Zimmerman for his heavy-lifting with the data mining for this article.
The Pointlessness of Signing After the Draft.
Nelson Cruz got tired of unemployment and signed a one year, $8 million deal over the weekend, taking nearly half of the salary he turned down when the Rangers made him a qualifying offer back in November. However, according to agents Scott Boras and Bean Stringfellow, fellow remaining free agents Ervin Santana, Kendrys Morales, and Stephen Drew aren’t particularly interested in following in Cruz’s footsteps, and are even openly talking about waiting until after the June draft — when they will no longer have compensation picks attached — before signing a new contract. The theory is that, without the encumbrance of draft pick tax, teams would be lining up to sign these players.
There’s a problem with this theory, however; the math simply doesn’t work. Over at MLBTradeRumors, Tim Dierkes did a great job laying out the picks that each team would have to surrender if they signed any of the remaining qualified free agents. He also helpfully included the pool amount allocated to each pick, so we can see that the exposed draft pick “values” range from $2.8M down to $600K.
Now, because the flow of cash into the draft is restricted, draft dollars are worth more than their face value. Any team wanting to acquire draft pool allocation has to pay more than $1 for $1 in order to do so, since draft dollars are a limited resource relative to a team’s access to capital. Last summer, the Dodgers essentially bought $210,000 in international spending money — limited to some extent the same way the draft dollars are — by taking on $500,000 of Carlos Marmol‘s salary, putting a 2.4X valuation on those international dollars.
Draft dollars are probably worth more than international spending dollars, since the penalties for blowing your international budget out of the water aren’t as severe as ignoring your draft budget. In conversations with people in MLB front offices, the general consensus has ranged around a 3X valuation for draft pick dollars, so a pick with a slot value of $2 million would be worth $6 million in open market dollars. This hypothesis is supported by transactions like the Bud Norris trade, where the Orioles gave up a pick — currently slotted in at #37 — for a moderate value arm, as well as the difference in contracts signed by the similar-ish free agent starters this winter. Picks certainly have value, especially in the #10 to #20 range, but teams are willing to trade that value for the right price, and that right price seems to be around three times the value of the pool allocation.
Take Nelson Cruz, for instance. When the Orioles 1st round pick — #17 overall, $2.2M slot value — was on the line, they weren’t willing to sign him, even for the 1/$8M he eventually agreed to. With a 3X valuation on that pick — which would make the pick worth $6.6 million — that would have made the true cost of signing him 1/$14.6M, or basically the same valuation as the qualifying offer. Once they signed Ubaldo Jimenez and Cruz’s signing only cost them the 55th pick — which has a slot bonus of $750K, and a 3X valuation would make that pick worth $2.2M — they agreed to terms on a deal that valued Cruz at just over $10M. Essentially, signing Jimenez made Cruz roughly $4 million cheaper for the Orioles, which was enough to push them to make a deal.
So, let’s get back to the threat of waiting until after the draft to sign. At the very top end of the exposed pick range, the value of the potential lost picks, using a 3X multiplier, would be around $8.3 million. That’s the added cost to the Brewers of signing any of the remaining qualified free agents, and is certainly a reason why the team pursued Matt Garza instead. But teams like the Brewers, Padres, and Giants aren’t really rumored to be the teams negotiating with qualified free agents at the moment.
Stephen Drew’s primary suitor seems to be the Mets, whose exposed draft pick is worth just $1.9M after applying the multiplier. The Mariners ($2.3M) have been linked to both Kendrys Morales and Ervin Santana. The Rockies ($4.9M) apparently have some interest in Santana, but not at his current asking price. The Orioles ($1.8M) are still being linked to Santana even after signing Jimenez. The Blue Jays ($3.5M) seem like they’re out on Santana, even though they have been linked to every available starting pitcher this winter, it seems. Of the clubs rumored to be interested, the magnitude of the draft pick tax is just not that high.
And there’s almost no way that the player would come out ahead by waiting until after the draft versus just taking a reduced salary equal to the team’s draft pick tax. By waiting to sign until June 8th, when the draft has completed, the players would be sitting out approximately 40% of the season; the Blue Jays play 64 games between Opening Day and June 8th, for instance. Because players who sign mid-season are only paid a pro-rated amount of the annual salary they agree to, it’s almost certain that 40% of the player’s 2013 salary will be larger than the draft pick tax of any interested teams.
For instance, if Santana is seeking a $50 million deal for four years, just like every other free agent hurler, he’s asking for a $12.5M salary in 2013. By sitting out 40% of the season and signing that exact same deal on June 8th, he’d earn a total of $7.5 million in 2014, meaning that sitting out the first two months of the season would cost him $5 million in salary. He’d be better off just giving that $5 million discount to the interested teams and pitching the entire season, since that $5 million discount is likely to be larger than any of the interested teams valuations on the pick they would lose to sign him.
Realistically, I just don’t see any real advantage to the player for sitting out two months of the season. At the prices they believe they’re worth, two month’s salary is probably more costly than the draft pick tax. It’s one thing to wait until after Opening Day to avoid receiving a qualifying offer next season — if Ken Rosenthal’s report is correct and players can avoid a 2015 QO by signing after April 1st — but sitting out until June in hopes that big offers will come rolling in once the pick expires just seems to overstate the value the teams are actually putting on the picks that are at-risk.
There’s a problem with this theory, however; the math simply doesn’t work. Over at MLBTradeRumors, Tim Dierkes did a great job laying out the picks that each team would have to surrender if they signed any of the remaining qualified free agents. He also helpfully included the pool amount allocated to each pick, so we can see that the exposed draft pick “values” range from $2.8M down to $600K.
Now, because the flow of cash into the draft is restricted, draft dollars are worth more than their face value. Any team wanting to acquire draft pool allocation has to pay more than $1 for $1 in order to do so, since draft dollars are a limited resource relative to a team’s access to capital. Last summer, the Dodgers essentially bought $210,000 in international spending money — limited to some extent the same way the draft dollars are — by taking on $500,000 of Carlos Marmol‘s salary, putting a 2.4X valuation on those international dollars.
Draft dollars are probably worth more than international spending dollars, since the penalties for blowing your international budget out of the water aren’t as severe as ignoring your draft budget. In conversations with people in MLB front offices, the general consensus has ranged around a 3X valuation for draft pick dollars, so a pick with a slot value of $2 million would be worth $6 million in open market dollars. This hypothesis is supported by transactions like the Bud Norris trade, where the Orioles gave up a pick — currently slotted in at #37 — for a moderate value arm, as well as the difference in contracts signed by the similar-ish free agent starters this winter. Picks certainly have value, especially in the #10 to #20 range, but teams are willing to trade that value for the right price, and that right price seems to be around three times the value of the pool allocation.
Take Nelson Cruz, for instance. When the Orioles 1st round pick — #17 overall, $2.2M slot value — was on the line, they weren’t willing to sign him, even for the 1/$8M he eventually agreed to. With a 3X valuation on that pick — which would make the pick worth $6.6 million — that would have made the true cost of signing him 1/$14.6M, or basically the same valuation as the qualifying offer. Once they signed Ubaldo Jimenez and Cruz’s signing only cost them the 55th pick — which has a slot bonus of $750K, and a 3X valuation would make that pick worth $2.2M — they agreed to terms on a deal that valued Cruz at just over $10M. Essentially, signing Jimenez made Cruz roughly $4 million cheaper for the Orioles, which was enough to push them to make a deal.
So, let’s get back to the threat of waiting until after the draft to sign. At the very top end of the exposed pick range, the value of the potential lost picks, using a 3X multiplier, would be around $8.3 million. That’s the added cost to the Brewers of signing any of the remaining qualified free agents, and is certainly a reason why the team pursued Matt Garza instead. But teams like the Brewers, Padres, and Giants aren’t really rumored to be the teams negotiating with qualified free agents at the moment.
Stephen Drew’s primary suitor seems to be the Mets, whose exposed draft pick is worth just $1.9M after applying the multiplier. The Mariners ($2.3M) have been linked to both Kendrys Morales and Ervin Santana. The Rockies ($4.9M) apparently have some interest in Santana, but not at his current asking price. The Orioles ($1.8M) are still being linked to Santana even after signing Jimenez. The Blue Jays ($3.5M) seem like they’re out on Santana, even though they have been linked to every available starting pitcher this winter, it seems. Of the clubs rumored to be interested, the magnitude of the draft pick tax is just not that high.
And there’s almost no way that the player would come out ahead by waiting until after the draft versus just taking a reduced salary equal to the team’s draft pick tax. By waiting to sign until June 8th, when the draft has completed, the players would be sitting out approximately 40% of the season; the Blue Jays play 64 games between Opening Day and June 8th, for instance. Because players who sign mid-season are only paid a pro-rated amount of the annual salary they agree to, it’s almost certain that 40% of the player’s 2013 salary will be larger than the draft pick tax of any interested teams.
For instance, if Santana is seeking a $50 million deal for four years, just like every other free agent hurler, he’s asking for a $12.5M salary in 2013. By sitting out 40% of the season and signing that exact same deal on June 8th, he’d earn a total of $7.5 million in 2014, meaning that sitting out the first two months of the season would cost him $5 million in salary. He’d be better off just giving that $5 million discount to the interested teams and pitching the entire season, since that $5 million discount is likely to be larger than any of the interested teams valuations on the pick they would lose to sign him.
Realistically, I just don’t see any real advantage to the player for sitting out two months of the season. At the prices they believe they’re worth, two month’s salary is probably more costly than the draft pick tax. It’s one thing to wait until after Opening Day to avoid receiving a qualifying offer next season — if Ken Rosenthal’s report is correct and players can avoid a 2015 QO by signing after April 1st — but sitting out until June in hopes that big offers will come rolling in once the pick expires just seems to overstate the value the teams are actually putting on the picks that are at-risk.
On the New Collision Rules at Home Plate.
It was back during the winter meetings when major league baseball made headlines by announcing their intention to eliminate home plate collisions. On Monday, MLB and the players’ association announced that a new rule will take effect in time for the 2014 season. The rule will be reviewed and possibly tweaked prior to the 2015 season.
The impetus to make a change is obvious, many teams count their catcher as one of their best players. In an otherwise non-contact sport, catchers get knocked off the field all too often. Baseball is a bit behind the curve. Other sports have been protecting exposed players for over a decade, like quarterbacks and kickers in football or goaltenders in hockey. Players like Buster Posey and Yadier Molina have been injured in recent seasons, as these two videos show (video one, video two).
The new rule can be read in its entirety here (twitter link). Umpires will now have two judgment calls to make on collision plays. Baserunners are disallowed from leaving a “direct line to the plate in order to initiate contact with the catcher.” Runners who break this rule will automatically be called out. This is not dissimilar from the double play rule that disallows baserunners from sliding out of the base path, so umpires shouldn’t have a hard time implementing the rule. Functionally, we should see catchers field the ball slightly in front of home plate, giving baserunners the opportunity to hook slide behind them rather than blind side them. The other component of the new rule is that the catcher cannot block the plate unless he is in possession of the ball. If he does so, the runner is automatically safe.
The MLB press release linked above states that the rule will “prevent the most egregious collisions.” In a sense that is true. The worst collisions are the ones like the Posey video where the ball and the player arrive at the same time. Under the old rule, the catcher is placed between a rock and a hard place where an out and a moderate case of whip lash is the friendliest outcome. With the new rule, Posey has to field the ball out of the base path, which may have prevented the injury.
Emphasis on “may.” As the Molina video demonstrates, the ball often arrives in time for the catcher to be set up in front of home plate. With this rule in place, maybe Molina fields the ball differently and isn’t hurt, but there are collisions each year where the ball beats the baserunner by enough time that the catcher can set up. There is no data to indicate that being fully prepared for a collision improves the health outcomes of the collision. Intuitively, the catcher can set up in the most effective manner to absorb a hit, but the advantages may be partially or completely mitigated by other factors.
What we do have data on is drunk and/or sleeping drivers. There are tragic headlines all the time like “Sleeping Driver Kills Two, Walks Out Unscathed.” Usually, when somebody runs into an immovable object while going 50 mph, all parties are going to get injured. With drunk or sleeping drivers, they don’t have the reaction time to tense up prior to a crash. That tension makes the body more brittle and prone to breaking bones and damaged connective tissue. Drunk and sleeping drivers do get injured frequently in their collisions, but they also walk away more often than otherwise expected.
Where this parlays back to catchers is that it’s not immediately obvious that a catcher prepared for a collision is much better off than a catcher that is unprepared. The prepared catcher is tensed and thus his body becomes more brittle. The unprepared catcher is (hypothetically) less tensed and thus more able to take the hit.
The new rule still allows collisions on plays where the catcher gets the ball in time to set up in front of the plate. This should reduce the number of full on collisions, but won’t eliminate them entirely. Maybe the most egregious collisions won’t happen, but the second most egregious still may. Fans who enjoy the collision play need not worry about it going extinct.
There is one last factor to keep in mind. The early supposition is that we’ll see more sliding plays at the plate. However, home plate has more in common with first base than second or third. The fastest way across the plate is running. While hook slides will probably go up, I also expect to see more glancing blows as runners try to scurry past the catcher. If my expectation proves accurate, we could be increasing injury risk to baserunners with the new rule. We’ll see how it shakes out and if any changes are implemented next offseason.
The impetus to make a change is obvious, many teams count their catcher as one of their best players. In an otherwise non-contact sport, catchers get knocked off the field all too often. Baseball is a bit behind the curve. Other sports have been protecting exposed players for over a decade, like quarterbacks and kickers in football or goaltenders in hockey. Players like Buster Posey and Yadier Molina have been injured in recent seasons, as these two videos show (video one, video two).
The new rule can be read in its entirety here (twitter link). Umpires will now have two judgment calls to make on collision plays. Baserunners are disallowed from leaving a “direct line to the plate in order to initiate contact with the catcher.” Runners who break this rule will automatically be called out. This is not dissimilar from the double play rule that disallows baserunners from sliding out of the base path, so umpires shouldn’t have a hard time implementing the rule. Functionally, we should see catchers field the ball slightly in front of home plate, giving baserunners the opportunity to hook slide behind them rather than blind side them. The other component of the new rule is that the catcher cannot block the plate unless he is in possession of the ball. If he does so, the runner is automatically safe.
The MLB press release linked above states that the rule will “prevent the most egregious collisions.” In a sense that is true. The worst collisions are the ones like the Posey video where the ball and the player arrive at the same time. Under the old rule, the catcher is placed between a rock and a hard place where an out and a moderate case of whip lash is the friendliest outcome. With the new rule, Posey has to field the ball out of the base path, which may have prevented the injury.
Emphasis on “may.” As the Molina video demonstrates, the ball often arrives in time for the catcher to be set up in front of home plate. With this rule in place, maybe Molina fields the ball differently and isn’t hurt, but there are collisions each year where the ball beats the baserunner by enough time that the catcher can set up. There is no data to indicate that being fully prepared for a collision improves the health outcomes of the collision. Intuitively, the catcher can set up in the most effective manner to absorb a hit, but the advantages may be partially or completely mitigated by other factors.
What we do have data on is drunk and/or sleeping drivers. There are tragic headlines all the time like “Sleeping Driver Kills Two, Walks Out Unscathed.” Usually, when somebody runs into an immovable object while going 50 mph, all parties are going to get injured. With drunk or sleeping drivers, they don’t have the reaction time to tense up prior to a crash. That tension makes the body more brittle and prone to breaking bones and damaged connective tissue. Drunk and sleeping drivers do get injured frequently in their collisions, but they also walk away more often than otherwise expected.
Where this parlays back to catchers is that it’s not immediately obvious that a catcher prepared for a collision is much better off than a catcher that is unprepared. The prepared catcher is tensed and thus his body becomes more brittle. The unprepared catcher is (hypothetically) less tensed and thus more able to take the hit.
The new rule still allows collisions on plays where the catcher gets the ball in time to set up in front of the plate. This should reduce the number of full on collisions, but won’t eliminate them entirely. Maybe the most egregious collisions won’t happen, but the second most egregious still may. Fans who enjoy the collision play need not worry about it going extinct.
There is one last factor to keep in mind. The early supposition is that we’ll see more sliding plays at the plate. However, home plate has more in common with first base than second or third. The fastest way across the plate is running. While hook slides will probably go up, I also expect to see more glancing blows as runners try to scurry past the catcher. If my expectation proves accurate, we could be increasing injury risk to baserunners with the new rule. We’ll see how it shakes out and if any changes are implemented next offseason.
2014 Payroll Allocation, By Position.
In Part One of this series, published yesterday, I ranked the projected 2014 Opening Day payrolls, estimated the number of pre-arbitration players on each Opening Day roster, and calculated the percentage of each team’s payroll attributed to the highest paid player.
Today, in Part Two, I break down the payrolls even further, into four component parts: the starting rotation, the starting lineup, the bullpen and the bench. In so doing, I made a judgment on who was likely to slot into these roles to start the season. FanGraphs’ Depth Charts and MLB Depth Charts were my go-to sources, but I made a deliberate decision to exclude all non-roster invitees from Opening Day rosters, as those players’ salaries aren’t included on Cot’s Contracts. Invariably, some of my judgment calls will be wrong. Feel free to note those in the comments, as many did yesterday in Part One.
How much will teams spend on their starting rotation, as a percentage of the overall payroll:
Before we get to the numbers, a note about methodology. Several teams have starters who are on the disabled list. On the Los Angeles Dodgers, for example, Chad Billingsley and Josh Beckett will be sidelined for the part of the season. I included their salaries as part of the Dodgers’ Opening Day starting rotation because to exclude them would have presented misleading information on how much the Dodgers are spending on starting pitchers this season.
Now, the numbers, in chart form:
Num Team 2014 Payroll Starters’ Combined Salary Starters as % of Payroll
1 Phillies $175,500,000 $80,675,000 46.10%
2 Giants $147,000,000 $57,800,000 39.30%
3 Brewers $100,500,000 $38,825,000 38.60%
4 Twins $82,500,000 $31,580,000 38.30%
5 Tigers $161,000,000 $60,325,000 37.50%
6 Mariners $87,500,000 $31,857,143 36.40%
7 Dodgers $223,000,000 $77,400,000 34.70%
8 Red Sox $155,000,000 $51,525,000 33.25%
9 Blue Jays $136,000,000 $44,700,000 32.90%
10 Cubs $89,000,000 $29,245,000 32.85%
11 Yankees $197,500,000 $64,800,000 32.80%
12 Pirates $71,500,000 $23,000,000 32.40%
13 Astros $49,000,000 $15,600,000 31.85%
14 Reds $106,000,000 $33,625,000 31.70%
15 Rockies $91,000,000 $26,062,500 28.65%
16 Royals $91,000,000 $25,050,000 27.50%
17 Rays $75,500,000 $20,225,000 26.80%
18 Cardinals $108,500,000 $28,875,000 26.60%
19 Diamondbacks $108,000,000 $28,650,000 26.50%
20 Padres $86,000,000 $21,150,000 24.60%
21 White Sox $89,000,000 $21,750,000 24.50%
22 Nationals $130,500,000 $30,275,000 23.20%
23 Mets $82,000,000 $18,675,000 22.75%
24 Angels $151,000,000 $34,200,000 22.65%
25 Orioles $105,000,000 $22,705,333 21.60%
26 Rangers $131,000,000 $27,000,000 21.10%
27 Indians $80,000,000 $13,200,000 16.50%
28 Athletics $79,000,000 $11,000,000 13.90%
29 Braves $96,000,000 $12,600,000 13.10%
30 Marlins $42,500,000 $3,000,000 7.10%
And in graph form [Note: after the post published, I edited the chart to better reflect the Pirates' spending on rotation, given the Astros' payment to the Pirates for $5.5 million in salary for Wandy Rodriguez. The graph does not contain that change.]:
Even with Ryan Howard‘s bloated contract, and expensive deals with aging veterans Jimmy Rollins and Chase Utley, the Phillies will still spend close to 50% of their payroll this season on starting pitching. Their recent A.J. Burnett signing pushed that number up significantly, but even so, without Burnett, Philadelphia was heavily committed to the rotation.
On the other end, the Miami Marlins will field four starters at the league minimum and one — Jacob Turner — at only $1 million. The Oakland Athletics will be the only other team to feature four pre-arbitration starting pitchers; the A’s overall spending on starters is higher than the Marlins due to Scott Kazmir‘s $9 million contract. The New York Mets would have been close to the A’s situation if Matt Harvey hadn’t required Tommy John surgery, which pushed the team to add Bartolo Colon on a 2-year/$20 million deal.
Five teams will feature starting rotations with no pre-arbitration pitchers: the Washington Nationals, San Diego Padres, Chicago Cubs, San Francisco Giants and Dodgers. With Derek Holland and Matt Harrison still recovering from injuries, the Texas Rangers may start the season with several pre-arbitration starters in their rotation, but the team is still on the hook for six major-league salaries for the rotation.
How much will teams spend on their starting lineup, as a percentage of the overall payroll:
The Dodgers, again, presented tough choices, given their outfield situation. I included Carl Crawford, Matt Kemp and Yasiel Puig in LA’s starting outfield with Andre Ethier coming off the bench. If you think Ethier will start, you’d have the Dodgers with a lower starting lineup number and a higher bench number. As it is, with Ethier coming off the bench, the Dodgers have the most expensive bench in the league this season.
The numbers, in chart form:
Rank Team Projected 2014 OD Payroll Starting Lineup Combined Salary Starting Lineup As % of Payroll
1 Rangers $131,000,000 $84,675,000 64.60%
2 Mets $82,000,000 $52,950,000 64.60%
3 Braves $96,000,000 $61,442,375 64%
4 Indians $80,000,000 $51,075,000 63.80%
5 Orioles $105,000,000 $65,171,667 62.10%
6 Yankees $197,500,000 $117,867,857 59.80%
7 Cardinals $108,500,000 $57,900,000 53.40%
8 Rockies $91,000,000 $48,528,571 53.30%
9 Nationals $130,500,000 $65,616,490 50.50%
10 Brewers $100,500,000 $50,450,000 50.20%
11 Marlins $42,500,000 $21,350,000 50.20%
12 White Sox $89,000,000 $44,542,000 50%
13 Diamondbacks $108,000,000 $52,750,000 48.80%
14 Tigers $161,000,000 $77,925,000 48.40%
15 Athletics $79,000,000 $38,150,000 48.30%
16 Angels $151,000,000 $72,125,000 47.80%
17 Blue Jays $136,000,000 $65,000,000 47.80%
18 Pirates $71,500,000 $33,425,333 46.70%
19 Mariners $87,500,000 $39,957,500 45.70%
20 Twins $82,500,000 $37,600,000 45.60%
21 Dodgers $223,000,000 $100,970,000 45.30%
22 Rays $75,500,000 $33,995,000 45%
23 Red Sox $155,000,000 $67,375,000 43.50%
24 Giants $147,000,000 $61,837,778 42.10%
25 Padres $86,000,000 $36,225,000 42.10%
26 Reds $106,000,000 $43,541,667 41.10%
27 Phillies $175,500,000 $70,450,000 40.25%
28 Royals $91,000,000 $30,300,000 33.30%
29 Astros $49,000,000 $14,737,000 30%
30 Cubs $89,000,000 $18,892,857 21.20%
And in graph form:
Look at the outliers. The Cubs will spend just more than 20% of their payroll on their starting lineup. Right fielder Nate Schierholtz — who was a platoon player on the Giants — will be the second-highest paid position player with a salary of $5 million. On the Astros, pitcher Scott Feldman‘s $12 million salary is nearly a quarter of the payroll, which pushes down the percentage spent offensive players.
What about the DH? American League teams have nine players in their starting lineups; National League teams have only eight. You’d expect — or at least I expected — to see more AL teams at the top of the rankings. But of the top 15 teams in spending on starting lineups, eight are NL teams.
How much will teams spend on their bullpen, as a percentage of the overall payroll:
Every team has an active bullpen competition in spring training, so my Opening Day roster picks are likely to be off for a number of teams. But that shouldn’t change the payroll percentage numbers too much, as most of the guys fighting for the last few bullpen spots are likely to be pre-arb or otherwise inexpensive players.
The numbers, in chart form:
Rank Team Projected 2014 Opening Day Payroll Bullpen Combined Salary Bullpen As % Payroll
1 Rays $75,500,000 $17,669,750 23.40%
2 Athletics $79,000,000 $17,840,000 22.60%
3 Royals $91,000,000 $18,522,500 20.40%
4 Marlins $42,500,000 $8,450,000 19.90%
5 Padres $86,000,000 $16,600,000 19.30%
6 Nationals $130,500,000 $25,125,000 19.25%
7 Reds $106,000,000 $17,050,000 17%
8 Diamondbacks $108,000,000 $17,975,000 16.60%
9 Rockies $91,000,000 $14,950,000 16.40%
10 Cubs $89,000,000 $14,375,000 16.20%
11 Astros $49,000,000 $7,500,000 15.30%
12 Angels $151,000,000 $22,887,500 15.20%
13 White Sox $89,000,000 $13,350,000 15%
14 Giants $147,000,000 $21,845,000 14.90%
15 Dodgers $223,000,000 $32,900,000 14.75%
16 Twins $82,500,000 $11,435,000 13.90%
17 Pirates $71,500,000 $9,975,000 13.80%
18 Phillies $175,500,000 $24,000,000 13.70%
19 Red Sox $155,000,000 $20,400,000 13.20%
20 Indians $80,000,000 $9,900,000 12.40%
21 Orioles $105,000,000 $12,850,000 12.20%
22 Cardinals $108,500,000 $13,000,000 12%
23 Mariners $87,500,000 $10,250,000 11.80%
24 Braves $96,000,000 $11,240,000 11.70%
25 Tigers $161,000,000 $15,737,500 9.80%
26 Blue Jays $136,000,000 $12,050,000 8.90%
27 Brewers $100,500,000 $8,700,000 8.70%
28 Mets $82,000,000 $6,700,000 8.20%
29 Rangers $131,000,000 $9,000,000 6.90%
30 Yankees $197,500,000 $12,480,000 6.30%
And in graph form:
The top six teams in this ranking are all small budget teams. And that makes sense, given the rise in relievers’ salaries in the last five years, particularly for “proven closers.” But look at the Nationals. Washington will spend nearly 20% of its payroll on its bullpen, which is an astounding figure for a team with a $130 million payroll.
Even so, the Nationals aren’t even the top spender on their relief corp. That honor goes to the Dodgers, of course, who will spend more on Brian Wilson to set up Kenley Jansen ($10 million), than seven teams will spend on their entire bullpen. And there’s still the matter of Brandon League‘s 3-year/$22.5 million contract, now in its second year. That’s a pretty, pretty expensive low-leverage middle reliever.
How much will teams spend on their bench, as a percentage of the overall payroll:
Rank Team Projected 2014 Opening Day Payroll Bench Combined Salary Bench as % of Payroll
1 Marlins $42,500,000 $5,800,000 13.60%
2 White Sox $89,000,000 $9,800,000 11.00%
3 Padres $86,000,000 $9,337,500 10.90%
4 Indians $80,000,000 $6,750,000 8.40%
5 Dodgers $223,000,000 $17,700,000 7.90%
6 Diamondbacks $108,000,000 $8,250,000 7.60%
7 Rays $75,500,000 $5,235,000 7.10%
8 Red Sox $155,000,000 $10,800,000 7.00%
9 Mets $82,000,000 $5,637,500 6.90%
10 Pirates $71,500,000 $4,950,000 6.90%
11 Rockies $91,000,000 $6,100,000 6.70%
12 Athletics $79,000,000 $4,895,000 6.20%
13 Reds $106,000,000 $6,360,000 6.00%
14 Astros $49,000,000 $2,800,000 5.70%
15 Cardinals $108,500,000 $6,040,000 5.60%
16 Nationals $130,500,000 $7,200,000 5.50%
17 Cubs $89,000,000 $4,900,000 5.50%
18 Mariners $87,500,000 $4,800,000 5.50%
19 Yankees $197,500,000 $9,700,000 4.90%
20 Braves $96,000,000 $4,590,000 4.80%
21 Tigers $161,000,000 $7,500,000 4.70%
22 Blue Jays $136,000,000 $5,250,000 3.90%
23 Giants $147,000,000 $5,415,000 3.70%
24 Royals $91,000,000 $2,955,000 3.20%
25 Rangers $131,000,000 $3,500,000 2.70%
26 Phillies $175,500,000 $4,612,500 2.60%
27 Brewers $100,500,000 $2,500,000 2.50%
28 Twins $82,500,000 $2,000,000 2.40%
29 Orioles $105,000,000 $2,350,000 2.20%
30 Angels $151,000,000 $2,000,000 1.30%
And in graph form:
I’ve searched and searched for a pattern to emerge with these bench payroll numbers, and I don’t see much. On average, teams will spend just under $6 million on their bench, so the Dodgers, Red Sox, Yankees, Tigers and Nationals — among the big spending teams — and the White Sox, Indians, Padres and Diamondbacks — among the low spending teams — are on the high end. Again, I expected to see bigger numbers from NL teams because they have a five-man bench, while AL teams have only four, with the DH taking up the extra spot in the starting lineup. But that didn’t show itself in the actual numbers.
Putting all the numbers together in one chart:
The moment you’ve all been waiting for. No? I guess you’re not as much of a numbers geek as I am.
We return to the chart ranking the projected Opening Day payrolls, and give you the percentages for rotation, starting lineup, bullpen and bench. Before you start hollering in the comments, some of the percentages will add up to more than 100%. From what I can see, that’s largely the result of using rounded numbers and then adding those rounded numbers together. Obviously, if I made an egregious mistake, tell me in the comments. But save yourself the energy on “Minor nitpick but the Yankees’ numbers add up to 102%.”
Rank Team Projected 2014 Payroll Rotation as % of Payroll Starting Lineup as % of Payroll Bullpen as % Payroll Bench as % of Payroll
1 Dodgers $223,000,000 34.7% 45.3% 14.8% 7.9%
2 Yankees $197,500,000 32.8% 59.8% 6.3% 4.9%
3 Phillies $175,500,000 46.1% 40.3% 13.7% 2.6%
4 Tigers $161,000,000 37.5% 48.4% 9.8% 4.7%
5 Red Sox $155,000,000 33.3% 43.5% 13.2% 7.0%
6 Angels $151,000,000 22.7% 47.8% 15.2% 1.3%
7 Giants $147,000,000 39.3% 42.1% 14.9% 3.7%
8 Blue Jays $136,000,000 32.9% 47.8% 8.9% 3.9%
9 Rangers $131,000,000 21.1% 64.6% 6.9% 2.7%
10 Nationals $130,500,000 23.2% 50.5% 19.3% 5.5%
11 Cardinals $108,500,000 26.6% 53.4% 12.0% 5.6%
12 Diamondbacks $108,000,000 26.5% 48.8% 16.6% 7.6%
13 Reds $106,000,000 31.7% 41.1% 17.0% 6.0%
14 Orioles $105,000,000 21.6% 62.1% 12.2% 2.2%
15 Brewers $100,500,000 38.6% 50.2% 8.7% 2.5%
16 Braves $96,000,000 13.1% 64.0% 11.7% 4.8%
17 Rockies $91,000,000 28.7% 53.3% 20.4% 6.7%
18 Royals $91,000,000 27.5% 33.3% 16.4% 3.2%
19 Cubs $89,000,000 32.9% 21.2% 16.2% 5.5%
20 White Sox $89,000,000 24.5% 50% 15.0% 11%
21 Mariners $87,500,000 36.4% 45.7% 11.8% 5.5%
22 Padres $86,000,000 24.6% 42.1% 19.3% 10.9%
23 Twins $82,500,000 38.3% 45.6% 13.9% 2.4%
24 Mets $82,000,000 22.8% 64.6% 8.2% 6.9%
25 Indians $80,000,000 16.5% 63.8% 12.4% 8.4%
26 Athletics $79,000,000 13.9% 48.3% 22.6% 6.2%
27 Rays $75,500,000 26.8% 45.0% 23.4% 7.1%
28 Pirates $71,500,000 32.4% 46.7% 13.8% 6.9%
29 Astros $49,000,000 31.9% 30.0% 15.3% 5.7%
30 Marlins $42,500,000 7.1% 50.2% 19.9% 13.6%
*********
Two postscripts:
A big, big thank you to my colleague Bill Petti for the graphs. Yes, a writer at FanGraphs is graphically-challenged.
Several readers left good comments on Part One with suggestions of other ways to break down the salary numbers. Please leave your suggestions below. I will review the suggestions and write a follow-up post with additional analysis.
Today, in Part Two, I break down the payrolls even further, into four component parts: the starting rotation, the starting lineup, the bullpen and the bench. In so doing, I made a judgment on who was likely to slot into these roles to start the season. FanGraphs’ Depth Charts and MLB Depth Charts were my go-to sources, but I made a deliberate decision to exclude all non-roster invitees from Opening Day rosters, as those players’ salaries aren’t included on Cot’s Contracts. Invariably, some of my judgment calls will be wrong. Feel free to note those in the comments, as many did yesterday in Part One.
How much will teams spend on their starting rotation, as a percentage of the overall payroll:
Before we get to the numbers, a note about methodology. Several teams have starters who are on the disabled list. On the Los Angeles Dodgers, for example, Chad Billingsley and Josh Beckett will be sidelined for the part of the season. I included their salaries as part of the Dodgers’ Opening Day starting rotation because to exclude them would have presented misleading information on how much the Dodgers are spending on starting pitchers this season.
Now, the numbers, in chart form:
Num Team 2014 Payroll Starters’ Combined Salary Starters as % of Payroll
1 Phillies $175,500,000 $80,675,000 46.10%
2 Giants $147,000,000 $57,800,000 39.30%
3 Brewers $100,500,000 $38,825,000 38.60%
4 Twins $82,500,000 $31,580,000 38.30%
5 Tigers $161,000,000 $60,325,000 37.50%
6 Mariners $87,500,000 $31,857,143 36.40%
7 Dodgers $223,000,000 $77,400,000 34.70%
8 Red Sox $155,000,000 $51,525,000 33.25%
9 Blue Jays $136,000,000 $44,700,000 32.90%
10 Cubs $89,000,000 $29,245,000 32.85%
11 Yankees $197,500,000 $64,800,000 32.80%
12 Pirates $71,500,000 $23,000,000 32.40%
13 Astros $49,000,000 $15,600,000 31.85%
14 Reds $106,000,000 $33,625,000 31.70%
15 Rockies $91,000,000 $26,062,500 28.65%
16 Royals $91,000,000 $25,050,000 27.50%
17 Rays $75,500,000 $20,225,000 26.80%
18 Cardinals $108,500,000 $28,875,000 26.60%
19 Diamondbacks $108,000,000 $28,650,000 26.50%
20 Padres $86,000,000 $21,150,000 24.60%
21 White Sox $89,000,000 $21,750,000 24.50%
22 Nationals $130,500,000 $30,275,000 23.20%
23 Mets $82,000,000 $18,675,000 22.75%
24 Angels $151,000,000 $34,200,000 22.65%
25 Orioles $105,000,000 $22,705,333 21.60%
26 Rangers $131,000,000 $27,000,000 21.10%
27 Indians $80,000,000 $13,200,000 16.50%
28 Athletics $79,000,000 $11,000,000 13.90%
29 Braves $96,000,000 $12,600,000 13.10%
30 Marlins $42,500,000 $3,000,000 7.10%
And in graph form [Note: after the post published, I edited the chart to better reflect the Pirates' spending on rotation, given the Astros' payment to the Pirates for $5.5 million in salary for Wandy Rodriguez. The graph does not contain that change.]:
Even with Ryan Howard‘s bloated contract, and expensive deals with aging veterans Jimmy Rollins and Chase Utley, the Phillies will still spend close to 50% of their payroll this season on starting pitching. Their recent A.J. Burnett signing pushed that number up significantly, but even so, without Burnett, Philadelphia was heavily committed to the rotation.
On the other end, the Miami Marlins will field four starters at the league minimum and one — Jacob Turner — at only $1 million. The Oakland Athletics will be the only other team to feature four pre-arbitration starting pitchers; the A’s overall spending on starters is higher than the Marlins due to Scott Kazmir‘s $9 million contract. The New York Mets would have been close to the A’s situation if Matt Harvey hadn’t required Tommy John surgery, which pushed the team to add Bartolo Colon on a 2-year/$20 million deal.
Five teams will feature starting rotations with no pre-arbitration pitchers: the Washington Nationals, San Diego Padres, Chicago Cubs, San Francisco Giants and Dodgers. With Derek Holland and Matt Harrison still recovering from injuries, the Texas Rangers may start the season with several pre-arbitration starters in their rotation, but the team is still on the hook for six major-league salaries for the rotation.
How much will teams spend on their starting lineup, as a percentage of the overall payroll:
The Dodgers, again, presented tough choices, given their outfield situation. I included Carl Crawford, Matt Kemp and Yasiel Puig in LA’s starting outfield with Andre Ethier coming off the bench. If you think Ethier will start, you’d have the Dodgers with a lower starting lineup number and a higher bench number. As it is, with Ethier coming off the bench, the Dodgers have the most expensive bench in the league this season.
The numbers, in chart form:
Rank Team Projected 2014 OD Payroll Starting Lineup Combined Salary Starting Lineup As % of Payroll
1 Rangers $131,000,000 $84,675,000 64.60%
2 Mets $82,000,000 $52,950,000 64.60%
3 Braves $96,000,000 $61,442,375 64%
4 Indians $80,000,000 $51,075,000 63.80%
5 Orioles $105,000,000 $65,171,667 62.10%
6 Yankees $197,500,000 $117,867,857 59.80%
7 Cardinals $108,500,000 $57,900,000 53.40%
8 Rockies $91,000,000 $48,528,571 53.30%
9 Nationals $130,500,000 $65,616,490 50.50%
10 Brewers $100,500,000 $50,450,000 50.20%
11 Marlins $42,500,000 $21,350,000 50.20%
12 White Sox $89,000,000 $44,542,000 50%
13 Diamondbacks $108,000,000 $52,750,000 48.80%
14 Tigers $161,000,000 $77,925,000 48.40%
15 Athletics $79,000,000 $38,150,000 48.30%
16 Angels $151,000,000 $72,125,000 47.80%
17 Blue Jays $136,000,000 $65,000,000 47.80%
18 Pirates $71,500,000 $33,425,333 46.70%
19 Mariners $87,500,000 $39,957,500 45.70%
20 Twins $82,500,000 $37,600,000 45.60%
21 Dodgers $223,000,000 $100,970,000 45.30%
22 Rays $75,500,000 $33,995,000 45%
23 Red Sox $155,000,000 $67,375,000 43.50%
24 Giants $147,000,000 $61,837,778 42.10%
25 Padres $86,000,000 $36,225,000 42.10%
26 Reds $106,000,000 $43,541,667 41.10%
27 Phillies $175,500,000 $70,450,000 40.25%
28 Royals $91,000,000 $30,300,000 33.30%
29 Astros $49,000,000 $14,737,000 30%
30 Cubs $89,000,000 $18,892,857 21.20%
And in graph form:
Look at the outliers. The Cubs will spend just more than 20% of their payroll on their starting lineup. Right fielder Nate Schierholtz — who was a platoon player on the Giants — will be the second-highest paid position player with a salary of $5 million. On the Astros, pitcher Scott Feldman‘s $12 million salary is nearly a quarter of the payroll, which pushes down the percentage spent offensive players.
What about the DH? American League teams have nine players in their starting lineups; National League teams have only eight. You’d expect — or at least I expected — to see more AL teams at the top of the rankings. But of the top 15 teams in spending on starting lineups, eight are NL teams.
How much will teams spend on their bullpen, as a percentage of the overall payroll:
Every team has an active bullpen competition in spring training, so my Opening Day roster picks are likely to be off for a number of teams. But that shouldn’t change the payroll percentage numbers too much, as most of the guys fighting for the last few bullpen spots are likely to be pre-arb or otherwise inexpensive players.
The numbers, in chart form:
Rank Team Projected 2014 Opening Day Payroll Bullpen Combined Salary Bullpen As % Payroll
1 Rays $75,500,000 $17,669,750 23.40%
2 Athletics $79,000,000 $17,840,000 22.60%
3 Royals $91,000,000 $18,522,500 20.40%
4 Marlins $42,500,000 $8,450,000 19.90%
5 Padres $86,000,000 $16,600,000 19.30%
6 Nationals $130,500,000 $25,125,000 19.25%
7 Reds $106,000,000 $17,050,000 17%
8 Diamondbacks $108,000,000 $17,975,000 16.60%
9 Rockies $91,000,000 $14,950,000 16.40%
10 Cubs $89,000,000 $14,375,000 16.20%
11 Astros $49,000,000 $7,500,000 15.30%
12 Angels $151,000,000 $22,887,500 15.20%
13 White Sox $89,000,000 $13,350,000 15%
14 Giants $147,000,000 $21,845,000 14.90%
15 Dodgers $223,000,000 $32,900,000 14.75%
16 Twins $82,500,000 $11,435,000 13.90%
17 Pirates $71,500,000 $9,975,000 13.80%
18 Phillies $175,500,000 $24,000,000 13.70%
19 Red Sox $155,000,000 $20,400,000 13.20%
20 Indians $80,000,000 $9,900,000 12.40%
21 Orioles $105,000,000 $12,850,000 12.20%
22 Cardinals $108,500,000 $13,000,000 12%
23 Mariners $87,500,000 $10,250,000 11.80%
24 Braves $96,000,000 $11,240,000 11.70%
25 Tigers $161,000,000 $15,737,500 9.80%
26 Blue Jays $136,000,000 $12,050,000 8.90%
27 Brewers $100,500,000 $8,700,000 8.70%
28 Mets $82,000,000 $6,700,000 8.20%
29 Rangers $131,000,000 $9,000,000 6.90%
30 Yankees $197,500,000 $12,480,000 6.30%
And in graph form:
The top six teams in this ranking are all small budget teams. And that makes sense, given the rise in relievers’ salaries in the last five years, particularly for “proven closers.” But look at the Nationals. Washington will spend nearly 20% of its payroll on its bullpen, which is an astounding figure for a team with a $130 million payroll.
Even so, the Nationals aren’t even the top spender on their relief corp. That honor goes to the Dodgers, of course, who will spend more on Brian Wilson to set up Kenley Jansen ($10 million), than seven teams will spend on their entire bullpen. And there’s still the matter of Brandon League‘s 3-year/$22.5 million contract, now in its second year. That’s a pretty, pretty expensive low-leverage middle reliever.
How much will teams spend on their bench, as a percentage of the overall payroll:
Rank Team Projected 2014 Opening Day Payroll Bench Combined Salary Bench as % of Payroll
1 Marlins $42,500,000 $5,800,000 13.60%
2 White Sox $89,000,000 $9,800,000 11.00%
3 Padres $86,000,000 $9,337,500 10.90%
4 Indians $80,000,000 $6,750,000 8.40%
5 Dodgers $223,000,000 $17,700,000 7.90%
6 Diamondbacks $108,000,000 $8,250,000 7.60%
7 Rays $75,500,000 $5,235,000 7.10%
8 Red Sox $155,000,000 $10,800,000 7.00%
9 Mets $82,000,000 $5,637,500 6.90%
10 Pirates $71,500,000 $4,950,000 6.90%
11 Rockies $91,000,000 $6,100,000 6.70%
12 Athletics $79,000,000 $4,895,000 6.20%
13 Reds $106,000,000 $6,360,000 6.00%
14 Astros $49,000,000 $2,800,000 5.70%
15 Cardinals $108,500,000 $6,040,000 5.60%
16 Nationals $130,500,000 $7,200,000 5.50%
17 Cubs $89,000,000 $4,900,000 5.50%
18 Mariners $87,500,000 $4,800,000 5.50%
19 Yankees $197,500,000 $9,700,000 4.90%
20 Braves $96,000,000 $4,590,000 4.80%
21 Tigers $161,000,000 $7,500,000 4.70%
22 Blue Jays $136,000,000 $5,250,000 3.90%
23 Giants $147,000,000 $5,415,000 3.70%
24 Royals $91,000,000 $2,955,000 3.20%
25 Rangers $131,000,000 $3,500,000 2.70%
26 Phillies $175,500,000 $4,612,500 2.60%
27 Brewers $100,500,000 $2,500,000 2.50%
28 Twins $82,500,000 $2,000,000 2.40%
29 Orioles $105,000,000 $2,350,000 2.20%
30 Angels $151,000,000 $2,000,000 1.30%
And in graph form:
I’ve searched and searched for a pattern to emerge with these bench payroll numbers, and I don’t see much. On average, teams will spend just under $6 million on their bench, so the Dodgers, Red Sox, Yankees, Tigers and Nationals — among the big spending teams — and the White Sox, Indians, Padres and Diamondbacks — among the low spending teams — are on the high end. Again, I expected to see bigger numbers from NL teams because they have a five-man bench, while AL teams have only four, with the DH taking up the extra spot in the starting lineup. But that didn’t show itself in the actual numbers.
Putting all the numbers together in one chart:
The moment you’ve all been waiting for. No? I guess you’re not as much of a numbers geek as I am.
We return to the chart ranking the projected Opening Day payrolls, and give you the percentages for rotation, starting lineup, bullpen and bench. Before you start hollering in the comments, some of the percentages will add up to more than 100%. From what I can see, that’s largely the result of using rounded numbers and then adding those rounded numbers together. Obviously, if I made an egregious mistake, tell me in the comments. But save yourself the energy on “Minor nitpick but the Yankees’ numbers add up to 102%.”
Rank Team Projected 2014 Payroll Rotation as % of Payroll Starting Lineup as % of Payroll Bullpen as % Payroll Bench as % of Payroll
1 Dodgers $223,000,000 34.7% 45.3% 14.8% 7.9%
2 Yankees $197,500,000 32.8% 59.8% 6.3% 4.9%
3 Phillies $175,500,000 46.1% 40.3% 13.7% 2.6%
4 Tigers $161,000,000 37.5% 48.4% 9.8% 4.7%
5 Red Sox $155,000,000 33.3% 43.5% 13.2% 7.0%
6 Angels $151,000,000 22.7% 47.8% 15.2% 1.3%
7 Giants $147,000,000 39.3% 42.1% 14.9% 3.7%
8 Blue Jays $136,000,000 32.9% 47.8% 8.9% 3.9%
9 Rangers $131,000,000 21.1% 64.6% 6.9% 2.7%
10 Nationals $130,500,000 23.2% 50.5% 19.3% 5.5%
11 Cardinals $108,500,000 26.6% 53.4% 12.0% 5.6%
12 Diamondbacks $108,000,000 26.5% 48.8% 16.6% 7.6%
13 Reds $106,000,000 31.7% 41.1% 17.0% 6.0%
14 Orioles $105,000,000 21.6% 62.1% 12.2% 2.2%
15 Brewers $100,500,000 38.6% 50.2% 8.7% 2.5%
16 Braves $96,000,000 13.1% 64.0% 11.7% 4.8%
17 Rockies $91,000,000 28.7% 53.3% 20.4% 6.7%
18 Royals $91,000,000 27.5% 33.3% 16.4% 3.2%
19 Cubs $89,000,000 32.9% 21.2% 16.2% 5.5%
20 White Sox $89,000,000 24.5% 50% 15.0% 11%
21 Mariners $87,500,000 36.4% 45.7% 11.8% 5.5%
22 Padres $86,000,000 24.6% 42.1% 19.3% 10.9%
23 Twins $82,500,000 38.3% 45.6% 13.9% 2.4%
24 Mets $82,000,000 22.8% 64.6% 8.2% 6.9%
25 Indians $80,000,000 16.5% 63.8% 12.4% 8.4%
26 Athletics $79,000,000 13.9% 48.3% 22.6% 6.2%
27 Rays $75,500,000 26.8% 45.0% 23.4% 7.1%
28 Pirates $71,500,000 32.4% 46.7% 13.8% 6.9%
29 Astros $49,000,000 31.9% 30.0% 15.3% 5.7%
30 Marlins $42,500,000 7.1% 50.2% 19.9% 13.6%
*********
Two postscripts:
A big, big thank you to my colleague Bill Petti for the graphs. Yes, a writer at FanGraphs is graphically-challenged.
Several readers left good comments on Part One with suggestions of other ways to break down the salary numbers. Please leave your suggestions below. I will review the suggestions and write a follow-up post with additional analysis.
Area Scouting, the Home Visit and the Phillies/Wetzler Affair.
It was only a matter of time. The team turned out to the Phillies, but it could have been anyone, and the player turned to be Oregon State LHP Ben Wetzler, though it too could have been anyone. The disconnect between the NCAA rules and the reality governing the mating ritual between major league clubs and amateur prospects ensured that it would eventually come to this, with a player’s eligibility being compromised for doing what the vast majority of players in his position have done without incident, in the simple course of doing business.
Depending on one’s home base, an area scout can basically set his calendar a year in advance. I was based in the Northeast in my area scouting days, so we’ll use my calendar as a frame of reference. Just days after the annual Rule 4 draft, an initial follow list of top prospects for the next year’s draft is filed. Throughout the summer, while mixing in high school prospect showcases, college summer wood bat league games, coverage of minor league teams and tryout camps, you begin to visit the homes of the top prospects in your area, starting the process of getting to know the prospect and his family. Once school resumes, college scout day workouts begin, while the home visits with prospects continue. In the winter, it’s too cold to play, but you attend some indoor player workouts, while the home visits go on.
Once the spring season begins, a cold-weather scout will often head south to watch their snow-birding college prospects, but once the weather warms, you head back north to watch the prospects play, and to continue to meet with prospects and their families, following up with the kids who have been prospects all along, and getting to know the ones who are just beginning to make their mark.
In these visits, medical information may be collected, the prospects may be given psychological and vision tests, but by and large, there is conversation. Conversation about professional baseball, the lifestyle, the minor leagues, the spring training facility, you name it. Over time you learn what makes each player tick, get a feel for who the ultimate decision-maker in the family is, and try to develop the relationship to the point that a level of trust is in place for when the important, financially-based questions begin to be asked late in the spring prior to the draft.
Suffice it to stay, this relationship-building process is a very significant component of an area scout’s job, both in terms of importance and quantity of time spent. Why is so much time spent in this regard? To avoid exactly what happened in the Phillies/Ben Wetzler situation.
Put yourself in the shoes of a high school or college prospect or of their mother or father. The player has always been the star of the team, the first one picked, and has on many occasions been pursued diligently by third parties long before the area scout walked in the door. The traveling teams, the colleges, the agents/advisors in some cases, have all come calling. The player and his family, quite likely, have little sense as to where the player’s talent fits in within the context of the entire country, and unless their last name is Upton, Cecchini or Frazier, likely have little idea regarding the nuances of the major league draft. The family gets one shot at it, and for the player’s sake, they have to do everything within their power to get it right.
The area scout, who at the entry level doesn’t earn much of a salary, is the club employee responsible for developing that relationship, being the human embodiment of his major league franchise to the player and his family, and their resource for guidance throughout the draft process. The objective is not necessarily to improve the player’s chances of signing with the area scout’s club – in fact, that possibility is out of his hands, as he could do everything right and still have a one in thirty shot of getting an opportunity to sign the player, with the trigger being pulled several layers of responsibility above him. More than anything, the area scout’s responsibility to eliminate the grey area – black or white are both fine.
If at the end of the process, a high school prospect has been educated regarding the realities of the draft and pro baseball, and the inherent differences between the pro and college experiences – for better and for worse – and makes a clear decision prior to the draft, this benefits the club, even is the decision is in favor of college baseball. The club in most cases will simply use their pick on someone else, and avoid the severe consequence of a wasted draft pick. Ideally, money should not be the sole or even primary driver of a player’s decision. In the real world, however, everyone has their price. This is where the whole thing gets dicey.
Every spring, a hard-working area scout doing his job appropriately will come across one or more “pop-up” prospects. Never heard of him before, got a tip, and lo and behold, kid is throwing 92 with a functional breaking ball. Right now I’m thinking of a specific high school prospect from my area a decade ago who fit that profile, and reached the big leagues last season. There are several stages that families of such prospects tend to go through: 1) Thrilled to get attention from a scout; 2) Very receptive to information about draft and pro ball, solid sum of money plus college scholarship money that doesn’t go away sounds good to them; 3) Local “expert” from their area enters picture, pumps up family’s financial expectations beyond reason, and 4) Family has to make a final call regarding their financial requirements for the draft. If all goes well, the final result is black or white, and not grey, and there are no regrets.
Problems arise when a team thinks it has a final answer regarding the player’s financial requirements, only for them to change after the player is drafted. Today, teams have an assigned draft pool, and each and every player is drafted with a specific signing amount in mind, making the entire relationship-building process more important than ever. I am not here to pass judgment upon the Philadelphia Phillies, or upon Ben Wetzler and/or his advisor. Most likely, the Phillies thought Wetzler would sign for a certain amount, and the player changed his mind. That’s his prerogative, but at the same time, the club had invested not only a valuable 5th round pick in the player, but also a great deal of time and effort in scouting and developing a relationship with the player so that the eventual result would not occur. Most clubs in this position lick their wounds and move on. At this stage, however, the Phils took the seemingly draconian step of reporting the player to the NCAA for improper use of an advisor. No matter the details of the negotiation process in this specific case, the Phillies have clearly made no friends in the agent/advisor community, and repercussions could well be felt in drafted player negotiations going forward.
The obvious elephant in the room is this – almost every player in every year’s draft has an advisor in this day and age. The top prospects not only have representatives of 30 teams traipse into their living rooms, they also have a handful of agents doing the same exact thing. Without going into great detail, if the letter of the current NCAA law was to be enforced with regard to the actual role of agents/advisors in the signing process, let’s just say that quite a few more players’ NCAA eligibility would be compromised. It only makes sense – for most players/families, this is one of the largest financial and life decisions they will ever make. Retention of a legal/financial professional’s assistance would seem to be the normal course of business, at least at the top of the draft.
Some of my fondest memories of area scouting are of the relationships developed with players and their families, and not only with the ones you were lucky enough to have drafted and eventually sign. It is a great feeling to walk into a ballpark with scouts present from all 30 clubs, and to have the prospect single you out for a personal welcome just after he finishes throwing his bullpen. It feels great to be invited to a draftee’s wedding, years after you meet him. The relationships developed often pay real baseball dividends as well.
Like the time a New York City high school catcher who played in the city championship game the day after being drafted. I watched advisors literally chase his mother around the ballpark handing her business cards. She came directly to me and said, “Come to my house tomorrow, let’s get this done”. The family had been educated regarding the draft, the rounds, the dollars, and had developed a trust in me. We got the deal done the next day.
Or the time a draft-and-follow New Jersey pitcher had a final decision to make. His car was packed for his trip to college, taking with it any chances of him signing a pro contract. I was welcomed into the home one final time, and after we talked into the wee hours of the morning, the player’s best friend gave him life advice in words that I never could have. The player signed.
Or the time another New Jersey pitcher was the first player to agree to terms in his draft year. We had determined exactly how much it would take to sign the player in advance, but just as we were ready to select him, I received a call from the player’s father. Another team had called during the draft, offering more. I responded that our money was real, that we were moments from selecting him, and called upon the trust that had been developed between us. We drafted him, and he immediately signed.
Or the time I had dinner at a chain restaurant with an outfield prospect, his mother and grandmother. After discussing terms for a period of time, and making little progress, they asked me to step out for a moment. I came back a few minutes later, and he immediately agreed to terms. Only later did I find out that the grandmother had basically read him the riot act, and he listened. God bless her.
Stories like this happen in every draft – some, unlike those referenced above, involve contact with advisors. Relationships and levels of trust are built, enabling players to embark upon their professional dream. I consider many of the players and families – and agents – with whom I have interacted friends, and maintain ongoing relationships with them. As in any professional pursuit, interpersonal relationships are the engine that makes things work.
Something broke down in the Phillies/Wetzler case. Most likely, it was simply the case of a player changing his mind, which can and has happened to every club, with the club then taking a fairly drastic, risky measure to register their displeasure. The Phillies very well may have done everything perfectly in their evaluation and eventual drafting of Wetzler, and it wasn’t enough. Moving forward, it would certainly be in all parties’ best interest to recognize that the agent/advisor has a role in the signing process, and that this role should be more realistically spelled out in the NCAA regulations. Such a development will benefit all parties, but most of all the young, aspiring athlete in need of professional guidance that is occasionally beyond the reach of his parents and immediate family members.
Depending on one’s home base, an area scout can basically set his calendar a year in advance. I was based in the Northeast in my area scouting days, so we’ll use my calendar as a frame of reference. Just days after the annual Rule 4 draft, an initial follow list of top prospects for the next year’s draft is filed. Throughout the summer, while mixing in high school prospect showcases, college summer wood bat league games, coverage of minor league teams and tryout camps, you begin to visit the homes of the top prospects in your area, starting the process of getting to know the prospect and his family. Once school resumes, college scout day workouts begin, while the home visits with prospects continue. In the winter, it’s too cold to play, but you attend some indoor player workouts, while the home visits go on.
Once the spring season begins, a cold-weather scout will often head south to watch their snow-birding college prospects, but once the weather warms, you head back north to watch the prospects play, and to continue to meet with prospects and their families, following up with the kids who have been prospects all along, and getting to know the ones who are just beginning to make their mark.
In these visits, medical information may be collected, the prospects may be given psychological and vision tests, but by and large, there is conversation. Conversation about professional baseball, the lifestyle, the minor leagues, the spring training facility, you name it. Over time you learn what makes each player tick, get a feel for who the ultimate decision-maker in the family is, and try to develop the relationship to the point that a level of trust is in place for when the important, financially-based questions begin to be asked late in the spring prior to the draft.
Suffice it to stay, this relationship-building process is a very significant component of an area scout’s job, both in terms of importance and quantity of time spent. Why is so much time spent in this regard? To avoid exactly what happened in the Phillies/Ben Wetzler situation.
Put yourself in the shoes of a high school or college prospect or of their mother or father. The player has always been the star of the team, the first one picked, and has on many occasions been pursued diligently by third parties long before the area scout walked in the door. The traveling teams, the colleges, the agents/advisors in some cases, have all come calling. The player and his family, quite likely, have little sense as to where the player’s talent fits in within the context of the entire country, and unless their last name is Upton, Cecchini or Frazier, likely have little idea regarding the nuances of the major league draft. The family gets one shot at it, and for the player’s sake, they have to do everything within their power to get it right.
The area scout, who at the entry level doesn’t earn much of a salary, is the club employee responsible for developing that relationship, being the human embodiment of his major league franchise to the player and his family, and their resource for guidance throughout the draft process. The objective is not necessarily to improve the player’s chances of signing with the area scout’s club – in fact, that possibility is out of his hands, as he could do everything right and still have a one in thirty shot of getting an opportunity to sign the player, with the trigger being pulled several layers of responsibility above him. More than anything, the area scout’s responsibility to eliminate the grey area – black or white are both fine.
If at the end of the process, a high school prospect has been educated regarding the realities of the draft and pro baseball, and the inherent differences between the pro and college experiences – for better and for worse – and makes a clear decision prior to the draft, this benefits the club, even is the decision is in favor of college baseball. The club in most cases will simply use their pick on someone else, and avoid the severe consequence of a wasted draft pick. Ideally, money should not be the sole or even primary driver of a player’s decision. In the real world, however, everyone has their price. This is where the whole thing gets dicey.
Every spring, a hard-working area scout doing his job appropriately will come across one or more “pop-up” prospects. Never heard of him before, got a tip, and lo and behold, kid is throwing 92 with a functional breaking ball. Right now I’m thinking of a specific high school prospect from my area a decade ago who fit that profile, and reached the big leagues last season. There are several stages that families of such prospects tend to go through: 1) Thrilled to get attention from a scout; 2) Very receptive to information about draft and pro ball, solid sum of money plus college scholarship money that doesn’t go away sounds good to them; 3) Local “expert” from their area enters picture, pumps up family’s financial expectations beyond reason, and 4) Family has to make a final call regarding their financial requirements for the draft. If all goes well, the final result is black or white, and not grey, and there are no regrets.
Problems arise when a team thinks it has a final answer regarding the player’s financial requirements, only for them to change after the player is drafted. Today, teams have an assigned draft pool, and each and every player is drafted with a specific signing amount in mind, making the entire relationship-building process more important than ever. I am not here to pass judgment upon the Philadelphia Phillies, or upon Ben Wetzler and/or his advisor. Most likely, the Phillies thought Wetzler would sign for a certain amount, and the player changed his mind. That’s his prerogative, but at the same time, the club had invested not only a valuable 5th round pick in the player, but also a great deal of time and effort in scouting and developing a relationship with the player so that the eventual result would not occur. Most clubs in this position lick their wounds and move on. At this stage, however, the Phils took the seemingly draconian step of reporting the player to the NCAA for improper use of an advisor. No matter the details of the negotiation process in this specific case, the Phillies have clearly made no friends in the agent/advisor community, and repercussions could well be felt in drafted player negotiations going forward.
The obvious elephant in the room is this – almost every player in every year’s draft has an advisor in this day and age. The top prospects not only have representatives of 30 teams traipse into their living rooms, they also have a handful of agents doing the same exact thing. Without going into great detail, if the letter of the current NCAA law was to be enforced with regard to the actual role of agents/advisors in the signing process, let’s just say that quite a few more players’ NCAA eligibility would be compromised. It only makes sense – for most players/families, this is one of the largest financial and life decisions they will ever make. Retention of a legal/financial professional’s assistance would seem to be the normal course of business, at least at the top of the draft.
Some of my fondest memories of area scouting are of the relationships developed with players and their families, and not only with the ones you were lucky enough to have drafted and eventually sign. It is a great feeling to walk into a ballpark with scouts present from all 30 clubs, and to have the prospect single you out for a personal welcome just after he finishes throwing his bullpen. It feels great to be invited to a draftee’s wedding, years after you meet him. The relationships developed often pay real baseball dividends as well.
Like the time a New York City high school catcher who played in the city championship game the day after being drafted. I watched advisors literally chase his mother around the ballpark handing her business cards. She came directly to me and said, “Come to my house tomorrow, let’s get this done”. The family had been educated regarding the draft, the rounds, the dollars, and had developed a trust in me. We got the deal done the next day.
Or the time a draft-and-follow New Jersey pitcher had a final decision to make. His car was packed for his trip to college, taking with it any chances of him signing a pro contract. I was welcomed into the home one final time, and after we talked into the wee hours of the morning, the player’s best friend gave him life advice in words that I never could have. The player signed.
Or the time another New Jersey pitcher was the first player to agree to terms in his draft year. We had determined exactly how much it would take to sign the player in advance, but just as we were ready to select him, I received a call from the player’s father. Another team had called during the draft, offering more. I responded that our money was real, that we were moments from selecting him, and called upon the trust that had been developed between us. We drafted him, and he immediately signed.
Or the time I had dinner at a chain restaurant with an outfield prospect, his mother and grandmother. After discussing terms for a period of time, and making little progress, they asked me to step out for a moment. I came back a few minutes later, and he immediately agreed to terms. Only later did I find out that the grandmother had basically read him the riot act, and he listened. God bless her.
Stories like this happen in every draft – some, unlike those referenced above, involve contact with advisors. Relationships and levels of trust are built, enabling players to embark upon their professional dream. I consider many of the players and families – and agents – with whom I have interacted friends, and maintain ongoing relationships with them. As in any professional pursuit, interpersonal relationships are the engine that makes things work.
Something broke down in the Phillies/Wetzler case. Most likely, it was simply the case of a player changing his mind, which can and has happened to every club, with the club then taking a fairly drastic, risky measure to register their displeasure. The Phillies very well may have done everything perfectly in their evaluation and eventual drafting of Wetzler, and it wasn’t enough. Moving forward, it would certainly be in all parties’ best interest to recognize that the agent/advisor has a role in the signing process, and that this role should be more realistically spelled out in the NCAA regulations. Such a development will benefit all parties, but most of all the young, aspiring athlete in need of professional guidance that is occasionally beyond the reach of his parents and immediate family members.
2014 Top 10 Prospects: Boston Red Sox.
The Red Sox system is loaded with talent. A lot of the players in the 11-15 range would be on most other clubs’ Top 10 lists. If there is one area of weakness in the organization, it’s pitching — due to a lack of high-ceiling talent. Many of the arms project as mid-rotation arms or are in the lowest levels of the system.
#1 Xander Bogaerts | 70/MLB (3B/SS)
Age PA BB% K% AVG OBP SLG wOBA wRC+ Off Def WAR
20 50 10.0 % 26.0 % .250 .320 .364 .304 86 -0.4 0.2 0.2
The Year in Review: Bogaerts combined for an .865 OPS between Double-A and Triple-A in 2013. That performance led to a big league call-up at the age of 20. The young hitter held his own in 18 big league games and then produced a .412 on-base percentage in 12 playoff games.
The Scouting Report: The 21-year-old Aruba native has an advanced approach to hitting for his age. He generates good pop thanks to his quick bat but he still has more power to grow into as he matures as a hitter. He has a solid approach at the plate and a developing eye that should allow him to hit for a high average; he should also produce a strong on-base percentage. Bogaerts has shown the ability to handle both positions on the left side of the infield and has a solid arm for either shortstop or third base.
The Year Ahead: Although the Stephen Drew saga has yet to come to a conclusion, Bogaerts is the favorite to start at shortstop in 2014. It would be a wise move because the rookie has a strong shot at out-performing the veteran — despite his inexperience.
The Career Outlook: Bogaerts gave flashes of his potential during his 2013 call-up and could be a perennial all-star at either shortstop or third base for years to come in Boston.
#2 Jackie Bradley | 60/MLB (OF)
Age PA BB% K% AVG OBP SLG wOBA wRC+ Off Def WAR
23 107 9.3 % 29.0 % .189 .280 .337 .279 69 -3.0 -2.3 -0.2
The Year in Review: Bradley was a surprise addition to Boston’s opening day roster in 2013 but failed to stick. He rode the shuttle between The Show and Triple-A numerous times throughout the season and appeared in a total of 37 games with the Sox. In 80 Triple-A games, he produced an .842 OPS.
The Scouting Report: Bradley’s greatest asset is his above-average defense in center field, which comes from excellent reads, good range and a solid arm. At the plate, he shows a patient approach and isn’t afraid to work the count. He doesn’t have plus power but it could be average or a tick above. He should hit at the top of a big league lineup, although he lacks impact speed.
The Year Ahead: With Jacoby Ellsbury heading to the rival New York Yankees, Bradley has a clear shot at a permanent starting gig with Boston and he’s much more prepared for the job coming into 2014 than he was in ’13.
The Career Outlook: Bradley doesn’t have a “wow” factor but he should be an above-average defensive outfielder who produces a strong on-base percentage and some pop at the plate.
#3 Garin Cecchini | 60/AA (3B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
22 640 164 37 7 111 100 26 .316 .442 .455 .416
The Year in Review: Cecchini just keeps on hitting. The third base prospect opened 2013 in High-A ball and hit .350 with a 1.016 OPS in 63 games to earn a promotion to Double-A. There, he just missed hitting .300 but produced an .825 OPS thanks to 51 walks in 66 games.
The Scouting Report: Cecchini will probably never be your prototypical slugging third baseman but he has a chance to be a special hitter with the bat, nonetheless. He utilizes the entire field and has excellent bat control as well as a strong eye; that allowed him to walk more than he struck out in 2013. He has a chance to be a solid but unspectacular fielder with modest range and a solid arm.
The Year Ahead: If the young player performs well in spring training he could earn an opening day assignment to Triple-A after performing well in 66 Double-A games in 2013. However, with the presence of a young Will Middlebrooks in Boston, there isn’t a need to aggressively push Cecchini.
The Career Outlook: Cecchini produces an outstanding on-base percentage thanks to his ability to coax walks while also producing a strong batting average. That should allow him to be a solid third base option despite the lack of prototypical power output.
#4 Mookie Betts | 60/A+ (2B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 619 161 39 16 90 67 46 .309 .411 .491 .414
The Year in Review: Betts performed extremely well in 2013 at two A-ball levels. Combined, he produced a .417 on-base percentage and a .923 OPS while producing unexpected gap power. He didn’t turn 21 until early October but he held his own in the Arizona Fall League as one of the youngest participants.
The Scouting Report: Betts’ value jumped more than perhaps any other prospect in the system between the end of 2012 and the end of 2013. The infielder is ultra-athletic and could probably play a variety of positions, although his modest arm makes him an attractive option as a second baseman; he could be a plus defender at the keystone. At the plate, Betts generates plus bat speed that helps him generate surprising pop for his size. He also makes good contact and has a patient approach. His above-average speed could allow him to steal 20+ bases in a full season.
The Year Ahead: After hitting .341 in 51 High-A games, Betts may be ready for a promotion to Double-A and could even see Triple-A before the year is out.
The Career Outlook: Obviously, Betts is blocked at second base in Boston but he’s athletic enough to move to another position, including shortstop or centre field.
#5 Blake Swihart | 60/A- (C)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
21 422 112 29 2 41 63 7 .298 .366 .428 .364
The Year in Review: Swihart has avoided the dreaded prep catcher stagnation issue that plagues a lot of highly-drafted young catchers. He continues to get better and better with every passing season. He hit .298 with a much-improved approach at the plate in 2013; his walk rate jumped from 6.9 to 9.7% over the past two seasons.
The Scouting Report: The athletic Swihart projects to develop into an average or better defender behind the plate with strong leadership abilities. At the plate, he shows a solid approach and should hit for average with a solid on-base percentage. He doesn’t currently produce much power but projects to have at least average pop.
The Year Ahead: Swihart will move up to Double-A in 2014 and could spend the full year there with Christian Vazquez ahead of him on the depth chart and in Triple-A.
The Career Outlook: Switch-hitting catchers that can actually hit with average or better defense are not easy to find so Swihart carries a lot of value.
#6 Henry Owens | 60/AA (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
20 26 26 135.0 84 9 11.27 4.53 2.67 3.27
The Year in Review: Owens opened 2013 in High-A ball and made 20 starts at that level. He was difficult to hit with just 66 base-knocks allowed and 123 strikeouts issued in 104.2 innings. He made things easier for hitters at times, though, by struggling to find the plate; he issued 53 free passes. Owens, 21, received a six-start trial in Double-A towards the end of the season and struck out 46 batters in 30.1 innings.
The Scouting Report: The highly-projectable Owens is all arms and legs, which gives him deception, but also leads to command/control issues. Like with a lot of tall, young pitchers it may take time for the pitcher to train himself to repeat his delivery on a consistent basis. The southpaw has a low-90s fastball that touches 94-95 mph and his changeup has plus potential. His curveball has a chance to be an average or better offering. He needs to learn to use his height to his advantage and spend more time in the lower half of the strike zone in an effort to induce more ground-ball outs.
The Year Ahead: Owens will no doubt return to Double-A to open the 2014 season. He could also see Triple-A action in 2014 but he may not be quite ready for the Majors unless he takes a huge step forward with his command.
The Career Outlook: The tall lefty has the ceiling of a No. 2 or 3 starter if he realizes his full potential and finds a consistent feel for his breaking ball. Even if he ends up as more of a No. 4, though, he could have value as a workhorse.
#7 Matt Barnes | 60/AAA (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
23 25 25 113.1 115 11 11.28 3.81 4.13 3.33
The Year in Review: The right-hander made 24 starts in Double-A. His lack of polish caught up to him and Barnes allowed quite a few base runners with 112 hits and 46 walks in 108.0 innings. On the plus side, he missed his fair share of bats and struck out 135 batters. He made one start at the Triple-A level without allowing a run in 5.1 innings.
The Scouting Report: Barnes, 23, succeeds based on the strength of his mid-to-upper-90s fastball, which shows good movement. He also has a changeup and curveball but both offerings need polish to become consistently above average; the former shows the most potential. There is a chance that he may end up as a high-leverage reliever based on the strength of his fastball-changeup combo.
The Year Ahead: The University of Connecticut alum should spend much of the year in Triple-A but could see his first big league action in 2014 if/when an injury strikes the big league staff.
The Career Outlook: Barnes has a strong frame that suggests he could develop into an innings-eating No. 3 or 4 starter depending on the development of his secondary stuff.
#8 Trey Ball | 60/R (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
19 5 5 7.0 10 1 6.43 7.71 6.43 6.20
The Year in Review: Ball made just five appearances after turning pro in 2013. In seven innings at the Rookie ball level, he struggled with both his command and control. He allowed 10 hits and six walks.
The Scouting Report: Selected seventh overall in 2013, Ball didn’t focus on pitching full-time until turning pro. Much like former Red Sox prospect Casey Kelly, the Indiana native native was a two-way player in high school so he could see his skills take a big jump forward as he devotes himself to pitching. A very athletic player, Ball has a solid delivery and could develop both above-average control and command. He throws his fastball up into the low 90s and both his secondary offerings — a curveball and changeup — show the potential to develop into above-average offerings.
The Year Ahead: Because he’s a little bit behind due to his double-duty in high school, Ball may open 2014 in extended spring training. If he comes out strong, though, Boston could push him to Low-A ball.
The Career Outlook: He still has a lot to learn but Ball has the necessary athleticism to take quick steps forward in his development on the mound.
#9 Allen Webster | 60/ MLB (P)
Age IP K/9 BB/9 GB% ERA FIP xFIP RA9-WAR WAR
23 30.1 6.82 5.34 43.1 % 8.60 6.51 5.18 -0.9 -0.3
The Year in Review: Webster made his long-awaited MLB debut in his six pro season but was bounced around due to a lack of command and control. He allowed 18 walks and 37 hits in 30.1 innings. In 21 Triple-A starts, Webster produced a solid ground ball rate and struck out 116 batters in 105.0 innings.
The Scouting Report: A starter for most of his career, Webster’s command and control issues may prevent him from realizing his full potential as a starter. However, he’s flashed significant promise during brief stints in the bullpen. With mid-to-high 90s velocity, the right-hander can be down right dominant when he commands it — and especially when he’s also throwing his changeup and breaking ball for strikes. His ground-ball tendencies add significant value.
The Year Ahead: Webster has a shot at beating out Felix Doubront for the fifth starter’s role but, more than likely, he’ll head back to Triple-A and may be the first starting pitcher recalled in the event of an injury or demotion.
The Career Outlook: Webster’s future may lie in the bullpen if he cannot add the necessary polish to his game, but he could develop into a dominant, late-game reliever.
#10 Christian Vazquez | 55/R (C)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
22 403 99 19 5 48 44 7 .287 .375 .391 .355
The Year in Review: The young catcher saw his value increase significantly as his bat took a step forward. He trimmed his strikeout rate and walked more than he K’d (47-44) while playing at Double-A. He also saw one game of action at the Triple-A level.
The Scouting Report: Vazquez’s strength is behind the plate and he has a chance to be one of the better defensive catchers in the American League. He makes youthful mistakes at times but he calls a good game and is an excellent receiver with a strong arm. At the plate, he showed a patient approach in 2013 that helped him walk more than he struck out. He has some gap pop but he’ll probably never hit for much home run power.
The Year Ahead: With the catching tandem of A.J. Pierzynski and David Ross reaching the twilight of their respective careers, injuries could become more commonplace so Vazquez might be a busy man riding the Pawtucket/Boston shuttle.
The Career Outlook: Vazquez will certainly be challenged by the catching depth in the system with the likes of Blake Swihart and Jon Denney coming up behind him but the Puerto Rico native offers the best defense out of the group.
The Next Five:
11. Jonathan Denney, C: Denney was a potential first round draft pick in 2013 but slid to the Sox in the third round due to signability concerns. The young catcher shows potential behind the plate, although he’s far from a finished product. At the plate, he’s overly aggressive at times but has plus power potential from the right side of the dish.
12. Manuel Margot, OF: Margot is a toolsy outfield prospect that’s oozing with raw potential. He made some adjustments throughout the 2013 season and came on strong in the last month of the year — leading to the expectation that the 19 year old will be ready for full season ball in 2014. He has good speed, a strong arm and should hit for more authority as he matures as a hitter.
13. Anthony Ranaudo, RHP: In a lot of organizations, Ranaudo would be a no-brainer as a Top 10 prospect. In the deep Red Sox system, though, he just doesn’t make the cut. Injuries have been a problem for Ranaudo in the past — as well as inconsistent results — but he pitched well in both Double-A and Triple-A in 2013. He has the ceiling of a No. 3 starter.
14. Deven Marrero, SS: The 24th overall selection from the 2012 amateur draft, Marrero’s offense was a disappointment in his first full season. He posted an OPS of just .655 while splitting the season between High-A and Double-A. On the plus side, he stole 27 bases in 29 tries and also showed a patient approach at the plate. He’ll certainly stick at shortstop at the big league level, and he could eventually force Xander Bogaerts off the position — assuming the Arizona State alum hits well enough to by an everyday guy.
15. Brandon Workman, RHP: After working as a starter in the minors, Workman found his niche at the big league level as a reliever. His four-pitch repertoire gives him a shot at returning to the rotation but the depth on the Red Sox may keep him in the ‘pen barring a trade or injury. Workman posted a 10.15 K/9 strikeout rate in the Majors but still needs to polish his command.
#1 Xander Bogaerts | 70/MLB (3B/SS)
Age PA BB% K% AVG OBP SLG wOBA wRC+ Off Def WAR
20 50 10.0 % 26.0 % .250 .320 .364 .304 86 -0.4 0.2 0.2
The Year in Review: Bogaerts combined for an .865 OPS between Double-A and Triple-A in 2013. That performance led to a big league call-up at the age of 20. The young hitter held his own in 18 big league games and then produced a .412 on-base percentage in 12 playoff games.
The Scouting Report: The 21-year-old Aruba native has an advanced approach to hitting for his age. He generates good pop thanks to his quick bat but he still has more power to grow into as he matures as a hitter. He has a solid approach at the plate and a developing eye that should allow him to hit for a high average; he should also produce a strong on-base percentage. Bogaerts has shown the ability to handle both positions on the left side of the infield and has a solid arm for either shortstop or third base.
The Year Ahead: Although the Stephen Drew saga has yet to come to a conclusion, Bogaerts is the favorite to start at shortstop in 2014. It would be a wise move because the rookie has a strong shot at out-performing the veteran — despite his inexperience.
The Career Outlook: Bogaerts gave flashes of his potential during his 2013 call-up and could be a perennial all-star at either shortstop or third base for years to come in Boston.
#2 Jackie Bradley | 60/MLB (OF)
Age PA BB% K% AVG OBP SLG wOBA wRC+ Off Def WAR
23 107 9.3 % 29.0 % .189 .280 .337 .279 69 -3.0 -2.3 -0.2
The Year in Review: Bradley was a surprise addition to Boston’s opening day roster in 2013 but failed to stick. He rode the shuttle between The Show and Triple-A numerous times throughout the season and appeared in a total of 37 games with the Sox. In 80 Triple-A games, he produced an .842 OPS.
The Scouting Report: Bradley’s greatest asset is his above-average defense in center field, which comes from excellent reads, good range and a solid arm. At the plate, he shows a patient approach and isn’t afraid to work the count. He doesn’t have plus power but it could be average or a tick above. He should hit at the top of a big league lineup, although he lacks impact speed.
The Year Ahead: With Jacoby Ellsbury heading to the rival New York Yankees, Bradley has a clear shot at a permanent starting gig with Boston and he’s much more prepared for the job coming into 2014 than he was in ’13.
The Career Outlook: Bradley doesn’t have a “wow” factor but he should be an above-average defensive outfielder who produces a strong on-base percentage and some pop at the plate.
#3 Garin Cecchini | 60/AA (3B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
22 640 164 37 7 111 100 26 .316 .442 .455 .416
The Year in Review: Cecchini just keeps on hitting. The third base prospect opened 2013 in High-A ball and hit .350 with a 1.016 OPS in 63 games to earn a promotion to Double-A. There, he just missed hitting .300 but produced an .825 OPS thanks to 51 walks in 66 games.
The Scouting Report: Cecchini will probably never be your prototypical slugging third baseman but he has a chance to be a special hitter with the bat, nonetheless. He utilizes the entire field and has excellent bat control as well as a strong eye; that allowed him to walk more than he struck out in 2013. He has a chance to be a solid but unspectacular fielder with modest range and a solid arm.
The Year Ahead: If the young player performs well in spring training he could earn an opening day assignment to Triple-A after performing well in 66 Double-A games in 2013. However, with the presence of a young Will Middlebrooks in Boston, there isn’t a need to aggressively push Cecchini.
The Career Outlook: Cecchini produces an outstanding on-base percentage thanks to his ability to coax walks while also producing a strong batting average. That should allow him to be a solid third base option despite the lack of prototypical power output.
#4 Mookie Betts | 60/A+ (2B)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
20 619 161 39 16 90 67 46 .309 .411 .491 .414
The Year in Review: Betts performed extremely well in 2013 at two A-ball levels. Combined, he produced a .417 on-base percentage and a .923 OPS while producing unexpected gap power. He didn’t turn 21 until early October but he held his own in the Arizona Fall League as one of the youngest participants.
The Scouting Report: Betts’ value jumped more than perhaps any other prospect in the system between the end of 2012 and the end of 2013. The infielder is ultra-athletic and could probably play a variety of positions, although his modest arm makes him an attractive option as a second baseman; he could be a plus defender at the keystone. At the plate, Betts generates plus bat speed that helps him generate surprising pop for his size. He also makes good contact and has a patient approach. His above-average speed could allow him to steal 20+ bases in a full season.
The Year Ahead: After hitting .341 in 51 High-A games, Betts may be ready for a promotion to Double-A and could even see Triple-A before the year is out.
The Career Outlook: Obviously, Betts is blocked at second base in Boston but he’s athletic enough to move to another position, including shortstop or centre field.
#5 Blake Swihart | 60/A- (C)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
21 422 112 29 2 41 63 7 .298 .366 .428 .364
The Year in Review: Swihart has avoided the dreaded prep catcher stagnation issue that plagues a lot of highly-drafted young catchers. He continues to get better and better with every passing season. He hit .298 with a much-improved approach at the plate in 2013; his walk rate jumped from 6.9 to 9.7% over the past two seasons.
The Scouting Report: The athletic Swihart projects to develop into an average or better defender behind the plate with strong leadership abilities. At the plate, he shows a solid approach and should hit for average with a solid on-base percentage. He doesn’t currently produce much power but projects to have at least average pop.
The Year Ahead: Swihart will move up to Double-A in 2014 and could spend the full year there with Christian Vazquez ahead of him on the depth chart and in Triple-A.
The Career Outlook: Switch-hitting catchers that can actually hit with average or better defense are not easy to find so Swihart carries a lot of value.
#6 Henry Owens | 60/AA (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
20 26 26 135.0 84 9 11.27 4.53 2.67 3.27
The Year in Review: Owens opened 2013 in High-A ball and made 20 starts at that level. He was difficult to hit with just 66 base-knocks allowed and 123 strikeouts issued in 104.2 innings. He made things easier for hitters at times, though, by struggling to find the plate; he issued 53 free passes. Owens, 21, received a six-start trial in Double-A towards the end of the season and struck out 46 batters in 30.1 innings.
The Scouting Report: The highly-projectable Owens is all arms and legs, which gives him deception, but also leads to command/control issues. Like with a lot of tall, young pitchers it may take time for the pitcher to train himself to repeat his delivery on a consistent basis. The southpaw has a low-90s fastball that touches 94-95 mph and his changeup has plus potential. His curveball has a chance to be an average or better offering. He needs to learn to use his height to his advantage and spend more time in the lower half of the strike zone in an effort to induce more ground-ball outs.
The Year Ahead: Owens will no doubt return to Double-A to open the 2014 season. He could also see Triple-A action in 2014 but he may not be quite ready for the Majors unless he takes a huge step forward with his command.
The Career Outlook: The tall lefty has the ceiling of a No. 2 or 3 starter if he realizes his full potential and finds a consistent feel for his breaking ball. Even if he ends up as more of a No. 4, though, he could have value as a workhorse.
#7 Matt Barnes | 60/AAA (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
23 25 25 113.1 115 11 11.28 3.81 4.13 3.33
The Year in Review: The right-hander made 24 starts in Double-A. His lack of polish caught up to him and Barnes allowed quite a few base runners with 112 hits and 46 walks in 108.0 innings. On the plus side, he missed his fair share of bats and struck out 135 batters. He made one start at the Triple-A level without allowing a run in 5.1 innings.
The Scouting Report: Barnes, 23, succeeds based on the strength of his mid-to-upper-90s fastball, which shows good movement. He also has a changeup and curveball but both offerings need polish to become consistently above average; the former shows the most potential. There is a chance that he may end up as a high-leverage reliever based on the strength of his fastball-changeup combo.
The Year Ahead: The University of Connecticut alum should spend much of the year in Triple-A but could see his first big league action in 2014 if/when an injury strikes the big league staff.
The Career Outlook: Barnes has a strong frame that suggests he could develop into an innings-eating No. 3 or 4 starter depending on the development of his secondary stuff.
#8 Trey Ball | 60/R (P)
Age G GS IP H HR K/9 BB/9 ERA FIP
19 5 5 7.0 10 1 6.43 7.71 6.43 6.20
The Year in Review: Ball made just five appearances after turning pro in 2013. In seven innings at the Rookie ball level, he struggled with both his command and control. He allowed 10 hits and six walks.
The Scouting Report: Selected seventh overall in 2013, Ball didn’t focus on pitching full-time until turning pro. Much like former Red Sox prospect Casey Kelly, the Indiana native native was a two-way player in high school so he could see his skills take a big jump forward as he devotes himself to pitching. A very athletic player, Ball has a solid delivery and could develop both above-average control and command. He throws his fastball up into the low 90s and both his secondary offerings — a curveball and changeup — show the potential to develop into above-average offerings.
The Year Ahead: Because he’s a little bit behind due to his double-duty in high school, Ball may open 2014 in extended spring training. If he comes out strong, though, Boston could push him to Low-A ball.
The Career Outlook: He still has a lot to learn but Ball has the necessary athleticism to take quick steps forward in his development on the mound.
#9 Allen Webster | 60/ MLB (P)
Age IP K/9 BB/9 GB% ERA FIP xFIP RA9-WAR WAR
23 30.1 6.82 5.34 43.1 % 8.60 6.51 5.18 -0.9 -0.3
The Year in Review: Webster made his long-awaited MLB debut in his six pro season but was bounced around due to a lack of command and control. He allowed 18 walks and 37 hits in 30.1 innings. In 21 Triple-A starts, Webster produced a solid ground ball rate and struck out 116 batters in 105.0 innings.
The Scouting Report: A starter for most of his career, Webster’s command and control issues may prevent him from realizing his full potential as a starter. However, he’s flashed significant promise during brief stints in the bullpen. With mid-to-high 90s velocity, the right-hander can be down right dominant when he commands it — and especially when he’s also throwing his changeup and breaking ball for strikes. His ground-ball tendencies add significant value.
The Year Ahead: Webster has a shot at beating out Felix Doubront for the fifth starter’s role but, more than likely, he’ll head back to Triple-A and may be the first starting pitcher recalled in the event of an injury or demotion.
The Career Outlook: Webster’s future may lie in the bullpen if he cannot add the necessary polish to his game, but he could develop into a dominant, late-game reliever.
#10 Christian Vazquez | 55/R (C)
Age PA H 2B HR BB SO SB AVG OBP SLG wOBA
22 403 99 19 5 48 44 7 .287 .375 .391 .355
The Year in Review: The young catcher saw his value increase significantly as his bat took a step forward. He trimmed his strikeout rate and walked more than he K’d (47-44) while playing at Double-A. He also saw one game of action at the Triple-A level.
The Scouting Report: Vazquez’s strength is behind the plate and he has a chance to be one of the better defensive catchers in the American League. He makes youthful mistakes at times but he calls a good game and is an excellent receiver with a strong arm. At the plate, he showed a patient approach in 2013 that helped him walk more than he struck out. He has some gap pop but he’ll probably never hit for much home run power.
The Year Ahead: With the catching tandem of A.J. Pierzynski and David Ross reaching the twilight of their respective careers, injuries could become more commonplace so Vazquez might be a busy man riding the Pawtucket/Boston shuttle.
The Career Outlook: Vazquez will certainly be challenged by the catching depth in the system with the likes of Blake Swihart and Jon Denney coming up behind him but the Puerto Rico native offers the best defense out of the group.
The Next Five:
11. Jonathan Denney, C: Denney was a potential first round draft pick in 2013 but slid to the Sox in the third round due to signability concerns. The young catcher shows potential behind the plate, although he’s far from a finished product. At the plate, he’s overly aggressive at times but has plus power potential from the right side of the dish.
12. Manuel Margot, OF: Margot is a toolsy outfield prospect that’s oozing with raw potential. He made some adjustments throughout the 2013 season and came on strong in the last month of the year — leading to the expectation that the 19 year old will be ready for full season ball in 2014. He has good speed, a strong arm and should hit for more authority as he matures as a hitter.
13. Anthony Ranaudo, RHP: In a lot of organizations, Ranaudo would be a no-brainer as a Top 10 prospect. In the deep Red Sox system, though, he just doesn’t make the cut. Injuries have been a problem for Ranaudo in the past — as well as inconsistent results — but he pitched well in both Double-A and Triple-A in 2013. He has the ceiling of a No. 3 starter.
14. Deven Marrero, SS: The 24th overall selection from the 2012 amateur draft, Marrero’s offense was a disappointment in his first full season. He posted an OPS of just .655 while splitting the season between High-A and Double-A. On the plus side, he stole 27 bases in 29 tries and also showed a patient approach at the plate. He’ll certainly stick at shortstop at the big league level, and he could eventually force Xander Bogaerts off the position — assuming the Arizona State alum hits well enough to by an everyday guy.
15. Brandon Workman, RHP: After working as a starter in the minors, Workman found his niche at the big league level as a reliever. His four-pitch repertoire gives him a shot at returning to the rotation but the depth on the Red Sox may keep him in the ‘pen barring a trade or injury. Workman posted a 10.15 K/9 strikeout rate in the Majors but still needs to polish his command.
The Most- and Least-Improved Teams for 2014.
Here’s the thing about projections: we always want them to get better, but we never want them to be perfect. Not that perfect is anywhere within our grasp, but in the hypothetical reality where we knew for sure what was going to happen, sports would be ruined. We don’t want to know the future — we just want to think we do, so we can talk about and analyze things that haven’t fully played out. With that in mind, hey look, we have complete combined 2014 data for Steamer and ZiPS!
We have combined 2014 season projections, and we have author-generated team-by-team depth charts. So what we have is an idea of the projected upcoming standings, an intelligent declaration of how things will go that we know will look kind of silly in six months. Reality always deviates from the projections, but that doesn’t mean the projections are valueless, and I thought it could be worth looking at which teams appear the most and least improved from last season.
The simplest approach: a raw comparison of 2013 team WAR to projected 2014 team WAR. Now, that might not seem right to you. Projections are based around estimated true talent. Last season’s raw WAR doesn’t capture true talent — it captures true talent +/- a whole lot of luck. But the way people always think about this is, the most recent record was the “real” record. Which teams stand to post the most- and least-improved records? Just because last year’s Astros were worse than they should’ve been doesn’t mean they didn’t happen. Ask anybody. They happened.
I’ll spoil something right away — of course, a phenomenon you’re going to notice is regression to the mean. Last year’s worst teams ought to do better. Last year’s best teams ought to do worse. The standings can sometimes exaggerate the real spread of talent, and over a bigger sample, you expect teams to play closer to average. The lists you’re going to see aren’t just in order of 2013 record, but there’s a definite correlation.
Now then, the whole process was simple. For each team, I added up 2013 WAR. Then I went to this page to track down the projected 2014 WAR. Ervin Santana is still out there as a meaningful free agent, but not a lot about this is going to change on account of someone signing Ervin Santana. I did have to make one adjustment, because right now the projected 2014 WARs add up to something well over 1,000. Once that was adjusted down, it became a matter of simple sorting and subtraction.
We’ll begin with the ten most-improved teams:
Astros, +18 WAR
Phillies, +12
Mariners, +11
Marlins, +8
Yankees, +8
Blue Jays, +8
Padres, +8
White Sox, +6
Twins, +5
Brewers, +4
One interesting thing about the Astros: they project to be way, way better this year than last. Another interesting thing about the Astros: they still project for the second-lowest WAR in baseball, between the Twins and the Marlins. That’s a better team, an improved team, but it’s still a bad team with a handful of shinier pieces. While neither Dexter Fowler nor Scott Feldman is a widely-recognized superstar, they’re hints of adequacy on a roster with a greater degree of adequacy and depth. Improvements tend to be swiftest at the start, and last season was a disaster.
I’ll note that, between 2003-2004, the Tigers went from about 2 WAR to about 33. There were different players, but not as many as you might expect. Ivan Rodriguez didn’t hurt the cause. The Astros didn’t pick up an Ivan Rodriguez, but it’s not like they’re feeling a real sense of urgency.
The Phillies, in a sense, are a positive regression case. They also added A.J. Burnett, Roberto Hernandez, Miguel Gonzalez, and Marlon Byrd, so while they also don’t project very well, they should be in the hunt a little longer. It pains me to say that the Phillies should be better for no longer having Roy Halladay. It pains me less to say they should be better for no longer having Delmon Young.
It’s not surprising to see the Mariners, because they made the biggest splash of all by signing Robinson Cano. Nearby, you also see Cano’s former team, which elected to replace him with Jacoby Ellsbury, Brian McCann, and Masahiro Tanaka. So, the Mariners benefited by adding a star. The Yankees lost one star and added three, which is a different approach. In between, there are the Marlins, who if nothing else should get twice the year from Giancarlo Stanton.
The Blue Jays should be able to look ahead to better health and fewer black holes. As much as theirs has been an offseason of inactivity, they should get better just by staying the same. The Padres, meanwhile, have put together a fairly interesting rotation, and a rotation that includes none of Edinson Volquez, Clayton Richard, and Jason Marquis. While San Diego might be the worst team in the NL West at the moment, they’re also a more or less average team in a division that’s light on great but heavy on depth.
Now to turn things around and look at the other end of the spreadsheet:
Red Sox, -16 WAR
Tigers, -14
Rays, -8
Braves, -8
Athletics, -8
Reds, -7
Rangers, -7
Royals, -6
Orioles, -6
Pirates, -5
A lot of people have asked how the Red Sox are going to survive the losses of Ellsbury, Jarrod Saltalamacchia, and Stephen Drew. Similarly, people have observed that the Tigers have downgraded by losing guys like Doug Fister, Jhonny Peralta, and Prince Fielder. Absolutely, it looks like both teams will step back. But one has to understand just how good these teams were a year ago. The Red Sox had the highest team WAR in baseball. The Tigers came in second. The Rays were in third, a full ten WAR behind Detroit. These teams could afford to lose some ground, and even still they look like the favorites to win each of their respective divisions. The Red Sox will be in a battle, but they have plenty of organizational depth. The Tigers have less depth, but also should have less of a struggle to reach the Division Series.
All of these are at least fairly good teams. They were all good teams in 2013. The Rays are projected to regress a little bit in a lot of different places. The Braves have spent the offseason signing players they already had, and they’re also projected for an accumulation of little regressions. Same story for the A’s, although Josh Donaldson is projected for more than a little regression. Last year, he was worth almost eight wins. This year he’s pegged for a little over four. It’s worth noting the A’s lost Bartolo Colon and don’t have the same rotation depth. They have all kinds of depth in the field.
The Reds simply haven’t done anything, and they’ve lost Shin-soo Choo. Projections expect less from the stars that remain. The Rangers have some pitching-staff issues to work out given the injured Derek Holland and the absent Joe Nathan. The Royals and Orioles have made some offseason additions, but the Royals remain a good deal behind the Tigers and the projections just aren’t quite buying the breakouts of Chris Davis and Manny Machado. Finally, we’ve talked about the Pirates regressing for months, and they could really end up missing A.J. Burnett. There are interesting pieces to possibly lift them up within the system, but the Pirates haven’t moved forward since finally getting back to October and a repeat performance doesn’t seem to be so obviously in the cards.
All the other teams — they’re within two of last year’s total WAR. Funny how that one worked out. At present, the Giants, Cardinals, and Angels are projected to be the exact same. The divisions around them have changed, but they haven’t, so much. At least until we observe the unpredictable. Then we’ll be like, welp, so much for everything we talked about before.
We have combined 2014 season projections, and we have author-generated team-by-team depth charts. So what we have is an idea of the projected upcoming standings, an intelligent declaration of how things will go that we know will look kind of silly in six months. Reality always deviates from the projections, but that doesn’t mean the projections are valueless, and I thought it could be worth looking at which teams appear the most and least improved from last season.
The simplest approach: a raw comparison of 2013 team WAR to projected 2014 team WAR. Now, that might not seem right to you. Projections are based around estimated true talent. Last season’s raw WAR doesn’t capture true talent — it captures true talent +/- a whole lot of luck. But the way people always think about this is, the most recent record was the “real” record. Which teams stand to post the most- and least-improved records? Just because last year’s Astros were worse than they should’ve been doesn’t mean they didn’t happen. Ask anybody. They happened.
I’ll spoil something right away — of course, a phenomenon you’re going to notice is regression to the mean. Last year’s worst teams ought to do better. Last year’s best teams ought to do worse. The standings can sometimes exaggerate the real spread of talent, and over a bigger sample, you expect teams to play closer to average. The lists you’re going to see aren’t just in order of 2013 record, but there’s a definite correlation.
Now then, the whole process was simple. For each team, I added up 2013 WAR. Then I went to this page to track down the projected 2014 WAR. Ervin Santana is still out there as a meaningful free agent, but not a lot about this is going to change on account of someone signing Ervin Santana. I did have to make one adjustment, because right now the projected 2014 WARs add up to something well over 1,000. Once that was adjusted down, it became a matter of simple sorting and subtraction.
We’ll begin with the ten most-improved teams:
Astros, +18 WAR
Phillies, +12
Mariners, +11
Marlins, +8
Yankees, +8
Blue Jays, +8
Padres, +8
White Sox, +6
Twins, +5
Brewers, +4
One interesting thing about the Astros: they project to be way, way better this year than last. Another interesting thing about the Astros: they still project for the second-lowest WAR in baseball, between the Twins and the Marlins. That’s a better team, an improved team, but it’s still a bad team with a handful of shinier pieces. While neither Dexter Fowler nor Scott Feldman is a widely-recognized superstar, they’re hints of adequacy on a roster with a greater degree of adequacy and depth. Improvements tend to be swiftest at the start, and last season was a disaster.
I’ll note that, between 2003-2004, the Tigers went from about 2 WAR to about 33. There were different players, but not as many as you might expect. Ivan Rodriguez didn’t hurt the cause. The Astros didn’t pick up an Ivan Rodriguez, but it’s not like they’re feeling a real sense of urgency.
The Phillies, in a sense, are a positive regression case. They also added A.J. Burnett, Roberto Hernandez, Miguel Gonzalez, and Marlon Byrd, so while they also don’t project very well, they should be in the hunt a little longer. It pains me to say that the Phillies should be better for no longer having Roy Halladay. It pains me less to say they should be better for no longer having Delmon Young.
It’s not surprising to see the Mariners, because they made the biggest splash of all by signing Robinson Cano. Nearby, you also see Cano’s former team, which elected to replace him with Jacoby Ellsbury, Brian McCann, and Masahiro Tanaka. So, the Mariners benefited by adding a star. The Yankees lost one star and added three, which is a different approach. In between, there are the Marlins, who if nothing else should get twice the year from Giancarlo Stanton.
The Blue Jays should be able to look ahead to better health and fewer black holes. As much as theirs has been an offseason of inactivity, they should get better just by staying the same. The Padres, meanwhile, have put together a fairly interesting rotation, and a rotation that includes none of Edinson Volquez, Clayton Richard, and Jason Marquis. While San Diego might be the worst team in the NL West at the moment, they’re also a more or less average team in a division that’s light on great but heavy on depth.
Now to turn things around and look at the other end of the spreadsheet:
Red Sox, -16 WAR
Tigers, -14
Rays, -8
Braves, -8
Athletics, -8
Reds, -7
Rangers, -7
Royals, -6
Orioles, -6
Pirates, -5
A lot of people have asked how the Red Sox are going to survive the losses of Ellsbury, Jarrod Saltalamacchia, and Stephen Drew. Similarly, people have observed that the Tigers have downgraded by losing guys like Doug Fister, Jhonny Peralta, and Prince Fielder. Absolutely, it looks like both teams will step back. But one has to understand just how good these teams were a year ago. The Red Sox had the highest team WAR in baseball. The Tigers came in second. The Rays were in third, a full ten WAR behind Detroit. These teams could afford to lose some ground, and even still they look like the favorites to win each of their respective divisions. The Red Sox will be in a battle, but they have plenty of organizational depth. The Tigers have less depth, but also should have less of a struggle to reach the Division Series.
All of these are at least fairly good teams. They were all good teams in 2013. The Rays are projected to regress a little bit in a lot of different places. The Braves have spent the offseason signing players they already had, and they’re also projected for an accumulation of little regressions. Same story for the A’s, although Josh Donaldson is projected for more than a little regression. Last year, he was worth almost eight wins. This year he’s pegged for a little over four. It’s worth noting the A’s lost Bartolo Colon and don’t have the same rotation depth. They have all kinds of depth in the field.
The Reds simply haven’t done anything, and they’ve lost Shin-soo Choo. Projections expect less from the stars that remain. The Rangers have some pitching-staff issues to work out given the injured Derek Holland and the absent Joe Nathan. The Royals and Orioles have made some offseason additions, but the Royals remain a good deal behind the Tigers and the projections just aren’t quite buying the breakouts of Chris Davis and Manny Machado. Finally, we’ve talked about the Pirates regressing for months, and they could really end up missing A.J. Burnett. There are interesting pieces to possibly lift them up within the system, but the Pirates haven’t moved forward since finally getting back to October and a repeat performance doesn’t seem to be so obviously in the cards.
All the other teams — they’re within two of last year’s total WAR. Funny how that one worked out. At present, the Giants, Cardinals, and Angels are projected to be the exact same. The divisions around them have changed, but they haven’t, so much. At least until we observe the unpredictable. Then we’ll be like, welp, so much for everything we talked about before.
Did Houston Spend Wisely This Winter?
How you view the near-unprecedented teardown of the Houston Astros depends largely on how you view the sport of baseball as a whole. If you’re in it for the long haul, for the joy of seeing teams attempting to build dynasties from within and using their resources effectively, you probably appreciate the commitment to the vision. If you’re a fan who doesn’t enjoy spending your hard-earned dollars to go watch a bunch of players you’ve never heard of (“Look, kids, Marwin Gonzalez!”) lose over 100 games for the third season in a row, then you probably find it to be an abomination.
It’s safe to say that the majority of FanGraphs readers fall under the first category, though there’s a certain validity to both sides. But all that really matters is how ownership feels about it, because while Jim Crane’s commitment to letting Jeff Luhnow blow things up and start from scratch has been admirable so far, there’s only so many 0.0 television ratings a businessman can suffer. That’s especially true as attendance has continued to shrink — down from just over three million in 2007 to half that in 2013, ahead of only three other clubs — and as reports surfaced in December that MLBPA head Tony Clark was “monitoring” the Houston situation, given that the club’s $549,603 average per player was the lowest the sport had seen since the 1999 Royals, who paid out $534,460 per player while losing 97 games. (Luhnow disputes the accuracy of that report, but the fact that Houston’s payroll was particularly low is unavoidable.)
While it’d be beyond foolhardy to deviate from the plan now, and while the continued television mess is a huge limitation for the team, we heard multiple times last fall that the Astros planned to spend to improve the big league team in 2014, with Luhnow insisting the result would be better on the field. It would have been difficult not to, anyway, because additional cost-cutting moves during the season led to an end-of-season roster which had only $1.437 million committed to Jose Altuve in 2014, along with an arbitration case for Jason Castro and $5.5m to Pittsburgh to cover Wandy Rodriguez.
When we started hearing things like “the payroll could be between $50-60 million next year” and that they might actually be in on Shin-Soo Choo, I took the time in early November to imagine all the fun they could have this winter with that flexibility, starting from essentially payroll-zero to spend $50 million or more. The Astros didn’t follow any of my tongue-in-cheek plans — I guess we won’t be seeing an outfield of Choo, Jacoby Ellsbury, and Nate McLouth any time soon — nor did they go down the more realistic path I laid out.
But they did take some steps to improving, making one big trade and signing several major league free agents. As Wendy Thurm wrote earlier today, the Opening Day payroll appears to be around $49 million, ahead of the Marlins but still a good $20 million behind the next-stingiest team, Pittsburgh. Still, it’s in the range that was promised months ago, and it’s a step forward. Did the road Houston took this winter make sense?
The answer to that question really depends on what you’re expecting to get out of this season for the Astros. They are, still, unavoidably a bad team. Even if they improved by 20 games this year — a massive leap — they’d still have 91 losses. In a division with two clear contenders, an Angels team that still has Mike Trout, and a Seattle club that, for all its flaws, did add Robinson Cano, there’s almost no way 2014 doesn’t end with a fourth-straight last-place finish.
But if the goal here is merely to say they’ve found rock bottom, turned the corner, seen the light, however you want to put it, all without damaging the bright future they have, then this winter has been a pretty successful one in Houston. Take, for example, the three categories of deals they made.
1) Traded Jordan Lyles and Brandon Barnes for Dexter Fowler ($7.85m, with one arbitration year remaining).
This move was so good that it made Dave Cameron’s list of the 10 best transactions of the offseason, even ahead of the Dodgers taking a one-year gamble on Dan Haren, which was universally loved. In order to upgrade from one 28-year-old outfielder to another, the cost was a still-talented young arm who has shown very little improvement in parts of three seasons in the big leagues. Put another way: last year’s Houston rotation was one of the worst in the bigs, and Lyles was below-average even only among Astros starters. He may yet improve; he may not, although Colorado isn’t the best place for him to find out. In return, Houston picked up a solid two-to-three win player who can get on base, do some damage when he’s there, and add a little power. Fowler is not without flaws; he’s also clearly better than Barnes, by multiple wins, and at 29 next season, may yet have some trade value if the team chooses to flip him.
2) Signed Scott Feldman (3/$30m) and Jerome Williams (1/$2.1m) to the rotation.
Feldman is not exciting, even though he’s taking up nearly a quarter of the club payroll. Williams is less exciting. But then, the baseline isn’t “exciting.” It’s not “playoffs.” For this team, it’s merely “getting better,” and in order to add at least something to that awful rotation, the options were limited. Houston wasn’t going to give up a draft pick for an Ervin Santana or an Ubaldo Jimenez, nor should they have, even if any of those guys wanted to come to Houston. They weren’t going to trade for David Price or entice Tim Hudson to spend his final years in last place. They weren’t going to convince Bronson Arroyo to take his brand of flyballery to Houston, and again, in last place.
That means that what’s left are the mild upgrades, and Feldman and Williams certainly count as that. Feldman, when healthy, has consistently put up seasonal FIP numbers of around 4.00, and xFIP slightly less than that, though BABIP fluctuations has made the ERA not always align. $10 million annually sounds high; then again, that barely buys two wins these days, we can’t know how much extra the Astros needed to kick in to convince even a mildly-useful player to come. Williams may or may not end up in the bullpen, and may or may not continue on the pace that made him worth about 1 WAR in 351 innings for the Angels. For $2.1m, it’s practically free to find out, and again, WAR only works when the guys you’re replacing are even up to being the R.
3) Added Matt Albers (1/$2.45m with club option), Chad Qualls (2/$6m with club option), Jesse Crain (1/$3.25m), Anthony Bass (trade from San Diego), and Darin Downs (waivers) to reinforce the bullpen.
The bullpen was like the rotation, but worse: By ERA, by FIP, by xFIP, by BB/9, by HR/9, by WAR, by whatever metric you choose to use, the 23 Houston relievers, from Wesley Wright down to two cameos from Lyles, were the worst group in baseball. They were actually worse than that; even though WAR is an imperfect stat for relievers for several reasons, it’s still a laugh to at least point out that no group of relievers in the history of baseball in our database ever managed a WAR quite so bad as -5.4. (Again, don’t take that too seriously, if only because WAR is a counting stat, and past teams with superior and/or old-school rotations who pitched deeper into games wouldn’t have had the opportunities to compile that bullpen number.)
However it is you want to put it, the bullpen was atrocious, and Crane and Luhnow both placed it on their list of priorities this winter, though “making it less terrible” isn’t the same thing as “spending big,” because we should know by now that awful teams don’t need to spend on their bullpens. And so while you might snark a bit at some of these names, know that last year’s names were Hector Ambriz and Paul Clemens and Chia-Jen Lo and Jose Cisnero. Crain, remember, was so good in his three years in Chicago (176/65 K/BB, 2.10 ERA) that Tampa Bay traded for him knowing full well he had a shoulder injury. Albers seems unlikely to keep up his BABIP magic, but has thrown at least 60 innings in each of the last five years, with a FIP below 4.24 in four of them. That would have made him practically an All-Star candidate on this team.
And Qualls, well, everyone likes to make fun of Chad Qualls. With good reason, too. But do remember Eno Sarris’ semi-positive look at Qualls:
Of course, those that are thinking of the 2010-2012 Chad Qualls are snarfing their milk right now. But that’s a little unfair. In 2009, he had a bad knee injury. Apparently he changed his mechanics to relieve stress on that knee. It was only in 2013 that he went back to his old delivery, to great results. Take a look at some of his per-pitch stats in 2010-2012 and then last season:
Category Frequency Velocity Whiff% GB%
Years 2010-2012 2013 2010-2012 2013 2010-2012 2013 2010-2012 2013
Sinker 65% 62% 92.5 94 6% 7% 63% 71%
Slider 34% 38% 87 87 14% 19% 39% 55%
Change 1% 0% 84 4% 75%
In terms of movement, he gained an inch of horizontal movement on the sinker, and his slider got tighter. Both pitches gained velocity, and both pitches were much more effective in 2013. This echoes what Qualls says in the piece above, too. Despite being a sinker/slider guy, Qualls also didn’t show a big platoon split on his pitches. Against lefties last year, his slider got *more* whiffs (22%) even as it lost the grounders (36%). The sinker still did its thing (66% grounders v LHB).
It’s still not going to be a good bullpen. It’s still not going to be a good team, at least not until George Springer and Carlos Correa and Mark Appel and friends get going. But if the goal this winter was to:
1) Be a better team, if even only somewhat
2) Show the fans and the union that more money could be spent
3) Provide some sort of veteran base for the coming prospects
4) Buy future talent by signing potentially tradeable assets now, and
5) Not sacrifice anyone you’d miss in the future
…then it’s hard to say that the Astros misfired this winter, especially if you buy into the PR value of saying they reportedly “just missed” on Jose Abreu and supposedly offered north of $100 million for Masahiro Tanaka. It’s still going to be a long season in Houston, one filled with far more losses than wins. But finally, after all these years, it seems like the bottom has been reached, and now it’s uphill towards the goal. It’s doubtful that any of the players acquired this winter are going to be on the next Houston team that reaches the playoffs. But in their own way, whether it’s through future trades or giving potential free agents a slightly better impression of the team or helping a young pitcher blow just one less big league game, they’ll have helped play a part in that. That’s money well spent.
It’s safe to say that the majority of FanGraphs readers fall under the first category, though there’s a certain validity to both sides. But all that really matters is how ownership feels about it, because while Jim Crane’s commitment to letting Jeff Luhnow blow things up and start from scratch has been admirable so far, there’s only so many 0.0 television ratings a businessman can suffer. That’s especially true as attendance has continued to shrink — down from just over three million in 2007 to half that in 2013, ahead of only three other clubs — and as reports surfaced in December that MLBPA head Tony Clark was “monitoring” the Houston situation, given that the club’s $549,603 average per player was the lowest the sport had seen since the 1999 Royals, who paid out $534,460 per player while losing 97 games. (Luhnow disputes the accuracy of that report, but the fact that Houston’s payroll was particularly low is unavoidable.)
While it’d be beyond foolhardy to deviate from the plan now, and while the continued television mess is a huge limitation for the team, we heard multiple times last fall that the Astros planned to spend to improve the big league team in 2014, with Luhnow insisting the result would be better on the field. It would have been difficult not to, anyway, because additional cost-cutting moves during the season led to an end-of-season roster which had only $1.437 million committed to Jose Altuve in 2014, along with an arbitration case for Jason Castro and $5.5m to Pittsburgh to cover Wandy Rodriguez.
When we started hearing things like “the payroll could be between $50-60 million next year” and that they might actually be in on Shin-Soo Choo, I took the time in early November to imagine all the fun they could have this winter with that flexibility, starting from essentially payroll-zero to spend $50 million or more. The Astros didn’t follow any of my tongue-in-cheek plans — I guess we won’t be seeing an outfield of Choo, Jacoby Ellsbury, and Nate McLouth any time soon — nor did they go down the more realistic path I laid out.
But they did take some steps to improving, making one big trade and signing several major league free agents. As Wendy Thurm wrote earlier today, the Opening Day payroll appears to be around $49 million, ahead of the Marlins but still a good $20 million behind the next-stingiest team, Pittsburgh. Still, it’s in the range that was promised months ago, and it’s a step forward. Did the road Houston took this winter make sense?
The answer to that question really depends on what you’re expecting to get out of this season for the Astros. They are, still, unavoidably a bad team. Even if they improved by 20 games this year — a massive leap — they’d still have 91 losses. In a division with two clear contenders, an Angels team that still has Mike Trout, and a Seattle club that, for all its flaws, did add Robinson Cano, there’s almost no way 2014 doesn’t end with a fourth-straight last-place finish.
But if the goal here is merely to say they’ve found rock bottom, turned the corner, seen the light, however you want to put it, all without damaging the bright future they have, then this winter has been a pretty successful one in Houston. Take, for example, the three categories of deals they made.
1) Traded Jordan Lyles and Brandon Barnes for Dexter Fowler ($7.85m, with one arbitration year remaining).
This move was so good that it made Dave Cameron’s list of the 10 best transactions of the offseason, even ahead of the Dodgers taking a one-year gamble on Dan Haren, which was universally loved. In order to upgrade from one 28-year-old outfielder to another, the cost was a still-talented young arm who has shown very little improvement in parts of three seasons in the big leagues. Put another way: last year’s Houston rotation was one of the worst in the bigs, and Lyles was below-average even only among Astros starters. He may yet improve; he may not, although Colorado isn’t the best place for him to find out. In return, Houston picked up a solid two-to-three win player who can get on base, do some damage when he’s there, and add a little power. Fowler is not without flaws; he’s also clearly better than Barnes, by multiple wins, and at 29 next season, may yet have some trade value if the team chooses to flip him.
2) Signed Scott Feldman (3/$30m) and Jerome Williams (1/$2.1m) to the rotation.
Feldman is not exciting, even though he’s taking up nearly a quarter of the club payroll. Williams is less exciting. But then, the baseline isn’t “exciting.” It’s not “playoffs.” For this team, it’s merely “getting better,” and in order to add at least something to that awful rotation, the options were limited. Houston wasn’t going to give up a draft pick for an Ervin Santana or an Ubaldo Jimenez, nor should they have, even if any of those guys wanted to come to Houston. They weren’t going to trade for David Price or entice Tim Hudson to spend his final years in last place. They weren’t going to convince Bronson Arroyo to take his brand of flyballery to Houston, and again, in last place.
That means that what’s left are the mild upgrades, and Feldman and Williams certainly count as that. Feldman, when healthy, has consistently put up seasonal FIP numbers of around 4.00, and xFIP slightly less than that, though BABIP fluctuations has made the ERA not always align. $10 million annually sounds high; then again, that barely buys two wins these days, we can’t know how much extra the Astros needed to kick in to convince even a mildly-useful player to come. Williams may or may not end up in the bullpen, and may or may not continue on the pace that made him worth about 1 WAR in 351 innings for the Angels. For $2.1m, it’s practically free to find out, and again, WAR only works when the guys you’re replacing are even up to being the R.
3) Added Matt Albers (1/$2.45m with club option), Chad Qualls (2/$6m with club option), Jesse Crain (1/$3.25m), Anthony Bass (trade from San Diego), and Darin Downs (waivers) to reinforce the bullpen.
The bullpen was like the rotation, but worse: By ERA, by FIP, by xFIP, by BB/9, by HR/9, by WAR, by whatever metric you choose to use, the 23 Houston relievers, from Wesley Wright down to two cameos from Lyles, were the worst group in baseball. They were actually worse than that; even though WAR is an imperfect stat for relievers for several reasons, it’s still a laugh to at least point out that no group of relievers in the history of baseball in our database ever managed a WAR quite so bad as -5.4. (Again, don’t take that too seriously, if only because WAR is a counting stat, and past teams with superior and/or old-school rotations who pitched deeper into games wouldn’t have had the opportunities to compile that bullpen number.)
However it is you want to put it, the bullpen was atrocious, and Crane and Luhnow both placed it on their list of priorities this winter, though “making it less terrible” isn’t the same thing as “spending big,” because we should know by now that awful teams don’t need to spend on their bullpens. And so while you might snark a bit at some of these names, know that last year’s names were Hector Ambriz and Paul Clemens and Chia-Jen Lo and Jose Cisnero. Crain, remember, was so good in his three years in Chicago (176/65 K/BB, 2.10 ERA) that Tampa Bay traded for him knowing full well he had a shoulder injury. Albers seems unlikely to keep up his BABIP magic, but has thrown at least 60 innings in each of the last five years, with a FIP below 4.24 in four of them. That would have made him practically an All-Star candidate on this team.
And Qualls, well, everyone likes to make fun of Chad Qualls. With good reason, too. But do remember Eno Sarris’ semi-positive look at Qualls:
Of course, those that are thinking of the 2010-2012 Chad Qualls are snarfing their milk right now. But that’s a little unfair. In 2009, he had a bad knee injury. Apparently he changed his mechanics to relieve stress on that knee. It was only in 2013 that he went back to his old delivery, to great results. Take a look at some of his per-pitch stats in 2010-2012 and then last season:
Category Frequency Velocity Whiff% GB%
Years 2010-2012 2013 2010-2012 2013 2010-2012 2013 2010-2012 2013
Sinker 65% 62% 92.5 94 6% 7% 63% 71%
Slider 34% 38% 87 87 14% 19% 39% 55%
Change 1% 0% 84 4% 75%
In terms of movement, he gained an inch of horizontal movement on the sinker, and his slider got tighter. Both pitches gained velocity, and both pitches were much more effective in 2013. This echoes what Qualls says in the piece above, too. Despite being a sinker/slider guy, Qualls also didn’t show a big platoon split on his pitches. Against lefties last year, his slider got *more* whiffs (22%) even as it lost the grounders (36%). The sinker still did its thing (66% grounders v LHB).
It’s still not going to be a good bullpen. It’s still not going to be a good team, at least not until George Springer and Carlos Correa and Mark Appel and friends get going. But if the goal this winter was to:
1) Be a better team, if even only somewhat
2) Show the fans and the union that more money could be spent
3) Provide some sort of veteran base for the coming prospects
4) Buy future talent by signing potentially tradeable assets now, and
5) Not sacrifice anyone you’d miss in the future
…then it’s hard to say that the Astros misfired this winter, especially if you buy into the PR value of saying they reportedly “just missed” on Jose Abreu and supposedly offered north of $100 million for Masahiro Tanaka. It’s still going to be a long season in Houston, one filled with far more losses than wins. But finally, after all these years, it seems like the bottom has been reached, and now it’s uphill towards the goal. It’s doubtful that any of the players acquired this winter are going to be on the next Houston team that reaches the playoffs. But in their own way, whether it’s through future trades or giving potential free agents a slightly better impression of the team or helping a young pitcher blow just one less big league game, they’ll have helped play a part in that. That’s money well spent.
The Surprising Reality of Brett Gardner.
Yesterday, the Yankees gave Brett Gardner $52 million to not exercise his right to become a free agent next winter. Instead, he’ll now stay in New York and play left field alongside Jacoby Ellsbury, rather than testing free agency to see if he could land a bigger deal as the best center fielder on the market. And that means Gardner has just signed up for four more years of criticism from those who think a left fielder should be “a run producer”, a guy who knocks the ball out of the ballpark and hits in the middle of the line-up.
Gardner is not that guy. He has more career triples than home runs, and a large part of his value comes from running down balls in the outfield. He’s a speed-and-defense guy, and traditionally, speed-and-defense guys have not been paid the same level of wages as similarly valuable sluggers. But while these kinds of labels help us describe the ways in which a player creates value, there’s also a trap to using these kinds of generalities, and we shouldn’t be so confined by player types that we miss the fact that Brett Gardner is actually a pretty good offensive player.
Just for fun, I pulled a leaderboard of all players who have accumulated at least 1,000 plate appearances over the last three years, and then calculated the spread between their OFF and DEF ratings. As a short reminder, OFF is the sum of a player’s batting and baserunning runs above average, while DEF is the sum of their UZR and the positional adjustment. Players with a large span between their OFF rating and DEF rating are specialists, guys who provide a huge bulk of their value with either their bat or their glove.
To no surprise, the largest gap in the game goes to Miguel Cabrera, who has a span of 212 runs between his OFF and DEF from 2011 to 2013. Joey Votto, Prince Fielder, Edwin Encarnacion, and Ryan Braun are all in the range of of a 150 run span. On the flip side, Brendan Ryan (93 runs), Darwin Barney (91 runs), and Clint Barmes (87 runs) have the largest negative spans, coming out nearly 100 runs worse on OFF than on DEF. Subracting the DEF rating from the OFF rating isn’t some huge analytical breakthrough, but I think these results do show that it does a pretty decent job of grouping players by their type.
So, where does OFF-DEF put Brett Gardner? Well, from 2011 to 2013 — which is actually just two seasons in his case, since he missed almost all of 2012 — he’s at +17 runs as a hitter and +22 runs as a fielder, for a span of just five runs to the defensive side. This makes his peer group include guys like Ian Desmond, Howie Kendrick, Yadier Molina, Erick Aybar, Jason Heyward, and Michael Bourn. That doesn’t mean all those guys are equally valuable — you can have a small OFF-DEF span by posting either 0/0 ratings or +20/+20 ratings, when higher numbers are obviously better — but it should serve as a reminder that Gardner’s peers aren’t really defensive specialists; they’re solid hitters who also happen to add value on the field.
In fact, this OFF-DEF toy actually reveals a pretty interesting comparison for Gardner’s contract that you’d likely never connect based on the way they look: Jhonny Peralta. Peralta signed a four year, $53 million contract with the Cardinals as a free agent this winter, so he got basically the same deal Gardner just signed, even though his performance has actually been more skewed towards defensive value than Gardner’s has.
From 2011 to 2013, Peralta’s offense has graded out at +8 runs relative to the league average hitter, while his DEF ratings have graded him out as +43 runs relative to an average defender. Peralta actually has an OFF-DEF span of 35 runs towards the defensive side of the ledger, even though no one really thinks of him as a glove first player. The reality, though, is that Peralta isn’t actually that all different from Gardner in how he creates his value.
Both are roughly average hitters. From 2011 to 2013, Peralta posted a 109 wRC+ compared to Gardner’s 103, so Peralta’s been a little bit better at the plate, but the gap is not particularly large, grading out to 13 runs by wRAA. Gardner then makes it all up and more once he reaches bases, as his baserunning advantage is +20 runs thanks to his ability to steal bases and turn his times on base into a higher percentage of runs scored. So, even with 400 fewer plate appearances, Gardner has actually been a better offensive player than Peralta since the start of the 2011 season.
Going forward, the forecasts expect this to continue. Both ZIPS and Steamer see Peralta continuing to be a slightly better hitter than Gardner (105 wRC+ to 100 wRC+), with Gardner making up the gap on the bases. While Peralta’s frame and ability to hit the ball over the wall more frequently suggest that he’s an offense-first player, the reality is that Peralta is an average hitter whose value comes from being able to provide real defensive value by playing shortstop. Gardner, meanwhile, is also roughly an average offensive player who creates value through his defense, only instead of being a solid defender at an up-the-middle position, he’s going to go back to being an excellent defender at a corner spot. At the end of the day, the value between those two things is simply not that different.
Peralta might not seem like a comparison for Gardner, but he is an example of the market price for average hitters with defensive value. Both Peralta and Gardner have their warts — the former a PED suspension, the latter a history of injuries — but Peralta’s deal makes a pretty good case that Gardner was probably in line for more than what the Yankees gave him if he got to free agency. While this kind of player is still generally underrated, it is clear that the Yankees see that Gardner is a quality contributor, even as a left fielder, and were willing to pay for the right to keep him and Ellsbury together for the next five years.
The contrast between the contracts signed this weekend — $8 million for Nelson Cruz, $52 million for Brett Gardner — are a great example of the changes that are taking place in MLB front offices. Gardner’s a good player, even if he doesn’t look like a traditional good left fielder. The days of average hitters with defensive skills being overlooked and drastically underpaid seem to be coming to an end.
Gardner is not that guy. He has more career triples than home runs, and a large part of his value comes from running down balls in the outfield. He’s a speed-and-defense guy, and traditionally, speed-and-defense guys have not been paid the same level of wages as similarly valuable sluggers. But while these kinds of labels help us describe the ways in which a player creates value, there’s also a trap to using these kinds of generalities, and we shouldn’t be so confined by player types that we miss the fact that Brett Gardner is actually a pretty good offensive player.
Just for fun, I pulled a leaderboard of all players who have accumulated at least 1,000 plate appearances over the last three years, and then calculated the spread between their OFF and DEF ratings. As a short reminder, OFF is the sum of a player’s batting and baserunning runs above average, while DEF is the sum of their UZR and the positional adjustment. Players with a large span between their OFF rating and DEF rating are specialists, guys who provide a huge bulk of their value with either their bat or their glove.
To no surprise, the largest gap in the game goes to Miguel Cabrera, who has a span of 212 runs between his OFF and DEF from 2011 to 2013. Joey Votto, Prince Fielder, Edwin Encarnacion, and Ryan Braun are all in the range of of a 150 run span. On the flip side, Brendan Ryan (93 runs), Darwin Barney (91 runs), and Clint Barmes (87 runs) have the largest negative spans, coming out nearly 100 runs worse on OFF than on DEF. Subracting the DEF rating from the OFF rating isn’t some huge analytical breakthrough, but I think these results do show that it does a pretty decent job of grouping players by their type.
So, where does OFF-DEF put Brett Gardner? Well, from 2011 to 2013 — which is actually just two seasons in his case, since he missed almost all of 2012 — he’s at +17 runs as a hitter and +22 runs as a fielder, for a span of just five runs to the defensive side. This makes his peer group include guys like Ian Desmond, Howie Kendrick, Yadier Molina, Erick Aybar, Jason Heyward, and Michael Bourn. That doesn’t mean all those guys are equally valuable — you can have a small OFF-DEF span by posting either 0/0 ratings or +20/+20 ratings, when higher numbers are obviously better — but it should serve as a reminder that Gardner’s peers aren’t really defensive specialists; they’re solid hitters who also happen to add value on the field.
In fact, this OFF-DEF toy actually reveals a pretty interesting comparison for Gardner’s contract that you’d likely never connect based on the way they look: Jhonny Peralta. Peralta signed a four year, $53 million contract with the Cardinals as a free agent this winter, so he got basically the same deal Gardner just signed, even though his performance has actually been more skewed towards defensive value than Gardner’s has.
From 2011 to 2013, Peralta’s offense has graded out at +8 runs relative to the league average hitter, while his DEF ratings have graded him out as +43 runs relative to an average defender. Peralta actually has an OFF-DEF span of 35 runs towards the defensive side of the ledger, even though no one really thinks of him as a glove first player. The reality, though, is that Peralta isn’t actually that all different from Gardner in how he creates his value.
Both are roughly average hitters. From 2011 to 2013, Peralta posted a 109 wRC+ compared to Gardner’s 103, so Peralta’s been a little bit better at the plate, but the gap is not particularly large, grading out to 13 runs by wRAA. Gardner then makes it all up and more once he reaches bases, as his baserunning advantage is +20 runs thanks to his ability to steal bases and turn his times on base into a higher percentage of runs scored. So, even with 400 fewer plate appearances, Gardner has actually been a better offensive player than Peralta since the start of the 2011 season.
Going forward, the forecasts expect this to continue. Both ZIPS and Steamer see Peralta continuing to be a slightly better hitter than Gardner (105 wRC+ to 100 wRC+), with Gardner making up the gap on the bases. While Peralta’s frame and ability to hit the ball over the wall more frequently suggest that he’s an offense-first player, the reality is that Peralta is an average hitter whose value comes from being able to provide real defensive value by playing shortstop. Gardner, meanwhile, is also roughly an average offensive player who creates value through his defense, only instead of being a solid defender at an up-the-middle position, he’s going to go back to being an excellent defender at a corner spot. At the end of the day, the value between those two things is simply not that different.
Peralta might not seem like a comparison for Gardner, but he is an example of the market price for average hitters with defensive value. Both Peralta and Gardner have their warts — the former a PED suspension, the latter a history of injuries — but Peralta’s deal makes a pretty good case that Gardner was probably in line for more than what the Yankees gave him if he got to free agency. While this kind of player is still generally underrated, it is clear that the Yankees see that Gardner is a quality contributor, even as a left fielder, and were willing to pay for the right to keep him and Ellsbury together for the next five years.
The contrast between the contracts signed this weekend — $8 million for Nelson Cruz, $52 million for Brett Gardner — are a great example of the changes that are taking place in MLB front offices. Gardner’s a good player, even if he doesn’t look like a traditional good left fielder. The days of average hitters with defensive skills being overlooked and drastically underpaid seem to be coming to an end.
- 21,784
- 2,957
- Joined
- Feb 17, 2007
Mike Trout signs one year, $1M deal with the Angels.
DeadsetAce
Supporter
- 105,970
- 51,889
- Joined
- May 31, 2004
wait...can someone explain this?
- 57,877
- 29,277
- Joined
- Feb 12, 2005
He will receive One Million dollars from the Angels during the 2014 season.
iono.
iono.
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- 21,784
- 2,957
- Joined
- Feb 17, 2007
Since he can't negotiate with anyone else but the Angels, he has to take whatever they're willing to negotiate with him and his agent. This number actually breaks the record for an arby player set by Ryan Howard in 2007 with the Phillies (which was 900,000). Mike will get his money eventually, plus this allows for the team to wait longer to hammer out a long term deal.
DeadsetAce
Supporter
- 105,970
- 51,889
- Joined
- May 31, 2004
ah gotcha. thanks for explaining that. wow, though. just sounds nuts, but makes sense
GreenNGold89
formerly bbllplaya23
- 6,551
- 2,063
- Joined
- Apr 5, 2005
That boy will get paid soon. Angels better enjoy it while it lasts.
- 1,227
- 92
- Joined
- Oct 20, 2012
Basically the Angels gave him $1 mil to butter him up hoping he signs that 6 or 7 year contract. Remember last year when they renewed his contract for $510k, only $20k over the league min. and it ticked off Trout and his agent.
GreenNGold89
formerly bbllplaya23
- 6,551
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- Joined
- Apr 5, 2005
Bend_The_Knee
formerly gotholesinmysocks
- 61,341
- 23,045
- Joined
- Apr 11, 2008
That boy will get paid soon. Angels better enjoy it while it lasts.
Can't wait 'til he's a yankee.
- 3,142
- 1,904
- Joined
- Sep 1, 2012
When Mike Trout signs his next contract I wouldn't be surprise if he gets 300 million
- 13,655
- 1,083
- Joined
- Feb 19, 2006
Depends if the Angels ride out arbitration or buy those years out, he'll definitely break all the arbitration records, that's a fact.
- 19,563
- 6,838
- Joined
- Apr 27, 2009
That boy will get paid soon. Angels better enjoy it while it lasts.
Can't wait 'til he's a yankee.
Chill. Yall couldn't even keep your own big name player
- 28,328
- 16,748
- Joined
- Mar 22, 2003
- 21,784
- 2,957
- Joined
- Feb 17, 2007
- 19,563
- 6,838
- Joined
- Apr 27, 2009
you damn right. push for 3rd place and a .500 record
- 28,328
- 16,748
- Joined
- Mar 22, 2003
you damn right. push for 3rd place and a .500 record
...nice.
jumpmanfromdabay
Banned
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- Jan 25, 2008
Them low expectations
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- 91
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- Dec 17, 2003
Bend_The_Knee
formerly gotholesinmysocks
- 61,341
- 23,045
- Joined
- Apr 11, 2008
Because we didn't want to keep paying him into his 40s.
- 19,563
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- Apr 27, 2009
jumpmanfromdabay
Banned
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- Jan 25, 2008
Lets keep it baseball related in here, okay champ?
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- 19,563
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- Apr 27, 2009
Lets keep it baseball related in here, okay champ?
Lmao I saw what you posted before. Good thing you switched that up. You were obviously hurt
jumpmanfromdabay
Banned
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I didn't want to derail the thread! You had to bring another sport into this it's okay I would to if I was a Mariners Fan
it's okay I would to if I was a Mariners Fan- Status