Any ******* way
The Mets Weren’t Throwing Swing-and-Miss Pitches.Warning: Spoiler! (Click to show)
I don’t blame you if you’re getting tired of the the-Royals-make-a-lot-of-contact stuff. It’s the core of most of the analysis being done right now, but in fairness, it’s the core because the Royals make a lot of contact. It’s arguably their most outstanding skill, which is what makes them such an intriguing match-up for the Mets. And they were up to their usual business again Wednesday. You knew about it, because it was all over Twitter, and it was all over the broadcast, and also you have eyes. Jacob deGrom is the ace of the Mets, and in some other years he’d be the ace of the National League. He tends to be a strikeout machine, yet in Game 2 he assembled but two strikeouts before getting shut off. Mets relievers combined for one more. All the Mets, total, generated six swings and misses, and if you look just at deGrom, here’s his 2015 postseason swinging-strike log:
October 9: 21 whiffs
October 15: 14
October 20: 18
October 28: 3
You don’t need to conduct any deep level of analysis to know that last point stands out. Given just those bullet points, you’d figure something happened on October 28. With three swinging strikes, deGrom equaled his career low, and in no other starts did he finish with fewer than six. Based on the evidence, the Royals royaled. This is precisely why the Royals have been viewed as a legitimate threat. They could negate the Mets’ greatest strength.
So, as far as the contact, there was a question during and after the game — was it the pitchers, or was it the hitters? Were the Royals doing a particularly good job of taking the bat to the ball, or were the Mets doing something a little sloppy? Let me let you cheat: both. The answer is both. The answer is pretty much always both. But, for sure, the Mets weren’t executing. Beginning — but not ending — with deGrom, the Mets weren’t actually throwing the Royals swing-and-miss pitches.
Here’s a lesson in baseball fundamentals you don’t need. You can, without doubt, get hitters to swing and miss at strikes. Really overpowering pitchers will do that, just to show off. It’s a great skill to possess. But, for everyone, there are more swings and misses out of the zone. That’s the whole idea behind the zone. The zone is supposed to represent the hitting area. Hitters will do worse outside of the area designed for good hitting.
I plugged in the nine Royals regular hitters. This year, they made contact about 90% of the time they swung at a strike. They made contact about 70% of the time they swung at a ball. I checked out Jacob deGrom. He allowed contact a little more than 80% of the time he threw a strike. He allowed contact roughly 60% of the time he threw a ball.
That’s all fairly unremarkable stuff. deGrom usually gets swings and misses. The Royals usually avoid them. Now, this is a little more critical: through Game 1, deGrom saw 56% of swings attempted at pitches in the zone. That is, of all swings against deGrom, 56% were at strikes, and 44% were at balls (roughly). The regular Royals hitters were similar. Total, they attempted 55% of their swings at strikes, and 45% of their swings at balls. It’s not quite 50/50, but it’s in the neighborhood. It’s 50/50 adjacent.
I know that doesn’t make for great reading. Most people would probably prefer to read a story. But that background is crucial for understanding what happened on Wednesday. Because on Wednesday, this was the Royals’ hitting plot:
That’s an approximation of the strike zone; one size doesn’t fit all. The box is in there just as a reference. What you might see in the image is an awful lot of swings at pitches over the plate. And you’d be correct. The Royals swung at a little under half of the Mets’ pitches. Of the Royals’ swings, an amazing 75% of them were attempted at strikes.
Recall that, ordinarily, the Royals would be around 55%, and the same would go for deGrom. This was somehow even more extreme with two strikes. This year, the regular Royals hitters averaged 47% swings at strikes in two-strike counts. On Wednesday, they finished at 80%. In two-strike counts, 20 of the 25 Royals swings were at probable strikes. When you have a contact-oriented team going after that many pitches over the plate, you’re just not going to see whiffs. The whiffs exist elsewhere. They’re generally not going to be in the zone.
It’s not like the Royals were suddenly exercising discipline. That’s not their game — they want to swing first and think second (if necessary). If you let them, the Royals will more than happily be aggressive, but this was an issue of pitcher command, as the Mets would concede in the aftermath. Terry Collins noted in his presser that deGrom could’ve stood to throw fewer strikes. He wasn’t the only pitcher at fault, but he was the only one whose performance ultimately mattered. deGrom didn’t throw enough quality balls. When he went out of the zone, he sometimes went too far. And he simply caught too much of the plate, too often. He missed in areas that are easy to hit. So the Royals hit him. They didn’t clobber him by any stretch of the imagination, but they bunched enough good things together, which is something you’re more able to do when you don’t whiff. You get to keep the line moving, as they say.
In the critical bottom of the fifth, deGrom was hurt by a leadoff walk that sure came close to not being what it was:
It’s okay to gripe about that. Those are some good pitches. But then Alex Rios smacked an elevated fastball over the plate. Alcides Escobar drilled a two-strike hanging slider over the middle. Lorenzo Cain lined out on a two-strike fastball at the belt. Eric Hosmer singled on a slider over the middle with deGrom ahead. Kendrys Morales singled on a changeup at the thigh with deGrom ahead. Mike Moustakas singled on a hanging breaking ball. deGrom struggled to throw good pitches. When he threw one, he struggled to throw another. The Royals took advantage of enough of his mistakes, and then they later added on against mistakes from other guys. Too many strikes. The Royals hit strikes.
Also, Johnny Cueto threw a two-hitter.
So much talk has been about the Royals’ ability to make contact. So much talk has been about the Royals’ contact going up against the Mets’ power and strikeouts. In Game 2, the Mets didn’t even make it a challenge. Their pitches were asking for contact. The Royals were happy to oblige.
What Went Wrong With Jeurys Familia’s Sinker.Warning: Spoiler! (Click to show)
Let’s over-analyze. It’s why we’re here, right? We’ve got one baseball game to talk about, and we have a few more hours until we have another one baseball game to talk about. This is when we’re supposed to make a lot of a little, so let’s do just that, focusing on Game 1’s ninth inning. More specifically, let’s focus on Jeurys Familia facing Alex Gordon, with a one-run lead.
Gordon and Familia had never before faced off. So Gordon was trying to figure out his opponent, and after three pitches, you could say he did his job, tying the game with a homer to straightaway center field. It wasn’t a homer that won the ballgame, but it was a homer that later allowed the ballgame to be won, a stunning blast against an otherwise incredible closer. The Mets don’t expect Familia to fail. If anything, they’ve come to take him for granted. But the Royals went all Royals on him, and you know the rest. Familia would later admit that he made a mistake.
It’s easy enough to leave it there. Familia threw a bad fastball, and Gordon punished him for it. But why not go deeper? Why go deeper, you might ask? Because we can. Because the numbers are there for us to look at. This is the best time to be alive, so far.
Familia’s own analysis:
“It’s part of the game. I just left my fastball up in the zone,” Familia said. “He made the swing. That’s it. I missed the zone a little bit. I wanted to go away, down. I left it in the middle, a little up.”
Entirely reasonable; perfectly level-headed. Spoken like a guy who realizes pitchers make frequent mistakes. Spoken like a guy who’ll have no problem getting the ball again in the next game or two. There’s nothing wrong with what Familia said. Left a fastball up. Got hurt.
But, we have PITCHf/x. Technically, Familia also has PITCHf/x, but we’re nerdy enough to look at it. And it’s interesting what it says. Before we get to that, it’s important to make sure Familia threw the pitch it seemed like he threw. It wasn’t a split-fingered fastball. It wasn’t a slider. Of the other options, Familia mostly throws a sinker, but from time to time he also mixes in a higher, straighter fastball. This is where signs come in handy. Here’s Travis d’Arnaud, calling for a sinker in the previous at-bat:
One finger down, twirly motion. (Ignore the first sign; Familia shook it off.) Here’s d’Arnaud against the Cubs, calling for a four-seamer:
Annoyingly, that got more pixelated when I uploaded it, but if you can’t tell or if you’re tired of squinting, it’s one finger down, with no twirly motion. It’s the classic, fundamental No. 1. So what it looks like: if d’Arnaud wants the straighter fastball, he puts down the index finger. If he wants the sinker, he puts down the index finger and moves it in a circle. Great! Now, the sign for the pitch to Gordon:
There’s the twirly motion. d’Arnaud moved his finger, so we can be pretty confident Familia was throwing a sinker here. Another clue: Familia said he was aiming down and away, and d’Arnaud set up down and away. Here’s the setup, and then the actual location of contact:
Sinkers are supposed to stay down. Familia generally wants his four-seamer to stay up. It all seems pretty conclusive. Which means we can proceed with the PITCHf/x analysis. In Game 1, Familia threw eight fastballs. All of them look to have been sinkers. They averaged a little shy of eight inches of run, with a vertical-movement measurement of about five inches. The fateful sinker to Gordon had a bit over six inches of run, and the vertical-movement measurement came in a hair above seven inches. In plainer English: the Gordon sinker had less run, and it had less drop. It had almost an inch and a half less drop than the next-least sinky pitch.
Gordon hit the third pitch out. The first two pitches were sinkers, and they had similar movement. Compared to those two pitches, the third sinker dropped by about two and a half fewer inches. The second sinker actually hung up, but Gordon swung and tapped it foul, hitting the top of the ball. The location of that sinker was bad, but the movement helped. The location of the third sinker was bad, and the movement didn’t help. Gordon was very obviously right on it, and within seconds the ball was more than 400 feet away.
So the problems were twofold: Familia didn’t put the sinker in a good place, nor did he give it his usual movement. Gordon tracked the pitch in, but consider the margins here. Gordon hit the pitch right about square. What if the pitch had one more inch of sink? What if the pitch had two more inches of sink? Gordon might still have made solid contact, but instead of a tying home run, maybe it’s a one-out line-drive single. Maybe it’s a grounder. Maybe it’s a foul. Probably, with a normal sinker there, the game doesn’t become tied, even with the missed location.
Why the missed location? Why the worse movement? As it happens, Familia tried to quick-pitch Gordon. According to Statcast, Familia got less extension than usual. That suggests he didn’t have everything streamlined in his mechanics. A quick-pitch can cause a pitcher to hurry, too. Yet, Familia had also quick-pitched Salvador Perez — in fact, that’s what tipped Gordon off that Familia might try it again. Against Perez, the pitches were fine. Familia didn’t suffer. Only against Gordon did it all go wrong.
So maybe that’s reason enough for Familia to quick-pitch less often. His stuff seems like it ought to be sufficient. But he knows better than I do, and it takes some balls to do that in the World Series in the first place. Maybe the quick-pitch doesn’t deserve the blame. But Familia’s delivery was abnormal. His release point cost him, in terms of location, and something about his fingers cost him, in terms of sinker movement. When the sinker doesn’t sink, and when the sinker hangs up in the middle of the zone, that’s one way to generate October heroics. Just, not for your own team.
Projecting Raul Mondesi.Warning: Spoiler! (Click to show)
In something of a surprise move, the Kansas City Royals added 20-year-old Raul Mondesi — the son of the former Dodgers outfielder — to their World Series roster to replace pinch-runner Terrance Gore. Since Mondesi can play shortstop and second base, he gives the team a bit more roster flexibility, especially for the games that will be played under NL rules. Interestingly, Mondesi has never played in a major league game, or even a Triple-A game for that matter. So if Ned Yost decides to use him off the bench this series, he’ll make his big league debut in the World Series — something no one’s done before. As I noted in my write-up of Matt Reynolds, who was on the Mets’ NLDS and NLCS rosters despite having zero big league experience, this sort of thing is super unusual.
Mondesi’s most notable attribute is his infield defense. Kiley McDaniel, our erstwhile lead prospect analyst, gave his fielding and throwing tools future grades of 60. Yet, despite his defensive savvy, Mondesi’s hitting — or lack thereof — makes him a something of a polarizing prospect. Baseball Prospectus ranked him 12th on their mid-season list, while Keith Law had him down at 38th. Others put him somewhere in-between. There’s not a ton of consensus on Mondesi’s future.
The questions regarding Mondesi’s bat are obvious. He hit .243/.279/.372 in his age-19 season this year, and put up a similar .246/.293/.361 batting line over his previous three years in the minors. For a point of comparison, Alexei Ramirez essentially had Mondesi’s season in the majors this year, and was worth all of -0.5 WAR despite being a non-terrible defensive shortstop.
Yet, as bad as Mondesi’s hitting has been, he’s also been very young for his level at every stop along the way. Although he’s yet to master a minor league level, he’s always been exceptionally young for those same levels. He was 19 when he was in Double-A, 18 in High-A and 17 in Low-A. Players who are that much younger than their competition are few and far between.
So how do we weigh all of these pluses and minuses?
Well, that’s what KATOH‘s for. Plugging Mondesi’s numbers into the KATOH machine yields a projection of 9.1 WAR through age 28. That’s pretty good! In my in-season prospect update, KATOH ranked Mondesi 17th overall, ahead of guys like Corey Seager and Joey Gallo. Yes, Mondesi’s raw offensive numbers have been terrible, but he’s also faced off against many pitchers four or five years his senior. In fact, in four years in the minors, Mondesi’s faced just one pitcher younger than him: Julio Urias. If Mondesi had spent 2015 in, say, Low-A, he almost certainly would have hit for a passable triple slash line.
Let’s get to the comps. Using Mondesi’s league-adjusted stats and his age, I calculated the Mahalanobis distance between his 2015 season, and every Double-A season since 1990 in which a player recorded at least 400 plate appearances. Below, you’ll find a list of historical players whose performances were nearest and dearest to Mondesi’s, ranked from most to least similar.
Raul Mondesi’s Mahalanobis Comps
Rank Mah Dist Name PA thru 28 WAR thru 28
1 2.23 Nathan Haynes 95 0.0
2 2.66 Mike Hardge 0 0.0
3 2.72 Luis Rivas 2,290 0.0
4 3.08 Hiram Bocachica 461 0.0
5 3.17 Yamil Benitez 481 0.0
6 3.25 Willie Romero 0 0.0
7 3.35 Jose Tabata* 1,765 2.0
8 3.42 Alex Gonzalez^ 3,634 8.0
9 3.54 Cristian Guerrero 0 0.0
10 3.63 Brian Specht 0 0.0
11 3.79 Hugh Walker 0 0.0
12 3.80 Edwin Diaz 15 0.0
13 3.88 Andrew McCutchen 4,504 40.3
14 3.89 Edward Salcedo* 0 0.0
15 3.93 Duane Singleton 93 0.0
16 4.08 Chad Hermansen 541 0.0
17 4.14 Tim Beckham* 231 0.1
18 4.21 Willie Ansley 0 0.0
19 4.21 Brett Lawrie* 2,033 8.8
20 4.26 Ray Durham 3,993 8.0
Middle infielders colored in blue
*Yet to Play age-28 season
^This is the Blue Jays Alex Gonzalez, and not the “Sea Bass” one, if that helps at all.
As always, take these comps with a grain of salt. This is just a smattering of players who happened to perform most similarly to Mondesi. In other words, this is a small sample, and as we all know, strange things can happen in small sample sizes. But this list gives us a general idea of some optimistic yet realistic outcomes for Mondesi. This Alex Gonzalez. Or Luis Rivas, but with (hopefully) much better defense.
Of course, most of that doesn’t much matter right now. Regardless of what his future holds, Mondesi’s role in the World Series is as a pinch-runner and/or defensive replacement. He’s undeniably the 25th man on the roster, and is almost certainly the last pinch-hitter Ned Yost would use off the bench. In other words, it’s unlikely he’ll touch a bat this series. Nonetheless, Mondesi’s on a World Series roster, and that means he could play a pivotal role in deciding this year’s champion on any given night.
Mondesi’s just a baby, who lacks big league experience and can’t hit a lick at this stage of his career. If he gets into a game, he’ll usurp Roberto Osuna as the youngest player to play in the big leagues this year. Heck, Bartolo Colon was already a 22-year-old pitcher when Mondesi was born. But despite his greenness, Mondesi’s plus speed and defense make him a potential asset off the bench. It’s all hands on deck in Kansas City, and the Royals are choosing to carry the player who adds the most to their roster, regardless of his age and experience.
Matt Harvey’s Career-Worst Stuff.Warning: Spoiler! (Click to show)
The title is a little alarmist, yes. Matt Harvey‘s career has not been that long, and stuff usually just fades as you age. It’s a sad fact. Given all of that, though, his Game 1 performance was still noteworthy, in a bad way. In a lot of ways, he showed the worst stuff he’s ever shown.
Never once before had Harvey thrown fewer than 40% fastballs in a start. That’s the first sign things went wrong in Game 1, but it’s not the best one. The Royals love fastballs, and do well against hard fastballs, and so maybe he decided he’d go with his junk more often.
More of a problem was this. Harvey had the second-worst fastball velocity of his career on Tuesday night, second only to his work earlier this October against the Nationals. Only three times has he averaged under 94 mph in a start, and two of those times have been this month. He doesn’t have his best fastball right now.
That might not be a problem if the rest of his stuff was biting. It isn’t.
In Game 1, Harvey saw, ranked among all of his 68 starts in PITCHf/x:
* The seventh-worst differential between his fastball and changeup velocity
* The eighteenth-worst slider velocity
* The twelfth-worst curveball velocity
* The sixth-worst four-seam run
* The fifth-worst changeup run
* The tenth-worst curveball cut
* The ninth-worst changeup drop
* The eleventh-worst slider drop
* The third-worst curveball drop
Harvey has had worse starts when it comes to outcomes. Six innings, three earned runs, two strikeouts, two walks and a homer is not his worst game. But by stuff, he had the worst game of his career.
If you average the ranks for each of his pitches Tuesday night among all of the games of his career, that game was his worst game for velocity, his second-worst game for horizontal movement, and the fourth-worst game for drop. And overall, his worst game for stuff.
It is, of course, fair to wonder if he’s hurting, and if this is the fatigue that Harvey’s doctor and agent were worried about as he hurtles by the 180-inning limit that was once put upon him.
The best thing we can do in times like this is turn to Josh Kalk’s injury finder, which Jeff Zimmerman revived recently on Baseballheatmaps. Kalk’s “Injury Zone” found that arm slot inconsistency, paired with velocity loss and a decrease in zone percentage, showed some success in predicting injury.
Harvey’s velocity is down, that much we know. Almost a full tick and a half off of a June peak this year. His five-game rolling zone percentage is down a bit, too. But his release point is just as consistent as ever late in the game. And even the total variance on his release points is in line with his normal work:
So maybe Harvey isn’t hurt. Or not hurting in the traditional sense. He could be tired, that seems a reasonable thing to wonder. On the other hand, it was a cold and wet night in Kansas City, too. In any case, Harvey showed the worst stuff of his career Tuesday night. Mets fans will have to hope that it was just the weather if Harvey pitches again against the Royals in this World Series.
Second-Guessing Starting Yoenis Cespedes in Center.Warning: Spoiler! (Click to show)
There are a few phrases in baseball that come up from time to time which have no real evidence behind them, but generally inject a little enjoyment to the game as a bit of harmless trivia. One of my favorites is “As so often happens,” employed to describe that sequence when a player makes a great defensive play to close out one half-inning only to begin the next half-inning as the leadoff batter. One hears another such phrase when a defensive player has been going through struggles, perhaps has a bad reputation as a fielder, or might be nursing an injury. On those occasions when the relevant fielder is involved in a play, announcers are quick to note that “The ball will find you.” Last night, the ball found Yoenis Cespedes.
Cespedes, though turning 30 years old earlier this month, is in just his fourth year of professional baseball in the United States after defecting from Cuba. The Oakland Athletics signed Cespedes to a four-year, $36 million contract and installed him as the team’s center fielder. That particular experiment didn’t last. The A’s, perhaps trying to ease Cespedes’ transition to the majors, moved Coco Crisp from center field to left field so Cespedes could play his preferred center field. By the end of the season, the two outfielders had switched places; Cespedes, in the end, had started just 46 games in center. Until his trade to the Mets, Cespedes had recorded just 19 more starts in center field over two-and-a-half seasons. With Curtis Granderson in right, Michael Conforto in left and no designated hitter, Cespedes took over in center field as his hot bat helped the Mets to a division title.
Whether Cespedes is a more ideal fit for center field or left field is not set in stone, but the evidence we do have suggests left field is better suited to his skills. Cespedes struggled in the field in his initial transition to the majors, in both center and left field, but he adjusted to left field and quickly became one of the better left fielders in Major League Baseball.
Best Left Fielders 2013-2015
Pos Inn ARM RngR ErrR UZR UZR/150
Yoenis Cespedes LF 2914.1 21.4 17.3 -1.7 36.9 17.6
Alex Gordon LF 3601.2 19.1 17.5 3.8 40.4 14.2
Starling Marte LF 3168.1 3.8 19.0 -3.2 19.6 12.0
Christian Yelich LF 2474 -3.9 11.6 2.9 10.6 5.2
Brett Gardner LF 2010 -2.6 2.6 1.4 1.3 1.5
Alex Gordon, with the edge in innings, leads left fielders in UZR over the past three seasons, but on a rate basis, Cespedes nudges him out. Given his great numbers in left, the transition to center field doesn’t immediately look to be one that would challenge Cespedes unduly. We know Cespedes is fast, and he has a great arm. In the absence of more data, however, his capacity to play center field remains a matter of debate. Much of Cespedes’ value in left field is tied up in his arm, where he has thrown runners out at third and home and prevented runners from advancing due to his arm. Taking the chart above and removing his arm from the calculation, we see the following.
Best Left Fielders 2013-2015: UZR Minus ARM(Total)
Pos Inn ARM RngR ErrR UZR UZR-ARM
Alex Gordon LF 3601.2 19.1 17.5 3.8 40.4 21.3
Starling Marte LF 3168.1 3.8 19 -3.2 19.6 15.8
Yoenis Cespedes LF 2914.1 21.4 17.3 -1.7 36.9 15.5
Christian Yelich LF 2474 -3.9 11.6 2.9 10.6 14.5
Matt Holliday LF 2926.1 -14.4 5.5 0.5 -8.3 6.1
Cespedes’ UZR figures as a left fielder remain strong even when his arm is taken out of the equation — maybe 5-6 runs above average over the course of the season — but not elite. Center field removes much of the advantage that his arm gives him, and it renders his above-average range as a corner outfielder much more pedestrian. Kansas City — like Citi Field, Comerica Park, and Oakland’s home field — all have large outfields.
Juan Lagares is an excellent center fielder, but after an injury-filled season, and with Cespedes in the fold, he’s been reduced to a bench role. With everyone healthy, Lagares in center and Cespedes in left is about as good as a team could hope for, potentially rivaling the Royals’ duo of Lorenzo Cain and Alex Gordon. There is some Statcast information to suggest, as Mike Petriello notes, that Cespedes over Lagares in center, even with the designated hitter, is not a poor choice. Terry Collins chose Kelly Johnson and his average (99 wRC+ in 865 PA against LH 2013-2015) bat over Lagares’ defense and below average bat (career wRC+ of 86). The decision appeared to hurt Terry Collins and the Mets on the very first pitch.
On the play last night, Alcides Escobar struck the ball to deep left-center field. Michael Conforto might have had a play on the ball, but showed deference, as left fielders frequently do, to the center fielder. As the ball fell to the ground, Conforto stopped several feet short to give Cespedes an opportunity to catch it.
Whether Lagares would have caught Escobar’s fly ball is another question. And it should be noted: it’s possible we’re not even comparing Cespedes to Lagares, in this case. There’s also the question of a healthy Cespedes versus a less healthy one. After injuring himself against the Cubs in the National League Championship Series, Cespedes admitted he was still compromised physically, but expressed confidence he could play, especially in the field.
From a recent piece by ESPN’s Adam Rubin:
“I still feel a little discomfort — nothing compared to what I felt in Chicago, when I had to leave the game,” Cespedes told ESPN Deportes’ Marly Rivera in Spanish on Monday. “It will not prevent me from swinging, but I am not 100 percent. I’m not playing with a full tank.
“If I can’t hit — and I do think I will be able to — I can run, I can field and I can throw. I can do everything else that I know how to do.”
Despite Cespedes’ confidence, it doesn’t take a big leap of logic to imagine that Cespedes’ shoulder injury somehow altered his ability to field Escobar’s fly ball cleanly. While there could have been other factors — miscommunication with Conforto, concern over a possible collision with Conforto, a slightly ineffecient route, a moving ball that altered its course — it certainly appears as though Cespedes also approached the ball awkwardly rather than merely lifting his injured shoulder to grab the ball on the fly. The bounce the ball took might have been bad luck, but it was the failure to make the catch that caused the bounce. Terry Collins likely saw the same thing: Lagares, who got a key hit in the ninth inning of last night’s game, will be playing center field in Game 2 of the World Series.
We have seen managers choose offense over defense throughout the playoffs and have it pay off. Kyle Schwarber was huge for the Cubs over the Cardinals and Cespedes’ bat is an important part of the Mets lineup, but inserting Kelly Johnson in the lineup is a different matter. Collins appears to be correcting his mistake, likely one both of process as well as results, but he might have gotten a bit greedy going for offense in Game 1 and it cost the team a run to start the World Series.