2016 MLB thread. THE CUBS HAVE BROKEN THE CURSE! Chicago Cubs are your 2016 World Series champions

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Free Jarrod Dyson!

If there is one thing we have learned from the American League teams this postseason, it’s that defense and baserunning really are very important. No one person has better exemplified this than Royals outfielder Jarrod Dyson. You’ve already read Jeff’s article on how Dyson stole perhaps the biggest base since Dave Roberts in 2004. Eventually though, this postseason run for the Royals is going to end. Whether that is in four games or 14 games is not yet certain, but when it does end, the Royals will need to make a decision as to what they are going to do with Dyson next season. They should let him play.

Over the past two seasons, there have only been 29 outfielders in baseball more valuable than Dyson. Of those 29, only one of them had as few plate appearances as did Dyson. Most of them have double the plate appearances, and some have 2.5 times Dyson’s 529 PAs. Dyson is particularly adept afield. Over the past two seasons, only three outfielders have been worth more defensively per our Def statistic, and only 15 position players in general.

And it’s not just UZR where Dyson ranks well. He also scores well via DRS as well as our Inside Edge fielding numbers. They all paint him as one of the very best defensive center fielders in the game. Even his Fans Scouting Report score, which has penalized him in the past for his less than stellar throwing strength, has risen for the second straight year, and now stands at an above average 61. He has put this defense on display when called into duty, and the diminutive center fielder has made the most out of his limited opportunities.

That is not something that can be said about Norichika Aoki, the man who has played instead of Dyson and who is set to enter free agency after the season ends. In fact, Aoki had done a great deal to squander his walk year, and has only redeemed himself in the last month-plus. At the end of August, Aoki’s slugging percentage was the same as his on-base percentage — .332. He then went bananas in September, to the tune of .379/.432/.494, and it still only brought him up to 1.1 WAR for the season.

Aoki essentially had the same season as he did in 2013, but with the demerit of horrible baserunning mixed into the equation. Once a bargain, Aoki has trended from 2.3 WAR, to 1.6 and 1.1 in his three major league seasons. Even if you consider the poor baserunning decisions, both in the stolen base department and otherwise, to be a one-year blip, he’s still unlikely to add much value in that department.

Dyson, on the other hand, excels at baserunning. We covered that up top. Let’s cover it some more. Over the past three seasons, Dyson ranks sixth in the majors in BsR. Here again this is where we bring up the lack of playing time. One fun stat that Baseball-Reference tracks is stolen base opportunities. Dyson managed to have 116 of these, which are defined as “plate appearances through which a runner was on first or second with the next base open,” and successfully stole a base during 31 percent of them. That’s a higher rate than Dee Gordon, who stole bases in 27.9% of his stolen base opportunities, but because Gordon had 229 SBOs, he wound up with 64 steals as opposed to Dyson’s 36. Double Dyson’s playing time, and something like that could be in the cards for Kansas City.

Of course, it’s tempting to keep Dyson in reserve so that he can jump in for anyone at any time, that need will be lessened next season thanks to the person of Terrance Gore, who stole five bases in 11 SBOs. And if the club declines Billy Butler‘s club option or ships him off to a team desperate for his sweaty charms, then there won’t be as glaring of a need for a regular pinch runner anyway.

The reason to this point that Dyson hasn’t been further let off the chain is because his hitting tool is not necessarily up to snuff, particularly against left-handed pitching. To which I would say, so what? This season, the other four teams in the AL Central had a combined total of 25 pitchers start at least 10 games. Of them, six were left-handed — John Danks, Chris Sale, Jose Quintana, David Price, Drew Smyly and T.J. House.

One of these six (Smyly) won’t be around next season, one is terrible (Danks) and three of them — Price, Sale and Quintana — are so good that it doesn’t matter if you stack the deck against them with right-handed hitters anyway. Lefties or righties, a team faces long odds to get to four runs scored on the day against that trio. So, while you certainly don’t have to play Dyson in all 162 games, he isn’t in more danger of being victimized by left-handed starting pitchers than anyone else on his team is.

Finally, there is the matter of salary. Dyson is eligible for arbitration for the first time this offseason, but even if he scores a raise to $3 or 4 million, he’s going to be cheap compared to the value he’s providing. And given that the Royals are going to need to pinch every penny if they want to bring James Shields back, they could do a lot worse than letting Aoki and Willingham walk and installing Dyson every day.

In other sports, specialists generally go far more appreciated than they do in baseball. Specialist relievers are often derided or fit into a tiny box so small that they can never provide real value. Such is not the case with Jarrod Dyson. He might not be the next Willie Mays, but three-win outfielders don’t exactly grow on trees. That’s essentially what Dyson has been the past two seasons, in part-time duty. Even if he regresses to more average defense in a full-time role, he will be just as valuable as Norichika Aoki was this season. And if he manages to maintain that elite level of baserunning and defense for a whole campaign, then the Royals might just have a four-win player on their hands for a relative pittance. Free Jarrod Dyson.

How Chris Tillman Keeps Runners From Running.

Chris Tillman‘s 2014 has a pretty great storyline. Approaching the end of July, Tillman had an average ERA and below-average peripherals, with 51 walks to go with 83 strikeouts. That’s not at all what the Orioles were looking for, and then all of a sudden Tillman turned his year around. Over the dozen starts he had remaining, he allowed 23 runs, with 15 walks and 67 strikeouts. Last week, Tillman was reasonably effective against the Tigers, with six whiffs in five innings. People who look at the Orioles’ rotation don’t see an ace, but Tillman’s the closest they’ve got, and he’s pitched at that level for a couple of months.

So, Tillman’s had a great second half of the year, just like the whole team around him has, and that’s one thing you could talk about. But in October, people love to focus on the matchups, and Tillman’s about to go up against the Royals, who made a name for themselves in the Wild Card game by running all over the place. The perception of the Royals, now, is that they’ll run you to death if you give them the chance. And yet, Chris Tillman doesn’t give runners chances. This’ll be a fascinating matchup for a number of reasons.

How much would you like to know? This season, attempted base-stealers were 1-for-4 with Tillman on the mound. Tillman, incidentally, is right-handed, and in case you’re wondering about that one successful steal, here it is in all of its glory:

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It was a busted hit-and-run where the hitter basically stood directly in the catcher’s way as he tried to throw to second. With an even halfway accurate throw, the runner would’ve been out, so this deserves a big ol’ asterisk. It wasn’t a straight steal attempt, and the runner was safe only because the catcher had trouble throwing from behind another person.

And last year? Last year, attempted base-stealers were 1-for-9 with Tillman on the mound. Last year, Tillman was also right-handed. Here are Tillman’s last four years, and the rate at which runners tried to steal given the opportunity.

2011: 6.7% attempts
2012: 5.6%
2013: 3.2%
2014: 1.3%

And Tillman, in turn, has reduced his pickoff attempts. His pickoff attempt rate this year was a third what it was in 2011, not because Tillman doesn’t have a good pickoff, but because runners just aren’t so aggressive with their leads against him anymore. He knows they’re not likely to try.

The pickoff — it’s a good pickoff.

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In the first one, you see an attempt before Tillman even comes set. In the second one, you see an attempt as he’s coming set. Runners know that pickoff is there.

Tillman didn’t have the lowest steal rate in 2014, even among righties. There was just one attempt against Doug Fister, and it was unsuccessful. There were two attempts against Yordano Ventura, and one of them was successful. There were two attempts against Michael Wacha and four against Lance Lynn, in large part probably a function of Yadier Molina. But this isn’t just a one-year thing for Tillman, and he’s clearly extreme even if he might not be the most extreme. So how does Tillman do it, beyond just being able to throw pretty quickly to first base?

Ben Lindbergh wrote well about Ventura almost exactly a month ago. Runners don’t try to steal against Ventura, and though some of that is his velocity and some of that is the presence of Salvador Perez, mostly it’s because Ventura is quicker to home plate than any other pitcher. The Orioles want all their pitchers to be no slower than 1.3 seconds to home, which is a pretty quick time. Ventura measures at 1.1 seconds, and that makes for almost impossible math for any would-be runner.

Tillman doesn’t have a Salvador Perez. In fact, he commonly throws to Nick Hundley, who isn’t a great defensive backstop. Tillman also doesn’t have Ventura’s velocity, not that velocity plays a huge role in steal success. And Tillman isn’t as quick to the plate as Ventura is, because nobody is, as I already mentioned. But for one thing, there’s that pickoff. For another thing, Tillman isn’t slow. And for a third thing, Tillman’s got his own quirks to combat any kind of running game that might exist.

Why don’t we just look at one example, say, from when Tillman faced the Royals earlier in the season? Below, Tillman pitching in a close game with Alcides Escobar on first base. Escobar stole 31 bases this year. Last year, he stole 22 in 22 tries. Escobar likes to run, and against Tillman, he didn’t do anything. Let’s try to figure out why.

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You see that? You see the way that Tillman comes set? It’s subtle, until you notice it, and then you can’t not notice it. He puts his hand in his glove up at his chest, then he very slowly lowers his hands to his belt while his left foot taps in front of him. From first base, it looks like Tillman’s in constant motion, until he comes set and steady. And then that’s another thing. I’ll track some numbers below the .gifs.

Time while set: 1.3 seconds
Time to home: 1.23 seconds

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Same quirk with the glove and left foot. Tillman does that every time. But pay close attention to the numbers below.

Time while set: 2.0 seconds
Time to home: 1.26 seconds

Tillman held the ball a little longer than he did the first time. Plenty of pitchers are told to do this, to vary their looks, but few do it as well or as consistently as Tillman does.

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Same approach to being set; opposite difference once set. The numbers again:

Time while set: 0.5 seconds
Time to home: 1.37 seconds

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And here we have a pickoff attempt. Not only is it a quick and accurate attempt, but it’s very difficult to pick up on specifically because of what Tillman does with his foot and his hands. The runner is trying to read the pitcher’s movements, and here, Tillman was already in motion before throwing over. His hands were already moving, and his foot was already bouncing, and that gives him an incremental timing advantage with his throw to first because the runner might be that much slower to react. And Tillman doesn’t always try to pick a guy off at this point in his motion. Refer back to the two attempts shown above — he also throws over before coming set, and as he’s coming set. He’s quick enough to throw over whenever he wants, which makes him very unpredictable, which makes him very hard to read if you’re trying to move up 90 feet. Running is simply about detecting a pattern. Tillman keeps himself pretty random.

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Here you really get to see that left foot at work. If I’m going to be honest with you, I didn’t know this was even allowed. And I’ve watched Chris Tillman before. I’ve just never watched this part of his game very closely. I guess the Royals are causing me to examine the anatomy of steals and non-steals closer than I ever have. Escobar doesn’t even try anything. Dyson singled, but that’s beside the point. Escobar couldn’t read Tillman very well, so he didn’t try to steal, and he didn’t get a running start on the knock. So the single just moved him from first to second, the same as it would’ve done for Billy Butler.

Time while set: 2.1 seconds
Time to home: 1.30 seconds

Tillman doesn’t have Ventura’s explosive delivery that allows him to be so quick to home. But he’s still faster than average, and he blends that speed with a terrific pickoff move, deception, and varied timing. Many pitchers are told to vary their timing, but the numbers indicate that Tillman’s better than almost everyone at it, and it doesn’t seem to cost him anything in terms of performance with men on. You can see in the case with Escobar above, Tillman was set for as little as half a second, and for as much as more than two seconds. It gives him a tiny little edge when it comes to plays decided by tiny little differences. Some runners, surely, could steal against Tillman, but they’ve pretty much all just decided it’s not worth the risk.

So if the Royals face Tillman twice, it’ll be fascinating to see how aggressive they are. Buck Showalter says the goal is to keep guys off base in the first place, but Tillman might at least be able to keep the runners he does allow from going anywhere. And if you look at the Royals’ splits, they seem to prefer running later anyway, presumably because they get to see relievers and get to use pinch-runners:

Innings 1-3: 42 steals (7th in MLB)
Innings 4-6: 44 steals (2nd)
Innings 7-9: 62 (1st)

With Jarrod Dyson and Terrance Gore on the bench, the Royals can try to select their own running opportunities, but when Chris Tillman is on the mound, those opportunities might not really exist. Which means, when Chris Tillman is on the mound, the Royals might have to beat him with their bats, and that’s where the Royals are weakest. It’s an awful small thing, but it can be such a big thing, as the Royals have demonstrated, and the beauty is in the details anyhow.

Discussing the “NLCS Powered by JABO” with Rob Neyer.

Tomorrow night, Fox Sports 1 is going full nerd. While their mothership is showing the traditional broadcast of the game, FS1 is going to have a simulcast of the game action, but instead of the traditional play-by-play and color commentary audio, the crew from Just A Bit Outside — C.J. Nitkowski, Gabe Kapler, and Rob Neyer — will be offering their insights while the game occurs. They’ve also wrangled Bud Black into joining them, and the whole thing will be hosted by Kevin Burkhardt. You can read more about what they have planned here, or watch this video preview, or you can read below, where I talk to Rob about what it is they’re going to do tomorrow night.

Also, while those guys getting ogled on your TV screen, we’ll be making sure JABO.com is still loaded with content. Jeff Sullivan, Drew Fairservice, August Fagerstrom, and myself will be representing the FG crew, providing quick-hit analysis and commentary on the site, and expect a few other notable voices to chime in as well. If you want to be fully ensconced in analysis while you watch the game, tomorrow is the night for you.

Dave: So, what exactly is this thing you guys are doing on Saturday night, and how can people watch it and the game at the same time?

Rob: That’s exactly what they can do! At every moment, anyone watching FS1 will see the same game they would see on Fox. Often it’ll be a split-screen, with the game in one screen and our panel in the other. At key moments, we’ll switch the game action to full-screen and you’ll hear us doing our thing. And occasionally during a break in the action, you might see just us.

Dave: This is like color commentary on steroids, then? Wait, maybe that isn’t the best metaphor. But I gather this broadcast will focus more on the commentary side of things and less on the play by play of a traditional broadcast booth?

Rob: Very little play-by-play, unless we’re in the middle of a discussion, or there’s a lull, and Kevin Burkhardt pulls us back into the game for a little context.

Dave: What are some fun things that you expect to be able to do on Saturday night that fans aren’t used to getting in a traditional broadcast? Are you going to actually going to say the words “linear weights” on television?

Rob: I’ll be shocked if linear weights doesn’t come up at some point, at least in passing. Essentially, we’ll be talking about all the things that we — and by we, I mean you and I — talk about when we get together: defense and the vagaries of measuring it, pitch-framing, game theory, wOBA … You know, all the good stuff. But it won’t be just the sabermetrics. We’ve got a big studio, a bunch of cameras, and two tremendously smart and experienced ex-players in Gabe Kapler and C.J. Nitkowski, who can walk away from the desk anytime they like and give us all lessons in how the game’s really played. Oh, and we’ve also got Bud Black! You wanna know what it’s like to manage against Bruce Bochy? I’ll bet Bud Black will tell us.

Dave: How much is the balance going to lean towards appealing to people who read FanGraphs versus retaining mainstream appeal for casual fans who might just be flipping through the channels? If my wife watched the broadcast with me, would she enjoy the simulcast, or is this something we should watch alone in our mother’s basements?

Rob: Honestly, I think any baseball fan who’s not utterly hostile toward sabermetrics will enjoy this broadcast. We’ll be explaining everything we talk about, but I think briefly enough that neither you nor Amy will be bored. Also, there’s this: Gabe and C.J. are both wildly engaging. Just great people to be around, and I think if you’re watching you’ll feel like you’re just in the middle of a great conversation about baseball, not to mention the occasional moments when those guys step away from our desk and demonstrate pitch-framing or reading a left-handed pitcher or whatever. We’ve done a few hours of rehearsals, and my only regret is that I can’t just hang out at home and watch these guys do their thing. Because they’re really, really good at it. Plus Kevin Burkhardt is one of the best studio hosts I’ve ever seen.

Dave: If we overnight you a FanGraphs t-shirt, will you wear it on the air? What if we special order a FanGraphs button-down, or better yet, a FanGraphs flannel? You’d wear that on TV, right?

Rob: Can you overnight me a FanGraphs tie? They’re making me wear a tie. And fancy pants, too. It better be worth it.

Orioles Keeping J.J. Hardy for Themselves.

Since it became clear that the 2014 Yankees weren’t very good, a lot of people in our chats started asking about the 2015 Yankees. Specifically, a lot of people started asking about the shortstop for the 2015 Yankees, since they’re not going to have Derek Jeter, in a different way from how the 2014 Yankees didn’t really have Derek Jeter. A name I kept arriving at was J.J. Hardy — he was due to be a free agent, and he’s pretty good, and he’d cost plenty without costing plenty. He seemed like a good option for a Yankees team that might not want to break the bank. Also, he’s not an option anymore.

In the break between playoff series, the Orioles have signed Hardy to a multi-year extension:

Source: Hardy deal 3 years, $40 mil with $6.5 mil deferred. Vesting option 4th year based on ABs #orioles

— Roch Kubatko (@masnRoch) October 9, 2014

In re-signing Hardy, the Orioles are getting for about market value a player who is no longer young but who is not yet a problem. That sentence is all the analysis you need, but now let’s get into some details you might want.

You might somewhat recognize the structure of the contract. It’s not the exact same, but it’s similar to the contract to which the Cardinals signed Jhonny Peralta last offseason. Peralta was given a guaranteed four years and $53 million, which surprised some people who didn’t believe in his defense. Hardy’s getting basically the same money for three years, and he has a shot at a fourth. Sensible enough; Peralta and Hardy occupy the same mental tier.

I should note, though, that Peralta was being signed for ages 32 through 35. Hardy’s going to be a little bit older than Peralta was when he debuted with St. Louis. And over the three years leading up to the free-agent contract, Peralta was worth 11 WAR by our estimates, with a 109 wRC+. Hardy, over the last three years, in more playing time, has been worth 9.5 WAR, with an 89 wRC+. People believe a lot more in Hardy’s defense than they do in Peralta’s defense, but Peralta’s defensive performance has still been at least fine, and Hardy’s the inferior bat. So, Peralta had arguments in his favor, is the point.

But I suppose if you believed in all of Peralta’s numbers, the Cardinals were getting him for something of a bargain. Hardy’s a good player, and he’s long been a good player, and no matter what you think of WAR as a statistic, this at least implies a very solid asset:

2010: 2.2 WAR (375 PA)
2011: 4.3
2012: 2.7
2013: 3.4
2014: 3.4
Hardy’s offense has been a little difficult to figure out. His wRC+ has recently bounced from 93 to 113 to 78 to 100, and this past season he hit just nine home runs. Overall, Hardy’s been a below-average bat, and because of his tendency to pop the ball up he’s run some fairly low BABIPs. But the Orioles aren’t fond of Hardy because of his All-Star offensive productivity. At the plate, he’s good enough. In the field is where Hardy seems to shine through.

He’s one of the best defensive shortstops in baseball, according to Defensive Runs Saved. He’s one of the best defensive shortstops in baseball, according to UZR. He’s one of the best defensive shortstops in baseball, according to Inside Edge, and he’s one of the best defensive shortstops in baseball, according to the Fan Scouting Report. Everybody loves Hardy’s defensive work, and while he’ll never be confused for Andrelton Simmons, Hardy’s a defender without any flaws. He doesn’t make a lot of errors, he converts the routine plays, he converts a lot of the non-routine plays, and he’s one of the better shortstops around when it comes to starting or turning the double play. Here is a gratuitous J.J. Hardy defensive .gif, to break up the text:

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Hardy isn’t going to get better as he ages, but he’ll start the contract from a high level. And it’s worth considering the organizational context in which he’s being signed — Manny Machado just suffered another injury, and he’s proven to be an outstanding defensive third baseman, so the Orioles were presumably less willing than ever to move Machado back over a few steps. And while the Orioles’ system doesn’t literally have zero shortstops in it, it’s not a position of strength or depth, so Hardy keeps a position from becoming a hole. Without him, there were no realistic internal replacements.

I want to say something about Hardy’s offense, and it does trouble me a little. Hardy, for a while, was known for his outstanding contact skills. Used to be he maintained a contact rate in the upper 80s. This past season he dropped to 81%, and his strikeouts went up as a consequence. Between 2013 and 2014, 237 players batted at least 250 times in each season. Hardy just had the fifth-highest strikeout-rate increase, and the third-greatest contact-rate decrease. Curiously, Hardy made the same amount of contact within the zone. But his contact rate on pitches out of the zone plummeted, and unlike Devin Mesoraco, Hardy didn’t pair that with a huge power breakout. Hardy just put the bat on the ball less, especially on pitches down or away.

It’s possible that bodes poorly for Hardy’s offensive future. But then, it’s also possible he’s just adjusting to getting older, and it’s alternatively possible that this is the result of Hardy playing a lot of games with a somewhat uncomfortable back. It didn’t seem to have an effect on his defense, but maybe Hardy was less able to reach when he was at the plate. The likelihood is that Hardy will remain a slightly below-average hitter in the coming years, but he might be changing as he approaches his mid-30s.

Ultimately, the Orioles have chosen to spend good money on a player they know well. He’s a player they like, obviously, and he’s a player for whom they don’t have an alternative, and even if you don’t love the idea of $40 million for a player like this, the fact that Hardy is so capable up the middle makes him tough to replace for cheap. Replacement-level shortstops don’t pair decent bats with above-average fielding. Hardy’s is a difficult skillset to acquire, and now the free-agent market is without one of its potential impact players. As shortstops go, Hanley Ramirez will be expensive and not a shortstop for long. Jed Lowrie isn’t really a shortstop, Asdrubal Cabrera isn’t really a shortstop, and Stephen Drew was just worth negative WAR. Hardy was the promising one, so now the Yankees in particular will have to scour the trade market. While the Orioles didn’t re-sign Hardy just to make the Yankees a little more frustrated, it makes for a delightful little side effect.

How Matt Carpenter Destroyed the Dodgers.

There was no baseball last night. There will be no baseball tonight. This is the fault of a great many people, too many to list here. The cynical might say some blame falls at the feet of Don Mattingly and Matt Williams. Others insist the entirety of the blame belongs there.

Mattingly tried his best and Clayton Kershaw turned in two starts (or parts of two starts) unbecoming of a presumptive MVP and Cy Young winner. But if you’re looking for the true catalyst of the Dodgers’ demise and the author of a short series win, look no further than Matt Carpenter.

The Cardinals’ third baseman was unconscious during the division series, clubbing a home run and double apiece in the first three games of the series. In the deciding Game Four, he went 0-4 but his mark on this series remains indelible.

All that extra base pop is slightly out of character for Carpenter, who claimed the same high-OBP as his 7 WAR campaign of 2013 only without the extra base power. He hit just eight home runs during the regular season, only one player hit for less power while still producing more than 10% better than league average.

None of this makes Dodgers fans feel any better. How could L.A. let off-brand Joe Mauer beat them so soundly during the Division Series? Carpenter bested the Dodgers in three key ways.

Flipping the script

Carpenter is a selective hitter. He’s a very selective hitter, all told. Only two qualified hitters saw more pitches per plate appearance than the Cardinals lead-off hitter in 2014. Only one qualified hitter swung at the first pitch less frequently than Carpenter. Only one hitter swung-and-missed more rarely than Carpenter this season. None of this is news. He’s patient and precise. We get it.

These established facts regarding Carpenter’s plate discipline make his performance in the NLDS a very “man bites dog” baseball event. Of his three home runs, he parked two of them on the first pitch, as well as one of his doubles. Swinging at the first pitch is something Carpenter simply doesn’t do, but against Clayton Kershaw of all people, he pulled the trigger to great effect.

Those four extra base hits represent all his first-pitch swings this postseason. After a mere 17 plate appearances, it hardly suggests a turn towards the reckless. If anything, it is further proof of his discipline. Carpenter went to the plate with a plan – swing first pitch if I see a fastball middle-in – and pulled the trigger when he saw what he liked.

It’s the difference between selective and passive. Carpenter knew the likelihood of a fastball from Kershaw was high, just as the odds of J.P. Howell throwing a first pitch sinker. He combined this information with his keen pitch recognition skills and made very good things happen for the Cardinals when he found pitches to his liking.

Staying the course

It wasn’t all first pitch glory and ambush swings from the Cards’ third baseman. Matt Carpenter can grind out at bats like few other hitters in baseball, staying back on breaking balls while fighting off good fastballs from top pitchers. This Game One battle against Kershaw s one of the best at bats we’ll see this postseason.



Many watching this game wondered aloud if the Cardinals had something on Kershaw, if perhaps he was tipping his pitches or the base runners were stealing signs. The swings Carpenter put on some of these pitches are comfortable enough to suggest some sort of prior knowledge, though our own Mike Petriello debunked that line of thinking over at Dodgers Digest

If we track back one year, we find a nearly identical battle between Kershaw and Carpenter from Game Six of the 2013 NLCS. The batting-gloveless one fights off fastball after fastball, staying alive and on the sliders and curves that Kershaw offers before banging the 11th pitch he sees, a slider, into the right-field corner for a double. He’s a great hitter who, in these situations, hung tough against the game’s best.

In earlier at bats, Kershaw dispensed with Carpenter easily, striking him out on four pitches and coaxing a tame infield popup. But in these huge at bats, the motor of the Cards offense earned himself some hittable pitches, not to mention more fastballs from a quickly-tiring Kershaw, by simply keeping the at bat alive.

Gift Horse Rodeo

We often hear about good pitching beating good hitting, but even great pitching isn’t immune to mistakes. Great hitting is all about taking advantage of those mistakes and turning them into opportunities for your club. Against Matt Carpenter in the NLDS, the Dodgers made more than their share of mistakes.

A quick look at the strike zone plot of his extra base hits shows just how generous L.A.’s pitching staff was with the Cardinals lead-off man. Fastballs over the heart of the plate, change ups that caught far too much of the strike zone and two cookies in the typical lefty wheelhouse, down and in.

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The pitch plot tells some of the story, but the locations appear worse when contrasted with the targets set by Dodgers’ catcher A.J. Ellis. We see Ellis reaching back across the plate on the bomb Carpenter hit off Howell and groping for an even bigger miss when the two met again in St. Louis. His first homer off Kershaw came on a fastball that stayed up, and the worst offender of all, the bases-clearing double, which missed its spot by the full width of the plate.

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It takes a great hitter to capitalize on these mistakes and Carpenter is just that. As noted above, he “earned” these pitches by making the opposition work and staying alive through some long at bats. After a season in which he admits to fighting his swing, it all came together in time for another Cardinals run to the league championship series.

What can and will the Giants do to combat the relentless Carpenter? Game One starter Madison Bumgarner will try keeping his fastball on the outside part of the plate, perhaps trying looking to flip in a first pitch breaking ball to jump ahead in the count? It isn’t something he’s done in their matchups in the past and it isn’t a pitch he typically throws to lefties to open at bats (around 7% of the time this year), but Carpenter surely earned the full attention of all coaches and scouts in SF.

We know Matt Carpenter isn’t going to beat himself too often at the plate. In the NLDS, he showed he can a very good team. He’ll continue making himself a tough out and while he might not earn many more Stan Musial comps, the Giants must avoid the same mistakes made by their bitter rivals to the south lest Carpenter become The Man once again.


So Why Do Our Playoff Odds Love the Royals?

This is the postseason of the underdog. The Angels, Dodgers, Tigers, and Nationals were all bounced in the first round. Both wild card teams advanced, combining to lose one game in the process, despite having burned their best starting pitchers in the play-in game. One of the remaining division winners won just 90 games. These are not the League Championship Series many people expected, and with the little guys advancing in each division series, we should be in for some pretty even match-ups. At least, that’s what one would think.

But if you look over at our Playoff Odds page, our depth chart forecasts don’t exactly see it that way. This is how those projections look right now, before the start of either LCS.

Team LCS Odds WS Odds
Royals 63% 36%
Cardinals 52% 25%
Giants 48% 23%
Orioles 37% 16%
Our projections have the Royals as a significant favorite over the Orioles, even though Baltimore was the better regular season team by just about any measure you want to use. But this isn’t another FanGraphs-just-hates-the-Orioles situation — we don’t, really, I promise — as our forecasts actually had the Royals-Angels match-up as essentially a coin toss, and see them as a legitimately strong contender, not just a Wild Card who snuck past the first round due to the randomness of October.

But the Royals certainly didn’t play like an elite team this summer. By BaseRuns, they were a .500 team, and only managed to snag a Wild Card spot because of their strong performances in the clutch. So what’s the deal? Why do our forecasts love the Royals so much?

Thanks to our Depth Charts overview page and our positional leaderboards we can actually go see exactly where the differences are between projected value and what the Royals produced in 2014. So let’s find out where exactly the projections are bullish on this roster.

Royals C 1B 2B SS 3B LF CF RF DH SP RP Bat Pit WAR
Projections 4.4 2.6 2.2 2.2 3.4 4.4 3.5 2.4 1.6 10.3 5.0 26.7 15.3 42.0
2014 3.0 1.0 1.0 3.4 1.3 6.2 5.8 2.3 (1.7) 12.9 5.9 22.3 18.8 41.1
Difference 1.4 1.6 1.2 (1.2) 2.1 (1.8) (2.3) 0.1 3.3 (2.6) (0.9) 4.4 (3.5) 0.9
Overall, the forecasts are pretty optimistic about the Royals young position players, giving them league average or better marks at essentially every position on the field. But there are two notable forecasts that paint a significantly more positive view than just looking at 2014 performance: third base and designated hitter.

Let’s start at DH, where Billy Butler was a miserable failure, especially when he wasn’t playing the field. His overall .271/.323/.379 line is bad enough for a bat-only player, but even that was pulled up by solid production when Butler played first base; as a DH, Butler hit .259/.307/.335, good for just a 79 wRC+. The guys who filled in when he played first base weren’t a lot better, and overall, the Royals DH’s combined for the second worst total in the AL, with only the Mariners (-3.2 WAR!) getting less from the position.

But the Steamer forecasts — the engine powering our Playoff Odds models — aren’t really phased by Butler’s lousy 2014 season, and think he’s basically still the good-not-great hitter he’s always been. The 119 wRC+ forecast for him is actually slightly above his career average mark, as Steamer is still giving weight to his strong 2012 season, and at 28 years old, he’s right in the sweet spot of the aging curve. This season, Butler was awful, but the forecasts don’t see Butler as an actually awful player, and assuming that he’s classic Billy Butler and not the 2014 version gives the team a significant boost in the forecasts.

The story is similar at third base. Mike Moustaksas had a miserable regular season, posting a 76 wRC+ and getting himself optioned back to Triple-A for a stint, but Steamer sees him as an above average big league third baseman. In fact, his +3 WAR in 586 PA is shockingly strong given that, in nearly 2,000 plate appearances, Moustakas has produced a total of just +5 WAR over his career. Steamer is really bullish on Moustakas despite a poor Major League track record, and so to find out why, I emailed Jared Cross, the gatekeper of the projection system and asked him what was up. His response:

In addition to going into a peak age, I think he’s benefitting from having a slightly better year this year (than his career average) in terms of BB%, K% and a worse year in BABIP. BABIP not only gets regressed more than K% and BB%, but BABIP data from longer ago weighs in more heavily relative to data from the more recent season (although the most recent season still gets the highest weight, of course). So, his rough year in 2014 isn’t quite as bad as it looks, projection-wise, because it’s largely the result of a terrible BABIP.

Jared isn’t kidding; Moustakas had a .220 BABIP this year, the lowest mark of any hitter who hit at least 500 times this season. His high infield fly rate shows that this isn’t just bad luck, as Moustakas makes a ton of weak contact that results in easy outs for the infield. But Moustakas has always hit a ton of infield flies, and he’s never run a .220 BABIP before; his career mark is .260, and Steamer is only forecasting him for a few ticks above that, at .272.

But as Jared notes, if you don’t hold the entirety of his .220 BABIP against him, the rest of Moustakas’ line actually isn’t half bad. His walk rate was the highest of his career, and his strikeout rate was well below the league average, while he also posted a decent-ish .149 ISO. For comparison, Moustakas’ BB/K/ISO numbers are almost exactly the same as Jacoby Ellsbury‘s, and actually a little bit ahead of guys like Lonnie Chisenhall, Starlin Castro, and Pablo Sandoval, each of whom were slightly better than league average hitters. This high-contact/some power combination, mixed in with a smattering of walks, is a decent offensive player as long as the BABIP is within the normal range.

And that’s basically what Steamer is projecting for Moustakas; a strong enough BABIP regression to make him a league average hitter, based on his solid enough underlying skills. Add in his defensive skills at third base, and Steamer sees Moustakas as a productive player, not the black hole he was in the Royals line-up for most of the year.

Interestingly enough, this is one of those times when the data and the scouts likely agree. The Royals believed themselves to be contenders this year based in part on their faith in Moustakas and Butler, and both underachieved relative to what the team and the forecasts believed they were capable of. The same could be true, to a lesser extent, of Eric Hosmer, Salvador Perez, and Omar Infante. The Royals expected to have a productive infield, and the forecasts thought this group should be pretty solid as well, but in reality, they were pretty lousy, especially if you consider Butler part of the infield group. But just as the Royals haven’t given up on their young core, neither have the projections, and their optimism about these young players performing better than their 2014 numbers has the forecasts buying into Kansas City as a legitimate contender.

A total projection of 42 WAR might not sound like a lot, because after all, it’s only 1 WAR higher than their 2014 total, but it’s actually the fourth highest projected total of any team in baseball, a tenth of a win behind the Dodgers. These forecasts look at the Royals and see a legitimately good team, not a .500 club that clutched their way into the playoffs.

If you go to the Royals team depth chart page, you can see how the individual forecasts add up at the runs level. The positive forecasts for the young players turns the Royals from a bad offensive team into an above average one, grading them out at +26 runs above average with the bats. Toss in another +34 runs for their fielding, and Steamer really likes the Royals position players. Pair that with a decent rotation and a great bullpen, and the forecasts think the Royals are clearly the best team left in the postseason, as good as any of the big boys who just knocked out in the first round.

Now, how much emphasis you put on these forecasts is a matter of opinion, and if you think that the only data that matters is what happened in the regular season, then our season-to-date Playoff Odds model probably aligns more with your expectations, with the Orioles as strong favorites to win both the ALCS and the World Series. If you think Moustakas, Hosmer, and Butler are more of what they showed this season than what the forecasts think, then the Royals probably aren’t a legitimately great team.

Personally, I’m probably somewhere in between, thinking the Royals are better than their 2014 performance but not entirely buying into the full improvements that Steamer sees for the Royals young hitters. But then again, I’m also the guy who would have had Anaheim, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Washington playing in the LCS, so Steamer’s doing better than I am this postseason.
 
EJ is my guy but he isnt built for playoff baseball :lol:

Hope whoever comes out the AL wins it all
 
What channel was this **** on? Mlb need to get their **** together and stop with the billion channels broadcasting the playoffs
 
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