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screw the future, i guess... Braun out 50 games, Fielder gone, Pujols gone... NL Central is ours to take.
2016 MLB thread. THE CUBS HAVE BROKEN THE CURSE! Chicago Cubs are your 2016 World Series champions
- Thread in 'Sports & Training' Thread starter Started by proshares,
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Since we're going all in this year I wouldn't mind going after Beltran. I think this trade save us close to 4 million. I really don't know what he's looking for but if we could get him for a year or two for 8-10 million per, I'd say go for it. He can play left and hit behind Votto and before Bruce. We could get a big reward like the Cards got out of Berkman last season.
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Since we're going all in this year I wouldn't mind going after Beltran. I think this trade save us close to 4 million. I really don't know what he's looking for but if we could get him for a year or two for 8-10 million per, I'd say go for it. He can play left and hit behind Votto and before Bruce. We could get a big reward like the Cards got out of Berkman last season.
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Reds making big splashes? I'm down for it.
Our success greatly hinders on Drew Stubs not swinging at EVERYTHING.
Padres get short and long-term help for Latos.
Reds finally get their ace in Mat Latos.
If Minnesota loves Jason Kubel, let him go.
Derek Holland, Rangers talking extension.
It’s difficult to say how much of those improvements Holland will carry over into 2012, but over the tail end of last season, he was arguably as good or better than C.J. Wilson. The Rangers have resigned themselves to losing Wilson in free agency, but they just might have the next Wilson already on their roster.
But since the terms of the agreement haven’t been released yet, what should we expect? How much will Holland get in this deal? That question is a lot easier to answer than you’d imagine.
When you look at the extensions that other young pitchers have signed in recent year, it’s easy to notice a common theme:
*Blue squares represent club options.
This isn’t a comprehensive list of every extension signed over the last few seasons — I tried to pick pitchers that compare well with Holland, so you’ll notice the disproportionate amount of lefties — but it should hopefully be enough to get the picture. Almost every extension followed the exact same template. After posting a 3.5-4.0 WAR season, the young starter signed an extension that gave them a raise over their remaining cost-controlled years (if they had any), and paid them close to $3m, $5.5m, and $7.5m over their arbitration years. There were also one or two team options tacked on at the end of the deal.
And if you look even closer, you’ll notice that the template gets even more precise depending on when the pitcher signed their contract. The three pitchers that signed before their final year of cost control (like Holland’s situation right now) all received a $30 million payout over five guaranteed years, with a $13 million team option tacked on the end. Considering Holland has been roughly similar to those pitchers through this stage of his career, I’d imagine that his deal will approximate those contracts.
Whenever a team signs a young pitcher to a long-term extension like this, the common refrain is almost always, “That’s such a good deal, so why don’t more teams do this with their players?
Spoiler [+]
The Reds and Padres swung a mini-blockbuster today, with Mat Latos heading to Cincinnati in exchange for four players: first baseman Yonder Alonso, catcher Yasmani Grandal, and right-handers Edinson Volquez and Brad Boxberger. We’re all familiar with Volquez because he’s been around a while, and Baseball America recently ranked Alonso, Grandal, and Boxberger as the Reds’ third, fourth, and tenth best prospects, respectively.
Rather than look to fill specific needs — which some felt the Royals did when they traded Zack Greinke to the Brewers last winter — it appears as though the Padres just took the best package of talent they could find. There’s a lot going on here as far as the San Diego is concerned, so let’s break it all down…
Both Yonder and Rizzo?
First base prospect Anthony Rizzo was a key piece of last winter’s Adrian Gonzalez trade, and about two months later Baseball America ranked him as the 75th prospect in the game. Alonso was two spots ahead of him at number 73. San Diego now has two young, high-end, left-handed power bats at first base that are essentially Major League ready in their organization, creating a bit of a logjam.
The Reds tried like crazy to find a non-first base spot for Alonso over the last few years, trying him at third base and in the outfield. Most of his big league time has come in left field, but it’s hard to find anyone that thinks that experiment will work long-term. Rizzo has never played anything other than first base in the minors, and as a left-handed thrower, he’s limited to first or the outfield. Neither player has great defensive tools, so they’re stuck battling it out for the same full-time roster spot. Ultimately, another trade is likely.
Petco Park tends to favor right-handed hitters or opposite field lefties like Gonzalez, which actually makes Alonso a better long-term fit than Rizzo even though his minor league performance isn’t as impressive. Both players have power the other way, though Alonso does have longer track record of hitting the ball to all fields with authority, dating back to his days at Miami. Their big league spray charts don’t tell us anything definitive given the small sample sizes (Alonso and Rizzo), but there is a noticeable difference. Yonder has also exhibited better strike zone discipline in the minors (11.0 BB% compared to 9.7% for Rizzo) without the propensity to strike out (15.1 K% compared to 20.7% for Rizzo).
It’s worth mentioning that Alonso figures to be more expensive going forward even though both guys are under team control through 2017. The big league contract he signed out of the draft in 2008 will pay him $1 million in 2012, and that will impact his future salaries going forward. Rizzo will make half that next season and won’t have the same trickle down effect. Both guys are great young hitters, but Alonso is probably a better long-term fit for San Diego given their extreme home park situation. There will be no shortage of teams willing to trade for Rizzo, with Rays, Blue Jays, Orioles, Mariners, Nationals, Cubs, Cardinals, and Brewers among the clubs that could use a young, power-hitting first baseman.
Volquez in Petco Park
We’re now three years removed from Volquez’s breakout 4.2 WAR season in 2008, with Tommy John surgery, a PED suspension, and walk issues popping up in recent years. The now 28-year-old right-hander has walked 13.4% of the batters he’s faced since the start of 2009, second most behind Carlos Marmol (16.6%) among pitchers who’ve thrown at least 220 innings. The strikeout (22.2 K% and 8.88 K/9) and ground ball (51.3%) rates are still very good during that time, it just continues to be a question of control.
For now, Volquez steps into Latos’ vacated rotation spot. He’s only under control through 2013 as an arbitration-eligible player, so don’t expect his tenure in San Diego to be all that long. With some help from a strong defensive club and a drastic change in home ballparks, Volquez could find himself on another club as soon as this summer if he puts together a solid first half. The guy has always had walk problems, but he could see some improvement going forward as he gets further away from elbow reconstruction. He’s the only established big leaguer heading to the Padres, but it isn’t insane to consider him the fourth piece of the deal as far as they’re concerned.
The Long-Term Catcher
The Reds were blessed with two top catching prospects, but it’s not surprising they decided to keep the big league ready Devin Mesoraco over Grandal, the 12th overall pick in the 2010 draft. Grandal had a huge year with the stick at three minor league levels in 2011 (.305/.401/.500 with 14 homers in 105 games), and Baseball America recently touted him as being an average receiver and thrower in the long-term. Like Alonso, he does a nice job controlling the strike zone (13.3 BB% so far in his career), and catchers that can avoid being zeros at the plate while being average behind it are very valuable. Grandal figures to be much more than that, and as an added bonus, he’s a switch-hitter.
The Padres are pretty well set behind the plate next year with Nick Hundley and John Baker, so they can afford to be patient and give Grandal a full season in the minors. He crushed Double-A pitching during his 45-game cameo there last summer (.301/.360/.474), so a full season in Triple-A is probably in the forecast next year. San Diego had little upper level catcher depth in the minors, so this move fills a glaring hole.
Bullpen Depth
The 43rd overall pick in 2009, the Reds moved Boxberger to the bullpen full-time this season and he flourished. In 62 innings split almost evenly between Double- and Triple-A, he struck out 93 and walked just 28 with a strong ground ball rate (~46% according to Minor League Central). He tacked on another 22 strikeouts and six walks in 11.1 Arizona Fall League innings after the season.
For all intents and purposes, Boxberger is a big league ready bullpen arm with swing-and-miss stuff (92-95 fastball and an average slider) and some control problems. The Padres have a knack for turning guys like this into quality late-inning arms, which is what Boxberger projected to be even before the move to Petco. Boxberger is unlikely to step into the shoes previously filled by Heath Bell, at least not in 2012, but getting six cost-controlled years of a power reliever as an extra piece was a nice get for Byrnes.
* * *
It going to hurt anytime a team trades a young, homegrown, ace-caliber pitcher, but the Padres did a fine job of getting long-term solutions at first base and catcher while adding some young bullpen help. Volquez is a bit of a wildcard, but he’s got a chance to help the club both on the mound and as a trade chip within the next two seasons. Byrnes managed to get a nice combination of short-term production and long-term value by trading Latos, and he should be applauded for being open-minded enough to take an upgrade over Rizzo if it meant getting the most talent possible.
Rather than look to fill specific needs — which some felt the Royals did when they traded Zack Greinke to the Brewers last winter — it appears as though the Padres just took the best package of talent they could find. There’s a lot going on here as far as the San Diego is concerned, so let’s break it all down…
Both Yonder and Rizzo?
First base prospect Anthony Rizzo was a key piece of last winter’s Adrian Gonzalez trade, and about two months later Baseball America ranked him as the 75th prospect in the game. Alonso was two spots ahead of him at number 73. San Diego now has two young, high-end, left-handed power bats at first base that are essentially Major League ready in their organization, creating a bit of a logjam.
The Reds tried like crazy to find a non-first base spot for Alonso over the last few years, trying him at third base and in the outfield. Most of his big league time has come in left field, but it’s hard to find anyone that thinks that experiment will work long-term. Rizzo has never played anything other than first base in the minors, and as a left-handed thrower, he’s limited to first or the outfield. Neither player has great defensive tools, so they’re stuck battling it out for the same full-time roster spot. Ultimately, another trade is likely.
Petco Park tends to favor right-handed hitters or opposite field lefties like Gonzalez, which actually makes Alonso a better long-term fit than Rizzo even though his minor league performance isn’t as impressive. Both players have power the other way, though Alonso does have longer track record of hitting the ball to all fields with authority, dating back to his days at Miami. Their big league spray charts don’t tell us anything definitive given the small sample sizes (Alonso and Rizzo), but there is a noticeable difference. Yonder has also exhibited better strike zone discipline in the minors (11.0 BB% compared to 9.7% for Rizzo) without the propensity to strike out (15.1 K% compared to 20.7% for Rizzo).
It’s worth mentioning that Alonso figures to be more expensive going forward even though both guys are under team control through 2017. The big league contract he signed out of the draft in 2008 will pay him $1 million in 2012, and that will impact his future salaries going forward. Rizzo will make half that next season and won’t have the same trickle down effect. Both guys are great young hitters, but Alonso is probably a better long-term fit for San Diego given their extreme home park situation. There will be no shortage of teams willing to trade for Rizzo, with Rays, Blue Jays, Orioles, Mariners, Nationals, Cubs, Cardinals, and Brewers among the clubs that could use a young, power-hitting first baseman.
Volquez in Petco Park
We’re now three years removed from Volquez’s breakout 4.2 WAR season in 2008, with Tommy John surgery, a PED suspension, and walk issues popping up in recent years. The now 28-year-old right-hander has walked 13.4% of the batters he’s faced since the start of 2009, second most behind Carlos Marmol (16.6%) among pitchers who’ve thrown at least 220 innings. The strikeout (22.2 K% and 8.88 K/9) and ground ball (51.3%) rates are still very good during that time, it just continues to be a question of control.
For now, Volquez steps into Latos’ vacated rotation spot. He’s only under control through 2013 as an arbitration-eligible player, so don’t expect his tenure in San Diego to be all that long. With some help from a strong defensive club and a drastic change in home ballparks, Volquez could find himself on another club as soon as this summer if he puts together a solid first half. The guy has always had walk problems, but he could see some improvement going forward as he gets further away from elbow reconstruction. He’s the only established big leaguer heading to the Padres, but it isn’t insane to consider him the fourth piece of the deal as far as they’re concerned.
The Long-Term Catcher
The Reds were blessed with two top catching prospects, but it’s not surprising they decided to keep the big league ready Devin Mesoraco over Grandal, the 12th overall pick in the 2010 draft. Grandal had a huge year with the stick at three minor league levels in 2011 (.305/.401/.500 with 14 homers in 105 games), and Baseball America recently touted him as being an average receiver and thrower in the long-term. Like Alonso, he does a nice job controlling the strike zone (13.3 BB% so far in his career), and catchers that can avoid being zeros at the plate while being average behind it are very valuable. Grandal figures to be much more than that, and as an added bonus, he’s a switch-hitter.
The Padres are pretty well set behind the plate next year with Nick Hundley and John Baker, so they can afford to be patient and give Grandal a full season in the minors. He crushed Double-A pitching during his 45-game cameo there last summer (.301/.360/.474), so a full season in Triple-A is probably in the forecast next year. San Diego had little upper level catcher depth in the minors, so this move fills a glaring hole.
Bullpen Depth
The 43rd overall pick in 2009, the Reds moved Boxberger to the bullpen full-time this season and he flourished. In 62 innings split almost evenly between Double- and Triple-A, he struck out 93 and walked just 28 with a strong ground ball rate (~46% according to Minor League Central). He tacked on another 22 strikeouts and six walks in 11.1 Arizona Fall League innings after the season.
For all intents and purposes, Boxberger is a big league ready bullpen arm with swing-and-miss stuff (92-95 fastball and an average slider) and some control problems. The Padres have a knack for turning guys like this into quality late-inning arms, which is what Boxberger projected to be even before the move to Petco. Boxberger is unlikely to step into the shoes previously filled by Heath Bell, at least not in 2012, but getting six cost-controlled years of a power reliever as an extra piece was a nice get for Byrnes.
* * *
It going to hurt anytime a team trades a young, homegrown, ace-caliber pitcher, but the Padres did a fine job of getting long-term solutions at first base and catcher while adding some young bullpen help. Volquez is a bit of a wildcard, but he’s got a chance to help the club both on the mound and as a trade chip within the next two seasons. Byrnes managed to get a nice combination of short-term production and long-term value by trading Latos, and he should be applauded for being open-minded enough to take an upgrade over Rizzo if it meant getting the most talent possible.
Reds finally get their ace in Mat Latos.
Spoiler [+]
The Cincinnati Reds had an abundance of redundant prospects and a big need to upgrade their starting rotation, so their plan for this off-season was obvious to nearly everyone. They needed to combine a group of good young talents who were blocked from playing regularly and turn them into one high quality starting pitcher. After kicking the tires on nearly every available arm on the market, the Reds finally got their wish today, shipping a quartet of good young talents to San Diego in exchange for 24-year-old Mat Latos.
Let’s start with what the Reds are getting in Latos, who is probably the best fit for their team of any pitcher rumored to be available on the market this winter. During his first two years and change in the Majors, Latos has been one of the better pitchers in baseball. For comparison, here are the starters who have thrown at least 350 innings in the last two years and have posted strikeout rates between 23% and 25%.
[table][tr][th=""]Name[/th][th=""]Age[/th][th=""]IP[/th][th=""]BB%[/th][th=""]K%[/th][th=""]GB%[/th][th=""]BABIP[/th][th=""]HR/FB[/th][th=""]ERA-[/th][th=""]FIP-[/th][th=""]xFIP-[/th][/tr][tr][td]Cliff Lee[/td][td]32[/td][td]445.0[/td][td]3.4%[/td][td]24.0%[/td][td]44.1%[/td][td]0.289[/td][td]7.5%[/td][td]69[/td][td]64[/td][td]71[/td][/tr][tr][td]Felix Hernandez[/td][td]25[/td][td]483.1[/td][td]7.0%[/td][td]23.1%[/td][td]52.0%[/td][td]0.284[/td][td]9.0%[/td][td]72[/td][td]78[/td][td]77[/td][/tr][tr][td]Zack Greinke[/td][td]27[/td][td]391.2[/td][td]6.1%[/td][td]23.4%[/td][td]46.5%[/td][td]0.311[/td][td]9.8%[/td][td]101[/td][td]79[/td][td]78[/td][/tr][tr][td]Cole Hamels[/td][td]27[/td][td]424.2[/td][td]6.2%[/td][td]23.7%[/td][td]48.9%[/td][td]0.272[/td][td]11.2%[/td][td]74[/td][td]85[/td][td]80[/td][/tr][tr][td]Justin Verlander[/td][td]28[/td][td]475.1[/td][td]6.8%[/td][td]24.8%[/td][td]40.6%[/td][td]0.261[/td][td]7.3%[/td][td]68[/td][td]72[/td][td]81[/td][/tr][tr][td]Yovani Gallardo[/td][td]25[/td][td]392.1[/td][td]8.0%[/td][td]24.4%[/td][td]44.9%[/td][td]0.306[/td][td]10.2%[/td][td]95[/td][td]86[/td][td]83[/td][/tr][tr][td]Jon Lester[/td][td]27[/td][td]399.2[/td][td]9.5%[/td][td]24.5%[/td][td]52.0%[/td][td]0.288[/td][td]10.2%[/td][td]78[/td][td]81[/td][td]83[/td][/tr][tr][td]Mat Latos[/td][td]23[/td][td]379.0[/td][td]7.2%[/td][td]24.2%[/td][td]43.7%[/td][td]0.279[/td][td]7.6%[/td][td]90[/td][td]86[/td][td]86[/td][/tr][tr][td]Jered Weaver[/td][td]28[/td][td]460.0[/td][td]6.0%[/td][td]23.5%[/td][td]34.2%[/td][td]0.262[/td][td]7.0%[/td][td]67[/td][td]77[/td][td]87[/td][/tr][tr][td]Ubaldo Jimenez[/td][td]27[/td][td]410.0[/td][td]9.9%[/td][td]23.0%[/td][td]48.0%[/td][td]0.292[/td][td]7.1%[/td][td]87[/td][td]79[/td][td]92[/td][/tr][/table]
That’s some pretty good company Latos has been keeping. There aren’t that many pitchers in the sport who can miss bats with the frequency that Latos has established while also pounding the strike zone with regularity. Guys who can live in the zone and still avoid contact are generally the best pitchers in the game. This is the one skillset you want in a pitcher more than any other.
In terms of pure upside, Latos is likely going to be the best pitcher to change teams this winter. His command of four pitches gives him the chance of being a true front-line starter, and he’s already shown he can dominate hitters from both sides of the plate, so he’s not a guy who can be neutralized through match-up advantages. So, why were the Padres willing to trade him?
Well, as with any young pitcher, Latos carries a decent amont of risk. The flameout rate for developing arms is still pretty high, and Latos has not established himself as a durable innings eater. In fact, Latos began the 2011 season on the disabled list with shoulder bursitis – never a great thing for a pitcher – and missed a few starts in 2010 after straining his side while holding in a sneeze. That’s not exactly the type of injury you expect to recur, but the fact that he’s only averaged about 3,000 pitchers per season the last two years does mean that he hasn’t yet shown that he can hold up under the types of workloads that contenders hope to get from their aces.
With the Reds gunning for a playoff spot in 2012, the restraints are going to have to come off their prized off-season acquisition, and they’ll be forced to ask him to increase his workload, both in terms of games pitched and how many pitches he throws – he’s only crossed the 110 pitch threshold in four of his 72 career starts – in those games. Can he hold up under the increased workload? The Reds have to hope so, but the unknown in this situation provides some risk that allowed Cincinnati to acquire Latos in the first place. Put simply, if he had already proven to be a workhorse capable of these kinds of performances, the Padres probably wouldn’t have traded him. So, the Reds get the upside of a #1 starter by accepting the risks regarding durability and how well Latos will perform outside of Petco Park.
As we talked about with Heath Bell earlier, there are certainly pitchers who you might want to be careful in taking out of San Diego, but honestly, Latos isn’t really one of those guys. For one, Latos hasn’t been given the Aaron Harang treatment, where the Padres rigged the schedule to maximize his starts in Petco. In his career, he’s actually thrown more innings on the road (244.1) than at home (185.1) and his underlying performances have been nearly identical. While this doesn’t mean that he hasn’t benefited from pitching in Petco, he’s not a guy who relies on HR prevention to succeed, and the ability to run a 3-1 strikeout to walk ratio travels well from one ballpark to another. Latos will likely see his HR rate rise a bit with the move to Great American Ballpark, but even with a slight uptick in home runs allowed, he’ll still profile as one of the better starters in the National League.
Latos has the potential to be exactly what the Reds need, and could improve their 2012 roster enough to push them back into position to be real contenders for the National League Central crown next year. Beyond just his short term value, the Reds retain control of his rights through 2015, so this is a move that offers both near term and long term rewards.
The cost was high – I like all four of the guys they gave up – but the reality was that the Reds had too many players for too few spots. They weren’t going to be able to receive value from both Yonder Alonso and Joey Votto or Devin Mesoraco and Yasmani Grandal, so packaging their excess depth with Volquez and Boxberger to get Latos made sense. If Latos does show that he can be a 220 inning ace going forward, they won’t regret this deal even if the players they shipped to San Diego turn out to be stars. The Reds needed to consolidate talent this winter, and they’ve managed to trade quantity for quality at the position they needed most.
Pitching doesn’t come cheap, but credit the Reds for landing a pitcher good enough to make a real difference. This move isn’t without its risks, but Latos has the upside to be worth betting on.
Let’s start with what the Reds are getting in Latos, who is probably the best fit for their team of any pitcher rumored to be available on the market this winter. During his first two years and change in the Majors, Latos has been one of the better pitchers in baseball. For comparison, here are the starters who have thrown at least 350 innings in the last two years and have posted strikeout rates between 23% and 25%.
[table][tr][th=""]Name[/th][th=""]Age[/th][th=""]IP[/th][th=""]BB%[/th][th=""]K%[/th][th=""]GB%[/th][th=""]BABIP[/th][th=""]HR/FB[/th][th=""]ERA-[/th][th=""]FIP-[/th][th=""]xFIP-[/th][/tr][tr][td]Cliff Lee[/td][td]32[/td][td]445.0[/td][td]3.4%[/td][td]24.0%[/td][td]44.1%[/td][td]0.289[/td][td]7.5%[/td][td]69[/td][td]64[/td][td]71[/td][/tr][tr][td]Felix Hernandez[/td][td]25[/td][td]483.1[/td][td]7.0%[/td][td]23.1%[/td][td]52.0%[/td][td]0.284[/td][td]9.0%[/td][td]72[/td][td]78[/td][td]77[/td][/tr][tr][td]Zack Greinke[/td][td]27[/td][td]391.2[/td][td]6.1%[/td][td]23.4%[/td][td]46.5%[/td][td]0.311[/td][td]9.8%[/td][td]101[/td][td]79[/td][td]78[/td][/tr][tr][td]Cole Hamels[/td][td]27[/td][td]424.2[/td][td]6.2%[/td][td]23.7%[/td][td]48.9%[/td][td]0.272[/td][td]11.2%[/td][td]74[/td][td]85[/td][td]80[/td][/tr][tr][td]Justin Verlander[/td][td]28[/td][td]475.1[/td][td]6.8%[/td][td]24.8%[/td][td]40.6%[/td][td]0.261[/td][td]7.3%[/td][td]68[/td][td]72[/td][td]81[/td][/tr][tr][td]Yovani Gallardo[/td][td]25[/td][td]392.1[/td][td]8.0%[/td][td]24.4%[/td][td]44.9%[/td][td]0.306[/td][td]10.2%[/td][td]95[/td][td]86[/td][td]83[/td][/tr][tr][td]Jon Lester[/td][td]27[/td][td]399.2[/td][td]9.5%[/td][td]24.5%[/td][td]52.0%[/td][td]0.288[/td][td]10.2%[/td][td]78[/td][td]81[/td][td]83[/td][/tr][tr][td]Mat Latos[/td][td]23[/td][td]379.0[/td][td]7.2%[/td][td]24.2%[/td][td]43.7%[/td][td]0.279[/td][td]7.6%[/td][td]90[/td][td]86[/td][td]86[/td][/tr][tr][td]Jered Weaver[/td][td]28[/td][td]460.0[/td][td]6.0%[/td][td]23.5%[/td][td]34.2%[/td][td]0.262[/td][td]7.0%[/td][td]67[/td][td]77[/td][td]87[/td][/tr][tr][td]Ubaldo Jimenez[/td][td]27[/td][td]410.0[/td][td]9.9%[/td][td]23.0%[/td][td]48.0%[/td][td]0.292[/td][td]7.1%[/td][td]87[/td][td]79[/td][td]92[/td][/tr][/table]
That’s some pretty good company Latos has been keeping. There aren’t that many pitchers in the sport who can miss bats with the frequency that Latos has established while also pounding the strike zone with regularity. Guys who can live in the zone and still avoid contact are generally the best pitchers in the game. This is the one skillset you want in a pitcher more than any other.
In terms of pure upside, Latos is likely going to be the best pitcher to change teams this winter. His command of four pitches gives him the chance of being a true front-line starter, and he’s already shown he can dominate hitters from both sides of the plate, so he’s not a guy who can be neutralized through match-up advantages. So, why were the Padres willing to trade him?
Well, as with any young pitcher, Latos carries a decent amont of risk. The flameout rate for developing arms is still pretty high, and Latos has not established himself as a durable innings eater. In fact, Latos began the 2011 season on the disabled list with shoulder bursitis – never a great thing for a pitcher – and missed a few starts in 2010 after straining his side while holding in a sneeze. That’s not exactly the type of injury you expect to recur, but the fact that he’s only averaged about 3,000 pitchers per season the last two years does mean that he hasn’t yet shown that he can hold up under the types of workloads that contenders hope to get from their aces.
With the Reds gunning for a playoff spot in 2012, the restraints are going to have to come off their prized off-season acquisition, and they’ll be forced to ask him to increase his workload, both in terms of games pitched and how many pitches he throws – he’s only crossed the 110 pitch threshold in four of his 72 career starts – in those games. Can he hold up under the increased workload? The Reds have to hope so, but the unknown in this situation provides some risk that allowed Cincinnati to acquire Latos in the first place. Put simply, if he had already proven to be a workhorse capable of these kinds of performances, the Padres probably wouldn’t have traded him. So, the Reds get the upside of a #1 starter by accepting the risks regarding durability and how well Latos will perform outside of Petco Park.
As we talked about with Heath Bell earlier, there are certainly pitchers who you might want to be careful in taking out of San Diego, but honestly, Latos isn’t really one of those guys. For one, Latos hasn’t been given the Aaron Harang treatment, where the Padres rigged the schedule to maximize his starts in Petco. In his career, he’s actually thrown more innings on the road (244.1) than at home (185.1) and his underlying performances have been nearly identical. While this doesn’t mean that he hasn’t benefited from pitching in Petco, he’s not a guy who relies on HR prevention to succeed, and the ability to run a 3-1 strikeout to walk ratio travels well from one ballpark to another. Latos will likely see his HR rate rise a bit with the move to Great American Ballpark, but even with a slight uptick in home runs allowed, he’ll still profile as one of the better starters in the National League.
Latos has the potential to be exactly what the Reds need, and could improve their 2012 roster enough to push them back into position to be real contenders for the National League Central crown next year. Beyond just his short term value, the Reds retain control of his rights through 2015, so this is a move that offers both near term and long term rewards.
The cost was high – I like all four of the guys they gave up – but the reality was that the Reds had too many players for too few spots. They weren’t going to be able to receive value from both Yonder Alonso and Joey Votto or Devin Mesoraco and Yasmani Grandal, so packaging their excess depth with Volquez and Boxberger to get Latos made sense. If Latos does show that he can be a 220 inning ace going forward, they won’t regret this deal even if the players they shipped to San Diego turn out to be stars. The Reds needed to consolidate talent this winter, and they’ve managed to trade quantity for quality at the position they needed most.
Pitching doesn’t come cheap, but credit the Reds for landing a pitcher good enough to make a real difference. This move isn’t without its risks, but Latos has the upside to be worth betting on.
If Minnesota loves Jason Kubel, let him go.
Spoiler [+]
The seemingly unending slow dance between the Minnesota Twins, the Colorado Rockies and Michael Cuddyer is over. As Matt Klaassen already analyzed, the Twins will probably be better off seeing other people in right field. For Terry Ryan and Minnesota, the attention now shifts back to another old flame: Jason Kubel. Kubel has already earned some interest from the Indians, and if Kubel leaves Minneapolis, the Twins can pick up a third compensatory draft pick to go with the two the Twins pick up with Cuddyer’s departure. But reports say the Twins could be looking to keep Kubel for next season instead.
Between Denard Span, Ben Revere, Josh Willingham, Ryan Doumit, Justin Morneau, Joe Mauer, Chris Parmelee, and Trevor Plouffe, the Twins appear to have the outfield, first base, and designated hitter spots covered. If the Twins really love Jason Kubel — and, more importantly, if they really love long-term assets — they should set him free.
Jason Kubel’s bat is very much a major league-quality one. Year-in and year-out, the Twins have been able to rely on average or better from the 29-year-old:
But with Kubel, a player who can hit a little bit but is limited to right field, or more often, not playing the field at all, is he really worth keeping? It depends on the Twins’ answers to two questions. How much better is Kubel’s bat than those already under contract? And, with that answered, is that difference worth the extra money and losing the chance at a much-needed compensatory draft pick.
The answer to the first question is a bit depressing for the organization — Kubel could very well be the team’s fourth best hitter if he returns, and the second best if Mauer and Morneau continue to struggle with injuries. The ZiPS projections for the Twins are already out, and here’s what it says about the bats the Twins already have between the outfield, first base, and designated hitter:
*No ZiPS yet; three-year average wRC+ used
The answer, it would seem, is that Kubel is significantly better than the other options available internally. However, Revere’s defense should be enough to earn him a spot in center field, which would push Span to left or right field depending on where the Twins play Willingham. That leaves just first base and designated hitter open to Kubel, and those spots will be filled routinely by Joe Mauer and Justin Morneau as the Twins will, in all probability, play it somewhat safe with their stars in their returns to the diamond.
Then, is it really worth it for Minnesota to save 300-to-400 plate appearances at DH for Kubel over some platoon combination of, say, Trevor Plouffe and Ryan Doumit? The Twins will improve defensively without Kubel plodding around spacious Target Field, and if they set him free — to Cleveland or some other team — the return of a compensatory draft pick should do much more for the team in the long-term than anything Kubel can provide.
Let him go, Terry. You can find another, better, younger Kubel in June.
Between Denard Span, Ben Revere, Josh Willingham, Ryan Doumit, Justin Morneau, Joe Mauer, Chris Parmelee, and Trevor Plouffe, the Twins appear to have the outfield, first base, and designated hitter spots covered. If the Twins really love Jason Kubel — and, more importantly, if they really love long-term assets — they should set him free.
Jason Kubel’s bat is very much a major league-quality one. Year-in and year-out, the Twins have been able to rely on average or better from the 29-year-old:
But with Kubel, a player who can hit a little bit but is limited to right field, or more often, not playing the field at all, is he really worth keeping? It depends on the Twins’ answers to two questions. How much better is Kubel’s bat than those already under contract? And, with that answered, is that difference worth the extra money and losing the chance at a much-needed compensatory draft pick.
The answer to the first question is a bit depressing for the organization — Kubel could very well be the team’s fourth best hitter if he returns, and the second best if Mauer and Morneau continue to struggle with injuries. The ZiPS projections for the Twins are already out, and here’s what it says about the bats the Twins already have between the outfield, first base, and designated hitter:
Code:
Player OPS+Willingham 129*Mauer 120Morneau 116Kubel 109Doumit 95Span 93Plouffe 87Parmelee 81Revere 77*No ZiPS yet; three-year average wRC+ used
The answer, it would seem, is that Kubel is significantly better than the other options available internally. However, Revere’s defense should be enough to earn him a spot in center field, which would push Span to left or right field depending on where the Twins play Willingham. That leaves just first base and designated hitter open to Kubel, and those spots will be filled routinely by Joe Mauer and Justin Morneau as the Twins will, in all probability, play it somewhat safe with their stars in their returns to the diamond.
Then, is it really worth it for Minnesota to save 300-to-400 plate appearances at DH for Kubel over some platoon combination of, say, Trevor Plouffe and Ryan Doumit? The Twins will improve defensively without Kubel plodding around spacious Target Field, and if they set him free — to Cleveland or some other team — the return of a compensatory draft pick should do much more for the team in the long-term than anything Kubel can provide.
Let him go, Terry. You can find another, better, younger Kubel in June.
Derek Holland, Rangers talking extension.
Spoiler [+]
Early Thursday afternoon, Evan Grant of the Dallas Morning News reported that the Texas Rangers were working on a long-term deal with starter Derek Holland. As an unabashed fan of Derek Holland (yes, despite his performance against the Rays in the playoffs) and a loather of all things having to do with the Rangers (the playoffs may have something to do with this), this news caused conflicting emotions to simultaneously flit across my mind. Sweet, great move locking him up! Arg, but why does it have to be the Rangers?
I’m getting ahead of myself, though. Why is locking up Holland a great move? If you take a cursory glance over his statistics, you’ll notice he had an impressive 2011 season: 3.95 ERA, 3.86 SIERA, 3.6 WAR. It was a breakout year for Holland, but it’s not exactly an unexpected development. He has dominant stuff — a 94 MPH fastball with plus movement, a hard slider that destroys lefties, and a changeup and curveball for attacking righties — and he was a top ranked prospect when coming up through the minors. He’s durable, throwing 198 innings last season, and he’s a mere 25 years old.
Also, it’s worth considering that Holland improved dramatically over the second half of 2011. As I noted during the playoffs:
I’m getting ahead of myself, though. Why is locking up Holland a great move? If you take a cursory glance over his statistics, you’ll notice he had an impressive 2011 season: 3.95 ERA, 3.86 SIERA, 3.6 WAR. It was a breakout year for Holland, but it’s not exactly an unexpected development. He has dominant stuff — a 94 MPH fastball with plus movement, a hard slider that destroys lefties, and a changeup and curveball for attacking righties — and he was a top ranked prospect when coming up through the minors. He’s durable, throwing 198 innings last season, and he’s a mere 25 years old.
Also, it’s worth considering that Holland improved dramatically over the second half of 2011. As I noted during the playoffs:
It’s difficult to say how much of those improvements Holland will carry over into 2012, but over the tail end of last season, he was arguably as good or better than C.J. Wilson. The Rangers have resigned themselves to losing Wilson in free agency, but they just might have the next Wilson already on their roster.
But since the terms of the agreement haven’t been released yet, what should we expect? How much will Holland get in this deal? That question is a lot easier to answer than you’d imagine.
When you look at the extensions that other young pitchers have signed in recent year, it’s easy to notice a common theme:
*Blue squares represent club options.This isn’t a comprehensive list of every extension signed over the last few seasons — I tried to pick pitchers that compare well with Holland, so you’ll notice the disproportionate amount of lefties — but it should hopefully be enough to get the picture. Almost every extension followed the exact same template. After posting a 3.5-4.0 WAR season, the young starter signed an extension that gave them a raise over their remaining cost-controlled years (if they had any), and paid them close to $3m, $5.5m, and $7.5m over their arbitration years. There were also one or two team options tacked on at the end of the deal.
And if you look even closer, you’ll notice that the template gets even more precise depending on when the pitcher signed their contract. The three pitchers that signed before their final year of cost control (like Holland’s situation right now) all received a $30 million payout over five guaranteed years, with a $13 million team option tacked on the end. Considering Holland has been roughly similar to those pitchers through this stage of his career, I’d imagine that his deal will approximate those contracts.
Whenever a team signs a young pitcher to a long-term extension like this, the common refrain is almost always, “That’s such a good deal, so why don’t more teams do this with their players?
Padres get short and long-term help for Latos.
Reds finally get their ace in Mat Latos.
If Minnesota loves Jason Kubel, let him go.
Derek Holland, Rangers talking extension.
It’s difficult to say how much of those improvements Holland will carry over into 2012, but over the tail end of last season, he was arguably as good or better than C.J. Wilson. The Rangers have resigned themselves to losing Wilson in free agency, but they just might have the next Wilson already on their roster.
But since the terms of the agreement haven’t been released yet, what should we expect? How much will Holland get in this deal? That question is a lot easier to answer than you’d imagine.
When you look at the extensions that other young pitchers have signed in recent year, it’s easy to notice a common theme:
*Blue squares represent club options.
This isn’t a comprehensive list of every extension signed over the last few seasons — I tried to pick pitchers that compare well with Holland, so you’ll notice the disproportionate amount of lefties — but it should hopefully be enough to get the picture. Almost every extension followed the exact same template. After posting a 3.5-4.0 WAR season, the young starter signed an extension that gave them a raise over their remaining cost-controlled years (if they had any), and paid them close to $3m, $5.5m, and $7.5m over their arbitration years. There were also one or two team options tacked on at the end of the deal.
And if you look even closer, you’ll notice that the template gets even more precise depending on when the pitcher signed their contract. The three pitchers that signed before their final year of cost control (like Holland’s situation right now) all received a $30 million payout over five guaranteed years, with a $13 million team option tacked on the end. Considering Holland has been roughly similar to those pitchers through this stage of his career, I’d imagine that his deal will approximate those contracts.
Whenever a team signs a young pitcher to a long-term extension like this, the common refrain is almost always, “That’s such a good deal, so why don’t more teams do this with their players?
Spoiler [+]
The Reds and Padres swung a mini-blockbuster today, with Mat Latos heading to Cincinnati in exchange for four players: first baseman Yonder Alonso, catcher Yasmani Grandal, and right-handers Edinson Volquez and Brad Boxberger. We’re all familiar with Volquez because he’s been around a while, and Baseball America recently ranked Alonso, Grandal, and Boxberger as the Reds’ third, fourth, and tenth best prospects, respectively.
Rather than look to fill specific needs — which some felt the Royals did when they traded Zack Greinke to the Brewers last winter — it appears as though the Padres just took the best package of talent they could find. There’s a lot going on here as far as the San Diego is concerned, so let’s break it all down…
Both Yonder and Rizzo?
First base prospect Anthony Rizzo was a key piece of last winter’s Adrian Gonzalez trade, and about two months later Baseball America ranked him as the 75th prospect in the game. Alonso was two spots ahead of him at number 73. San Diego now has two young, high-end, left-handed power bats at first base that are essentially Major League ready in their organization, creating a bit of a logjam.
The Reds tried like crazy to find a non-first base spot for Alonso over the last few years, trying him at third base and in the outfield. Most of his big league time has come in left field, but it’s hard to find anyone that thinks that experiment will work long-term. Rizzo has never played anything other than first base in the minors, and as a left-handed thrower, he’s limited to first or the outfield. Neither player has great defensive tools, so they’re stuck battling it out for the same full-time roster spot. Ultimately, another trade is likely.
Petco Park tends to favor right-handed hitters or opposite field lefties like Gonzalez, which actually makes Alonso a better long-term fit than Rizzo even though his minor league performance isn’t as impressive. Both players have power the other way, though Alonso does have longer track record of hitting the ball to all fields with authority, dating back to his days at Miami. Their big league spray charts don’t tell us anything definitive given the small sample sizes (Alonso and Rizzo), but there is a noticeable difference. Yonder has also exhibited better strike zone discipline in the minors (11.0 BB% compared to 9.7% for Rizzo) without the propensity to strike out (15.1 K% compared to 20.7% for Rizzo).
It’s worth mentioning that Alonso figures to be more expensive going forward even though both guys are under team control through 2017. The big league contract he signed out of the draft in 2008 will pay him $1 million in 2012, and that will impact his future salaries going forward. Rizzo will make half that next season and won’t have the same trickle down effect. Both guys are great young hitters, but Alonso is probably a better long-term fit for San Diego given their extreme home park situation. There will be no shortage of teams willing to trade for Rizzo, with Rays, Blue Jays, Orioles, Mariners, Nationals, Cubs, Cardinals, and Brewers among the clubs that could use a young, power-hitting first baseman.
Volquez in Petco Park
We’re now three years removed from Volquez’s breakout 4.2 WAR season in 2008, with Tommy John surgery, a PED suspension, and walk issues popping up in recent years. The now 28-year-old right-hander has walked 13.4% of the batters he’s faced since the start of 2009, second most behind Carlos Marmol (16.6%) among pitchers who’ve thrown at least 220 innings. The strikeout (22.2 K% and 8.88 K/9) and ground ball (51.3%) rates are still very good during that time, it just continues to be a question of control.
For now, Volquez steps into Latos’ vacated rotation spot. He’s only under control through 2013 as an arbitration-eligible player, so don’t expect his tenure in San Diego to be all that long. With some help from a strong defensive club and a drastic change in home ballparks, Volquez could find himself on another club as soon as this summer if he puts together a solid first half. The guy has always had walk problems, but he could see some improvement going forward as he gets further away from elbow reconstruction. He’s the only established big leaguer heading to the Padres, but it isn’t insane to consider him the fourth piece of the deal as far as they’re concerned.
The Long-Term Catcher
The Reds were blessed with two top catching prospects, but it’s not surprising they decided to keep the big league ready Devin Mesoraco over Grandal, the 12th overall pick in the 2010 draft. Grandal had a huge year with the stick at three minor league levels in 2011 (.305/.401/.500 with 14 homers in 105 games), and Baseball America recently touted him as being an average receiver and thrower in the long-term. Like Alonso, he does a nice job controlling the strike zone (13.3 BB% so far in his career), and catchers that can avoid being zeros at the plate while being average behind it are very valuable. Grandal figures to be much more than that, and as an added bonus, he’s a switch-hitter.
The Padres are pretty well set behind the plate next year with Nick Hundley and John Baker, so they can afford to be patient and give Grandal a full season in the minors. He crushed Double-A pitching during his 45-game cameo there last summer (.301/.360/.474), so a full season in Triple-A is probably in the forecast next year. San Diego had little upper level catcher depth in the minors, so this move fills a glaring hole.
Bullpen Depth
The 43rd overall pick in 2009, the Reds moved Boxberger to the bullpen full-time this season and he flourished. In 62 innings split almost evenly between Double- and Triple-A, he struck out 93 and walked just 28 with a strong ground ball rate (~46% according to Minor League Central). He tacked on another 22 strikeouts and six walks in 11.1 Arizona Fall League innings after the season.
For all intents and purposes, Boxberger is a big league ready bullpen arm with swing-and-miss stuff (92-95 fastball and an average slider) and some control problems. The Padres have a knack for turning guys like this into quality late-inning arms, which is what Boxberger projected to be even before the move to Petco. Boxberger is unlikely to step into the shoes previously filled by Heath Bell, at least not in 2012, but getting six cost-controlled years of a power reliever as an extra piece was a nice get for Byrnes.
* * *
It going to hurt anytime a team trades a young, homegrown, ace-caliber pitcher, but the Padres did a fine job of getting long-term solutions at first base and catcher while adding some young bullpen help. Volquez is a bit of a wildcard, but he’s got a chance to help the club both on the mound and as a trade chip within the next two seasons. Byrnes managed to get a nice combination of short-term production and long-term value by trading Latos, and he should be applauded for being open-minded enough to take an upgrade over Rizzo if it meant getting the most talent possible.
Rather than look to fill specific needs — which some felt the Royals did when they traded Zack Greinke to the Brewers last winter — it appears as though the Padres just took the best package of talent they could find. There’s a lot going on here as far as the San Diego is concerned, so let’s break it all down…
Both Yonder and Rizzo?
First base prospect Anthony Rizzo was a key piece of last winter’s Adrian Gonzalez trade, and about two months later Baseball America ranked him as the 75th prospect in the game. Alonso was two spots ahead of him at number 73. San Diego now has two young, high-end, left-handed power bats at first base that are essentially Major League ready in their organization, creating a bit of a logjam.
The Reds tried like crazy to find a non-first base spot for Alonso over the last few years, trying him at third base and in the outfield. Most of his big league time has come in left field, but it’s hard to find anyone that thinks that experiment will work long-term. Rizzo has never played anything other than first base in the minors, and as a left-handed thrower, he’s limited to first or the outfield. Neither player has great defensive tools, so they’re stuck battling it out for the same full-time roster spot. Ultimately, another trade is likely.
Petco Park tends to favor right-handed hitters or opposite field lefties like Gonzalez, which actually makes Alonso a better long-term fit than Rizzo even though his minor league performance isn’t as impressive. Both players have power the other way, though Alonso does have longer track record of hitting the ball to all fields with authority, dating back to his days at Miami. Their big league spray charts don’t tell us anything definitive given the small sample sizes (Alonso and Rizzo), but there is a noticeable difference. Yonder has also exhibited better strike zone discipline in the minors (11.0 BB% compared to 9.7% for Rizzo) without the propensity to strike out (15.1 K% compared to 20.7% for Rizzo).
It’s worth mentioning that Alonso figures to be more expensive going forward even though both guys are under team control through 2017. The big league contract he signed out of the draft in 2008 will pay him $1 million in 2012, and that will impact his future salaries going forward. Rizzo will make half that next season and won’t have the same trickle down effect. Both guys are great young hitters, but Alonso is probably a better long-term fit for San Diego given their extreme home park situation. There will be no shortage of teams willing to trade for Rizzo, with Rays, Blue Jays, Orioles, Mariners, Nationals, Cubs, Cardinals, and Brewers among the clubs that could use a young, power-hitting first baseman.
Volquez in Petco Park
We’re now three years removed from Volquez’s breakout 4.2 WAR season in 2008, with Tommy John surgery, a PED suspension, and walk issues popping up in recent years. The now 28-year-old right-hander has walked 13.4% of the batters he’s faced since the start of 2009, second most behind Carlos Marmol (16.6%) among pitchers who’ve thrown at least 220 innings. The strikeout (22.2 K% and 8.88 K/9) and ground ball (51.3%) rates are still very good during that time, it just continues to be a question of control.
For now, Volquez steps into Latos’ vacated rotation spot. He’s only under control through 2013 as an arbitration-eligible player, so don’t expect his tenure in San Diego to be all that long. With some help from a strong defensive club and a drastic change in home ballparks, Volquez could find himself on another club as soon as this summer if he puts together a solid first half. The guy has always had walk problems, but he could see some improvement going forward as he gets further away from elbow reconstruction. He’s the only established big leaguer heading to the Padres, but it isn’t insane to consider him the fourth piece of the deal as far as they’re concerned.
The Long-Term Catcher
The Reds were blessed with two top catching prospects, but it’s not surprising they decided to keep the big league ready Devin Mesoraco over Grandal, the 12th overall pick in the 2010 draft. Grandal had a huge year with the stick at three minor league levels in 2011 (.305/.401/.500 with 14 homers in 105 games), and Baseball America recently touted him as being an average receiver and thrower in the long-term. Like Alonso, he does a nice job controlling the strike zone (13.3 BB% so far in his career), and catchers that can avoid being zeros at the plate while being average behind it are very valuable. Grandal figures to be much more than that, and as an added bonus, he’s a switch-hitter.
The Padres are pretty well set behind the plate next year with Nick Hundley and John Baker, so they can afford to be patient and give Grandal a full season in the minors. He crushed Double-A pitching during his 45-game cameo there last summer (.301/.360/.474), so a full season in Triple-A is probably in the forecast next year. San Diego had little upper level catcher depth in the minors, so this move fills a glaring hole.
Bullpen Depth
The 43rd overall pick in 2009, the Reds moved Boxberger to the bullpen full-time this season and he flourished. In 62 innings split almost evenly between Double- and Triple-A, he struck out 93 and walked just 28 with a strong ground ball rate (~46% according to Minor League Central). He tacked on another 22 strikeouts and six walks in 11.1 Arizona Fall League innings after the season.
For all intents and purposes, Boxberger is a big league ready bullpen arm with swing-and-miss stuff (92-95 fastball and an average slider) and some control problems. The Padres have a knack for turning guys like this into quality late-inning arms, which is what Boxberger projected to be even before the move to Petco. Boxberger is unlikely to step into the shoes previously filled by Heath Bell, at least not in 2012, but getting six cost-controlled years of a power reliever as an extra piece was a nice get for Byrnes.
* * *
It going to hurt anytime a team trades a young, homegrown, ace-caliber pitcher, but the Padres did a fine job of getting long-term solutions at first base and catcher while adding some young bullpen help. Volquez is a bit of a wildcard, but he’s got a chance to help the club both on the mound and as a trade chip within the next two seasons. Byrnes managed to get a nice combination of short-term production and long-term value by trading Latos, and he should be applauded for being open-minded enough to take an upgrade over Rizzo if it meant getting the most talent possible.
Reds finally get their ace in Mat Latos.
Spoiler [+]
The Cincinnati Reds had an abundance of redundant prospects and a big need to upgrade their starting rotation, so their plan for this off-season was obvious to nearly everyone. They needed to combine a group of good young talents who were blocked from playing regularly and turn them into one high quality starting pitcher. After kicking the tires on nearly every available arm on the market, the Reds finally got their wish today, shipping a quartet of good young talents to San Diego in exchange for 24-year-old Mat Latos.
Let’s start with what the Reds are getting in Latos, who is probably the best fit for their team of any pitcher rumored to be available on the market this winter. During his first two years and change in the Majors, Latos has been one of the better pitchers in baseball. For comparison, here are the starters who have thrown at least 350 innings in the last two years and have posted strikeout rates between 23% and 25%.
[table][tr][th=""]Name[/th][th=""]Age[/th][th=""]IP[/th][th=""]BB%[/th][th=""]K%[/th][th=""]GB%[/th][th=""]BABIP[/th][th=""]HR/FB[/th][th=""]ERA-[/th][th=""]FIP-[/th][th=""]xFIP-[/th][/tr][tr][td]Cliff Lee[/td][td]32[/td][td]445.0[/td][td]3.4%[/td][td]24.0%[/td][td]44.1%[/td][td]0.289[/td][td]7.5%[/td][td]69[/td][td]64[/td][td]71[/td][/tr][tr][td]Felix Hernandez[/td][td]25[/td][td]483.1[/td][td]7.0%[/td][td]23.1%[/td][td]52.0%[/td][td]0.284[/td][td]9.0%[/td][td]72[/td][td]78[/td][td]77[/td][/tr][tr][td]Zack Greinke[/td][td]27[/td][td]391.2[/td][td]6.1%[/td][td]23.4%[/td][td]46.5%[/td][td]0.311[/td][td]9.8%[/td][td]101[/td][td]79[/td][td]78[/td][/tr][tr][td]Cole Hamels[/td][td]27[/td][td]424.2[/td][td]6.2%[/td][td]23.7%[/td][td]48.9%[/td][td]0.272[/td][td]11.2%[/td][td]74[/td][td]85[/td][td]80[/td][/tr][tr][td]Justin Verlander[/td][td]28[/td][td]475.1[/td][td]6.8%[/td][td]24.8%[/td][td]40.6%[/td][td]0.261[/td][td]7.3%[/td][td]68[/td][td]72[/td][td]81[/td][/tr][tr][td]Yovani Gallardo[/td][td]25[/td][td]392.1[/td][td]8.0%[/td][td]24.4%[/td][td]44.9%[/td][td]0.306[/td][td]10.2%[/td][td]95[/td][td]86[/td][td]83[/td][/tr][tr][td]Jon Lester[/td][td]27[/td][td]399.2[/td][td]9.5%[/td][td]24.5%[/td][td]52.0%[/td][td]0.288[/td][td]10.2%[/td][td]78[/td][td]81[/td][td]83[/td][/tr][tr][td]Mat Latos[/td][td]23[/td][td]379.0[/td][td]7.2%[/td][td]24.2%[/td][td]43.7%[/td][td]0.279[/td][td]7.6%[/td][td]90[/td][td]86[/td][td]86[/td][/tr][tr][td]Jered Weaver[/td][td]28[/td][td]460.0[/td][td]6.0%[/td][td]23.5%[/td][td]34.2%[/td][td]0.262[/td][td]7.0%[/td][td]67[/td][td]77[/td][td]87[/td][/tr][tr][td]Ubaldo Jimenez[/td][td]27[/td][td]410.0[/td][td]9.9%[/td][td]23.0%[/td][td]48.0%[/td][td]0.292[/td][td]7.1%[/td][td]87[/td][td]79[/td][td]92[/td][/tr][/table]
That’s some pretty good company Latos has been keeping. There aren’t that many pitchers in the sport who can miss bats with the frequency that Latos has established while also pounding the strike zone with regularity. Guys who can live in the zone and still avoid contact are generally the best pitchers in the game. This is the one skillset you want in a pitcher more than any other.
In terms of pure upside, Latos is likely going to be the best pitcher to change teams this winter. His command of four pitches gives him the chance of being a true front-line starter, and he’s already shown he can dominate hitters from both sides of the plate, so he’s not a guy who can be neutralized through match-up advantages. So, why were the Padres willing to trade him?
Well, as with any young pitcher, Latos carries a decent amont of risk. The flameout rate for developing arms is still pretty high, and Latos has not established himself as a durable innings eater. In fact, Latos began the 2011 season on the disabled list with shoulder bursitis – never a great thing for a pitcher – and missed a few starts in 2010 after straining his side while holding in a sneeze. That’s not exactly the type of injury you expect to recur, but the fact that he’s only averaged about 3,000 pitchers per season the last two years does mean that he hasn’t yet shown that he can hold up under the types of workloads that contenders hope to get from their aces.
With the Reds gunning for a playoff spot in 2012, the restraints are going to have to come off their prized off-season acquisition, and they’ll be forced to ask him to increase his workload, both in terms of games pitched and how many pitches he throws – he’s only crossed the 110 pitch threshold in four of his 72 career starts – in those games. Can he hold up under the increased workload? The Reds have to hope so, but the unknown in this situation provides some risk that allowed Cincinnati to acquire Latos in the first place. Put simply, if he had already proven to be a workhorse capable of these kinds of performances, the Padres probably wouldn’t have traded him. So, the Reds get the upside of a #1 starter by accepting the risks regarding durability and how well Latos will perform outside of Petco Park.
As we talked about with Heath Bell earlier, there are certainly pitchers who you might want to be careful in taking out of San Diego, but honestly, Latos isn’t really one of those guys. For one, Latos hasn’t been given the Aaron Harang treatment, where the Padres rigged the schedule to maximize his starts in Petco. In his career, he’s actually thrown more innings on the road (244.1) than at home (185.1) and his underlying performances have been nearly identical. While this doesn’t mean that he hasn’t benefited from pitching in Petco, he’s not a guy who relies on HR prevention to succeed, and the ability to run a 3-1 strikeout to walk ratio travels well from one ballpark to another. Latos will likely see his HR rate rise a bit with the move to Great American Ballpark, but even with a slight uptick in home runs allowed, he’ll still profile as one of the better starters in the National League.
Latos has the potential to be exactly what the Reds need, and could improve their 2012 roster enough to push them back into position to be real contenders for the National League Central crown next year. Beyond just his short term value, the Reds retain control of his rights through 2015, so this is a move that offers both near term and long term rewards.
The cost was high – I like all four of the guys they gave up – but the reality was that the Reds had too many players for too few spots. They weren’t going to be able to receive value from both Yonder Alonso and Joey Votto or Devin Mesoraco and Yasmani Grandal, so packaging their excess depth with Volquez and Boxberger to get Latos made sense. If Latos does show that he can be a 220 inning ace going forward, they won’t regret this deal even if the players they shipped to San Diego turn out to be stars. The Reds needed to consolidate talent this winter, and they’ve managed to trade quantity for quality at the position they needed most.
Pitching doesn’t come cheap, but credit the Reds for landing a pitcher good enough to make a real difference. This move isn’t without its risks, but Latos has the upside to be worth betting on.
Let’s start with what the Reds are getting in Latos, who is probably the best fit for their team of any pitcher rumored to be available on the market this winter. During his first two years and change in the Majors, Latos has been one of the better pitchers in baseball. For comparison, here are the starters who have thrown at least 350 innings in the last two years and have posted strikeout rates between 23% and 25%.
[table][tr][th=""]Name[/th][th=""]Age[/th][th=""]IP[/th][th=""]BB%[/th][th=""]K%[/th][th=""]GB%[/th][th=""]BABIP[/th][th=""]HR/FB[/th][th=""]ERA-[/th][th=""]FIP-[/th][th=""]xFIP-[/th][/tr][tr][td]Cliff Lee[/td][td]32[/td][td]445.0[/td][td]3.4%[/td][td]24.0%[/td][td]44.1%[/td][td]0.289[/td][td]7.5%[/td][td]69[/td][td]64[/td][td]71[/td][/tr][tr][td]Felix Hernandez[/td][td]25[/td][td]483.1[/td][td]7.0%[/td][td]23.1%[/td][td]52.0%[/td][td]0.284[/td][td]9.0%[/td][td]72[/td][td]78[/td][td]77[/td][/tr][tr][td]Zack Greinke[/td][td]27[/td][td]391.2[/td][td]6.1%[/td][td]23.4%[/td][td]46.5%[/td][td]0.311[/td][td]9.8%[/td][td]101[/td][td]79[/td][td]78[/td][/tr][tr][td]Cole Hamels[/td][td]27[/td][td]424.2[/td][td]6.2%[/td][td]23.7%[/td][td]48.9%[/td][td]0.272[/td][td]11.2%[/td][td]74[/td][td]85[/td][td]80[/td][/tr][tr][td]Justin Verlander[/td][td]28[/td][td]475.1[/td][td]6.8%[/td][td]24.8%[/td][td]40.6%[/td][td]0.261[/td][td]7.3%[/td][td]68[/td][td]72[/td][td]81[/td][/tr][tr][td]Yovani Gallardo[/td][td]25[/td][td]392.1[/td][td]8.0%[/td][td]24.4%[/td][td]44.9%[/td][td]0.306[/td][td]10.2%[/td][td]95[/td][td]86[/td][td]83[/td][/tr][tr][td]Jon Lester[/td][td]27[/td][td]399.2[/td][td]9.5%[/td][td]24.5%[/td][td]52.0%[/td][td]0.288[/td][td]10.2%[/td][td]78[/td][td]81[/td][td]83[/td][/tr][tr][td]Mat Latos[/td][td]23[/td][td]379.0[/td][td]7.2%[/td][td]24.2%[/td][td]43.7%[/td][td]0.279[/td][td]7.6%[/td][td]90[/td][td]86[/td][td]86[/td][/tr][tr][td]Jered Weaver[/td][td]28[/td][td]460.0[/td][td]6.0%[/td][td]23.5%[/td][td]34.2%[/td][td]0.262[/td][td]7.0%[/td][td]67[/td][td]77[/td][td]87[/td][/tr][tr][td]Ubaldo Jimenez[/td][td]27[/td][td]410.0[/td][td]9.9%[/td][td]23.0%[/td][td]48.0%[/td][td]0.292[/td][td]7.1%[/td][td]87[/td][td]79[/td][td]92[/td][/tr][/table]
That’s some pretty good company Latos has been keeping. There aren’t that many pitchers in the sport who can miss bats with the frequency that Latos has established while also pounding the strike zone with regularity. Guys who can live in the zone and still avoid contact are generally the best pitchers in the game. This is the one skillset you want in a pitcher more than any other.
In terms of pure upside, Latos is likely going to be the best pitcher to change teams this winter. His command of four pitches gives him the chance of being a true front-line starter, and he’s already shown he can dominate hitters from both sides of the plate, so he’s not a guy who can be neutralized through match-up advantages. So, why were the Padres willing to trade him?
Well, as with any young pitcher, Latos carries a decent amont of risk. The flameout rate for developing arms is still pretty high, and Latos has not established himself as a durable innings eater. In fact, Latos began the 2011 season on the disabled list with shoulder bursitis – never a great thing for a pitcher – and missed a few starts in 2010 after straining his side while holding in a sneeze. That’s not exactly the type of injury you expect to recur, but the fact that he’s only averaged about 3,000 pitchers per season the last two years does mean that he hasn’t yet shown that he can hold up under the types of workloads that contenders hope to get from their aces.
With the Reds gunning for a playoff spot in 2012, the restraints are going to have to come off their prized off-season acquisition, and they’ll be forced to ask him to increase his workload, both in terms of games pitched and how many pitches he throws – he’s only crossed the 110 pitch threshold in four of his 72 career starts – in those games. Can he hold up under the increased workload? The Reds have to hope so, but the unknown in this situation provides some risk that allowed Cincinnati to acquire Latos in the first place. Put simply, if he had already proven to be a workhorse capable of these kinds of performances, the Padres probably wouldn’t have traded him. So, the Reds get the upside of a #1 starter by accepting the risks regarding durability and how well Latos will perform outside of Petco Park.
As we talked about with Heath Bell earlier, there are certainly pitchers who you might want to be careful in taking out of San Diego, but honestly, Latos isn’t really one of those guys. For one, Latos hasn’t been given the Aaron Harang treatment, where the Padres rigged the schedule to maximize his starts in Petco. In his career, he’s actually thrown more innings on the road (244.1) than at home (185.1) and his underlying performances have been nearly identical. While this doesn’t mean that he hasn’t benefited from pitching in Petco, he’s not a guy who relies on HR prevention to succeed, and the ability to run a 3-1 strikeout to walk ratio travels well from one ballpark to another. Latos will likely see his HR rate rise a bit with the move to Great American Ballpark, but even with a slight uptick in home runs allowed, he’ll still profile as one of the better starters in the National League.
Latos has the potential to be exactly what the Reds need, and could improve their 2012 roster enough to push them back into position to be real contenders for the National League Central crown next year. Beyond just his short term value, the Reds retain control of his rights through 2015, so this is a move that offers both near term and long term rewards.
The cost was high – I like all four of the guys they gave up – but the reality was that the Reds had too many players for too few spots. They weren’t going to be able to receive value from both Yonder Alonso and Joey Votto or Devin Mesoraco and Yasmani Grandal, so packaging their excess depth with Volquez and Boxberger to get Latos made sense. If Latos does show that he can be a 220 inning ace going forward, they won’t regret this deal even if the players they shipped to San Diego turn out to be stars. The Reds needed to consolidate talent this winter, and they’ve managed to trade quantity for quality at the position they needed most.
Pitching doesn’t come cheap, but credit the Reds for landing a pitcher good enough to make a real difference. This move isn’t without its risks, but Latos has the upside to be worth betting on.
If Minnesota loves Jason Kubel, let him go.
Spoiler [+]
The seemingly unending slow dance between the Minnesota Twins, the Colorado Rockies and Michael Cuddyer is over. As Matt Klaassen already analyzed, the Twins will probably be better off seeing other people in right field. For Terry Ryan and Minnesota, the attention now shifts back to another old flame: Jason Kubel. Kubel has already earned some interest from the Indians, and if Kubel leaves Minneapolis, the Twins can pick up a third compensatory draft pick to go with the two the Twins pick up with Cuddyer’s departure. But reports say the Twins could be looking to keep Kubel for next season instead.
Between Denard Span, Ben Revere, Josh Willingham, Ryan Doumit, Justin Morneau, Joe Mauer, Chris Parmelee, and Trevor Plouffe, the Twins appear to have the outfield, first base, and designated hitter spots covered. If the Twins really love Jason Kubel — and, more importantly, if they really love long-term assets — they should set him free.
Jason Kubel’s bat is very much a major league-quality one. Year-in and year-out, the Twins have been able to rely on average or better from the 29-year-old:
But with Kubel, a player who can hit a little bit but is limited to right field, or more often, not playing the field at all, is he really worth keeping? It depends on the Twins’ answers to two questions. How much better is Kubel’s bat than those already under contract? And, with that answered, is that difference worth the extra money and losing the chance at a much-needed compensatory draft pick.
The answer to the first question is a bit depressing for the organization — Kubel could very well be the team’s fourth best hitter if he returns, and the second best if Mauer and Morneau continue to struggle with injuries. The ZiPS projections for the Twins are already out, and here’s what it says about the bats the Twins already have between the outfield, first base, and designated hitter:
*No ZiPS yet; three-year average wRC+ used
The answer, it would seem, is that Kubel is significantly better than the other options available internally. However, Revere’s defense should be enough to earn him a spot in center field, which would push Span to left or right field depending on where the Twins play Willingham. That leaves just first base and designated hitter open to Kubel, and those spots will be filled routinely by Joe Mauer and Justin Morneau as the Twins will, in all probability, play it somewhat safe with their stars in their returns to the diamond.
Then, is it really worth it for Minnesota to save 300-to-400 plate appearances at DH for Kubel over some platoon combination of, say, Trevor Plouffe and Ryan Doumit? The Twins will improve defensively without Kubel plodding around spacious Target Field, and if they set him free — to Cleveland or some other team — the return of a compensatory draft pick should do much more for the team in the long-term than anything Kubel can provide.
Let him go, Terry. You can find another, better, younger Kubel in June.
Between Denard Span, Ben Revere, Josh Willingham, Ryan Doumit, Justin Morneau, Joe Mauer, Chris Parmelee, and Trevor Plouffe, the Twins appear to have the outfield, first base, and designated hitter spots covered. If the Twins really love Jason Kubel — and, more importantly, if they really love long-term assets — they should set him free.
Jason Kubel’s bat is very much a major league-quality one. Year-in and year-out, the Twins have been able to rely on average or better from the 29-year-old:
But with Kubel, a player who can hit a little bit but is limited to right field, or more often, not playing the field at all, is he really worth keeping? It depends on the Twins’ answers to two questions. How much better is Kubel’s bat than those already under contract? And, with that answered, is that difference worth the extra money and losing the chance at a much-needed compensatory draft pick.
The answer to the first question is a bit depressing for the organization — Kubel could very well be the team’s fourth best hitter if he returns, and the second best if Mauer and Morneau continue to struggle with injuries. The ZiPS projections for the Twins are already out, and here’s what it says about the bats the Twins already have between the outfield, first base, and designated hitter:
Code:
Player OPS+Willingham 129*Mauer 120Morneau 116Kubel 109Doumit 95Span 93Plouffe 87Parmelee 81Revere 77*No ZiPS yet; three-year average wRC+ used
The answer, it would seem, is that Kubel is significantly better than the other options available internally. However, Revere’s defense should be enough to earn him a spot in center field, which would push Span to left or right field depending on where the Twins play Willingham. That leaves just first base and designated hitter open to Kubel, and those spots will be filled routinely by Joe Mauer and Justin Morneau as the Twins will, in all probability, play it somewhat safe with their stars in their returns to the diamond.
Then, is it really worth it for Minnesota to save 300-to-400 plate appearances at DH for Kubel over some platoon combination of, say, Trevor Plouffe and Ryan Doumit? The Twins will improve defensively without Kubel plodding around spacious Target Field, and if they set him free — to Cleveland or some other team — the return of a compensatory draft pick should do much more for the team in the long-term than anything Kubel can provide.
Let him go, Terry. You can find another, better, younger Kubel in June.
Derek Holland, Rangers talking extension.
Spoiler [+]
Early Thursday afternoon, Evan Grant of the Dallas Morning News reported that the Texas Rangers were working on a long-term deal with starter Derek Holland. As an unabashed fan of Derek Holland (yes, despite his performance against the Rays in the playoffs) and a loather of all things having to do with the Rangers (the playoffs may have something to do with this), this news caused conflicting emotions to simultaneously flit across my mind. Sweet, great move locking him up! Arg, but why does it have to be the Rangers?
I’m getting ahead of myself, though. Why is locking up Holland a great move? If you take a cursory glance over his statistics, you’ll notice he had an impressive 2011 season: 3.95 ERA, 3.86 SIERA, 3.6 WAR. It was a breakout year for Holland, but it’s not exactly an unexpected development. He has dominant stuff — a 94 MPH fastball with plus movement, a hard slider that destroys lefties, and a changeup and curveball for attacking righties — and he was a top ranked prospect when coming up through the minors. He’s durable, throwing 198 innings last season, and he’s a mere 25 years old.
Also, it’s worth considering that Holland improved dramatically over the second half of 2011. As I noted during the playoffs:
I’m getting ahead of myself, though. Why is locking up Holland a great move? If you take a cursory glance over his statistics, you’ll notice he had an impressive 2011 season: 3.95 ERA, 3.86 SIERA, 3.6 WAR. It was a breakout year for Holland, but it’s not exactly an unexpected development. He has dominant stuff — a 94 MPH fastball with plus movement, a hard slider that destroys lefties, and a changeup and curveball for attacking righties — and he was a top ranked prospect when coming up through the minors. He’s durable, throwing 198 innings last season, and he’s a mere 25 years old.
Also, it’s worth considering that Holland improved dramatically over the second half of 2011. As I noted during the playoffs:
It’s difficult to say how much of those improvements Holland will carry over into 2012, but over the tail end of last season, he was arguably as good or better than C.J. Wilson. The Rangers have resigned themselves to losing Wilson in free agency, but they just might have the next Wilson already on their roster.
But since the terms of the agreement haven’t been released yet, what should we expect? How much will Holland get in this deal? That question is a lot easier to answer than you’d imagine.
When you look at the extensions that other young pitchers have signed in recent year, it’s easy to notice a common theme:
*Blue squares represent club options.This isn’t a comprehensive list of every extension signed over the last few seasons — I tried to pick pitchers that compare well with Holland, so you’ll notice the disproportionate amount of lefties — but it should hopefully be enough to get the picture. Almost every extension followed the exact same template. After posting a 3.5-4.0 WAR season, the young starter signed an extension that gave them a raise over their remaining cost-controlled years (if they had any), and paid them close to $3m, $5.5m, and $7.5m over their arbitration years. There were also one or two team options tacked on at the end of the deal.
And if you look even closer, you’ll notice that the template gets even more precise depending on when the pitcher signed their contract. The three pitchers that signed before their final year of cost control (like Holland’s situation right now) all received a $30 million payout over five guaranteed years, with a $13 million team option tacked on the end. Considering Holland has been roughly similar to those pitchers through this stage of his career, I’d imagine that his deal will approximate those contracts.
Whenever a team signs a young pitcher to a long-term extension like this, the common refrain is almost always, “That’s such a good deal, so why don’t more teams do this with their players?
- 9,530
- 91
- Joined
- Dec 17, 2003
You must be higher than a Kite. Cards are winning the Central next year.
- 9,530
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- Dec 17, 2003
You must be higher than a Kite. Cards are winning the Central next year.
- 17,144
- 1,167
- Joined
- Jan 8, 2005
It'll be close but I gotta go with my Redlegs. I can't wait to get out to some games. NT Cincy Summit GABP?
- 17,144
- 1,167
- Joined
- Jan 8, 2005
It'll be close but I gotta go with my Redlegs. I can't wait to get out to some games. NT Cincy Summit GABP?
Sherrill returns to Seattle.
Arizona downgrades with Kubel addition.
Rollins returns to Philadelphia.
Spoiler [+]
After throwing 231 innings and compiling a 3.31 ERA in the independent league ranks between 1999 and 2003, the Seattle Mariners took a chance on left-hander George Sherrill and signed him to a minor-league deal. He promptly broke into the big leagues a year later and served as a core piece of the Mariners’ bullpen for four years before being shipped to Baltimore prior to the 2008 season in the blockbuster deal that brought Erik Bedard to the Pacific Northwest.
The career of George Sherrill now comes full circle, as he reportedly will return to Seattle on a one-year contract worth $1.1M plus incentives.
The Mariners have earnestly sought to upgrade the left-handed contingent of their bullpen, first drafting southpaw Lucas Luetge from the Milwaukee Brewers in the Rule 5 Draft and now signing Sherrill. Both lefties will seek to improve upon the forgettable production from Cesar Jimenez and Charlie Furbush, who were the two lefties in the ‘pen at the end of the season.
Jimenez is intriguing due to his 2.95 FIP in Triple-A and 2.28 FIP in the big leagues last season, but he did allow lefties to hit .283 against him in 71 Triple-A innings and has displayed command problems throughout his professional career. The 27-year-old has also dealt with significant arm issues in 2009 and 2010 that held him to only 28.2 innings during that stretch, so durability is also a concern.
Furbush was acquired in the trade that sent Doug Fister to Detroit. Upon arrival in Seattle, he struggled in both the starting rotation and the bullpen. The 25-year-old posted a 5.16 FIP on the season and continued to struggle with the long ball. Lefties also hit .284 against him in 2011, which cautions against employing him as a true lefty specialist out of the bullpen.
The question marks surrounding those two led to the relatively low-risk signing of George Sherrill. The addition should augment the Mariners’ bullpen, despite the fact that Seattle already enjoyed great success against left-handed hitters in 2011. The team’s 3.64 FIP against lefties was the sixth best in the league. Their strikeout percentage against lefties, however, was tied for the fifth-worst in the league at 17.2% and needed improvement.
Sherrill has a career 33.9% strikeout percentage against lefties. Furthermore, he displayed good command of the baseball in those matchups. His strikeout-to-walk ratio against left-handed hitters was an impressive 32-to-1 last season. That is exactly the skill set that will equip manager Eric Wedge with a valuable tool in 2012 that was largely unavailable to him a season ago — a reliever with strikeout stuff against tough left-handed batters.
Of course, the 34-year-old native of Tennessee signed with the Mariners at a modest price for a reason. His usefulness on the mound is extremely limited. Against left-handers, his career FIP is 2.20. Against right-handers, however, his career FIP is 5.17.
Eric Wedge should be exceedingly cautious when summoning Sherrill next season. The Braves utilized him against righties, but survived without suffering too much damage due to a .229 BABIP. His strikeout-to-walk ratio was still horrendous with six strikeouts and 11 walks, which suggests his relative success against right-handed batters was a mirage that will likely come crashing to earth in 2012.
Luckily, the Seattle Mariners will not need George Sherrill to be anything other than a left-handed specialist in their bullpen next season. Brandon League will return as the closer, and Tom Wilhelmsen is the leading candidate to pitch in the eighth inning. That should enable manager Eric Wedge to utilize Sherrill exactly how he should be, which is almost exclusively against lefties and never against a righty in a high-leverage situation.
If called upon to pitch in only those situations, George Sherrill should have a very successful year with the Mariners, and beyond that — even as his velocity continues to drop — he should be able to carve out a nice little niche as an aging LOOGY over the next few years.
The career of George Sherrill now comes full circle, as he reportedly will return to Seattle on a one-year contract worth $1.1M plus incentives.
The Mariners have earnestly sought to upgrade the left-handed contingent of their bullpen, first drafting southpaw Lucas Luetge from the Milwaukee Brewers in the Rule 5 Draft and now signing Sherrill. Both lefties will seek to improve upon the forgettable production from Cesar Jimenez and Charlie Furbush, who were the two lefties in the ‘pen at the end of the season.
Jimenez is intriguing due to his 2.95 FIP in Triple-A and 2.28 FIP in the big leagues last season, but he did allow lefties to hit .283 against him in 71 Triple-A innings and has displayed command problems throughout his professional career. The 27-year-old has also dealt with significant arm issues in 2009 and 2010 that held him to only 28.2 innings during that stretch, so durability is also a concern.
Furbush was acquired in the trade that sent Doug Fister to Detroit. Upon arrival in Seattle, he struggled in both the starting rotation and the bullpen. The 25-year-old posted a 5.16 FIP on the season and continued to struggle with the long ball. Lefties also hit .284 against him in 2011, which cautions against employing him as a true lefty specialist out of the bullpen.
The question marks surrounding those two led to the relatively low-risk signing of George Sherrill. The addition should augment the Mariners’ bullpen, despite the fact that Seattle already enjoyed great success against left-handed hitters in 2011. The team’s 3.64 FIP against lefties was the sixth best in the league. Their strikeout percentage against lefties, however, was tied for the fifth-worst in the league at 17.2% and needed improvement.
Sherrill has a career 33.9% strikeout percentage against lefties. Furthermore, he displayed good command of the baseball in those matchups. His strikeout-to-walk ratio against left-handed hitters was an impressive 32-to-1 last season. That is exactly the skill set that will equip manager Eric Wedge with a valuable tool in 2012 that was largely unavailable to him a season ago — a reliever with strikeout stuff against tough left-handed batters.
Of course, the 34-year-old native of Tennessee signed with the Mariners at a modest price for a reason. His usefulness on the mound is extremely limited. Against left-handers, his career FIP is 2.20. Against right-handers, however, his career FIP is 5.17.
Eric Wedge should be exceedingly cautious when summoning Sherrill next season. The Braves utilized him against righties, but survived without suffering too much damage due to a .229 BABIP. His strikeout-to-walk ratio was still horrendous with six strikeouts and 11 walks, which suggests his relative success against right-handed batters was a mirage that will likely come crashing to earth in 2012.
Luckily, the Seattle Mariners will not need George Sherrill to be anything other than a left-handed specialist in their bullpen next season. Brandon League will return as the closer, and Tom Wilhelmsen is the leading candidate to pitch in the eighth inning. That should enable manager Eric Wedge to utilize Sherrill exactly how he should be, which is almost exclusively against lefties and never against a righty in a high-leverage situation.
If called upon to pitch in only those situations, George Sherrill should have a very successful year with the Mariners, and beyond that — even as his velocity continues to drop — he should be able to carve out a nice little niche as an aging LOOGY over the next few years.
Arizona downgrades with Kubel addition.
Spoiler [+]
Last year, the Arizona Diamondbacks were baseball’s biggest surprise, winning 94 games and the NL West title just a year after finishing 65-97. The team’s turnaround was driven by strong performances across the roster, but among the key factors in their success was the excellent defense delivered by their trio of outfielders. Chris Young (+14.1), Gerardo Parra (+9.6), and Justin Upton (+7.7) all posted UZRs that ranked among the best in the league at their positions, and the Diamondbacks posted the best team outfield UZR (+31.1) in the National League. With the help of their strong gloves, the team was able to post an ERA (3.80) that was 22 points lower than their FIP (4.02), the fifth largest positive differential in the game.
Well, today, the team decided to change course, signing Jason Kubel to a two year, $15 million contract that will see him take over as the team’s left fielder. By acquiring Kubel, the D’Backs have essentially decided to displace the incumbent Gerardo Parra, and in looking at the two players, it’s not actually clear that the team is going to get any better.
Kubel’s addition signifies that the Diamondbacks wanted a bit more power from the left side to balance out the right-handedness brought by Upton, Young, Paul Goldschmidt, and Aaron Hill. While Miguel Montero and a potentially healthy Stephen Drew offered some power from the left side, the middle of the team’s batting order still skewed towards RHBs, and Kubel will give the team more thump at the plate than Parra would have. However, if the team thinks they’re getting a monstrous offensive upgrade in making the switch, they’re likely overestimating the difference between them.
While Kubel put himself on the map with a good 2009 season, he’s generally been only slightly better than an average hitter for most of his career. His career line of .271/.335/.459 is good for a 109 wRC+, almost a dead ringer for the 110 mark he put up last year. While he has some power, he’s not exactly a prototypical cleanup hitter, and he’s just about average in terms of drawing walks and avoiding strikeouts. At the plate, he’s okay at everything, and the overall package adds up to a decent-but-not-great offensive player.
How much better is he than Parra at the plate? Here are their career numbers side by side.
[table][tr][th=""]Name[/th][th=""]Team[/th][th=""]PA[/th][th=""]AVG[/th][th=""]OBP[/th][th=""]SLG[/th][th=""]BB%[/th][th=""]K%[/th][th=""]ISO[/th][th=""]BABIP[/th][th=""]wRC+[/th][/tr][tr][td]Jason Kubel[/td][td]Twins[/td][td]2846[/td][td].271[/td][td].335[/td][td].459[/td][td]8.8 %[/td][td]18.7 %[/td][td].188[/td][td].303[/td][td]109[/td][/tr][tr][td]Gerardo Parra[/td][td]’backs[/td][td]1377[/td][td].282[/td][td].331[/td][td].403[/td][td]6.6 %[/td][td]17.9 %[/td][td].120[/td][td].338[/td][td]88[/td][/tr][/table]
The walk and strikeout rates are similar, though it should be noted that Parra has drawn 23 intentional walks while hitting in front of the pitcher, so some of his perceived patience at the plate may be more of a factor of NL batting orders. Kubel has a big edge in power, though Parra’s speed has let him make up some of that difference with a higher BABIP. Overall, the offensive difference between the two based on their career numbers is about 15 runs over 600 plate appearances.
However, we probably shouldn’t just be content to use their career numbers. Kubel is five years older than Parra and is three years removed from his best season, while Parra showed signs of legitimate improvement at age 24 last year. If we give more weight to their most recent seasons, Parra’s wRC+ comes up to something closer to 95, cutting the difference between them to something closer to 10 runs over the course of a full season. It’s an offensive upgrade, but not a huge one.
And then we get to the parts of the game besides standing in the batter’s box, where Parra just destroys Kubel in value. This shows up most significantly on defense, where Kubel has essentially proven to be so bad that he should probably have been moved to permanent DH by now. In just over 3,000 innings in the outfield, he has a career UZR of -41.8, or about -17 runs per 150 games played. Even if you think UZR overstates the case against Kubel’s defensive prowess, he’s clearly below average at best and outright bad at worst. Even a strong regression on UZR will still leave you with an expectation of Kubel costing the D’Backs about 10 runs compared to an average defender if they run him out there as their regular left fielder.
And remember, Parra is not likely an average defensive left fielder. He has the skillset of a guy traditionally used in center field, and indeed, he’s racked up 360 innings of time in CF even with the D’Backs having a quality defender in Young already on the roster. In his nearly 2,000 innings of Major League experience in the outfield, Parra’s racked up a UZR of +22.5, or just about +10 runs per 150 games played. Given his player type, we should expect him to be better than the average left fielder, and defensive metrics suggest that this is exactly the case. Again, you can regress UZR if you don’t trust it’s conclusions, but you’re still going to come out with Parra being something like a +5 defender over a full season.
A +5 expectation for Parra and a -10 for Kubel would give us a gap of 15 runs defensively between the two, or about the same as the offensive difference between them strictly based on career numbers, ignoring Parra’s strong 2011 season and how their ages should inform our future projections. Once you add in baserunning (Kubel is lousy at this too) and durability, it’s really hard to make the case that Kubel is a better player than Parra. He provides a different set of strengths, but his weaknesses more than offset what he’ll bring to the table, and swapping out Parra for Kubel is likely to be a net negative for the Diamondbacks.
Now, Arizona might argue that it’s not either/or, and that they can have both on the roster with Parra moving to the fourth outfielder role, but that doesn’t really seem to be a very good use of resources. Both Kubel and Parra are left-handed bats, so they wouldn’t be able to platoon them and minimize Kubel’s struggles against southpaws. Meanwhile, Parra’s not going to take playing time from Upton in right field, and using him in center field would in lieu of Young would only serve to make the defense even worse without really upgrading the offense in any meaningful way.
With Kubel as the left fielder, Arizona’s fourth OF should be a right-hander who can give Kubel days off against LHPs and substitue in for him defensively late in games, and Parra only fits half that bill. If they’re not sold on him as a regular, they’re better off trading him to someone who is, and finding another player to get the 200-250 PA they’ve left over for him after signing Kubel to take his job.
Overall, this is just a weird signing. The Diamondbacks didn’t really improve themselves, displaced a decent young player, and gave up about 10-15% of their payroll to make this lateral move. They could potentially rescue this deal by moving Kubel to first base (where he could platoon with Goldschmidt), but it doesn’t sound like that’s in the plan.
In their chase for left-handed power, the Diamondbacks likely just wasted a roster spot and $15 million over the next two years. For a team with a limited budget, this isn’t the kind of move they should have been making.
Well, today, the team decided to change course, signing Jason Kubel to a two year, $15 million contract that will see him take over as the team’s left fielder. By acquiring Kubel, the D’Backs have essentially decided to displace the incumbent Gerardo Parra, and in looking at the two players, it’s not actually clear that the team is going to get any better.
Kubel’s addition signifies that the Diamondbacks wanted a bit more power from the left side to balance out the right-handedness brought by Upton, Young, Paul Goldschmidt, and Aaron Hill. While Miguel Montero and a potentially healthy Stephen Drew offered some power from the left side, the middle of the team’s batting order still skewed towards RHBs, and Kubel will give the team more thump at the plate than Parra would have. However, if the team thinks they’re getting a monstrous offensive upgrade in making the switch, they’re likely overestimating the difference between them.
While Kubel put himself on the map with a good 2009 season, he’s generally been only slightly better than an average hitter for most of his career. His career line of .271/.335/.459 is good for a 109 wRC+, almost a dead ringer for the 110 mark he put up last year. While he has some power, he’s not exactly a prototypical cleanup hitter, and he’s just about average in terms of drawing walks and avoiding strikeouts. At the plate, he’s okay at everything, and the overall package adds up to a decent-but-not-great offensive player.
How much better is he than Parra at the plate? Here are their career numbers side by side.
[table][tr][th=""]Name[/th][th=""]Team[/th][th=""]PA[/th][th=""]AVG[/th][th=""]OBP[/th][th=""]SLG[/th][th=""]BB%[/th][th=""]K%[/th][th=""]ISO[/th][th=""]BABIP[/th][th=""]wRC+[/th][/tr][tr][td]Jason Kubel[/td][td]Twins[/td][td]2846[/td][td].271[/td][td].335[/td][td].459[/td][td]8.8 %[/td][td]18.7 %[/td][td].188[/td][td].303[/td][td]109[/td][/tr][tr][td]Gerardo Parra[/td][td]’backs[/td][td]1377[/td][td].282[/td][td].331[/td][td].403[/td][td]6.6 %[/td][td]17.9 %[/td][td].120[/td][td].338[/td][td]88[/td][/tr][/table]
The walk and strikeout rates are similar, though it should be noted that Parra has drawn 23 intentional walks while hitting in front of the pitcher, so some of his perceived patience at the plate may be more of a factor of NL batting orders. Kubel has a big edge in power, though Parra’s speed has let him make up some of that difference with a higher BABIP. Overall, the offensive difference between the two based on their career numbers is about 15 runs over 600 plate appearances.
However, we probably shouldn’t just be content to use their career numbers. Kubel is five years older than Parra and is three years removed from his best season, while Parra showed signs of legitimate improvement at age 24 last year. If we give more weight to their most recent seasons, Parra’s wRC+ comes up to something closer to 95, cutting the difference between them to something closer to 10 runs over the course of a full season. It’s an offensive upgrade, but not a huge one.
And then we get to the parts of the game besides standing in the batter’s box, where Parra just destroys Kubel in value. This shows up most significantly on defense, where Kubel has essentially proven to be so bad that he should probably have been moved to permanent DH by now. In just over 3,000 innings in the outfield, he has a career UZR of -41.8, or about -17 runs per 150 games played. Even if you think UZR overstates the case against Kubel’s defensive prowess, he’s clearly below average at best and outright bad at worst. Even a strong regression on UZR will still leave you with an expectation of Kubel costing the D’Backs about 10 runs compared to an average defender if they run him out there as their regular left fielder.
And remember, Parra is not likely an average defensive left fielder. He has the skillset of a guy traditionally used in center field, and indeed, he’s racked up 360 innings of time in CF even with the D’Backs having a quality defender in Young already on the roster. In his nearly 2,000 innings of Major League experience in the outfield, Parra’s racked up a UZR of +22.5, or just about +10 runs per 150 games played. Given his player type, we should expect him to be better than the average left fielder, and defensive metrics suggest that this is exactly the case. Again, you can regress UZR if you don’t trust it’s conclusions, but you’re still going to come out with Parra being something like a +5 defender over a full season.
A +5 expectation for Parra and a -10 for Kubel would give us a gap of 15 runs defensively between the two, or about the same as the offensive difference between them strictly based on career numbers, ignoring Parra’s strong 2011 season and how their ages should inform our future projections. Once you add in baserunning (Kubel is lousy at this too) and durability, it’s really hard to make the case that Kubel is a better player than Parra. He provides a different set of strengths, but his weaknesses more than offset what he’ll bring to the table, and swapping out Parra for Kubel is likely to be a net negative for the Diamondbacks.
Now, Arizona might argue that it’s not either/or, and that they can have both on the roster with Parra moving to the fourth outfielder role, but that doesn’t really seem to be a very good use of resources. Both Kubel and Parra are left-handed bats, so they wouldn’t be able to platoon them and minimize Kubel’s struggles against southpaws. Meanwhile, Parra’s not going to take playing time from Upton in right field, and using him in center field would in lieu of Young would only serve to make the defense even worse without really upgrading the offense in any meaningful way.
With Kubel as the left fielder, Arizona’s fourth OF should be a right-hander who can give Kubel days off against LHPs and substitue in for him defensively late in games, and Parra only fits half that bill. If they’re not sold on him as a regular, they’re better off trading him to someone who is, and finding another player to get the 200-250 PA they’ve left over for him after signing Kubel to take his job.
Overall, this is just a weird signing. The Diamondbacks didn’t really improve themselves, displaced a decent young player, and gave up about 10-15% of their payroll to make this lateral move. They could potentially rescue this deal by moving Kubel to first base (where he could platoon with Goldschmidt), but it doesn’t sound like that’s in the plan.
In their chase for left-handed power, the Diamondbacks likely just wasted a roster spot and $15 million over the next two years. For a team with a limited budget, this isn’t the kind of move they should have been making.
Rollins returns to Philadelphia.
Spoiler [+]
In perhaps the least shocking move of the offseason, the Phillies re-signed Jimmy Rollins over the weekend. While the possibility always existed that he would sign elsewhere, the availability of several shortstop stopgaps drastically reduced his number of suitors. The remaining teams with shortstop vacancies lacked either the payroll flexibility to pay him eight figures per year or the desire to sign a player like him while not being in a position of contention.
For a week or two, Rollins and the Phillies had been negotiating with each other. No other parties were involved. The Brewers were linked to him at one point, but their three-year, $36 million deal with Aramis Ramirez closed that window. The Tigers popped up as potential suitors, but the rumor was baseless.
In the end, the Rollins-Phillies negotiations mirrored those of Derek Jeter and the Yankees last season. Each side knew the eventual outcome, and talks were more centered on how they could compromise while still showing respect to one another, both publicly and privately. The result was a three-year deal worth $33 million, with a vesting fourth-year option valued at another $11 million. The option is a very easy vest, however, so barring extreme health woes, he will play in Philly for four more years.
Realistically, this was the best possible deal the Phillies could sign.
If they weren’t going to offer a max-type deal to Jose Reyes, and didn’t want to deplete the farm system to acquire an Asdrubal Cabrera, Alexei Ramirez or Stephen Drew via trade, then Rollins on a relatively team-friendly deal was a better solution than signing Clint Barmes, Rafael Furcal or Alex Gonzalez. It was also better than simply using prospect Freddy Galvis.
The key to this move, from the Phillies side, is that Ruben Amaro let the market develop before extending the formal offer Rollins eventually accepted. With Jonathan Papelbon, and Raul Ibanez three years earlier, Amaro identified his guy and pounced early in the offseason, overpaying before the market set itself.
Years earlier, players like Adam Dunn, Pat Burrell and Bobby Abreu signed very team-friendly contracts. Milton Bradley also signed for less than Ibanez, and while that deal didn’t work out, it made far more sense on the surface.
This offseason, he signed Papelbon to a four-year, $50 million contract, where no other closer has even passed $30 million. With Rollins, however, Amaro identified his target and took a more laid-back approach that ultimately benefited the Phillies. When someone else emerged as a legitimate threat, he amped up negotiations.
Until then, he watched as stopgap after stopgap signed with shortstop-vacant clubs, and as the number of potential destinations continued to shrink. How a front office can act so diligently in one area and not exercise that level of care and caution elsewhere is a story for another day, but the end result of that patience was three guaranteed years at a lower average annual value than practically anyone expected.
Rollins entered the offseason by saying he wouldn’t take a hometown discount to remain with the Phillies, and that he sought five guaranteed years. In an interview with Jim Salisbury shortly after the signing became known, Rollins was candid as usual. He explicitly mentioned that his quest for a five-year deal was a negotiating ploy. Everyone knew that, but it’s still interesting to hear the athlete himself admit that fact.
He went onto say he would have loved five years, but four years was more than acceptable; that even though this is a three-year deal, the vesting option is very attainable, so it’s effectively a four-year deal. He also alluded to the idea that the Brewers offered more guaranteed years and dollars, but that it wasn’t enough above the Phillies offer to leave his legacy behind and start anew elsewhere.
So, the $11 million per year question is whether this is, overall, a good deal. Sure, it’s team-friendly relative to initial offseason expectations, but will the Phillies experience a return on their investment, or is this more of a break-even signing?
Rollins has averaged over 3 WAR from 2009-11, and that includes the 2009-10 seasons in which he was hurt. He played just 88 games in 2010, and had lingering injuries the year before that sapped some of his offensive ability. Last season marked a return to form of sorts, as he hit .268/.338/.399 in a down offensive league. With his great fielding and baserunning, a .330ish wOBA put him right back in the 4-WAR range. While expectations should certainly be tempered moving forward — 2012 is his age-33 season, after all — it’s tough to imagine Rollins producing fewer than 10 WAR over the next four years. Even when he played half of a season with below average offensive numbers he still managed 2.5 WAR, and his injuries largely looked behind him last year.
For the deal to work out, all he has to do is tally those 10 WAR over the likely four years of the contract. Our fan projections have him at 3.9 WAR next year, but even if we lop that down to 3.5 and project a decline on the order of a half-win per season, he would produce 11 WAR over the next four seasons.
As long as Rollins sustains some semblance of his offense from last year, continues to perform well in the field and on the bases, and stays on the field, this deal will work out for the Phillies. But even if they take a slight “loss
For a week or two, Rollins and the Phillies had been negotiating with each other. No other parties were involved. The Brewers were linked to him at one point, but their three-year, $36 million deal with Aramis Ramirez closed that window. The Tigers popped up as potential suitors, but the rumor was baseless.
In the end, the Rollins-Phillies negotiations mirrored those of Derek Jeter and the Yankees last season. Each side knew the eventual outcome, and talks were more centered on how they could compromise while still showing respect to one another, both publicly and privately. The result was a three-year deal worth $33 million, with a vesting fourth-year option valued at another $11 million. The option is a very easy vest, however, so barring extreme health woes, he will play in Philly for four more years.
Realistically, this was the best possible deal the Phillies could sign.
If they weren’t going to offer a max-type deal to Jose Reyes, and didn’t want to deplete the farm system to acquire an Asdrubal Cabrera, Alexei Ramirez or Stephen Drew via trade, then Rollins on a relatively team-friendly deal was a better solution than signing Clint Barmes, Rafael Furcal or Alex Gonzalez. It was also better than simply using prospect Freddy Galvis.
The key to this move, from the Phillies side, is that Ruben Amaro let the market develop before extending the formal offer Rollins eventually accepted. With Jonathan Papelbon, and Raul Ibanez three years earlier, Amaro identified his guy and pounced early in the offseason, overpaying before the market set itself.
Years earlier, players like Adam Dunn, Pat Burrell and Bobby Abreu signed very team-friendly contracts. Milton Bradley also signed for less than Ibanez, and while that deal didn’t work out, it made far more sense on the surface.
This offseason, he signed Papelbon to a four-year, $50 million contract, where no other closer has even passed $30 million. With Rollins, however, Amaro identified his target and took a more laid-back approach that ultimately benefited the Phillies. When someone else emerged as a legitimate threat, he amped up negotiations.
Until then, he watched as stopgap after stopgap signed with shortstop-vacant clubs, and as the number of potential destinations continued to shrink. How a front office can act so diligently in one area and not exercise that level of care and caution elsewhere is a story for another day, but the end result of that patience was three guaranteed years at a lower average annual value than practically anyone expected.
Rollins entered the offseason by saying he wouldn’t take a hometown discount to remain with the Phillies, and that he sought five guaranteed years. In an interview with Jim Salisbury shortly after the signing became known, Rollins was candid as usual. He explicitly mentioned that his quest for a five-year deal was a negotiating ploy. Everyone knew that, but it’s still interesting to hear the athlete himself admit that fact.
He went onto say he would have loved five years, but four years was more than acceptable; that even though this is a three-year deal, the vesting option is very attainable, so it’s effectively a four-year deal. He also alluded to the idea that the Brewers offered more guaranteed years and dollars, but that it wasn’t enough above the Phillies offer to leave his legacy behind and start anew elsewhere.
So, the $11 million per year question is whether this is, overall, a good deal. Sure, it’s team-friendly relative to initial offseason expectations, but will the Phillies experience a return on their investment, or is this more of a break-even signing?
Rollins has averaged over 3 WAR from 2009-11, and that includes the 2009-10 seasons in which he was hurt. He played just 88 games in 2010, and had lingering injuries the year before that sapped some of his offensive ability. Last season marked a return to form of sorts, as he hit .268/.338/.399 in a down offensive league. With his great fielding and baserunning, a .330ish wOBA put him right back in the 4-WAR range. While expectations should certainly be tempered moving forward — 2012 is his age-33 season, after all — it’s tough to imagine Rollins producing fewer than 10 WAR over the next four years. Even when he played half of a season with below average offensive numbers he still managed 2.5 WAR, and his injuries largely looked behind him last year.
For the deal to work out, all he has to do is tally those 10 WAR over the likely four years of the contract. Our fan projections have him at 3.9 WAR next year, but even if we lop that down to 3.5 and project a decline on the order of a half-win per season, he would produce 11 WAR over the next four seasons.
As long as Rollins sustains some semblance of his offense from last year, continues to perform well in the field and on the bases, and stays on the field, this deal will work out for the Phillies. But even if they take a slight “loss
Sherrill returns to Seattle.
Arizona downgrades with Kubel addition.
Rollins returns to Philadelphia.
Spoiler [+]
After throwing 231 innings and compiling a 3.31 ERA in the independent league ranks between 1999 and 2003, the Seattle Mariners took a chance on left-hander George Sherrill and signed him to a minor-league deal. He promptly broke into the big leagues a year later and served as a core piece of the Mariners’ bullpen for four years before being shipped to Baltimore prior to the 2008 season in the blockbuster deal that brought Erik Bedard to the Pacific Northwest.
The career of George Sherrill now comes full circle, as he reportedly will return to Seattle on a one-year contract worth $1.1M plus incentives.
The Mariners have earnestly sought to upgrade the left-handed contingent of their bullpen, first drafting southpaw Lucas Luetge from the Milwaukee Brewers in the Rule 5 Draft and now signing Sherrill. Both lefties will seek to improve upon the forgettable production from Cesar Jimenez and Charlie Furbush, who were the two lefties in the ‘pen at the end of the season.
Jimenez is intriguing due to his 2.95 FIP in Triple-A and 2.28 FIP in the big leagues last season, but he did allow lefties to hit .283 against him in 71 Triple-A innings and has displayed command problems throughout his professional career. The 27-year-old has also dealt with significant arm issues in 2009 and 2010 that held him to only 28.2 innings during that stretch, so durability is also a concern.
Furbush was acquired in the trade that sent Doug Fister to Detroit. Upon arrival in Seattle, he struggled in both the starting rotation and the bullpen. The 25-year-old posted a 5.16 FIP on the season and continued to struggle with the long ball. Lefties also hit .284 against him in 2011, which cautions against employing him as a true lefty specialist out of the bullpen.
The question marks surrounding those two led to the relatively low-risk signing of George Sherrill. The addition should augment the Mariners’ bullpen, despite the fact that Seattle already enjoyed great success against left-handed hitters in 2011. The team’s 3.64 FIP against lefties was the sixth best in the league. Their strikeout percentage against lefties, however, was tied for the fifth-worst in the league at 17.2% and needed improvement.
Sherrill has a career 33.9% strikeout percentage against lefties. Furthermore, he displayed good command of the baseball in those matchups. His strikeout-to-walk ratio against left-handed hitters was an impressive 32-to-1 last season. That is exactly the skill set that will equip manager Eric Wedge with a valuable tool in 2012 that was largely unavailable to him a season ago — a reliever with strikeout stuff against tough left-handed batters.
Of course, the 34-year-old native of Tennessee signed with the Mariners at a modest price for a reason. His usefulness on the mound is extremely limited. Against left-handers, his career FIP is 2.20. Against right-handers, however, his career FIP is 5.17.
Eric Wedge should be exceedingly cautious when summoning Sherrill next season. The Braves utilized him against righties, but survived without suffering too much damage due to a .229 BABIP. His strikeout-to-walk ratio was still horrendous with six strikeouts and 11 walks, which suggests his relative success against right-handed batters was a mirage that will likely come crashing to earth in 2012.
Luckily, the Seattle Mariners will not need George Sherrill to be anything other than a left-handed specialist in their bullpen next season. Brandon League will return as the closer, and Tom Wilhelmsen is the leading candidate to pitch in the eighth inning. That should enable manager Eric Wedge to utilize Sherrill exactly how he should be, which is almost exclusively against lefties and never against a righty in a high-leverage situation.
If called upon to pitch in only those situations, George Sherrill should have a very successful year with the Mariners, and beyond that — even as his velocity continues to drop — he should be able to carve out a nice little niche as an aging LOOGY over the next few years.
The career of George Sherrill now comes full circle, as he reportedly will return to Seattle on a one-year contract worth $1.1M plus incentives.
The Mariners have earnestly sought to upgrade the left-handed contingent of their bullpen, first drafting southpaw Lucas Luetge from the Milwaukee Brewers in the Rule 5 Draft and now signing Sherrill. Both lefties will seek to improve upon the forgettable production from Cesar Jimenez and Charlie Furbush, who were the two lefties in the ‘pen at the end of the season.
Jimenez is intriguing due to his 2.95 FIP in Triple-A and 2.28 FIP in the big leagues last season, but he did allow lefties to hit .283 against him in 71 Triple-A innings and has displayed command problems throughout his professional career. The 27-year-old has also dealt with significant arm issues in 2009 and 2010 that held him to only 28.2 innings during that stretch, so durability is also a concern.
Furbush was acquired in the trade that sent Doug Fister to Detroit. Upon arrival in Seattle, he struggled in both the starting rotation and the bullpen. The 25-year-old posted a 5.16 FIP on the season and continued to struggle with the long ball. Lefties also hit .284 against him in 2011, which cautions against employing him as a true lefty specialist out of the bullpen.
The question marks surrounding those two led to the relatively low-risk signing of George Sherrill. The addition should augment the Mariners’ bullpen, despite the fact that Seattle already enjoyed great success against left-handed hitters in 2011. The team’s 3.64 FIP against lefties was the sixth best in the league. Their strikeout percentage against lefties, however, was tied for the fifth-worst in the league at 17.2% and needed improvement.
Sherrill has a career 33.9% strikeout percentage against lefties. Furthermore, he displayed good command of the baseball in those matchups. His strikeout-to-walk ratio against left-handed hitters was an impressive 32-to-1 last season. That is exactly the skill set that will equip manager Eric Wedge with a valuable tool in 2012 that was largely unavailable to him a season ago — a reliever with strikeout stuff against tough left-handed batters.
Of course, the 34-year-old native of Tennessee signed with the Mariners at a modest price for a reason. His usefulness on the mound is extremely limited. Against left-handers, his career FIP is 2.20. Against right-handers, however, his career FIP is 5.17.
Eric Wedge should be exceedingly cautious when summoning Sherrill next season. The Braves utilized him against righties, but survived without suffering too much damage due to a .229 BABIP. His strikeout-to-walk ratio was still horrendous with six strikeouts and 11 walks, which suggests his relative success against right-handed batters was a mirage that will likely come crashing to earth in 2012.
Luckily, the Seattle Mariners will not need George Sherrill to be anything other than a left-handed specialist in their bullpen next season. Brandon League will return as the closer, and Tom Wilhelmsen is the leading candidate to pitch in the eighth inning. That should enable manager Eric Wedge to utilize Sherrill exactly how he should be, which is almost exclusively against lefties and never against a righty in a high-leverage situation.
If called upon to pitch in only those situations, George Sherrill should have a very successful year with the Mariners, and beyond that — even as his velocity continues to drop — he should be able to carve out a nice little niche as an aging LOOGY over the next few years.
Arizona downgrades with Kubel addition.
Spoiler [+]
Last year, the Arizona Diamondbacks were baseball’s biggest surprise, winning 94 games and the NL West title just a year after finishing 65-97. The team’s turnaround was driven by strong performances across the roster, but among the key factors in their success was the excellent defense delivered by their trio of outfielders. Chris Young (+14.1), Gerardo Parra (+9.6), and Justin Upton (+7.7) all posted UZRs that ranked among the best in the league at their positions, and the Diamondbacks posted the best team outfield UZR (+31.1) in the National League. With the help of their strong gloves, the team was able to post an ERA (3.80) that was 22 points lower than their FIP (4.02), the fifth largest positive differential in the game.
Well, today, the team decided to change course, signing Jason Kubel to a two year, $15 million contract that will see him take over as the team’s left fielder. By acquiring Kubel, the D’Backs have essentially decided to displace the incumbent Gerardo Parra, and in looking at the two players, it’s not actually clear that the team is going to get any better.
Kubel’s addition signifies that the Diamondbacks wanted a bit more power from the left side to balance out the right-handedness brought by Upton, Young, Paul Goldschmidt, and Aaron Hill. While Miguel Montero and a potentially healthy Stephen Drew offered some power from the left side, the middle of the team’s batting order still skewed towards RHBs, and Kubel will give the team more thump at the plate than Parra would have. However, if the team thinks they’re getting a monstrous offensive upgrade in making the switch, they’re likely overestimating the difference between them.
While Kubel put himself on the map with a good 2009 season, he’s generally been only slightly better than an average hitter for most of his career. His career line of .271/.335/.459 is good for a 109 wRC+, almost a dead ringer for the 110 mark he put up last year. While he has some power, he’s not exactly a prototypical cleanup hitter, and he’s just about average in terms of drawing walks and avoiding strikeouts. At the plate, he’s okay at everything, and the overall package adds up to a decent-but-not-great offensive player.
How much better is he than Parra at the plate? Here are their career numbers side by side.
[table][tr][th=""]Name[/th][th=""]Team[/th][th=""]PA[/th][th=""]AVG[/th][th=""]OBP[/th][th=""]SLG[/th][th=""]BB%[/th][th=""]K%[/th][th=""]ISO[/th][th=""]BABIP[/th][th=""]wRC+[/th][/tr][tr][td]Jason Kubel[/td][td]Twins[/td][td]2846[/td][td].271[/td][td].335[/td][td].459[/td][td]8.8 %[/td][td]18.7 %[/td][td].188[/td][td].303[/td][td]109[/td][/tr][tr][td]Gerardo Parra[/td][td]’backs[/td][td]1377[/td][td].282[/td][td].331[/td][td].403[/td][td]6.6 %[/td][td]17.9 %[/td][td].120[/td][td].338[/td][td]88[/td][/tr][/table]
The walk and strikeout rates are similar, though it should be noted that Parra has drawn 23 intentional walks while hitting in front of the pitcher, so some of his perceived patience at the plate may be more of a factor of NL batting orders. Kubel has a big edge in power, though Parra’s speed has let him make up some of that difference with a higher BABIP. Overall, the offensive difference between the two based on their career numbers is about 15 runs over 600 plate appearances.
However, we probably shouldn’t just be content to use their career numbers. Kubel is five years older than Parra and is three years removed from his best season, while Parra showed signs of legitimate improvement at age 24 last year. If we give more weight to their most recent seasons, Parra’s wRC+ comes up to something closer to 95, cutting the difference between them to something closer to 10 runs over the course of a full season. It’s an offensive upgrade, but not a huge one.
And then we get to the parts of the game besides standing in the batter’s box, where Parra just destroys Kubel in value. This shows up most significantly on defense, where Kubel has essentially proven to be so bad that he should probably have been moved to permanent DH by now. In just over 3,000 innings in the outfield, he has a career UZR of -41.8, or about -17 runs per 150 games played. Even if you think UZR overstates the case against Kubel’s defensive prowess, he’s clearly below average at best and outright bad at worst. Even a strong regression on UZR will still leave you with an expectation of Kubel costing the D’Backs about 10 runs compared to an average defender if they run him out there as their regular left fielder.
And remember, Parra is not likely an average defensive left fielder. He has the skillset of a guy traditionally used in center field, and indeed, he’s racked up 360 innings of time in CF even with the D’Backs having a quality defender in Young already on the roster. In his nearly 2,000 innings of Major League experience in the outfield, Parra’s racked up a UZR of +22.5, or just about +10 runs per 150 games played. Given his player type, we should expect him to be better than the average left fielder, and defensive metrics suggest that this is exactly the case. Again, you can regress UZR if you don’t trust it’s conclusions, but you’re still going to come out with Parra being something like a +5 defender over a full season.
A +5 expectation for Parra and a -10 for Kubel would give us a gap of 15 runs defensively between the two, or about the same as the offensive difference between them strictly based on career numbers, ignoring Parra’s strong 2011 season and how their ages should inform our future projections. Once you add in baserunning (Kubel is lousy at this too) and durability, it’s really hard to make the case that Kubel is a better player than Parra. He provides a different set of strengths, but his weaknesses more than offset what he’ll bring to the table, and swapping out Parra for Kubel is likely to be a net negative for the Diamondbacks.
Now, Arizona might argue that it’s not either/or, and that they can have both on the roster with Parra moving to the fourth outfielder role, but that doesn’t really seem to be a very good use of resources. Both Kubel and Parra are left-handed bats, so they wouldn’t be able to platoon them and minimize Kubel’s struggles against southpaws. Meanwhile, Parra’s not going to take playing time from Upton in right field, and using him in center field would in lieu of Young would only serve to make the defense even worse without really upgrading the offense in any meaningful way.
With Kubel as the left fielder, Arizona’s fourth OF should be a right-hander who can give Kubel days off against LHPs and substitue in for him defensively late in games, and Parra only fits half that bill. If they’re not sold on him as a regular, they’re better off trading him to someone who is, and finding another player to get the 200-250 PA they’ve left over for him after signing Kubel to take his job.
Overall, this is just a weird signing. The Diamondbacks didn’t really improve themselves, displaced a decent young player, and gave up about 10-15% of their payroll to make this lateral move. They could potentially rescue this deal by moving Kubel to first base (where he could platoon with Goldschmidt), but it doesn’t sound like that’s in the plan.
In their chase for left-handed power, the Diamondbacks likely just wasted a roster spot and $15 million over the next two years. For a team with a limited budget, this isn’t the kind of move they should have been making.
Well, today, the team decided to change course, signing Jason Kubel to a two year, $15 million contract that will see him take over as the team’s left fielder. By acquiring Kubel, the D’Backs have essentially decided to displace the incumbent Gerardo Parra, and in looking at the two players, it’s not actually clear that the team is going to get any better.
Kubel’s addition signifies that the Diamondbacks wanted a bit more power from the left side to balance out the right-handedness brought by Upton, Young, Paul Goldschmidt, and Aaron Hill. While Miguel Montero and a potentially healthy Stephen Drew offered some power from the left side, the middle of the team’s batting order still skewed towards RHBs, and Kubel will give the team more thump at the plate than Parra would have. However, if the team thinks they’re getting a monstrous offensive upgrade in making the switch, they’re likely overestimating the difference between them.
While Kubel put himself on the map with a good 2009 season, he’s generally been only slightly better than an average hitter for most of his career. His career line of .271/.335/.459 is good for a 109 wRC+, almost a dead ringer for the 110 mark he put up last year. While he has some power, he’s not exactly a prototypical cleanup hitter, and he’s just about average in terms of drawing walks and avoiding strikeouts. At the plate, he’s okay at everything, and the overall package adds up to a decent-but-not-great offensive player.
How much better is he than Parra at the plate? Here are their career numbers side by side.
[table][tr][th=""]Name[/th][th=""]Team[/th][th=""]PA[/th][th=""]AVG[/th][th=""]OBP[/th][th=""]SLG[/th][th=""]BB%[/th][th=""]K%[/th][th=""]ISO[/th][th=""]BABIP[/th][th=""]wRC+[/th][/tr][tr][td]Jason Kubel[/td][td]Twins[/td][td]2846[/td][td].271[/td][td].335[/td][td].459[/td][td]8.8 %[/td][td]18.7 %[/td][td].188[/td][td].303[/td][td]109[/td][/tr][tr][td]Gerardo Parra[/td][td]’backs[/td][td]1377[/td][td].282[/td][td].331[/td][td].403[/td][td]6.6 %[/td][td]17.9 %[/td][td].120[/td][td].338[/td][td]88[/td][/tr][/table]
The walk and strikeout rates are similar, though it should be noted that Parra has drawn 23 intentional walks while hitting in front of the pitcher, so some of his perceived patience at the plate may be more of a factor of NL batting orders. Kubel has a big edge in power, though Parra’s speed has let him make up some of that difference with a higher BABIP. Overall, the offensive difference between the two based on their career numbers is about 15 runs over 600 plate appearances.
However, we probably shouldn’t just be content to use their career numbers. Kubel is five years older than Parra and is three years removed from his best season, while Parra showed signs of legitimate improvement at age 24 last year. If we give more weight to their most recent seasons, Parra’s wRC+ comes up to something closer to 95, cutting the difference between them to something closer to 10 runs over the course of a full season. It’s an offensive upgrade, but not a huge one.
And then we get to the parts of the game besides standing in the batter’s box, where Parra just destroys Kubel in value. This shows up most significantly on defense, where Kubel has essentially proven to be so bad that he should probably have been moved to permanent DH by now. In just over 3,000 innings in the outfield, he has a career UZR of -41.8, or about -17 runs per 150 games played. Even if you think UZR overstates the case against Kubel’s defensive prowess, he’s clearly below average at best and outright bad at worst. Even a strong regression on UZR will still leave you with an expectation of Kubel costing the D’Backs about 10 runs compared to an average defender if they run him out there as their regular left fielder.
And remember, Parra is not likely an average defensive left fielder. He has the skillset of a guy traditionally used in center field, and indeed, he’s racked up 360 innings of time in CF even with the D’Backs having a quality defender in Young already on the roster. In his nearly 2,000 innings of Major League experience in the outfield, Parra’s racked up a UZR of +22.5, or just about +10 runs per 150 games played. Given his player type, we should expect him to be better than the average left fielder, and defensive metrics suggest that this is exactly the case. Again, you can regress UZR if you don’t trust it’s conclusions, but you’re still going to come out with Parra being something like a +5 defender over a full season.
A +5 expectation for Parra and a -10 for Kubel would give us a gap of 15 runs defensively between the two, or about the same as the offensive difference between them strictly based on career numbers, ignoring Parra’s strong 2011 season and how their ages should inform our future projections. Once you add in baserunning (Kubel is lousy at this too) and durability, it’s really hard to make the case that Kubel is a better player than Parra. He provides a different set of strengths, but his weaknesses more than offset what he’ll bring to the table, and swapping out Parra for Kubel is likely to be a net negative for the Diamondbacks.
Now, Arizona might argue that it’s not either/or, and that they can have both on the roster with Parra moving to the fourth outfielder role, but that doesn’t really seem to be a very good use of resources. Both Kubel and Parra are left-handed bats, so they wouldn’t be able to platoon them and minimize Kubel’s struggles against southpaws. Meanwhile, Parra’s not going to take playing time from Upton in right field, and using him in center field would in lieu of Young would only serve to make the defense even worse without really upgrading the offense in any meaningful way.
With Kubel as the left fielder, Arizona’s fourth OF should be a right-hander who can give Kubel days off against LHPs and substitue in for him defensively late in games, and Parra only fits half that bill. If they’re not sold on him as a regular, they’re better off trading him to someone who is, and finding another player to get the 200-250 PA they’ve left over for him after signing Kubel to take his job.
Overall, this is just a weird signing. The Diamondbacks didn’t really improve themselves, displaced a decent young player, and gave up about 10-15% of their payroll to make this lateral move. They could potentially rescue this deal by moving Kubel to first base (where he could platoon with Goldschmidt), but it doesn’t sound like that’s in the plan.
In their chase for left-handed power, the Diamondbacks likely just wasted a roster spot and $15 million over the next two years. For a team with a limited budget, this isn’t the kind of move they should have been making.
Rollins returns to Philadelphia.
Spoiler [+]
In perhaps the least shocking move of the offseason, the Phillies re-signed Jimmy Rollins over the weekend. While the possibility always existed that he would sign elsewhere, the availability of several shortstop stopgaps drastically reduced his number of suitors. The remaining teams with shortstop vacancies lacked either the payroll flexibility to pay him eight figures per year or the desire to sign a player like him while not being in a position of contention.
For a week or two, Rollins and the Phillies had been negotiating with each other. No other parties were involved. The Brewers were linked to him at one point, but their three-year, $36 million deal with Aramis Ramirez closed that window. The Tigers popped up as potential suitors, but the rumor was baseless.
In the end, the Rollins-Phillies negotiations mirrored those of Derek Jeter and the Yankees last season. Each side knew the eventual outcome, and talks were more centered on how they could compromise while still showing respect to one another, both publicly and privately. The result was a three-year deal worth $33 million, with a vesting fourth-year option valued at another $11 million. The option is a very easy vest, however, so barring extreme health woes, he will play in Philly for four more years.
Realistically, this was the best possible deal the Phillies could sign.
If they weren’t going to offer a max-type deal to Jose Reyes, and didn’t want to deplete the farm system to acquire an Asdrubal Cabrera, Alexei Ramirez or Stephen Drew via trade, then Rollins on a relatively team-friendly deal was a better solution than signing Clint Barmes, Rafael Furcal or Alex Gonzalez. It was also better than simply using prospect Freddy Galvis.
The key to this move, from the Phillies side, is that Ruben Amaro let the market develop before extending the formal offer Rollins eventually accepted. With Jonathan Papelbon, and Raul Ibanez three years earlier, Amaro identified his guy and pounced early in the offseason, overpaying before the market set itself.
Years earlier, players like Adam Dunn, Pat Burrell and Bobby Abreu signed very team-friendly contracts. Milton Bradley also signed for less than Ibanez, and while that deal didn’t work out, it made far more sense on the surface.
This offseason, he signed Papelbon to a four-year, $50 million contract, where no other closer has even passed $30 million. With Rollins, however, Amaro identified his target and took a more laid-back approach that ultimately benefited the Phillies. When someone else emerged as a legitimate threat, he amped up negotiations.
Until then, he watched as stopgap after stopgap signed with shortstop-vacant clubs, and as the number of potential destinations continued to shrink. How a front office can act so diligently in one area and not exercise that level of care and caution elsewhere is a story for another day, but the end result of that patience was three guaranteed years at a lower average annual value than practically anyone expected.
Rollins entered the offseason by saying he wouldn’t take a hometown discount to remain with the Phillies, and that he sought five guaranteed years. In an interview with Jim Salisbury shortly after the signing became known, Rollins was candid as usual. He explicitly mentioned that his quest for a five-year deal was a negotiating ploy. Everyone knew that, but it’s still interesting to hear the athlete himself admit that fact.
He went onto say he would have loved five years, but four years was more than acceptable; that even though this is a three-year deal, the vesting option is very attainable, so it’s effectively a four-year deal. He also alluded to the idea that the Brewers offered more guaranteed years and dollars, but that it wasn’t enough above the Phillies offer to leave his legacy behind and start anew elsewhere.
So, the $11 million per year question is whether this is, overall, a good deal. Sure, it’s team-friendly relative to initial offseason expectations, but will the Phillies experience a return on their investment, or is this more of a break-even signing?
Rollins has averaged over 3 WAR from 2009-11, and that includes the 2009-10 seasons in which he was hurt. He played just 88 games in 2010, and had lingering injuries the year before that sapped some of his offensive ability. Last season marked a return to form of sorts, as he hit .268/.338/.399 in a down offensive league. With his great fielding and baserunning, a .330ish wOBA put him right back in the 4-WAR range. While expectations should certainly be tempered moving forward — 2012 is his age-33 season, after all — it’s tough to imagine Rollins producing fewer than 10 WAR over the next four years. Even when he played half of a season with below average offensive numbers he still managed 2.5 WAR, and his injuries largely looked behind him last year.
For the deal to work out, all he has to do is tally those 10 WAR over the likely four years of the contract. Our fan projections have him at 3.9 WAR next year, but even if we lop that down to 3.5 and project a decline on the order of a half-win per season, he would produce 11 WAR over the next four seasons.
As long as Rollins sustains some semblance of his offense from last year, continues to perform well in the field and on the bases, and stays on the field, this deal will work out for the Phillies. But even if they take a slight “loss
For a week or two, Rollins and the Phillies had been negotiating with each other. No other parties were involved. The Brewers were linked to him at one point, but their three-year, $36 million deal with Aramis Ramirez closed that window. The Tigers popped up as potential suitors, but the rumor was baseless.
In the end, the Rollins-Phillies negotiations mirrored those of Derek Jeter and the Yankees last season. Each side knew the eventual outcome, and talks were more centered on how they could compromise while still showing respect to one another, both publicly and privately. The result was a three-year deal worth $33 million, with a vesting fourth-year option valued at another $11 million. The option is a very easy vest, however, so barring extreme health woes, he will play in Philly for four more years.
Realistically, this was the best possible deal the Phillies could sign.
If they weren’t going to offer a max-type deal to Jose Reyes, and didn’t want to deplete the farm system to acquire an Asdrubal Cabrera, Alexei Ramirez or Stephen Drew via trade, then Rollins on a relatively team-friendly deal was a better solution than signing Clint Barmes, Rafael Furcal or Alex Gonzalez. It was also better than simply using prospect Freddy Galvis.
The key to this move, from the Phillies side, is that Ruben Amaro let the market develop before extending the formal offer Rollins eventually accepted. With Jonathan Papelbon, and Raul Ibanez three years earlier, Amaro identified his guy and pounced early in the offseason, overpaying before the market set itself.
Years earlier, players like Adam Dunn, Pat Burrell and Bobby Abreu signed very team-friendly contracts. Milton Bradley also signed for less than Ibanez, and while that deal didn’t work out, it made far more sense on the surface.
This offseason, he signed Papelbon to a four-year, $50 million contract, where no other closer has even passed $30 million. With Rollins, however, Amaro identified his target and took a more laid-back approach that ultimately benefited the Phillies. When someone else emerged as a legitimate threat, he amped up negotiations.
Until then, he watched as stopgap after stopgap signed with shortstop-vacant clubs, and as the number of potential destinations continued to shrink. How a front office can act so diligently in one area and not exercise that level of care and caution elsewhere is a story for another day, but the end result of that patience was three guaranteed years at a lower average annual value than practically anyone expected.
Rollins entered the offseason by saying he wouldn’t take a hometown discount to remain with the Phillies, and that he sought five guaranteed years. In an interview with Jim Salisbury shortly after the signing became known, Rollins was candid as usual. He explicitly mentioned that his quest for a five-year deal was a negotiating ploy. Everyone knew that, but it’s still interesting to hear the athlete himself admit that fact.
He went onto say he would have loved five years, but four years was more than acceptable; that even though this is a three-year deal, the vesting option is very attainable, so it’s effectively a four-year deal. He also alluded to the idea that the Brewers offered more guaranteed years and dollars, but that it wasn’t enough above the Phillies offer to leave his legacy behind and start anew elsewhere.
So, the $11 million per year question is whether this is, overall, a good deal. Sure, it’s team-friendly relative to initial offseason expectations, but will the Phillies experience a return on their investment, or is this more of a break-even signing?
Rollins has averaged over 3 WAR from 2009-11, and that includes the 2009-10 seasons in which he was hurt. He played just 88 games in 2010, and had lingering injuries the year before that sapped some of his offensive ability. Last season marked a return to form of sorts, as he hit .268/.338/.399 in a down offensive league. With his great fielding and baserunning, a .330ish wOBA put him right back in the 4-WAR range. While expectations should certainly be tempered moving forward — 2012 is his age-33 season, after all — it’s tough to imagine Rollins producing fewer than 10 WAR over the next four years. Even when he played half of a season with below average offensive numbers he still managed 2.5 WAR, and his injuries largely looked behind him last year.
For the deal to work out, all he has to do is tally those 10 WAR over the likely four years of the contract. Our fan projections have him at 3.9 WAR next year, but even if we lop that down to 3.5 and project a decline on the order of a half-win per season, he would produce 11 WAR over the next four seasons.
As long as Rollins sustains some semblance of his offense from last year, continues to perform well in the field and on the bases, and stays on the field, this deal will work out for the Phillies. But even if they take a slight “loss
dacomeup
Supporter
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I like the deal more now other than Boxberger being included. Grandal wasn't going to play, Alonso wasn't going to play, and Volquez has been trash. But when Votto's contract is up we won't have anyone to replace him.
dacomeup
Supporter
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I like the deal more now other than Boxberger being included. Grandal wasn't going to play, Alonso wasn't going to play, and Volquez has been trash. But when Votto's contract is up we won't have anyone to replace him.
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Yeah, that Cubs roster is an absolute mess. Can't be mad at Theo if he wants to build from the ground up, and Rizzo is a good prospect. I think SD feels Alonso is just a better fit for Petco.
What's the word on Chapman? Last I heard he was having shoulder issues, but was slated to go for a starting spot in ST. Needs a third pitch if that's going to happen, though.
What's the word on Chapman? Last I heard he was having shoulder issues, but was slated to go for a starting spot in ST. Needs a third pitch if that's going to happen, though.
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