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on another note…what # do you guys think he will wear?24 is the number of mariners royalty so safe to say he's going to have to change.
2016 MLB thread. THE CUBS HAVE BROKEN THE CURSE! Chicago Cubs are your 2016 World Series champions
- Thread in 'Sports & Training' Thread starter Started by proshares,
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old cano jerseys just became tino martinez jerseys
jumpmanfromdabay
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Cano will definitely want to get traded in a couple years. This won't last.
Dominicans won't last in Seattle. He'll want out.
Dominicans won't last in Seattle. He'll want out.
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ARod was there for awhile.
mr marcus
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this Portuguese here
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Red Sox win.
again
Feldman provides innings Astros need.
Scott Feldman is probably a fourth starter in a good rotation, a third in some others, but for the Houston Astros, who return just two of the five members of their 2013 Opening Day rotation, neither of whom -- Brad Peacock and Lucas Harrell -- is a lock to remain a starter all year in 2014, he's their de facto No. 1 after agreeing to a three-year deal reportedly worth $30 million.
Feldman offers the team the capacity to soak up some innings that their young, developing starters won't be able to handle, with nobody else as much as even money to get to 200 innings. That means the Astros probably need a couple of additional arms, either in the rotation, to push guys like Peacock to long relief, or in the pen to take on multiple-inning workloads.
In front of an average defense, Feldman is probably a 4-ERA starter, avoiding walks and getting ground balls with his sinker, which improved in 2013 along with his curveball. The latter pitch had better angle and depth than in previous years, giving him the closest thing he's ever had to an out pitch and driving the best strikeout total and second-best strikeout rate of his career.
Houston's defense isn't going to be average, at least not to start the year, except at third base, as Matt Dominguez is the the team's only plus defender at any position. That will improve in time, but could mean some disappointing results, at least on a superficial level, from Feldman because he allows more balls in play than your typical top-of-the-rotation starter.
The value he provides to Houston will be more about the flexibility he provides them when handling the likes of Jarrod Cosart, Brett Oberholtzer, and soon Mark Appel and Vincent Velazquez and Mike Foltyniewicz, too.
This leaves the market for starters thin after the top tier of Ervin Santana and Matt Garza; you've got a few guys who will only consider specific markets, like A.J. Burnett, followed by a big dropoff to Paul Maholm, Jason Hammel, and Bronson Arroyo near the end of my top 50 free agent rankings.
That should speed up the race to sign Santana and Garza for any contenders still in the market for a starter who can make some impact rather than just making 30 below-average starts, while also possibly clearing the way for more starting pitcher trades at next week's winter meetings.
Feldman offers the team the capacity to soak up some innings that their young, developing starters won't be able to handle, with nobody else as much as even money to get to 200 innings. That means the Astros probably need a couple of additional arms, either in the rotation, to push guys like Peacock to long relief, or in the pen to take on multiple-inning workloads.
In front of an average defense, Feldman is probably a 4-ERA starter, avoiding walks and getting ground balls with his sinker, which improved in 2013 along with his curveball. The latter pitch had better angle and depth than in previous years, giving him the closest thing he's ever had to an out pitch and driving the best strikeout total and second-best strikeout rate of his career.
Houston's defense isn't going to be average, at least not to start the year, except at third base, as Matt Dominguez is the the team's only plus defender at any position. That will improve in time, but could mean some disappointing results, at least on a superficial level, from Feldman because he allows more balls in play than your typical top-of-the-rotation starter.
The value he provides to Houston will be more about the flexibility he provides them when handling the likes of Jarrod Cosart, Brett Oberholtzer, and soon Mark Appel and Vincent Velazquez and Mike Foltyniewicz, too.
This leaves the market for starters thin after the top tier of Ervin Santana and Matt Garza; you've got a few guys who will only consider specific markets, like A.J. Burnett, followed by a big dropoff to Paul Maholm, Jason Hammel, and Bronson Arroyo near the end of my top 50 free agent rankings.
That should speed up the race to sign Santana and Garza for any contenders still in the market for a starter who can make some impact rather than just making 30 below-average starts, while also possibly clearing the way for more starting pitcher trades at next week's winter meetings.
Ox.
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10 years . wow .
The Cano Decade.
Moving On Without Robinson Cano.
Never Mind the Bays — Mets Take Granderson.
The Brewers, Will Smith, and a Breakthrough.
Hey, Tony Blengino here. You might remember me from such Mariner classics as “MMIX – Negative Run Differential Theater” , or “2010 – A Spaced Odyssey”. For some years, I was a scout with the Brewers, and in more recent years I was an assistant to the GM with the Mariners. While I’m between baseball adventures, I’ve been given the privilege of writing on the storied pages of FanGraphs. I know the bar is high here, and I’ll do my best to reach it.
Alas, I am no longer a Mariner, but I was one long enough to help assemble a crew of talented, relatively inexpensive youngsters that made the Robinson Cano Era possible. This article will not attempt to say whether a 10-year, $240M commitment to Cano is a sign of the apocalypse, the gateway to a golden era in Mariner baseball, or something in between. There will be plenty of other articles for that. In this one, I will simply take a look at the player’s potential aging curve, from a couple of different perspectives — one historical, one more qualitative. Let’s get this out of the way from the get-go — Robinson Cano is pretty good. Clearly the best bat on the free agent market, and certainly a sturdier asset than Prince Fielder and Josh Hamilton were at the time they entered the free-agent market. He has been remarkably consistent, and remarkably healthy throughout his career. He provides offense at a position where it is not plentiful. But where does Robby Cano fit in with other offensive 2Bs in baseball history, and how did they age? Let’s take a look.
The first six columns list the players’ number of cumulative standard deviations above the average of league regulars’ OBP and SLG through age 30, through their first nine years as a regular, and for their respective careers. The next three columns list the players’ OPS+ through age 30, through their first nine years as a regular, and for their careers. The next column lists the age at which each player had their last “good” season, and the last column lists their three-year peak.
LAST FIRST + OBP 30 + SLG 30 + OBP 9Y + SLG 9Y + OBP CR + SLG CR OPS+ 30 OPS+ 9Y OPS+ CR LAST GD PEAK 3
Hornsby Rogers 25.22 29.18 21.02 24.48 35.10 38.60 177 179 175 35 27-29
Lajoie Nap 8.85 12.15 17.61 21.51 19.01 23.57 166 167 150 38 27-29
Collins Eddie 19.38 12.70 17.94 12.30 32.90 15.08 154 158 142 39 26-28
Morgan Joe 13.36 2.71 13.36 2.71 29.08 6.63 132 132 132 39 30-32
Carew Rod 11.07 4.89 13.19 6.43 29.82 7.10 132 132 131 37 29-31
Robinson Jackie 3.38 2.22 14.47 6.43 15.76 6.18 127 134 131 37 31-33
Doyle Larry 7.26 10.74 7.08 10.68 9.33 12.36 128 130 126 32 23-25
Utley Chase 5.95 6.34 9.13 7.54 130 126 126 26-28
Grich Bobby 7.83 3.00 10.26 5.49 15.39 6.52 125 127 125 35 30-32
Cano Robinson 4.34 9.54 4.34 9.54 125 125 125 28-30
Gehringer Charlie 3.19 3.89 5.24 4.90 14.69 8.53 119 123 124 37 32-34
Kent Jeff -2.37 2.88 0.06 5.62 2.83 10.63 112 122 123 39 30-32
Lazzeri Tony 4.17 5.90 4.17 5.90 3.99 5.23 127 127 121 29 23-25
Gordon Joe 1.00 5.26 0.28 7.65 -0.83 7.65 125 124 120 33 26-28
Whitaker Lou 5.77 -1.39 5.72 -1.25 13.24 3.33 108 109 117 37 34-36
Alomar Roberto 8.19 2.53 7.04 2.00 12.31 4.38 117 118 116 33 31-33
Sandberg Ryne 1.99 6.86 1.99 6.86 2.93 9.26 115 115 114 32 30-32
Biggio Craig 7.63 -0.16 9.32 0.69 8.93 -1.03 120 123 112 35 27-29
Frisch Frankie 5.03 4.73 4.46 4.40 7.33 2.10 116 116 110 34 23-25
McAuliffe **** 6.10 2.75 6.10 2.75 5.76 1.85 113 113 109 33 25-27
Before we do any meaningful analysis, let’s agree to largely ignore Rogers Hornsby, Nap Lajoie and Eddie Collins. Robinson Cano’s a really good offensive player, but he’s not those guys. On the other end, let’s agree to ignore **** McAuliffe. He was a nice, underrated player who even played SS for a few years in the offense-starved ’60′s. Cano is better than McAuliffe. It’s in the midst of these two extremes that we can learn a lot about the potential future of Robinson Cano.
It should be noted that the numbers in the first six columns are not adjusted for home park. This means that Cano’s + SLG numbers are likely be a bit inflated by Yankee Stadium’s cozy RF fence, and that Joe Morgan‘s + SLG numbers are likely deflated by the spacious Astrodome in the early days of his career. No matter — these figures not only give us a good sense of the respective offensive impact of each player, they also separate each player’s skills into OBP and SLG-based subsets which may age differently.
Through age 30/first nine full-time seasons of the players’ careers, we can make the following observations re: Cano’s career vis-a-vis the others:
Cano’s OBP relative to the league is fairly unremarkable in this company, ranking ahead of only Lazzeri/Sandberg/Gordon/Kent among this group.
Cano’s SLG relative to the league ranks quite high in this company, ranking behind only Hornsby/Lajoie/Collins/Doyle among this group.
Cano’s OPS+ ranks smack in the middle of this group.
Cano is peaking right now; if he posts a 2014 stat line resembling 2012 and 2013, his peak period will likely be from ages 29-31. Rod Carew peaked exactly then, and Morgan, Grich, Kent and Sandberg all peaked at ages 30-32. It’s also a fairly high peak for this group, with only Hornsby/Lajoie/Morgan/Carew/Collins/J.Robinson clearly exceeding it.
Let’s take a look at what this group of players went on to accomplish after age 30, starting with a look at the OPS+ columns. As you might expect, most players’ OPS+ declined between age 30 and the end of their career. Jackie Robinson is an obvious exception — he didn’t enter the majors until age 28, for obvious reasons, so his career lacked a growth phase. The other three players whose OPS+ increased in the second half of their career were Gehringer, Kent and Whitaker. Kent became a totally different player in his thirties, while Gehringer and Whitaker had common, OBP-based strengths that led to improvement over the second half of their careers. A handful of other players saw their OPS+ hold steady, Morgan, Carew, Grich to name three. Three more guys with high BB rates and significant OBP leanings in their overall profile.
In fact, after their age-30 season, the 18 players listed above whose careers are over had combined for 137 STD above average OBP and 111 STD above average SLG. After nine seasons as regulars they had combined for 159 STD OBP, 130 STD SLG. At their careers’ end, these players had combined for 258 STD OBP and 168 STD SLG. Only 57 STD SLG added after age 30, only 38 STD SLG added after year nine, for all 18 players combined. And a whole lot of that is Rogers Hornsby, all by himself. The bottom line — for Cano’s present power to last for much longer would be basically unprecedented among great offensive 2Bs.
Let’s look at the player who is likely the most comparable to Cano, Ryne Sandberg. Both players are more SLG than OBP-based. Cano is a better pure hitter, neither walks as much as their peers in this group. Both peaked around the same age. Both had a growth phase to their careers in which they were simply solid regulars while they gained strength and grew into their potential. Both saw their power augmented by a specific region of their home park — friendly Yankee Stadium RF/RCF for Cano, friendly Wrigley LCF for Sandberg. You will notice a preponderance of 32s, 33s, 34s in the “Last Good Year” column — which reads 32 for Sandberg — for all but the elite on this list, plus a few others with OBP-centered skillsets. One should expect Cano to become more of a 20ish homer guy in Seattle than the 30ish homer guy he was in New York, before too long.
Before moving on to another way of looking at Cano’s future, lets’ quickly compare him to Chase Utley, who just completed his ninth year as a regular, but who at 34, is four years older than Cano. At age 30, Utley had a higher career OPS+ and a far superior OBP history compared to Cano, albeit with a bit less power. Utley hasn’t been nearly as healthy nor as consistent as Cano, however, and he had an earlier and lower peak than Cano. Utley’s career OPS+ is 126 at present, and trending down, while Cano’s is 125, and might nudge up a notch or two before beginning its descent. Utley and Cano are likely to be very similar players qualitatively when all is said and done, but Cano will have a clear counting-stats advantage.
And this is one final point to be made in the historical analysis of these players. Take a look at Craig Biggio — 120 OPS+ at age 30, 123 through nine years as a regular. He wound up way down at 112, largely because of his chase for 3000 hits, during which he declined substantially as a hitter. With Cano under wraps for ten years, his milestone chase could become a similar problem down the road.
History says that Cano will ride out the end of his peak period in 2014, begin a solid decline phase with some .300ish, 18-20 HR seasons, than begin a deeper secondary decline phase during which he accumulate hits — and outs. By age 35, there will likely be a severe disconnect between Cano’s salary and his production. At the end of the day, he’ll get his 3000 hits, and his plaque in Cooperstown, but very well might watch his career OPS+ drop below 120 in the process.
Now let’s take a totally different approach to how this might all go down. What differentiates good hitters from not-so-good hitters? Largely, it comes down to their performances in these categories:
K rate
BB rate
Popup rate
LD rate
Hard Fly rate
Hard Ground rate
Very few hitters excel at all of these, but a good hitter has learned to piece together a portfolio of solid performances in more than one of these areas. High-average hitters tend to have low K and popup rates, and solid LD rates. Power hitters obviously have high Hard Fly rates. These skills vary in terms of predictability — LD rate is likely the flukiest, but the best hitters for average, like Robinson Cano, tend to run high LD rates. So how does he measure up in these areas, and what do the trends say?
K rate: Over a full standard deviation better than MLB average, trending steady
BB rate: For the first time was 1/2 STD better than MLB average in 2013, trending positively
Popup rate: 1/2 STD better than league average, trending positively
LD rate: Over 1 STD better than league average each of last three seasons, trending steady
Hard Fly Rate: In league average range, trending slightly negatively
Hard Ground Rate: Over 1 STD better than MLB average, trending steady
This is a picture of a high-average MLB hitter, at or near the peak of his game. His power numbers are pumped up a bit by his home park — other players with his homer totals have much higher Hard Fly rates, but Cano helps himself by staying healthy and on the field, keeping his counting numbers high. Does he have the best batted ball profile in the game — no, he’s not Miguel Cabrera, Joey Votto, Mike Trout, or even David Ortiz, but he’s right there in that next tier. He’s pretty good at just about everything, with no glaring weaknesses.
Every player’s time comes to an end, however. How will it end for Robby Cano? For many players, it ends when the Hard Fly rate collapses, with big numbers of batted balls sliding into the immediately adjacent “Can of Corn” bucket. For speed players, whose BABIP routinely outperforms their batted-ball quality, the slightest decline in their raw speed can have disastrous consequences. K rate can skyrocket for a variety of reasons. Significant LD rate drops can be the final straw. Combinations of more than of these can trigger a decline — Adam Dunn‘s already high K rate exploded, and his once-stratospheric Hard Fly rate fell into a less elite bracket, and here we are. Vernon Wells‘ K rate exploded. Placido Polanco‘s LD rate luck finally ran out. Ichiro went from a thoroughbred to just a fast guy, and the BABIP that had long forged his excellence cratered.
To see what the end holds for Cano, we need to find a player who had a similar skillset, but who has declined substantially since advanced batted-ball data became available. Let’s try Player A, who in 2011 possessed these fundamentals:
K rate: Over 1 STD better than MLB average, trending positively
BB rate: In league average range, trending steady
Popup rate: Over 1 STD better than MLB average, trending steady
LD rate: Over 1 STD better than MLB average for fourth straight year, trending steady
Hard Fly Rate: In league average range, trending sharply negatively
Hard Ground Rate: In league average range, trending negatively
This player, Michael Young, at age 34, had a superb offensive season in 2011, with a .338/.380/.474 line. That’s a line that Cano could conceivably put up at some point in the next few seasons. In 2012, his Hard Fly rate continued its decline, his BB rate fell off, but most vitally, his LD rate precipitously dropped into the league average range, and has remained there since. That single factor turns a Michael Young from a batting title contender into a guy hitting an empty .277. This happened at age 35. Derek Jeter‘s LD rate plunged, and he became a different, non-elite offensive player at age 36.
Robinson Cano has a diverse offensive skillset that should serve him well as he enters his decline phase. But let’s face it, he is about to enter it, and it’s called a decline phase for a reason. Might as well end with some crystal-balling:
Cano has already had his best season.
He will never hit 30 homers again.
He won’t ever hit his career-best .342 again, but he will bat at least .330 one more time in his career, and will have multiple future .300 seasons.
He will hit 50 doubles in a season.
His legendary durability will take a hit, beginning sometime in the next couple of seasons.
By age 34 or 35, Cano will cease to be a star, and will hit for a decent average, with few extras.
He will then hang around to reach milestones and collect his handsome paycheck.
He will reach 3000 hits and someday be deservedly enshrined in Cooperstown, while the equally deserving but comparably counting-stat-poor Chase Utley and Bobby Grich will not.
Alas, I am no longer a Mariner, but I was one long enough to help assemble a crew of talented, relatively inexpensive youngsters that made the Robinson Cano Era possible. This article will not attempt to say whether a 10-year, $240M commitment to Cano is a sign of the apocalypse, the gateway to a golden era in Mariner baseball, or something in between. There will be plenty of other articles for that. In this one, I will simply take a look at the player’s potential aging curve, from a couple of different perspectives — one historical, one more qualitative. Let’s get this out of the way from the get-go — Robinson Cano is pretty good. Clearly the best bat on the free agent market, and certainly a sturdier asset than Prince Fielder and Josh Hamilton were at the time they entered the free-agent market. He has been remarkably consistent, and remarkably healthy throughout his career. He provides offense at a position where it is not plentiful. But where does Robby Cano fit in with other offensive 2Bs in baseball history, and how did they age? Let’s take a look.
The first six columns list the players’ number of cumulative standard deviations above the average of league regulars’ OBP and SLG through age 30, through their first nine years as a regular, and for their respective careers. The next three columns list the players’ OPS+ through age 30, through their first nine years as a regular, and for their careers. The next column lists the age at which each player had their last “good” season, and the last column lists their three-year peak.
LAST FIRST + OBP 30 + SLG 30 + OBP 9Y + SLG 9Y + OBP CR + SLG CR OPS+ 30 OPS+ 9Y OPS+ CR LAST GD PEAK 3
Hornsby Rogers 25.22 29.18 21.02 24.48 35.10 38.60 177 179 175 35 27-29
Lajoie Nap 8.85 12.15 17.61 21.51 19.01 23.57 166 167 150 38 27-29
Collins Eddie 19.38 12.70 17.94 12.30 32.90 15.08 154 158 142 39 26-28
Morgan Joe 13.36 2.71 13.36 2.71 29.08 6.63 132 132 132 39 30-32
Carew Rod 11.07 4.89 13.19 6.43 29.82 7.10 132 132 131 37 29-31
Robinson Jackie 3.38 2.22 14.47 6.43 15.76 6.18 127 134 131 37 31-33
Doyle Larry 7.26 10.74 7.08 10.68 9.33 12.36 128 130 126 32 23-25
Utley Chase 5.95 6.34 9.13 7.54 130 126 126 26-28
Grich Bobby 7.83 3.00 10.26 5.49 15.39 6.52 125 127 125 35 30-32
Cano Robinson 4.34 9.54 4.34 9.54 125 125 125 28-30
Gehringer Charlie 3.19 3.89 5.24 4.90 14.69 8.53 119 123 124 37 32-34
Kent Jeff -2.37 2.88 0.06 5.62 2.83 10.63 112 122 123 39 30-32
Lazzeri Tony 4.17 5.90 4.17 5.90 3.99 5.23 127 127 121 29 23-25
Gordon Joe 1.00 5.26 0.28 7.65 -0.83 7.65 125 124 120 33 26-28
Whitaker Lou 5.77 -1.39 5.72 -1.25 13.24 3.33 108 109 117 37 34-36
Alomar Roberto 8.19 2.53 7.04 2.00 12.31 4.38 117 118 116 33 31-33
Sandberg Ryne 1.99 6.86 1.99 6.86 2.93 9.26 115 115 114 32 30-32
Biggio Craig 7.63 -0.16 9.32 0.69 8.93 -1.03 120 123 112 35 27-29
Frisch Frankie 5.03 4.73 4.46 4.40 7.33 2.10 116 116 110 34 23-25
McAuliffe **** 6.10 2.75 6.10 2.75 5.76 1.85 113 113 109 33 25-27
Before we do any meaningful analysis, let’s agree to largely ignore Rogers Hornsby, Nap Lajoie and Eddie Collins. Robinson Cano’s a really good offensive player, but he’s not those guys. On the other end, let’s agree to ignore **** McAuliffe. He was a nice, underrated player who even played SS for a few years in the offense-starved ’60′s. Cano is better than McAuliffe. It’s in the midst of these two extremes that we can learn a lot about the potential future of Robinson Cano.
It should be noted that the numbers in the first six columns are not adjusted for home park. This means that Cano’s + SLG numbers are likely be a bit inflated by Yankee Stadium’s cozy RF fence, and that Joe Morgan‘s + SLG numbers are likely deflated by the spacious Astrodome in the early days of his career. No matter — these figures not only give us a good sense of the respective offensive impact of each player, they also separate each player’s skills into OBP and SLG-based subsets which may age differently.
Through age 30/first nine full-time seasons of the players’ careers, we can make the following observations re: Cano’s career vis-a-vis the others:
Cano’s OBP relative to the league is fairly unremarkable in this company, ranking ahead of only Lazzeri/Sandberg/Gordon/Kent among this group.
Cano’s SLG relative to the league ranks quite high in this company, ranking behind only Hornsby/Lajoie/Collins/Doyle among this group.
Cano’s OPS+ ranks smack in the middle of this group.
Cano is peaking right now; if he posts a 2014 stat line resembling 2012 and 2013, his peak period will likely be from ages 29-31. Rod Carew peaked exactly then, and Morgan, Grich, Kent and Sandberg all peaked at ages 30-32. It’s also a fairly high peak for this group, with only Hornsby/Lajoie/Morgan/Carew/Collins/J.Robinson clearly exceeding it.
Let’s take a look at what this group of players went on to accomplish after age 30, starting with a look at the OPS+ columns. As you might expect, most players’ OPS+ declined between age 30 and the end of their career. Jackie Robinson is an obvious exception — he didn’t enter the majors until age 28, for obvious reasons, so his career lacked a growth phase. The other three players whose OPS+ increased in the second half of their career were Gehringer, Kent and Whitaker. Kent became a totally different player in his thirties, while Gehringer and Whitaker had common, OBP-based strengths that led to improvement over the second half of their careers. A handful of other players saw their OPS+ hold steady, Morgan, Carew, Grich to name three. Three more guys with high BB rates and significant OBP leanings in their overall profile.
In fact, after their age-30 season, the 18 players listed above whose careers are over had combined for 137 STD above average OBP and 111 STD above average SLG. After nine seasons as regulars they had combined for 159 STD OBP, 130 STD SLG. At their careers’ end, these players had combined for 258 STD OBP and 168 STD SLG. Only 57 STD SLG added after age 30, only 38 STD SLG added after year nine, for all 18 players combined. And a whole lot of that is Rogers Hornsby, all by himself. The bottom line — for Cano’s present power to last for much longer would be basically unprecedented among great offensive 2Bs.
Let’s look at the player who is likely the most comparable to Cano, Ryne Sandberg. Both players are more SLG than OBP-based. Cano is a better pure hitter, neither walks as much as their peers in this group. Both peaked around the same age. Both had a growth phase to their careers in which they were simply solid regulars while they gained strength and grew into their potential. Both saw their power augmented by a specific region of their home park — friendly Yankee Stadium RF/RCF for Cano, friendly Wrigley LCF for Sandberg. You will notice a preponderance of 32s, 33s, 34s in the “Last Good Year” column — which reads 32 for Sandberg — for all but the elite on this list, plus a few others with OBP-centered skillsets. One should expect Cano to become more of a 20ish homer guy in Seattle than the 30ish homer guy he was in New York, before too long.
Before moving on to another way of looking at Cano’s future, lets’ quickly compare him to Chase Utley, who just completed his ninth year as a regular, but who at 34, is four years older than Cano. At age 30, Utley had a higher career OPS+ and a far superior OBP history compared to Cano, albeit with a bit less power. Utley hasn’t been nearly as healthy nor as consistent as Cano, however, and he had an earlier and lower peak than Cano. Utley’s career OPS+ is 126 at present, and trending down, while Cano’s is 125, and might nudge up a notch or two before beginning its descent. Utley and Cano are likely to be very similar players qualitatively when all is said and done, but Cano will have a clear counting-stats advantage.
And this is one final point to be made in the historical analysis of these players. Take a look at Craig Biggio — 120 OPS+ at age 30, 123 through nine years as a regular. He wound up way down at 112, largely because of his chase for 3000 hits, during which he declined substantially as a hitter. With Cano under wraps for ten years, his milestone chase could become a similar problem down the road.
History says that Cano will ride out the end of his peak period in 2014, begin a solid decline phase with some .300ish, 18-20 HR seasons, than begin a deeper secondary decline phase during which he accumulate hits — and outs. By age 35, there will likely be a severe disconnect between Cano’s salary and his production. At the end of the day, he’ll get his 3000 hits, and his plaque in Cooperstown, but very well might watch his career OPS+ drop below 120 in the process.
Now let’s take a totally different approach to how this might all go down. What differentiates good hitters from not-so-good hitters? Largely, it comes down to their performances in these categories:
K rate
BB rate
Popup rate
LD rate
Hard Fly rate
Hard Ground rate
Very few hitters excel at all of these, but a good hitter has learned to piece together a portfolio of solid performances in more than one of these areas. High-average hitters tend to have low K and popup rates, and solid LD rates. Power hitters obviously have high Hard Fly rates. These skills vary in terms of predictability — LD rate is likely the flukiest, but the best hitters for average, like Robinson Cano, tend to run high LD rates. So how does he measure up in these areas, and what do the trends say?
K rate: Over a full standard deviation better than MLB average, trending steady
BB rate: For the first time was 1/2 STD better than MLB average in 2013, trending positively
Popup rate: 1/2 STD better than league average, trending positively
LD rate: Over 1 STD better than league average each of last three seasons, trending steady
Hard Fly Rate: In league average range, trending slightly negatively
Hard Ground Rate: Over 1 STD better than MLB average, trending steady
This is a picture of a high-average MLB hitter, at or near the peak of his game. His power numbers are pumped up a bit by his home park — other players with his homer totals have much higher Hard Fly rates, but Cano helps himself by staying healthy and on the field, keeping his counting numbers high. Does he have the best batted ball profile in the game — no, he’s not Miguel Cabrera, Joey Votto, Mike Trout, or even David Ortiz, but he’s right there in that next tier. He’s pretty good at just about everything, with no glaring weaknesses.
Every player’s time comes to an end, however. How will it end for Robby Cano? For many players, it ends when the Hard Fly rate collapses, with big numbers of batted balls sliding into the immediately adjacent “Can of Corn” bucket. For speed players, whose BABIP routinely outperforms their batted-ball quality, the slightest decline in their raw speed can have disastrous consequences. K rate can skyrocket for a variety of reasons. Significant LD rate drops can be the final straw. Combinations of more than of these can trigger a decline — Adam Dunn‘s already high K rate exploded, and his once-stratospheric Hard Fly rate fell into a less elite bracket, and here we are. Vernon Wells‘ K rate exploded. Placido Polanco‘s LD rate luck finally ran out. Ichiro went from a thoroughbred to just a fast guy, and the BABIP that had long forged his excellence cratered.
To see what the end holds for Cano, we need to find a player who had a similar skillset, but who has declined substantially since advanced batted-ball data became available. Let’s try Player A, who in 2011 possessed these fundamentals:
K rate: Over 1 STD better than MLB average, trending positively
BB rate: In league average range, trending steady
Popup rate: Over 1 STD better than MLB average, trending steady
LD rate: Over 1 STD better than MLB average for fourth straight year, trending steady
Hard Fly Rate: In league average range, trending sharply negatively
Hard Ground Rate: In league average range, trending negatively
This player, Michael Young, at age 34, had a superb offensive season in 2011, with a .338/.380/.474 line. That’s a line that Cano could conceivably put up at some point in the next few seasons. In 2012, his Hard Fly rate continued its decline, his BB rate fell off, but most vitally, his LD rate precipitously dropped into the league average range, and has remained there since. That single factor turns a Michael Young from a batting title contender into a guy hitting an empty .277. This happened at age 35. Derek Jeter‘s LD rate plunged, and he became a different, non-elite offensive player at age 36.
Robinson Cano has a diverse offensive skillset that should serve him well as he enters his decline phase. But let’s face it, he is about to enter it, and it’s called a decline phase for a reason. Might as well end with some crystal-balling:
Cano has already had his best season.
He will never hit 30 homers again.
He won’t ever hit his career-best .342 again, but he will bat at least .330 one more time in his career, and will have multiple future .300 seasons.
He will hit 50 doubles in a season.
His legendary durability will take a hit, beginning sometime in the next couple of seasons.
By age 34 or 35, Cano will cease to be a star, and will hit for a decent average, with few extras.
He will then hang around to reach milestones and collect his handsome paycheck.
He will reach 3000 hits and someday be deservedly enshrined in Cooperstown, while the equally deserving but comparably counting-stat-poor Chase Utley and Bobby Grich will not.
Moving On Without Robinson Cano.
It was pretty weird when Alex Rodriguez left the Mariners for the Rangers. It was weird when Jose Reyes left the Mets for the Marlins, and it was weird when Albert Pujols left the Cardinals for the Angels. There have been unexpected big-money moves in free agency before, but this one feels like it might be unprecedented, given who the Yankees are, and given who the Mariners are and have been. It makes total sense, of course — Robinson Cano couldn’t turn down ten guaranteed years — but the fact of the matter is that the Yankees lost a superstar to a team that’s been an also-ran, a team criticized for not opening up its wallet. This is not what people expected would happen, as little as a month ago.
This is a page of 2014 Steamer projections. You’ll find Cano seventh in projected WAR, between Troy Tulowitzki and David Wright. No matter how you look at it, Cano, right now, is among baseball’s very best position players. The Yankees don’t have him anymore. Look at the rest of that first page of projections and you’ll notice most of the top WAR guys are unavailable. They are, rightfully, under control and difficult to acquire. The Yankees need to figure out life after Robinson Cano, but despite the sequence of events, the team has already started. Really, he’s already been replaced.
That’s going to be the focus in New York, at least among fans and media types. Cano leaves a gaping hole — now Cano needs to be replaced, ideally by someone else who’s really good. It was cute when the Yankees signed Kelly Johnson as insurance, but Kelly Johnson isn’t an infield starter. He’s a potentially helpful reserve, and nothing much more on a team that isn’t the Marlins.
In a sense, the Yankees replaced Robinson Cano before they’d officially even lost him. They didn’t replace him with a second baseman, but, the Yankees reportedly refused to give Cano more than seven guaranteed years. They just the other day gave seven guaranteed expensive years to Jacoby Ellsbury, for a slightly lower total commitment than they were offering to Cano. Ellsbury’s a year younger, and the last three seasons, he and Cano have been of similar value. The only thing holding Ellsbury back is that he missed time with a shoulder injury after being fallen on, and by WAR/600 plate appearances, Ellsbury and Cano have been essentially equivalent. Cano, of course, has been more durable. Cano, of course, is more familiar, and he hits for more power. But Ellsbury does things that Cano doesn’t do so well, and he’s a star on his own right, and even if you like Cano more going forward, the difference can’t be huge. Not reasonably.
The Yankees have lost one star up the middle, and they’ve gained another star up the middle, at a different position. And, hell, as long as we’re here, we’ve got to acknowledge the Brian McCann acquisition, which is a massive upgrade over what the Yankees featured a year ago behind the plate. Combined, the Yankees got Ellsbury and McCann for two more guaranteed years than Cano is getting by himself, and McCann can do everything you want an upper-level catcher to do. He’s outstanding, and probably a bit underrated.
The sequence makes this feel gloomier, because the most recent thing that’s happened is that the Yankees have lost Cano to the Mariners. But imagine that that happened a few weeks ago. Imagine that the Yankees responded by quickly signing both Ellsbury and McCann. That would make the picture better, and it would be exactly the same as the current reality. The hardest work is already done.
But, all right, the Yankees were still in on Cano to the end, implying that there’s still room in the budget and money they intended to give to a star. There is work left to be done, and the Yankees do need to maximize their remaining flexibility now that Cano is off the market. To make sense of the situation, forget about Cano’s name. Forget about trying to get over the loss of a superstar. In the short term, Cano projects to be worth about five or six wins. The Yankees can make that up, without making a decade-long commitment.
A convenient thing about these Yankees is that they’re easily upgradeable. They need a second baseman, now, and the guy to whom they’ve been linked most often is Omar Infante. That’s far from automatic, but the Yankees would be the most likely destination, and just last year Infante was one of the better second basemen in baseball. He projects for a little over two wins, but the last two seasons he’s been worth 3.4 WAR/600 plate appearances. While he’s not Cano, he’s a real starter, which the Yankees don’t currently have. They could land Infante for a modest commitment.
The situation at third base is kind of up in the air, what with the Alex Rodriguez mystery, but without Rodriguez, it’s a hole. The Yankees have been tied to Chase Headley in the past, but that’s never come close to materializing. Interestingly, Juan Uribe is a free agent. He’s 34 years old, and in 2011, he was bad. In 2012, he was bad. In 2013, by our numbers, he was worth 5.1 WAR in 132 games. Of course, Uribe isn’t that good, and word is he’s been looking for a three-year deal, but he’s adequate, and he’s not going to get a three-year deal. If the Yankees feel like they won’t have Rodriguez next season, Uribe would make them better at the the hot corner, even if he wouldn’t raise anyone’s eyebrows.
And then there are the other holes. The Yankees are currently tied to Carlos Beltran, and Beltran could help as a DH/RF who’s better than Alfonso Soriano. Naturally, there’s the question of how much better, and Beltran doesn’t look so good at three years and $48 million, but the Yankees don’t project well at DH or in right field, according to Steamer, so that could be something to target. There’s also Shin-Soo Choo, who’s coming off a year of Uribe/Cano-type value. Choo has his own question marks, and what seems like a broad market, but whenever he signs, it’ll be for a fraction of the Cano commitment. In 2014, Choo should be worse than Cano, but not by a whole lot.
As far as the starting rotation is concerned, there’s word that Hiroki Kuroda might well be on the way back for a year. For an average annual value of about $15 million, the Yankees could probably have their pick of Matt Garza, Ervin Santana, and Ubaldo Jimenez. The new Japanese posting rules seem to make it less likely that Masahiro Tanaka will end up with the Yankees, since more teams will be involved and since more money will count against the payroll, but once that gets going the Yankees could easily end up looking like one of the favorites. It depends on how they position themselves, and on how patient they feel like being. Tanaka has it in him to be a front-of-the-rotation starter for several years, the kind of pitcher the Yankees lack.
Without Robinson Cano, the Yankees ought to be just fine, at least relative to what they’d be with him. They’ll miss him, but really, what they’ll miss is short-term Cano, and beyond the next few seasons he doesn’t project to be elite, or even significantly above-average. And in the short-term, they can make up for Cano by distributing that money in a few different places. It’s worth noting that, when the Mariners lost Alex Rodriguez, they improved. When the Cardinals lost Albert Pujols, they went to the NLCS. When the Mets lost Jose Reyes, they dropped all of three wins. When the Rangers lost Josh Hamilton, they dropped all of two wins. When the Indians lost Manny Ramirez, they gained a win and went to the playoffs. The history isn’t that losing a superstar is devastating. It’s that it’s survivable, and the Yankees have already made two major positive acquisitions.
Instead of Cano’s familiar value, the Yankees can go forward getting different but similar if not superior value. It’s a change, and that’s going to be weird at first, but different doesn’t automatically mean worse. Probably, in truth, this way the Yankees will be better off. That’ll be clearer when the shock goes away.
This is a page of 2014 Steamer projections. You’ll find Cano seventh in projected WAR, between Troy Tulowitzki and David Wright. No matter how you look at it, Cano, right now, is among baseball’s very best position players. The Yankees don’t have him anymore. Look at the rest of that first page of projections and you’ll notice most of the top WAR guys are unavailable. They are, rightfully, under control and difficult to acquire. The Yankees need to figure out life after Robinson Cano, but despite the sequence of events, the team has already started. Really, he’s already been replaced.
That’s going to be the focus in New York, at least among fans and media types. Cano leaves a gaping hole — now Cano needs to be replaced, ideally by someone else who’s really good. It was cute when the Yankees signed Kelly Johnson as insurance, but Kelly Johnson isn’t an infield starter. He’s a potentially helpful reserve, and nothing much more on a team that isn’t the Marlins.
In a sense, the Yankees replaced Robinson Cano before they’d officially even lost him. They didn’t replace him with a second baseman, but, the Yankees reportedly refused to give Cano more than seven guaranteed years. They just the other day gave seven guaranteed expensive years to Jacoby Ellsbury, for a slightly lower total commitment than they were offering to Cano. Ellsbury’s a year younger, and the last three seasons, he and Cano have been of similar value. The only thing holding Ellsbury back is that he missed time with a shoulder injury after being fallen on, and by WAR/600 plate appearances, Ellsbury and Cano have been essentially equivalent. Cano, of course, has been more durable. Cano, of course, is more familiar, and he hits for more power. But Ellsbury does things that Cano doesn’t do so well, and he’s a star on his own right, and even if you like Cano more going forward, the difference can’t be huge. Not reasonably.
The Yankees have lost one star up the middle, and they’ve gained another star up the middle, at a different position. And, hell, as long as we’re here, we’ve got to acknowledge the Brian McCann acquisition, which is a massive upgrade over what the Yankees featured a year ago behind the plate. Combined, the Yankees got Ellsbury and McCann for two more guaranteed years than Cano is getting by himself, and McCann can do everything you want an upper-level catcher to do. He’s outstanding, and probably a bit underrated.
The sequence makes this feel gloomier, because the most recent thing that’s happened is that the Yankees have lost Cano to the Mariners. But imagine that that happened a few weeks ago. Imagine that the Yankees responded by quickly signing both Ellsbury and McCann. That would make the picture better, and it would be exactly the same as the current reality. The hardest work is already done.
But, all right, the Yankees were still in on Cano to the end, implying that there’s still room in the budget and money they intended to give to a star. There is work left to be done, and the Yankees do need to maximize their remaining flexibility now that Cano is off the market. To make sense of the situation, forget about Cano’s name. Forget about trying to get over the loss of a superstar. In the short term, Cano projects to be worth about five or six wins. The Yankees can make that up, without making a decade-long commitment.
A convenient thing about these Yankees is that they’re easily upgradeable. They need a second baseman, now, and the guy to whom they’ve been linked most often is Omar Infante. That’s far from automatic, but the Yankees would be the most likely destination, and just last year Infante was one of the better second basemen in baseball. He projects for a little over two wins, but the last two seasons he’s been worth 3.4 WAR/600 plate appearances. While he’s not Cano, he’s a real starter, which the Yankees don’t currently have. They could land Infante for a modest commitment.
The situation at third base is kind of up in the air, what with the Alex Rodriguez mystery, but without Rodriguez, it’s a hole. The Yankees have been tied to Chase Headley in the past, but that’s never come close to materializing. Interestingly, Juan Uribe is a free agent. He’s 34 years old, and in 2011, he was bad. In 2012, he was bad. In 2013, by our numbers, he was worth 5.1 WAR in 132 games. Of course, Uribe isn’t that good, and word is he’s been looking for a three-year deal, but he’s adequate, and he’s not going to get a three-year deal. If the Yankees feel like they won’t have Rodriguez next season, Uribe would make them better at the the hot corner, even if he wouldn’t raise anyone’s eyebrows.
And then there are the other holes. The Yankees are currently tied to Carlos Beltran, and Beltran could help as a DH/RF who’s better than Alfonso Soriano. Naturally, there’s the question of how much better, and Beltran doesn’t look so good at three years and $48 million, but the Yankees don’t project well at DH or in right field, according to Steamer, so that could be something to target. There’s also Shin-Soo Choo, who’s coming off a year of Uribe/Cano-type value. Choo has his own question marks, and what seems like a broad market, but whenever he signs, it’ll be for a fraction of the Cano commitment. In 2014, Choo should be worse than Cano, but not by a whole lot.
As far as the starting rotation is concerned, there’s word that Hiroki Kuroda might well be on the way back for a year. For an average annual value of about $15 million, the Yankees could probably have their pick of Matt Garza, Ervin Santana, and Ubaldo Jimenez. The new Japanese posting rules seem to make it less likely that Masahiro Tanaka will end up with the Yankees, since more teams will be involved and since more money will count against the payroll, but once that gets going the Yankees could easily end up looking like one of the favorites. It depends on how they position themselves, and on how patient they feel like being. Tanaka has it in him to be a front-of-the-rotation starter for several years, the kind of pitcher the Yankees lack.
Without Robinson Cano, the Yankees ought to be just fine, at least relative to what they’d be with him. They’ll miss him, but really, what they’ll miss is short-term Cano, and beyond the next few seasons he doesn’t project to be elite, or even significantly above-average. And in the short-term, they can make up for Cano by distributing that money in a few different places. It’s worth noting that, when the Mariners lost Alex Rodriguez, they improved. When the Cardinals lost Albert Pujols, they went to the NLCS. When the Mets lost Jose Reyes, they dropped all of three wins. When the Rangers lost Josh Hamilton, they dropped all of two wins. When the Indians lost Manny Ramirez, they gained a win and went to the playoffs. The history isn’t that losing a superstar is devastating. It’s that it’s survivable, and the Yankees have already made two major positive acquisitions.
Instead of Cano’s familiar value, the Yankees can go forward getting different but similar if not superior value. It’s a change, and that’s going to be weird at first, but different doesn’t automatically mean worse. Probably, in truth, this way the Yankees will be better off. That’ll be clearer when the shock goes away.
Never Mind the Bays — Mets Take Granderson.
If you think wins are worth closer to seven million dollars a year, and that Curtis Granderson is a three-win player next year — reasonable assumptions, given the work of some, and the projections we have on our site — then giving him four years and $60 million is not a problem. It’s almost dead on. The problem comes when you realize that this is almost the exact same deal that the team gave Jason Bay. When he was two years younger. Mets’ fans might feel a chill go down their back right now, as I did when I heard the comparison.
Maybe the comparison won’t hold up to inspection, though.
If you zoom out past last year, things look good for Granderson. Since 2010, he’s 13th in the league in home runs, sixth in the league in isolated slugging percentage, and the 22nd-best outfielder by wRC+. Over that time frame, he put up 13.8 wins. If he did that again, he’d be worth the contract and then some.
Of course, he’s older now. Power peaks fairly early, as does defense, and he’s decidedly post-peak. But the projection systems take that into account, and OLIVER’s five-year projections have him worth over nine wins in the next four years. If you inflate the price of a win 10% every year over those four years, you get close to $60m in value even if you start with a $6m win this season. ZiPS is less optimistic (7.9 WAR over four years), but its owner would take the over based on the fact that the broken forearm came at the plate.
Will Granderson be the same in a new park? Our park factors have Yankee stadium inflating homers by lefties 14% (second-most in the league) while Citi plays just one percent above average. Granderson’s away isolated slugging percentages over the last four years are still comfortably above .200, though, and only one year in New York saw him put up a huge home/away split in terms of power. Most players play better at home, and he gets to keep his home city!
At 33, though, Granderson also two years older than Bay when he signed his contract. And Bay, over the four years going into that signing, had been 14th in the league in home runs, 29th in isolated slugging, and had been the 15th-best outfielder by wRC+. There’s that chill again. Why should Mets fans believe that Granderson will age better than Bay? Especially since he’s coming off a much worse season than Bay was coming off of back in 2009.
The non-hitting part of the package, with Granderson, is better than the one Bay offered. As a plus on the basepaths and in the field, Granderson has ways to offer value even as his power wanes, ways that Bay could not. Jason Bay hadn’t played center field in five years when he inked with the Mets. Granderson won’t play center with Juan Lagares around, but he played center last year. Projections that have him a minus on defense are probably projecting him as a center fielder. As a scratch center fielder, he should be a positive in the corner outfield. And Granderson has been a positive on the basepaths every year since he became a regular — Bay was closer to scratch and never showed the same peak speed as Granderson.
It seems that speedy players age better than those without speed, and that’s probably because their athleticism helps them be a plus on the basepaths and in the field even as their bat wanes. And that’s how we can take this past a comparison between two players. Because it’s 2013, and in 2013 $60 million dollars is worth less than it was back then Bay signed, and wins cost more money on the open market.
You might take a look at Granderson’s strikeout rate, and the fact that he’s been swinging more at pitches outside the zone, and want to run the other way. Toby Hyde did. But that’s just the natural process of aging, and last year was the first time Granderson swung at more pitches outside the zone than the league. And none of the comps in Hyde’s piece played center field, even at a scratch level, going into the seasons he’s covered.
Curtis Granderson is an athletic former center fielder that has been mostly healthy other than a couple bad hit-by-pitches that cost him much of last year. He fills a desperate need for the Mets, who don’t have great short- or long-term options at his position. Given his tools, he should age fairly gracefully. This deal isn’t a glaring overpay (beyond the fact that free agency is a tough place to get value), it won’t handcuff the team, and he’s projected to be an above-average player for two or three years. Why don’t people like it more?
Maybe the comparison won’t hold up to inspection, though.
If you zoom out past last year, things look good for Granderson. Since 2010, he’s 13th in the league in home runs, sixth in the league in isolated slugging percentage, and the 22nd-best outfielder by wRC+. Over that time frame, he put up 13.8 wins. If he did that again, he’d be worth the contract and then some.
Of course, he’s older now. Power peaks fairly early, as does defense, and he’s decidedly post-peak. But the projection systems take that into account, and OLIVER’s five-year projections have him worth over nine wins in the next four years. If you inflate the price of a win 10% every year over those four years, you get close to $60m in value even if you start with a $6m win this season. ZiPS is less optimistic (7.9 WAR over four years), but its owner would take the over based on the fact that the broken forearm came at the plate.
Will Granderson be the same in a new park? Our park factors have Yankee stadium inflating homers by lefties 14% (second-most in the league) while Citi plays just one percent above average. Granderson’s away isolated slugging percentages over the last four years are still comfortably above .200, though, and only one year in New York saw him put up a huge home/away split in terms of power. Most players play better at home, and he gets to keep his home city!
At 33, though, Granderson also two years older than Bay when he signed his contract. And Bay, over the four years going into that signing, had been 14th in the league in home runs, 29th in isolated slugging, and had been the 15th-best outfielder by wRC+. There’s that chill again. Why should Mets fans believe that Granderson will age better than Bay? Especially since he’s coming off a much worse season than Bay was coming off of back in 2009.
The non-hitting part of the package, with Granderson, is better than the one Bay offered. As a plus on the basepaths and in the field, Granderson has ways to offer value even as his power wanes, ways that Bay could not. Jason Bay hadn’t played center field in five years when he inked with the Mets. Granderson won’t play center with Juan Lagares around, but he played center last year. Projections that have him a minus on defense are probably projecting him as a center fielder. As a scratch center fielder, he should be a positive in the corner outfield. And Granderson has been a positive on the basepaths every year since he became a regular — Bay was closer to scratch and never showed the same peak speed as Granderson.
It seems that speedy players age better than those without speed, and that’s probably because their athleticism helps them be a plus on the basepaths and in the field even as their bat wanes. And that’s how we can take this past a comparison between two players. Because it’s 2013, and in 2013 $60 million dollars is worth less than it was back then Bay signed, and wins cost more money on the open market.
You might take a look at Granderson’s strikeout rate, and the fact that he’s been swinging more at pitches outside the zone, and want to run the other way. Toby Hyde did. But that’s just the natural process of aging, and last year was the first time Granderson swung at more pitches outside the zone than the league. And none of the comps in Hyde’s piece played center field, even at a scratch level, going into the seasons he’s covered.
Curtis Granderson is an athletic former center fielder that has been mostly healthy other than a couple bad hit-by-pitches that cost him much of last year. He fills a desperate need for the Mets, who don’t have great short- or long-term options at his position. Given his tools, he should age fairly gracefully. This deal isn’t a glaring overpay (beyond the fact that free agency is a tough place to get value), it won’t handcuff the team, and he’s projected to be an above-average player for two or three years. Why don’t people like it more?
The Brewers, Will Smith, and a Breakthrough.
One of baseball’s most compelling storylines during the 2013 season was the monster breakthrough campaign of Chris Davis. One of baseball’s most quietly hilarious storylines during the 2013 season was the very similar campaign of Khris Davis down the stretch. Last year, the Brewers didn’t have a whole lot going for them, but Davis shined rather unexpectedly, and the team liked what it saw. As an organization closer to rebuilding than contending, the Brewers want to see what Davis can do going forward, and with Carlos Gomez and Ryan Braun also around, it wasn’t hard to see coming that Norichika Aoki could end up on the outside looking in.
Aoki’s too old for a team like the Brewers, and he’s under contract only one more season. It made sense for them to try to ship him to a contender, and that’s precisely what they’ve done, as Aoki has joined the Royals. In Kansas City, Aoki should play more than he would’ve in Milwaukee, and he has a chance at seeing the playoffs. In exchange, the Royals gave the Brewers Will Smith. It’s a low-profile transaction, considerably lower-profile even than the earlier Dexter Fowler trade, but what makes the trade worth taking about are the signs of Smith’s progress as a young lefty.
To address the Kansas City side first: the front office is still at work, but for now, the outfield looks like Aoki, Alex Gordon, and Lorenzo Cain. What Aoki brings is some proven ability to rather consistently get on base, even if he doesn’t hit like he did in Japan. The Royals claim that Aoki will bat leadoff often, allowing Gordon to shift down in the lineup. These are little things, things baseball people talk about that don’t really seem to matter that much. Current outfield backups include Justin Maxwell, Jarrod Dyson, and David Lough. Just from a WAR perspective, it isn’t clear that Aoki is much better than any of them overall. This is, probably, a very small improvement. But it is an improvement, and Aoki is good at something few Royals are good at, and there’s nothing wrong with depth. It’s not like this is some kind of Dayton Moore disaster. Aoki is steady, predictable, and more than adequate.
And he’s super cheap, even on a one-year deal. His 2014 salary is just under $2 million, meaning he has a good amount of surplus value that the Royals can turn into flexibility. By getting someone at such a low cost, the Royals could conceivably still afford to make another significant upgrade. Reports suggest they’re trying. When you remember that teams trade for value more than they trade for player names, Aoki’s short-term value is pretty clear. He does a good amount for a little.
But the Brewers didn’t do poorly here, themselves. A week or two ago, Aoki rumors came up in a chat, and I figured the Brewers might be able to land a B-prospect. Will Smith isn’t a B-prospect, in that he’s got a lot of experience already in the majors, but he’s big-league ready, he’s under control for a long time, and there’s reason to be encouraged.
He’s a 24-year-old lefty who just had a good stretch out of a big-league bullpen. Yet the Brewers say he’s going to come to camp in February competing for a rotation slot. He was a starter into the middle of last season, when the Royals pushed him to the Omaha bullpen to prepare him to come up to the majors. It would be simple to say that Smith’s 2013 success came as a result of assuming an easier job. Indeed, relieving did help, just as it helps everybody. But before Smith moved to the bullpen, he was doing something out of the rotation he’d never done before.
He was striking batters out. Smith made just ten starts last year in triple-A, but over those starts he struck out more than a quarter of the hitters he faced. Previously as a starter, he was always around league average. A comparison of 2012 Smith to 2013 Smith as an Omaha starting pitcher:
Strikeout rate
2012: 19%
2013: 27%
Contact rate
2012: 81%
2013: 75%
The samples, of course, are fairly small, so there’s only so much you can do with them, but that’s a pretty big drop in contact rate allowed. It’s enough to grab your eye, and it’s enough to want to pursue. Unfortunately, it’s not entirely clear what Smith changed, if he changed anything, but there are clues. An article from spring training:
“The first two were so easy that I said, ‘Man, we’ve got to give him another one,’” Yost said. “He had all three of his pitches working today. Great downhill action on his fastball, really good changeup and a really good curve. He threw all three pitches for strikes.”
Actually, Smith referred to his breaking pitches as sliders.
“Me and Sal [catcher Salvador Perez] were on a pretty good page today. We usually are,” Smith said. “We were working first-pitch fastballs for the most part and I think all the strikeouts came on sliders. It’s still kind of a new pitch but not really. I’m starting to get a better feel for it and throw it for strikes. I like it.”
Slider or curveball, it worked.
“For me, curveballs,” Yost said. “Because we had opposing hitters telling our players that it was starting over the batter’s eye and then breaking down into the strike zone. So it was pretty impressive, whatever it was.”
In February, Smith suggested he was working on improving a slider. Ned Yost figured it was a curve, but here’s confirmation that, according to Smith, he throws both pitches:
‘The slider was working and the curveball, too,’ Smith said.
By PITCHf/x, the pitches aren’t real easy to separate. Further complicating matters is that almost all of Smith’s time in the majors in 2013 was spent in the bullpen, and relievers pitch differently than starters do. But from what we can tell, Smith did throw a lot more sliders this past season than he did the season before. Implied is that the slider was better. This is supported by digging into the splits, because while Smith improved, he really improved against lefties. Lefties get terrorized by sliders from lefties.
Against righties, Smith’s strikeout rates haven’t moved that much. In 2012, Smith struck out 20% of lefties in triple-A, and 17% of lefties in the majors. In 2013, he struck out 44% of lefties in triple-A, and 50% of lefties in the majors. We’ve got some really small sample sizes, but Aroldis Chapman last year struck out 50% of lefties in the majors, and that was the highest rate in baseball. Smith matched it over a handful of innings, and that speaks to a wipeout breaking pitch.
Smith doesn’t have an overpowering fastball, and with his repertoire in the past, he was fine and somewhat unremarkable. With what seems like a better slider this past season, Smith took a step forward as a starter before emerging as a quality big-league reliever. Already, what’s known is that he can relieve in the majors. What’s more likely than it was a year ago is that he can start in the majors. He needed to improve, and he made an improvement, even if he didn’t develop, say, a wonderful changeup.
Odds are Smith will be good against lefties in any role. Obviously, he’d be less dominant out of the rotation, but still effective enough. So it becomes a matter of what he can do against righties, but all he’d need to do is survive. If a lefty starter is good enough against lefties, he can scrape by. Joe Saunders has been doing it for years. Paul Maholm, too, has been doing it for years. They’re mediocre starters, but they’re decent and guys like this are somewhat valuable when they’re cheap. Smith right now might be a Saunders/Maholm type, and maybe he’s better than that against righties. So maybe he’s even a level or half-level above.
The ceiling is low, but Will Smith might now be a major-league starting pitcher. A back-of-the-rotation type, with possible no. 3 upside. That would be the magic of improving a breaking ball between seasons. And if the starter experiment doesn’t pan out, then the Brewers have a pretty good lefty reliever for a while, which is better than nothing. The nothing that Aoki would contribute to Milwaukee beyond 2014. It made sense to cash Aoki in for what the Brewers could get, and instead of a prospect, they got themselves immediate help, in some form or another. Immediate, cheap, and long-term help.
Aoki’s too old for a team like the Brewers, and he’s under contract only one more season. It made sense for them to try to ship him to a contender, and that’s precisely what they’ve done, as Aoki has joined the Royals. In Kansas City, Aoki should play more than he would’ve in Milwaukee, and he has a chance at seeing the playoffs. In exchange, the Royals gave the Brewers Will Smith. It’s a low-profile transaction, considerably lower-profile even than the earlier Dexter Fowler trade, but what makes the trade worth taking about are the signs of Smith’s progress as a young lefty.
To address the Kansas City side first: the front office is still at work, but for now, the outfield looks like Aoki, Alex Gordon, and Lorenzo Cain. What Aoki brings is some proven ability to rather consistently get on base, even if he doesn’t hit like he did in Japan. The Royals claim that Aoki will bat leadoff often, allowing Gordon to shift down in the lineup. These are little things, things baseball people talk about that don’t really seem to matter that much. Current outfield backups include Justin Maxwell, Jarrod Dyson, and David Lough. Just from a WAR perspective, it isn’t clear that Aoki is much better than any of them overall. This is, probably, a very small improvement. But it is an improvement, and Aoki is good at something few Royals are good at, and there’s nothing wrong with depth. It’s not like this is some kind of Dayton Moore disaster. Aoki is steady, predictable, and more than adequate.
And he’s super cheap, even on a one-year deal. His 2014 salary is just under $2 million, meaning he has a good amount of surplus value that the Royals can turn into flexibility. By getting someone at such a low cost, the Royals could conceivably still afford to make another significant upgrade. Reports suggest they’re trying. When you remember that teams trade for value more than they trade for player names, Aoki’s short-term value is pretty clear. He does a good amount for a little.
But the Brewers didn’t do poorly here, themselves. A week or two ago, Aoki rumors came up in a chat, and I figured the Brewers might be able to land a B-prospect. Will Smith isn’t a B-prospect, in that he’s got a lot of experience already in the majors, but he’s big-league ready, he’s under control for a long time, and there’s reason to be encouraged.
He’s a 24-year-old lefty who just had a good stretch out of a big-league bullpen. Yet the Brewers say he’s going to come to camp in February competing for a rotation slot. He was a starter into the middle of last season, when the Royals pushed him to the Omaha bullpen to prepare him to come up to the majors. It would be simple to say that Smith’s 2013 success came as a result of assuming an easier job. Indeed, relieving did help, just as it helps everybody. But before Smith moved to the bullpen, he was doing something out of the rotation he’d never done before.
He was striking batters out. Smith made just ten starts last year in triple-A, but over those starts he struck out more than a quarter of the hitters he faced. Previously as a starter, he was always around league average. A comparison of 2012 Smith to 2013 Smith as an Omaha starting pitcher:
Strikeout rate
2012: 19%
2013: 27%
Contact rate
2012: 81%
2013: 75%
The samples, of course, are fairly small, so there’s only so much you can do with them, but that’s a pretty big drop in contact rate allowed. It’s enough to grab your eye, and it’s enough to want to pursue. Unfortunately, it’s not entirely clear what Smith changed, if he changed anything, but there are clues. An article from spring training:
“The first two were so easy that I said, ‘Man, we’ve got to give him another one,’” Yost said. “He had all three of his pitches working today. Great downhill action on his fastball, really good changeup and a really good curve. He threw all three pitches for strikes.”
Actually, Smith referred to his breaking pitches as sliders.
“Me and Sal [catcher Salvador Perez] were on a pretty good page today. We usually are,” Smith said. “We were working first-pitch fastballs for the most part and I think all the strikeouts came on sliders. It’s still kind of a new pitch but not really. I’m starting to get a better feel for it and throw it for strikes. I like it.”
Slider or curveball, it worked.
“For me, curveballs,” Yost said. “Because we had opposing hitters telling our players that it was starting over the batter’s eye and then breaking down into the strike zone. So it was pretty impressive, whatever it was.”
In February, Smith suggested he was working on improving a slider. Ned Yost figured it was a curve, but here’s confirmation that, according to Smith, he throws both pitches:
‘The slider was working and the curveball, too,’ Smith said.
By PITCHf/x, the pitches aren’t real easy to separate. Further complicating matters is that almost all of Smith’s time in the majors in 2013 was spent in the bullpen, and relievers pitch differently than starters do. But from what we can tell, Smith did throw a lot more sliders this past season than he did the season before. Implied is that the slider was better. This is supported by digging into the splits, because while Smith improved, he really improved against lefties. Lefties get terrorized by sliders from lefties.
Against righties, Smith’s strikeout rates haven’t moved that much. In 2012, Smith struck out 20% of lefties in triple-A, and 17% of lefties in the majors. In 2013, he struck out 44% of lefties in triple-A, and 50% of lefties in the majors. We’ve got some really small sample sizes, but Aroldis Chapman last year struck out 50% of lefties in the majors, and that was the highest rate in baseball. Smith matched it over a handful of innings, and that speaks to a wipeout breaking pitch.
Smith doesn’t have an overpowering fastball, and with his repertoire in the past, he was fine and somewhat unremarkable. With what seems like a better slider this past season, Smith took a step forward as a starter before emerging as a quality big-league reliever. Already, what’s known is that he can relieve in the majors. What’s more likely than it was a year ago is that he can start in the majors. He needed to improve, and he made an improvement, even if he didn’t develop, say, a wonderful changeup.
Odds are Smith will be good against lefties in any role. Obviously, he’d be less dominant out of the rotation, but still effective enough. So it becomes a matter of what he can do against righties, but all he’d need to do is survive. If a lefty starter is good enough against lefties, he can scrape by. Joe Saunders has been doing it for years. Paul Maholm, too, has been doing it for years. They’re mediocre starters, but they’re decent and guys like this are somewhat valuable when they’re cheap. Smith right now might be a Saunders/Maholm type, and maybe he’s better than that against righties. So maybe he’s even a level or half-level above.
The ceiling is low, but Will Smith might now be a major-league starting pitcher. A back-of-the-rotation type, with possible no. 3 upside. That would be the magic of improving a breaking ball between seasons. And if the starter experiment doesn’t pan out, then the Brewers have a pretty good lefty reliever for a while, which is better than nothing. The nothing that Aoki would contribute to Milwaukee beyond 2014. It made sense to cash Aoki in for what the Brewers could get, and instead of a prospect, they got themselves immediate help, in some form or another. Immediate, cheap, and long-term help.
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What do I need to repeat myself? He won't finish his tenure of the contract in Seattle. I guarantee it.
You going to question me again bro, when in was telling you for over a year Dwight Howard was leaving the Lakers and you said I was crazy.
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old cano jerseys just became tino martinez jerseys
Nah, mine have 2008, 2010, 2011 All Star patches on them :x
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jewbacca
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JBJ
hope he comes on strong this year
That didn't work out so well last year.
mr marcus
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it's a 10 year contract.....with any player I'd take the odds that they wouldn't finish the contract out with that team
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You dimwit
. I isolated that part of what you said because I didn't understand why you wrote that Dominicans don't last in Seattle. Get over yourself.
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Mr.Guy
formerly timidtebow
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10 years 240 mil plus not state income tax in Washington. Robbie is winning.
DeadsetAce
Supporter
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JBJ
hope he comes on strong this year
That didn't work out so well last year.
no state income tax?!?!
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Mr.Guy
formerly timidtebow
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What are you laughing at???
no state income tax?!?!
Mr.Guy
formerly timidtebow
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"Cano agreed Friday to a 10-year, $240 million free-agent contract with the Mariners, as confirmed by FOX Sports’ Jon Paul Morosi. The deal ties Cano with Albert Pujols for the third-largest in baseball history.
no state income tax?!?!
"I can’t call Cano “dumb” for accepting such a contract, as I did Thursday night while the prospect was looming. For heaven’s sake, with no state income tax inWashington, the deal becomes that much more lucrative."
http://msn.foxsports.com/mlb/story/...new-york-yankees-jacoby-ellsbury-jay-z-120613
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