2016 MLB thread. THE CUBS HAVE BROKEN THE CURSE! Chicago Cubs are your 2016 World Series champions

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JumpmanFromDaBay said:
I have no idea what's wrong with Ryan Vogelsong :frown:
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Me either had to drop him off my fantasy roster a few weeks ago. I know he's usually a slow starter but something seems a little off this year .

My Braves just lost Johnny Venters for the year >: ... we gotta find a legit set up man now if we plan on holding off the Nationals :smh:
 
Darvish v. Verlander tonight. 
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Anyone else play Beat the Streak on MLB.com? One dude is at 43 games right now, he's 14 picks away from 5.6 million dollars :wow: :smokin
 
And when he loses it that close, he probably jumps off his apartment building.

I would, anyway. Luckily, I've only gotten up to 14.
 
I'm tipping my favor slightly in Yu's advantage for tonight's epic pitcher duel.

How is JV 4-3 with that minuscule ERA (rhetorical question). Unfair in comparison to the run support Teheran gets on the mound.
 
Great gesture displayed by Mike.

The ESPN article about Greg and his brother was mind blowing when I first read it. 
 
Speaking of which, that dude lost his streak today. :lol:

All you do is pick a player (or two - you can "double down") that you think will get a hit each day, in an attempt to top DiMaggio's 56. Do it and you win $5.6 million*. And there are a few smaller prizes along the way.

The game has been in existence for many years and the longest streak is 49.
 
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The 2013 Angels In a Nutshell.

8th inning, Angels lead the White Sox 4-2. Dane de la Rosa starts the inning.

Alejandro de Aza singles.
Alexei Ramirez singles.
Alex Rios strikes out.
Alejandro de Aza scores on a wild pitch.
Adam Dunn singles, Alexei Ramirez scores.

At this point, de la Rosa has lost the lead, and is pulled before the White Sox can do any further damage. Taking the hill is Michael Kohn, who has been among the Angels best bullpen arms so far this season.

Paul Konerko grounds out.
Conor Gillaspie walks.
Dayan Viciedo walks.

At this point, the bases are now loaded. The score is tied at 4-4. Jeff Keppinger is due to hit for the White Sox. Jeff Keppinger entered the day with a .185 batting average and a .182 on base percentage. His BA was higher than his OBP because, through 137 plate appearances, he had two sacrifice flies (which don’t count against your BA but do count against your OBP) and he had not yet drawn a walk. He didn’t walk in his first three trips to the plate either, so Keppinger was up to 140 plate walkless appearances to begin the season.

Bases loaded. Tie game. The batter at the plate has not drawn a walk all season.

Jeff Keppinger walks. White Sox 5, Angels 4.

Ladies and gentleman, the 2013 Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim.


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Matt Harvey and Doing It the Hard Way.

In a Friday matinee, the sensational Matt Harvey will take the mound for the Mets against the Cubs in Chicago. Though the Cubs are hardly to be considered a daunting opponent, Harvey’s right-handed, and the Cubs hitters to be worth a damn so far are the left-handed Anthony Rizzo, the left-handed Luis Valbuena, the left-handed Nate Schierholtz, and the left-handed David DeJesus. At a glance, you might figure this could be a tougher matchup for Harvey than it seems.

And it might well play out that way, because, baseball. The other day, after Dave Cameron ripped the Mariners for starting Raul Ibanez against CC Sabathia, Ibanez singled and homered. Hilarious! There’s absolutely not a single way to know how a given player is going to perform on a given day. Harvey might be aces, Harvey might be awful, or he might be somewhere in between. But if we’re going to think about the probability, we shouldn’t be worried about Harvey facing the Cubs’ lefties. Because to this point in his career, Harvey’s been doing something unusual.


Most everybody’s familiar with the concept of platoon splits, and most of those most understand that it can take some time for platoon splits to stabilize. An awful lot of time, in some cases, depending on the statistics you’re dealing with. Observed reverse platoon splits usually aren’t real reverse platoon splits on true talent. Hitters will generally be better against opposite-handed pitchers, and worse against same-handed pitchers. It’s important not to overreact to a small-sample platoon-split curiosity.

And Matt Harvey’s started only 18 games in the major leagues, facing 451 batters. Right away, we know it doesn’t matter what we look at — it’s going to have a small sample involved. But that doesn’t make the information meaningless, and things like strikeout rate stabilize faster than a lot of other things. Harvey, so far, has allowed a .247 wOBA to righties, and a .234 wOBA to lefties. That’s weird and exceptional. But it’s not just noise — the BABIPs are low for both. And the strikeouts are particularly notable.

Of 206 righties, Harvey has struck out 51, or 24.8%. That’s over his limited career. Of 245 lefties, Harvey has struck out 81, or 33.1%. One might also note that Harvey has walked six more righties than lefties despite the lower PA total, and all in all, Harvey is showing a hell of a split, in the other direction. A split based not only on wOBA, but also on more meaningful core statistics.

In case you’re dissatisfied, we also have some minor-league information on Harvey. We turn to Minor League Central, which offers Harvey splits for 2011-2012. Of 552 minor-league righties, Harvey struck out 115, or 20.8%. Of 488 minor-league lefties, Harvey struck out 153, or 31.4%. And again, Harvey had a slightly lower walk rate against lefties, too. We have more than two years of professional evidence that Matt Harvey could have a reverse platoon split, at least in terms of strikeouts.

If it’s pitch information you’re after, here’s a table you might appreciate:

Split Strike% Swing% Contact%
minors, RHB 60% 42% 79%
minors, LHB 64% 47% 70%
majors, RHB 62% 46% 78%
majors, LHB 66% 51% 71%

More strikes to lefties, more swings by lefties, less contact by lefties. The splits hold true, and now this is something to take seriously.

I was curious about the difference between Harvey’s strikeout rate against lefties and his strikeout rate against righties. The difference we have is 8.3 percentage points. I looked at everybody who has at least 50 innings pitched against both lefties and righties since 2008, then I narrowed the pool to only right-handed pitchers, then I narrowed the pool to only right-handed starters. I ordered by strikeout-rate difference, in the reverse-platoon direction. The top 5:

1.Matt Harvey, +8.3% against lefties
2.Miguel Gonzalez, +6.7%
3.Vance Worley, +5.5%
4.Mike Mussina, +5.2%
5.Gil Meche, +4.7%
Harvey beats everyone else, among his peer group. For whatever it’s worth, four right-handed relievers have shown a bigger difference, namely Jordan Walden, Ernesto Frieri, Scot Shields, and Kevin Gregg. Interestingly, all four have at least somewhat recently pitched for the Angels. The Angels would love to have Matt Harvey, too, but then the Angels would probably love to have any kind of half-decent starter. Like Ervin Santana, or Dan Haren.

Now, this is either a thing to celebrate or a thing to lament. Based on your perspective, Harvey is either performing incredibly well against lefties, or not well enough against righties. I can’t imagine anyone’s actually troubled, though, given the overall package, and we can wrap up with an attempted explanation. Righties get mostly fastballs and sliders from Harvey, with a few other pitches sneaking in when Harvey’s ahead. Lefties get mostly fastballs, curves, and changeups, and sliders creep into the picture when Harvey’s ahead. But this doesn’t say enough. Righties have made 83% contact against Harvey’s fastball. Lefties have made just 66% contact against the same pitch. Fastballs are supposed to be a pitcher’s most basic pitch, and Harvey’s is a putaway weapon.

Of Harvey’s 51 strikeouts of righties, 22 have come on his fastball and 18 have come on his slider. Of Harvey’s strikeouts of lefties, 48 have come on his fastball and 14 have come on his changeup. Below, look at a strikeout slider against a righty and a strikeout changeup against a lefty:

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But Harvey’s signature weapon is probably his high heat, which has just given lefties fits. It’s interesting that we’ve seen Frieri’s name, since he does the same thing with his fastball. This might be something to explore later on. But for now, we’ll settle for .gifs of pure unhittable gas:

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As with everything in baseball, a real explanation here would be complex. There’s a lot that’s gone into Matt Harvey establishing something of a reverse platoon split. It helps that he has a change and a curve, both of which are helpful against opposite-handed batters. The biggest key might well be Harvey’s high fastball, which might be an underrated weapon for righties against lefties, and for lefties against righties. And ultimately, even if the proposed explanation is way off, here’s what we know for certain: Harvey has had a weird, reverse platoon split. We see it in his minor-league numbers, too. Matt Harvey’s an interesting guy. Even more so than you probably already thought.


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Positional Case Study: Atlanta Braves Center Fielders.

This is a slightly different type of article. I will look at how a single franchise has filled a single spot on the diamond. The Braves have had a pretty good track record with center fielders, developing three of the top fifty center fielders of all time, Wally Berger (#46), Dale Murphy (#37), and Andruw Jones (#9).

But when they didn’t happen to draft or sign a historically good CFer, their approach became much more patchwork. Center field is one of the most important positions on the field, and one of the most difficult to fill. Here’s how the Braves did it.

Wally Berger was a really good player who happened to play for a lot of really bad Boston Braves teams in the 1930s. But I will focus on the last three decades or so. From 1980 to 1986, and half of 1989, the Braves’ primary center fielder was Dale Murphy, a charter member of the Hall of Very Good; from 1998 to 2007, it was Andruw Jones. For the other 17 seasons, they’ve had to make do.

In 1987, they started a CF-for-CF challenge trade streak that’s remarkable to recount in retrospect:

1.In January 1987, they traded Brad Komminsk (who’s now best remembered as a legendary tools bust) to Milwaukee for Dion James.
2.In mid-1989, they traded James to Cleveland for Oddibe McDowell.
3.(There were no challenge trades for the next few years. In 1991, they released McDowell, signed Deion Sanders, and traded C Jimmy Kremers and RHP Keith Morrison to Montreal for Otis Nixon.)
4.In 1994, they traded Sanders to the Reds for Roberto Kelly. (LHP Roger Etheridge also went to the Braves, but he never made the majors.
5.In 1995, the Braves traded Kelly to the Expos for Marquis Grissom. (OF Tony Tarasco and RHP Esteban Yan also went to the Expos, but neither amounted to much.)
6.In 1997, the Braves traded Grissom and right fielder David Justice to Cleveland for Kenny Lofton and lefty reliever Alan Embree.)
The next year, Andruw Jones was their center fielder until 2008.

From 1980 to 1986, the Braves got 33.5 WAR from center field, an average of 4.8 WAR a year. The Braves wouldn’t come close to that number for quite some time. Still, Dion James was quite good in 1987, as the full-time center fielder, and the Braves got 3.3 WAR from their center fielders that year.

But James turned back into a pumpkin in 1988. (There were a lot of players like that in the offensive explosion of ’87 and the collective hangover of ’88.) The Braves effectively had a center field-by-committee in 1988, and the Braves never quite solved the position. In addition to James’s uninspired play, poor performances were turned in by “Royal” Albert Hall, a late-70s Braves draftee; by Terry Blocker, acquired from the Mets for a PTBNL; Tommy Gregg, acquired from the Pirates for 3B Ken Oberkfell; and Jerry Royster, signed as an FA for what would be his final season. In all, the Braves got -1.8 WAR from center field that year.

It was so bad that Murphy, by then the full-time right fielder, shifted back to center field for the first half of 1989, until the Braves picked up McDowell. Oddibe was very good immediately after the trade, and the Braves got 3.1 WAR from center field that year.

But like James, McDowell’s bat turned cold the following season, so in 1990 the Braves turned to Ron Gant, who had come up as a stone-handed second baseman. Gant handled center field for most of 1990 and 1991, with a bit of Oddibe McDowell and free agent pickup Otis Nixon sprinkled in. Gant’s glove was iffy, though, and while it seemed to be decent enough in ’90 it took a turn for the worse the following year, so the Braves got 5 WAR from center field in 1990 but only 1.9 WAR in 1991.

Gant could really hit — he was a 30/30 man in both 1990 and 1991, when that really meant something — but he couldn’t really pick it in center. So, in 1992, Gant was mostly the left fielder, with Nixon splitting time in center field with new free agent pickup Deion Sanders. The same was true in 1993, and the fleet-footed and sure-gloved duo gave the Braves consistency up the middle, as the team got 5.9 WAR from center field in 1992, and 4.0 in 1993.

Sanders started as the full-time center fielder for the first two months in 1994, but by the end of May, the team felt like making a change. So they packaged him to Cincinnati for the beguiling Roberto Kelly, who appeared to have speed, power, and defense, and was an All-Star in 1992 and 1993. But the 29-year-old’s best years were behind him, and he never lived up to his 5-tool promise. He was only decent in the two and a half months before the baseball strike, and the Braves got 1.6 WAR out of center field in two-thirds of a season.

So the Braves traded Kelly to the team that finished ahead of them in the standings in the aborted 1994 season, the Expos. And they received Grissom, a free-swinger who had led the majors in steals in 1991 and 1992 and had been an All-Star in 1993 and 1994. He won the Gold Glove for the Braves in 1995, and more importantly, he caught the final out of the 1995 World Series, the first championship for the franchise since 1957 and the only one that it has won since moving to Atlanta in 1966.

Atlanta got 1.9 WAR in center field in 1995, largely because a BABIP-unlucky Grissom saw his batting average dip to .258 that year. Grissom’s BA rebounded in 1996, and the Braves got 4.7 WAR from CF that year.

Still, Braves GM John Schuerholz wanted to obtain the starting center fielder from the team he had beaten in 1995, so, the next offseason, he traded away two-thirds of his outfield, sending Grissom and often-injured right fielder David Justice to Cleveland for Kenny Lofton and reliever Alan Embree. Braves fans decried the trade, as Justice was one of the most popular players on the team, and while Lofton played quite well, he only played 122 games as a Brave, never fitting in the clubhouse. He departed as a free agent at the end of the year and immediately re-signed with Cleveland. Still, the Braves got 8.9 WAR from center field that year, because when Lofton wasn’t playing, the Braves could count on 20-year old wunderkind Andruw Jones, who spent most of the year in right field.

Jones played nearly every inning of nearly every game for the next decade and did so at a Hall of Fame level, as the Braves got 61.7 WAR from center field over a 10-year period, best in baseball. (The Cardinals were second, having had some very good years from Jim Edmonds, J.D. Drew, and the perennially underrated Ray Lankford.)

But the Braves did not have much of a plan for Jones’s departure. For 2008, the Braves traded reliever Joey Devine to Oakland for center fielder Mark Kotsay and salary relief. As was his wont, Kotsay played okay but was occasionally injured, and in August, they traded Kotsay to the Red Sox on waivers for a minor leaguer. Gregor Blanco and Josh Anderson played center in Kotsay’s absence. The Braves got just 2.5 WAR from CF that season: not a disaster, but nothing like what they were used to.

In 2009, the Braves handed the center field reins over to Jordan Schafer, a toolsy minor leaguer who played terribly before admitting that he had been hiding a wrist injury. So they traded for another center fielder, sending minor league outfielder Gorkys Hernandez and two pitching prospects to Pittsburgh for Nate McLouth. McLouth had been a fluky All-Star in 2008 and played okay for the rest of the year, but the Braves still got only 1 WAR from center field that year.

That offseason, the Braves traded pitcher Javier Vazquez to the Yankees for pitching prospect Arodys Vizcaino and Melky Cabrera, who was seen as an outfield tweener, with a glove better suited to a corner and a bat better suited for center. However, in 2010, McLouth and Cabrera were both sub-replacement level, and the Braves were caught in the same situation that they had faced in 1988. They played Gregor Blanco in center field, then packaged him with two relievers to the Kansas City Royals to obtain reliever Kyle Farnsworth and center fielder Rick Ankiel. In all, the Braves got -1.7 WAR from center field that year.

The 2011 season started out with more of the same, as McLouth continued to play poorly, and Schafer was awful in a callup. Finally, the Braves packaged him with three pitching prospects to the Astros for center fielder Michael Bourn. The Braves received 1.5 WAR from center field, largely thanks to Bourn. It was worst in the league, but still three wins better than the previous season.

Best of all, they had Bourn for all of 2012, and the 29-year-old had a career year, as the Braves received 5.6 wins from center field. Then, he departed for free agency, and the Braves did something that they had not done in the previous three decades: they opened their checkbook for a marquee center field free agent, bringing in B.J. Upton.

As you can see, the Braves did not like to pay top dollar for center field. Almost invariably they preferred to fill the position with a prospect or someone acquired by trade, with the exception of Deion Sanders. This may be because defense tends to be undervalued while offense tends to be overvalued, so the Braves could use their productive farm system to address their center field needs by patchwork, mostly choosing to acquire light- to average-hitting glove men like Nixon, Grissom, and Bourn. The most effective hitters in center field were almost invariably players the Braves had developed internally: Murphy, Gant, Jones.

The Braves of 1987 through 2011 probably would have traded for Denard Span rather than signing B.J. Upton. It is certainly possible that team strategy has changed, as many have written about the way that teams have begun hoarding prospects like never before, so it’s possible that the Braves’ trade-and-trade-some-more will need to change, too.

Upton was a departure for the Braves in many respects, the most expensive free agent the team has ever signed, and the first time in memory that the team has looked to fill center field from the free agent market. The ink has barely dried on his contract, so I shouldn’t make too much of his early-season struggles. But it is worth bearing in mind: if past history is any guide, there’s a chance that the Braves will try to solve their next hole in center field by trading Upton in 2016 or 2017.


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Climbing, With Jason Grilli.

There are a few different ways I could begin this post, and I can’t settle upon a best one, so you’re going to get them all. Prepare for a blitz of introductions. Jason Grilli was the fourth overall pick in the 1997 draft, and he was sent from the Giants to the Marlins in a trade for Livan Hernandez. He made his big-league debut for Florida in 2000, when he was 23 years old, and as a starter he worked 6.2 innings. In that one debut start, Grilli allowed more baserunners than he’s allowed so far in 2013 as the Pirates’ closer. As of Wednesday, he’s up to 16 saves.

Moving on. Every year, a handful of pitchers try to come back from existing completely off the radar. Most of them try to return and fail, but sometimes they succeed and make for improbable stories. A few years ago there was Ryan Vogelsong, and now there’s Scott Kazmir, who everyone previously assumed was never to be heard from again. Another guy trying to come back is Jeremy Bonderman, with the Mariners organization. He’s presently in Triple-A, and while he might not make it back to the majors, at least he knows a part of him is alive and well at the highest level. Because it was Bonderman who gave Jason Grilli some invaluable advice on developing and harnessing a slider.


Changing course. I might just make this whole post a disjointed assortment of introductions. Grilli landed with the Pirates in the middle of 2011, after he’d been pitching in Triple-A for the Phillies. The Phillies decided they didn’t have a spot for him in the bullpen, despite his statistical performance, so they allowed him to leave, and Grilli looked forward to a reunion with Clint Hurdle. While the Phillies did have a good bullpen that year, it wasn’t solid from top to bottom, and shortly thereafter they released Danys Baez. So they have that to regret. But while that looks like a major mistake in hindsight, Grilli’s move to Pittsburgh was such minor news at the time that Grilli broke it himself:

Black & Yellow! Black & Yellow! Black & Yellow! Cannot wait to join the new squadron.

— Jason Grilli (@GrillCheese49) July 20, 2011

And Grilli’s fallen in love with his situation. You can observe that here:

For the first time in career, he sees people in the stands wearing his jersey. The sight of a 40-foot banner outside PNC Park with his face on it stuns him.

“I’ve never felt this kind of love from a city,” Grilli said.

You can also observe it in the fact that Grilli stayed with the Pirates after being a free agent last offseason. He signed for two years and $6.75 million, turning down bigger offers from elsewhere. Grilli’s the closer in Pittsburgh, and he’s a nearly unhittable one, for cheap. Last October the Dodgers signed Brandon League to a three-year extension worth $22.5 million. There’s already talk of replacing him as closer with Kenley Jansen. League, all year, has seven strikeouts. Grilli has six strikeouts since Sunday.

I don’t know if I’ve yet made it clear that Jason Grilli is completely dominant. I know Dave Cameron likes to look at the leaderboards covering the past calendar year. Over the past calendar year, Grilli has struck out 38% of opposing batters. He’s posted a 2.11 FIP, slotting him between Jansen and Aroldis Chapman. Just this season, Grilli’s got an FIP of about half a run. He’s got baseball’s highest strikeout rate. He’s got CC Sabathia‘s walk rate. If you add up his ERA-, FIP-, and xFIP-, you get Tim Lincecum‘s career ERA-. He’s getting paid less than Yasiel Puig.

And making it all the more incredible is the course of Grilli’s development. Recall that he was drafted in 1997. Know that he’s 36 years old. Below, Grilli’s major-league strikeout rates since 2005, excluding 2010, which he missed because of a leg injury:

•2005: 7.9%
•2006: 11.5%
•2007: 17.6%
•2008: 21.4%
•2009: 23.1%
•2011: 26.4%
•2012: 36.9%
•2013: 43.3%
Granted, between 2005 and 2006, Grilli shifted to the bullpen. Granted, strikeout rates have been going up league-wide. But in case that doesn’t make Grilli’s progress clear, how about we look at this in a different way? Pitchers with similar strikeout rates to Grilli’s, by year:

•2005: Ryan Drese
•2006: Woody Williams
•2007: Peter Moylan
•2008: Will Ohman
•2009: Marc Rzepczynski
•2011: David Hernandez
•2012: Ernesto Frieri
•2013: Yu Darvish
As he’s gotten older, Grilli has figured out how to strike batters out. And his walks have actually gone down, despite the increase in deep counts. Jason Grilli has been climbing for a long time, and now he’s pitching like an All-Star closer for a Pirates team that might finally snap one of the most ignominious streaks in professional sports. The secret? There is no one secret, and if you ask Grilli, he’ll say that he just needed to get a good chance. He’s always had a live fastball, and years and years ago he ditched a curve in favor of a slider, which he still leans on today. This is what that slider looks like:

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Though Grilli is a fastball/slider righty reliever, he’s able to succeed against lefties, allowing him to serve as an effective closer. And while I can’t prove causation, it’s interesting to note that Grilli’s leap forward in 2011 correlates with a change in his slider’s movement. Thanks to Texas Leaguers, check out Grilli’s pitches between 2008-2009, and then his pitches since 2011:

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Ignore the slider/curveball distinction in the second graph. They’re all the same pitch. According to PITCHf/x, Grilli’s fastball now has about the same movement as it did in 2009. But his slider has three and a half more inches of horizontal movement, and four and a half more inches of sink. One notes that, between 2008-2009, Grilli threw 61% strikes. Since joining the Pirates, he’s thrown 66% strikes, generating a lot more swings. It stands to reason that Grilli’s different slider has made both his slider and his fastball better, and it also stands to reason that Grilli has made some improvements to his command. He’s still not a guy who consistently hits his spots, but the quality of his stuff is such that he can survive and thrive. His fastball spends a lot of time above the belt, which can be a dangerous area, but also a swing-and-miss area. Grilli’s technique these days is simple, but he’s mastered it, allowing him to become one of the premier relievers in the league.

It would be easy to use Jason Grilli as an example of why you shouldn’t pay too much for a closer. Better to use Brandon League as an example to demonstrate the same thing. That frees up Grilli to be used as an example of why baseball is amazing. About 16 years ago, Grilli was drafted in between Troy Glaus and Vernon Wells. And wouldn’t you know it, but he’s reaching his potential.


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Proshares said:
The 2013 Angels In a Nutshell.

8th inning, Angels lead the White Sox 4-2. Dane de la Rosa starts the inning.

Alejandro de Aza singles.
Alexei Ramirez singles.
Alex Rios strikes out.
Alejandro de Aza scores on a wild pitch.
Adam Dunn singles, Alexei Ramirez scores.

At this point, de la Rosa has lost the lead, and is pulled before the White Sox can do any further damage. Taking the hill is Michael Kohn, who has been among the Angels best bullpen arms so far this season.

Paul Konerko grounds out.
Conor Gillaspie walks.
Dayan Viciedo walks.

At this point, the bases are now loaded. The score is tied at 4-4. Jeff Keppinger is due to hit for the White Sox. Jeff Keppinger entered the day with a .185 batting average and a .182 on base percentage. His BA was higher than his OBP because, through 137 plate appearances, he had two sacrifice flies (which don’t count against your BA but do count against your OBP) and he had not yet drawn a walk. He didn’t walk in his first three trips to the plate either, so Keppinger was up to 140 plate walkless appearances to begin the season.

Bases loaded. Tie game. The batter at the plate has not drawn a walk all season.

Jeff Keppinger walks. White Sox 5, Angels 4.

Ladies and gentleman, the 2013 Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim.


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Going to the game tonight :x :smh: :rolleyes

will boo if necessary
 
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