The 2015 NBA Draft Thread: Draft Day Is Here

 
anyone got a list of the attendees?
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are these the same people that are in the back room for the actual drawing?
 
Enough is enough: It's time to abolish the NBA draft

The NBA draft system is broken.

Every season, 14 teams fail to make the playoffs. Roughly half of those teams start the next season with the intention of making the playoffs but then abandon ship once that goal seems unlikely.

Meanwhile, the other half of those 14 teams often will enter the season with full knowledge they have no chance to compete for a playoff berth, nor do they have a desire to. What could cause professional sports franchises, comprised of some of the most competitive people in the world, to stop competing midseason (or worse, never even start competing)? An incentive system that rewards ineptitude.

The draft gives teams an opportunity to acquire high upside talent in a virtually unilateral fashion: you draft a guy and he pretty much has to play for you, minus a few exceptions sprinkled throughout history. Because of this fact, teams that don't have a realistic shot at making the playoffs are given incentive to be as bad as possible in order to get to the front of the line for the talent handouts.

Instead of the draft being a means for down-on-their-luck teams to pull themselves out of their misfortune, it's turned into something that convinces teams to throw away entire seasons in exchange for priority boarding on "Air Superstar." And it's hardly a new phenomenon.

Thus, I've come up with a proposal on a plan I call the "Rookie Exception System."

But first, a little history and context about the lottery.

Brief history of the lottery

The draft lottery came into existence 30 years ago in 1985 because of the events of the prior season leading up to the 1984 NBA Draft. With a stacked incoming class, featuring Hakeem Olajuwon, Michael Jordan, and Charles Barkley, there was an extra incentive for franchises to make sure they had a chance to acquire this talent. In the old system, the two worst teams from either division would flip a coin to decide who would receive the No. 1 and No. 2 picks, and the rest of the draft was determined by reverse order of win-loss record.

That year, the Rockets (who already had drafted Ralph Sampson the year before with the No. 1 overall pick) lost 14 of their last 17 games to put themselves in a position to participate in the coin flip, which they won and ended up drafting Olajuwon.

The following year, the league instituted a simple lottery, which the seven non-playoff teams all had an equal chance of drawing the No. 1 overall pick. Five years later, the NBA introduced the weighted lottery to give more of an edge to teams with worse records. Then three years after that, the weights were adjusted to more heavily favor teams with worse records. Unwittingly, the league had just increased the incentive for teams to be as bad as possible rather than strive for success even in the face of missing out on the playoffs.

CBA and salary cap

Following the 1994 NBA draft class, in which No. 1 overall pick Glenn Robinson signed a 10-year, $68 million before ever suiting up for the Milwaukee Bucks, the NBA created the rookie scale, which would ensure that incoming first-round picks had to "earn their dues" before being eligible for bigger paydays. In an effort to protect veterans, the rookie scale instantly made high lottery picks even more valuable, not only did a draftee have to play for the team that drafted him, but they'd be grossly underpaid.

The original rookie scale contract was three years long, and players could sign extensions after their second year. In 1999, the rookie scale added a fourth year, meaning players couldn't sign extensions until after their third season.

The final CBA stroke was the implementation of the luxury tax in 2005, penalizing teams for spending above the tax threshold, making this "cheap skilled labor" even more valuable. The combination of having (a) draftees beholden to negotiating with only one team, (b) underpaying them for their troubles, (c) keeping them underpaid for a longer period and (d) avoiding financial penalties made first-round picks infinitely more valuable.

The problem

When you combine financial ramifications with effects of the weighted draft lottery, you can see very strong incentives for non-competitive teams to amass talent through the draft over any other means. Why is that an issue? Here's why

1. Any time a team is actively trying to not win, the NBA is failing to serve its fans. The best case scenario from this is the league ends up driving away fans from being invested in the product. The worst case is scenes like we saw in the last week of the 2014-15 season, where New York Knicks fans bemoaned their team defeating the Atlanta Hawks, owners of the best record in the East, because it hurt the Knicks' odds of getting the No. 1 overall pick.

2. It makes it hard to differentiate between teams trying to do this on purpose and mismanaged teams that just aren't good (I like to call this the "I meant to do that defense"). The draft supplies endless lifelines and excuses for bad GMs to keep stringing along the franchise, hoping that one of their decisions finally hits.

The proposal

Get rid of the draft. Not just the lottery, not the coin flip....just get rid of it altogether. We have to shift the incentive system to sound management principles and franchise building that has vision and purpose. That can't happen as long as we offer free whiffs at top tier talent by virtue of being terrible in the prior season.

Turn draft season into a rookie free agency period. Each team will have a rookie salary exception at its disposal. Teams would be free to negotiate with any incoming rookie player during this period, and can choose whether to use their entire exception on one player, or divide it among several players (as long as they each draw at least league minimum salary).

Inevitably, bad teams will decry the advantage good teams have, so we can weight the system can and size of the exception by reverse-order of season-ending standings, with non-playoff teams receiving the highest 14 exceptions. Below is an example of how this year's rookie exception distribution would work, with the current rookie scale salaries for the corresponding draft position listed for the sake of comparison.

View media item 1540472
Notice how the rookie exceptions are more heavily weighted towards the top of the draft; this is to account for the diminishing talent level the further down the traditional draft we go. In other words, we're still giving the worst teams the best financial device to lure the talent (money available), but they still have to convince players to sign there. For example, a team like the Knicks can offer a player like D'Angelo Russell $800,000 more than the Sixers can, but maybe Russell thinks the Philadelphia 76ers to be a team with clearer direction and vision, not to mention a style of play that he finds more amenable. It would be on the Knicks to convince him that signing with them comes with more perks than just more money.

Players have more choice in the matter, and teams should have to work hard to gain their services.

Will there be players who'll rather play for Miami for $2.2 million than in Detroit for $2.5 million? Of course, but the idea is that as a team like Miami signs better talent, they'll improve and eventually get smaller exceptions. In other words, while forgoing $300,000 in exchange for a more scenic location is an easy decision. You'll see very few, if any, prospects make that same switch from, say, the Detroit Pistons to the Los Angeles Clippers, who could only offer about $800,000 versus the Pistons' $2.5 million. Remember: most draftees have never seen a dime of professional pay. In most cases, the need to secure their financial future will outweigh the need to live by the beach.

Another likely objection will be the idea that this system favors successful teams. That's the idea! Players want to be on winning teams. The system should encourage teams to try to build winners.

But players also want playing time, so the argument that a top-5 talent will sacrifice money in order to play for the Golden State Warriors doesn't take into account he probably won't play much for because of the Warriors' stacked roster. Since playing time is the best marketing campaign for a future contract, it wouldn't make sense to sacrifice current dollars just to get into a situation that will dampen your chances at playing time and future dollars.

The beauty of the rookie exception system is that it keeps in place many of the features of the current draft like trading futures, including protections, while not guaranteeing anything. For example, the Hawks and Nets have a pick swap this year; in the rookie exception system, they'd have an exception swap, with Atlanta having $1.6 million to spend versus Brooklyn's $777,453. Atlanta should be rewarded for pulling one over on the Nets, but that doesn't guarantee they'll be able to convince a player to sign there.

What this system does is quickly separate savvy front offices from bumbling ones. You'll know right away which teams struggle to build attractive enough situations to get players to sign with them, especially if they leave money on the table. Inept general managers will have nowhere to hide when their teams are perennially in the top of the exception list and are unable to make anything happen with that pile of cash.
http://insider.espn.go.com/nba/draft2015/insider/story/_/id/12912177/nba-draft-abolish-draft

I like this idea.
 
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I just know the Thunder are gonna pull off the upset and get a Top 3 pick. Randomly end up in the lottery for the first time in six years. I just know it's happening.
 
D'Angelo Russell will be drafted high, but some teams have questions

Kurt Helin May 19, 2015, 2:45 PM EDT

D’Angelo Russell doesn’t have doubts — he says he’s the best player in this draft.

NBA teams, some of them have doubts.

Russell is a top talent who is a lock to go top five in the NBA draft (likely top three) — he impressed me the first time I saw him play at the Adidas Nations tournament before his senior year of high school. He’s a big guard at 6’5″ and the guy can score — he scored 9.3 points a game at Ohio State, hitting 41 percent from three. And that’s not even what scouts like best about him, as Chris Mannix of Sports Illustrated noted out of the recent NBA Draft Combine in Chicago.

Here’s what executives love about Russell: His passing. Russell has superior size, but it’s his ability to read defenses that stands out. Russell averaged 2.9 turnovers per game last season. Study the tape though, and watch how many picture-perfect fastballs bounced off teammates’ hands because they weren’t expecting them. Russell’s greatest strength is seeing a play develop before it happens.

But there are doubters as well.

Here’s what execs don’t love about Russell: His athleticism. More specifically, his lack of it. Russell is not a dynamic athlete. He doesn’t have the explosion of Emmanual Mudiay, the draft’s other top playmaking prospect. A common question is how Russell will handle more athletic opponents defensively.

Among the doubters, count PBT’s draft expert Ed Isaacson of Rotoworld and NBADraftBlog.

“I’m not as high on him as a lot of people. A lot of teams have found ways to be successful in pretty much stopping him — in all aspects, whether it be distributing the ball or scoring…. In games against the top 60 we’re talking about a guy who was shooting 36-37 percent, even less from three, was getting his assists but also was turning the ball over a lot more…. On the bright side, in a big spot he wants the ball, very aggressive, always looking to make something happen.”

There are players and point guards who thrive in the NBA without elite athleticism — if you can see the play developing and make the right reads your feel for the game will be enough. Plus with his size you can play Russell at the two guard spot at times.

But the questions are out there, there is not a consensus on what his ceiling will be. The Sixers reportedly love him; other teams are not as sold.

He’ll get drafted behind the two big men — Karl Anthony Towns and Jahlil Okafor — but whether he falls any farther depends on the outcome of the Draft Lottery Tuesday night. Is the GM of the team drafts third a believer or not?


http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports....stions/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter
 
From that PBT article:


“... A lot of teams have found ways to be successful in pretty much stopping him — in all aspects, whether it be distributing the ball or scoring…. In games against the top 60 we’re talking about a guy who was shooting 36-37 percent, even less from three, was getting his assists but also was turning the ball over a lot more…. On the bright side, in a big spot he wants the ball, very aggressive, always looking to make something happen.”


Sums up my feelings on Russell on May 19th, 2015.

Big Ten basketball is a primary focus of mine because of the Gophers, and in the 12-15 games I saw of his between the Big Ten conference season/Big Ten tournament, he seemed to always shy away against premier competition and then play his best against weaker opponents.
 
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As long as Russell can consistently shoot well he should be good ...if not , the track record for big pg's who aren't that athletic isn't pretty
 
 
tbh, her and her trash music was bad luck for the franchise.

Hopefully Vlade changes this.
I care not about any of those things..

sit there, look pretty.. hell, say or do  something stupid for my entertainment.. that's where my interest lie
 
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As long as Russell can consistently shoot well he should be good ...if not , the track record for big pg's who aren't that athletic isn't pretty


Is the poor track record for non-athletic PG's as of late caused by that specific style no longer working? I don't think it is.

The 2008 NBA Draft began the new breed of PG imo, with two top-5 picks Derrick Rose (No. 1) and Russell Westbrook (No. 4) becoming beacons for a new wave of PG to be geared and primed into the next decade and beyond; a wave of young kids who are watching Rose win the NBA MVP three years later, and Westbrook make the Finals four years later.

A higher frequency of that sort of player + reaffirmation of the style with the success of those carrying the torches early on.... it's no wonder we're seeing less of the non-athletic PGs, because what kids see and who/what they choose to model themselves after is what they see growing up. (For example, as NTers: What style of player were you when you played? I'm sure there was a certain player in the 1990s or 2000s that you said you were like or tried to emulate). It's natural. You see something you like, you model yourself after that.

I don't think that means we're in a time where non-athletic PGs, and the infrequency of non-athletic PGs, means that that style or a player with that style is without merit. It's possibly more valuable.
 
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