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[h1]2010-11 Forecast: G.S. Warriors[/h1]By John Hollinger
ESPN.com
Archive
[h3]2009-10 Recap[/h3]
Relax, Golden State Warriors fans -- your long nightmare is nearly over.
While the product on the court remains as incoherent as ever, Warriors fans can rejoice in the news that owner Chris Cohan will sell the team to a group headed by former Boston Celtics minority owner Joe Lacob and movie producer Peter Guber.
Under Cohan, the Warriors were run as badly as any team in basketball, making the lottery 15 times in 16 years. That's difficult to do in a sport in which more than half the teams in each conference qualify for the postseason. In fact, the Warriors never finished in the top half of the Western Conference standings while Cohan owned the team.
[h4]HOLLINGER'S '09-10 STATS[/h4]
W-L: 26-56 (Pythagorean W-L: 30-52)
Offensive Efficiency: 105.4 (14th)
Defensive Efficiency: 109.4 (29th)
Pace Factor: 102.7 (1st)
Highest PER: Monta Ellis (16.74)
While it produced an exciting, up-tempo brand of basketball on the court -- albeit one with an almost masochistic inattention to defense -- the Cohan-era Warriors organization was renowned for picking feuds with their best players, trading them away for pennies on the dollar, then starting the whole process anew with the next generation of high draft picks that their consistently awful records earned them.
So it was nice to see Cohan's ownership tenure come full circle last season. A misadventure that began with Chris Webber's dismissal a decade and a half earlier ended when Stephen Jackson played the owner and his inept minion, team president Robert Rowell, like a Stradivarius.
After roping them into a completely unnecessary (and certainly unwise) three-year, $28 million extension -- a deal Rowell concocted without any input from the basketball people -- Jackson demanded a trade less than a year later. Nine games into the season the Warriors obliged by dealing Jackson to Charlotte, in a salary dump that returned no players of value.
Head coach Don Nelson proved equally adept at bamboozling the front office, essentially mailing in the season after inking an extension of his own a year earlier. The new owners forced him out just before training camp, handing him $6 million to walk off into the sunset. Prior to the change, Nelson had effectively won control of the front office too, with long-time chum Larry Riley landing the general manager position after Nelson and Rowell forced out Chris Mullin.
[h4]Fastest Pace, 2009-10[/h4][table][tr][th=""]Team[/th][th=""]Pace[/th][/tr][tr][td]Golden State[/td][td]102.7[/td][/tr][tr][td]Indiana[/td][td]99.4[/td][/tr][tr][td]Minnesota[/td][td]98.5[/td][/tr][tr][td]Phoenix[/td][td]97.9[/td][/tr][tr][td]Denver[/td][td]97.3[/td][/tr][tr][td]League avg.[/td][td]95.1[/td][/tr][/table]
Under Nelson, the Warriors continued to be one of the most bizarre teams in league annals. His zest for small lineups was insatiable, to the point that Corey Maggette and Reggie Williams often appeared at power forward, and his squad played a ridiculously fast tempo (see chart). Not only did they use more than three possessions more per game than any other team, but the Warriors played a faster tempo than any NBA team in the past 18 seasons. You have to go back to Golden State's 1991-92 squad -- during Nelson's first run with the Warriors -- to find a team that played faster.
The more amazing feat was Golden State's inability to rebound. The Warriors played the league's fastest pace in two decades and still finished dead last in rebounds. Chew on that fact for a second and you'll get a perspective on how incredibly awful they were on the glass.
[h4]Worst Offensive Rebound Rate, 2009-10[/h4][table][tr][th=""]Team[/th][th=""]Off. Reb. Rate[/th][th=""]Def. Reb. Rate[/th][th=""]Overall[/th][/tr][tr][td]Golden State[/td][td]20.9[/td][td]68.5[/td][td]44.4[/td][/tr][tr][td]Indiana[/td][td]21.6[/td][td]73.0[/td][td]47.1[/td][/tr][tr][td]New York[/td][td]23.5[/td][td]72.1[/td][td]47.4[/td][/tr][tr][td]New Jersey[/td][td]25.1[/td][td]71.8[/td][td]47.4[/td][/tr][tr][td]New Orleans[/td][td]24.8[/td][td]73.8[/td][td]48.9[/td][/tr][tr][td]League avg.[/td][td]26.3[/td][td]73.7[/td][td]50.0[/td][/tr][/table]
Golden State was the worst team in both offensive rebound rate and defensive rebound rate; combine the two and the Warriors' overall rebound rate was so atrocious that it actually skewed the averages for the rest of the league -- 18 teams finished above the league average because the team at the bottom was so far below the norm.
The Warriors ended up with an impossibly bad rebound rate of 44.4; the difference between Golden State and No. 28 New York was greater than the difference between New York and the league average.
According to our friends at Elias, in fact, the Warriors were the worst rebounding team in history. Golden State had a -792 rebound differential last season; the previous worst was -789 by the Golden State team of 1989-90. That team also posted the previous worst rebound rate, based on available stats, at 44.7. You'll never guess who the coach was. While the Warriors can justifiably blame some of the slippage on a slew of frontcourt injuries, they often went small by choice and built a roster that would have been weak on the boards even at full strength.
Rebounding was the greatest anomaly with Golden State, but not the only one. Considering the small lineups and the fast pace, it's perhaps no surprise they were No.1 in forcing turnovers. Of course, this was also partly a symptom of the rebounding -- all those second shots gave Golden State extra opportunities to end possessions with turnovers. An even greater component was likely a mental one: The Warriors knew a turnover was their best shot at regaining possession, and thus focused their efforts on that possibility.
The other unusual aspect of last season's Warriors was a positive one. As badly run as the Warriors have been in other respects, they've been unbelievable at finding talent in the D-League. In addition to the play of recent call-ups like C.J. Watson and Kelenna Azubuike, Golden State discovered two more rotation players last season with Anthony Tolliver and Reggie Williams. Tolliver left as a free agent, but Williams should be a key player this coming season.
Unfortunately, it appears Rowell will too. Lacob's ownership won't be approved until October, which is likely too late to make a sharp change in direction for the coming season. Thus, long-time Nelson assistant Keith Smart will be coaching the team in Nelson's place, and we may not see any dramatic shifts in style of philosophy. Warriors fans will likely get one final taste of the bad old days in a series of 128-118 defeats before the rebuilding begins.
Amazingly, the term "Warriors fans" is still plural. Despite the mockery the Cohan regime made of their basketball team, Bay Area fans have spent the past two decades enthusiastically supporting the local cellar-dwellers. Imagine how enthusiastically they'll support the team if the new owners actually know what they're doing.
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[h3]Offseason Moves[/h3]
With a sale on the horizon, Golden State had a conservative offseason, letting a few players move on and making only one major addition in forward David Lee.
Let Anthony Tolliver leave, drafted Ekpe Udoh. I wasn't crazy about Udoh, especially with the sixth overall pick. He's ancient for a rookie (23) and his offensive skills are fairly limited; the four players taken after him all seemed to offer much more upside, most notably seventh pick Greg Monroe. We won't know much about Udoh for a while as he tore a ligament in his wrist during summer league and will miss half of the season.
Traded Corey Maggette and a second-round pick to Milwaukee for Charlie Bell and Dan Gadzuric. The Warriors were so anxious to clean up their books that they shipped out Maggette, one of the league's most productive scorers last season, in exchange for a pair of deadweight contracts. They even threw in a second-round pick for their trouble. The deal saves $10 million in 2012-13 and $6 million in 2011-12, but actually increases the Warriors' salary burden by $1.6 million for the current season. As for on-court value, forget it -- both players are well past their primes.
Acquired David Lee in six-year, $80 million sign-and-trade for Anthony Randolph, Ronny Turiaf, Kelenna Azubuike and a 2011 second-round pick. The biggest move of Golden State's offseason was curious on one level: Lee is a terrible defensive player and one of the Warriors' biggest weaknesses last year was their defense. However, he is an excellent rebounder, which is really attractive when you're the worst rebounding team in history. The trade also continues the Warriors' history of eating their young; just two years earlier the team relentlessly hyped Randolph.
Nonetheless, Lee offers a solid building block if Nelson can resist the urge to play him at center. His defensive shortcomings are less glaring as a power forward, and his abilities as a pick-and-roll partner for Stephen Curry can shine.
Signed-and-traded Anthony Morrow to New Jersey for a conditional second-round pick. What's with this move? Morrow is a young player and one of the league's best shooters, and he wasn't going to cost much. Instead the Warriors walk away with a $2 million trade exception that they'll likely never use. New Jersey owes the draft pick only if the Nets finish with one of the league's five best records, so that part is essentially worthless.
Signed Dorell Wright for three years, $11 million. Wright was a good value signing after a solid year in Miami, and he provides the Warriors with a legitimate small forward who can defend and score a little. Of course, there's a 50-50 chance that Nelson plays him at power forward all year, which would take most of the steam out of this move.
Signed-and-traded C.J. Watson to Chicago for a second-round pick. Watson was a valuable player whom the Warriors plucked from the depths of the D-League, but he was fairly determined to leave. Golden State doesn't get much in return -- the pick is the worse of Utah's pick or Phoenix's and probably will be around 50th, plus a $1.8 million trade exception.
Signed Jeremy Lin for two years, minimum. An undrafted free agent who played well in summer league, Lin is likely to be the backup point guard. Even after adjusting for the low competition level at Harvard, his statistical performance was strong enough that he should have been drafted, so the summer performance doesn't seem like a fluke. Only the first year of the deal is guaranteed.
Signed Rodney Carney for one year, veteran's minimum. An outstanding late summer move for a player who has been undervalued and should thrive in the Warrior's open-court system. Carney can fly up and down the court and is a halfway decent long-range shooter; it's all the other stuff that has held him back. In Golden State they don't worry about the other stuff.
Signed Louis Amundson for two years, $5 million. Another plank in the Warriors' offseason platform of rebounding, Amundson was a good value pickup who should provide a strong backup power forward until Ekpe Udoh is ready to contribute. Additionally, he's proven adept in the up-tempo game as an undersized energy player.
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[h3]Biggest Strength: Pick-and-roll[/h3]
If there's one reason to watch the Warriors next season, it's to see the two-man game between Curry and Lee -- something that should be the staple of Golden State's offense for the next half-decade. If this combo isn't quite in the Nash-to-Stoudemire class, it isn't too far away.
Curry showed an advanced understanding of how to operate the play even as a rookie, and he was mostly delivering the rock to the likes of Chris Hunter and Anthony Tolliver. Similarly, Lee put up huge numbers as the dive man on that play while pairing with the relatively unthreatening Chris Duhon.
Putting the two together puts defenses in a bind -- nobody wants to leave Curry because of his sweet jumper, but letting Lee receive a pass on the move is basically a lay-up drill. All the attention those two draw should make life a lot easier for Golden State's secondary players.
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[h3]Biggest Weakness: Bench[/h3]
One is tempted to say "defense" or "rebounding," but the second unit may be an even greater concern. Golden State had a very deep team a season ago, but the roster atrophied over the summer with the departures of Turiaf, Randolph, Azubuike, Tolliver, Watson, Morrow and Maggette.
The replacements aren't nearly as good, and a result the bench right now consists of two players -- Williams and Amundson -- who played effectively last season. In Williams' case, it's not exactly a lengthy résumé either. Lin is an undrafted rookie, Brandan Wright missed all of last season and doesn't appear to be a favorite of the coaching staff, Udoh is out for half the season, and Radmanovic, Bell and Gadzuric all produced well below replacement-level output last season. Carney has had his moments, but even he has been barely above replacement-level the past two seasons.
As a result, the Warriors will have subpar production from the backup center spots and both backcourt reserve positions, especially since whomever plays backup center (David Lee? Brandan Wright? Amundson?) will be giving up pounds and inches, as required in the Golden State operator's manual.
Adding to the worry, one wonders about the starting five's ability to stay intact. Ellis, Biedrins and Dorell Wright have missed large chunks of playing time over the past two seasons. Cross one of them out and the bench disadvantage becomes more dire.
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[h3]Outlook[/h3]
The one thing the Cohan group managed not to screw up was the salary cap situation. Or rather, they screwed it up but then stripped the roster by trading Jackson, Maggette, Randolph, Turiaf, Azubuike, Watson and Morrow, so that the future cap situation is now tenable. For that reason, the Warriors should be able to rebuild relatively quickly from their current base.
Unfortunately, this season is likely to be a wash. Nelson is gone but his assistant Smart may not change much, and his one head-coaching gig (9-31 as Cleveland's interim coach in 2003) was a train wreck. Curry and Lee promise to be a fantastic pick-and-roll combo, but the worry remains that Ellis will be a destructive offensive force. They'll be a halfway decent rebounding team this time around, but defense is a dirty word in these parts and the bench is terrible.
I could see the Warriors getting good very quickly in the post-Cohan, post-Nelson era, because they have some very solid building blocks, have a good cap situation, and will be an attractive free-agent destination. I just don't see it happening this season.
[h3]Prediction: 32-50, 3rd in Pacific Division, 12th in Western Conference[/h3]
