All of the Game 1s are now in the books, and for many fans (and some players), it seems like their series will be over quickly. However, no matter how lopsided a victory, both winning and losing coaching staffs are immediately breaking down film of what happened and making adjustments accordingly.
It is this chess match that makes playoff basketball so different from the regular season. Because teams have more time on their hands and only one opponent in their crosshairs, they can adjust and anticipate adjustments and readjust again in an endless ballroom dance of X's and O's.
Here are some adjustments we might see from the Clippers and Grizzlies, both Game 1 losers in their respective series.
Los Angeles Clippers: Make Curry exclusively a scorer
Los Angeles is rightfully worried about Stephen Curry's shooting ability, so they've made it a priority to force the ball out of his hands. The Warriors anticipated the Clippers' aggressive trapping of Curry in pick-and-roll situations and managed to exploit it by taking advantage of the other passers on the roster.
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In the screenshot above, the Warriors are running a variation of a play we ran with great success when I was in Phoenix called "Fist Up Short." It's a high pick and roll in which the ball handler comes off and hits a third player on the lane line, who then hits the rolling screen setter. Notice how high this pick is set (almost half court), and yet Griffin still is aggressively hedging the screen; that's a testament to Curry's range. Curry finds Harrison Barnes as he comes off the screen, who then hits the rolling David Lee, who has a ton of space (thanks to the high hedge) to drive in for the layup.
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This play is made possible by three things: the Clippers' respect for Curry, Barnes' ability to make a simple bounce pass into space and Lee's ability to catch, put the ball on the floor and make a play. If Jordan overcommits to Lee, then Jermaine O'Neal is wide open for a point-blank shot. If J.J. Redick cracks back to prevent that, then Klay Thompson is wide open in the corner for a 3. It is the truest form of "pick your poison."
As counterintuitive as this might sound, the Clippers might have to live with allowing Curry to shoot more. By hedging hard on such a high pick, they leave themselves extremely vulnerable by giving Golden State too much space. Even with perfect secondary and tertiary rotations, the Clippers are most likely conceding a wide-open layup or 3 so long as the Warriors have the personnel to execute. These breakdowns not only give confidence to the opponents' offense ("everyone has it going" vs. just Curry), but they shake the defense's confidence in its own schemes. You start to see more freelancing and gambling, as players take it upon themselves to stop what's happening, but that just leads to more breakdowns and more open shots.
By hedging less aggressively, you are opening yourself up to Curry getting some "looks" (I use the quotations because for a normal human being, these still aren't wide-open looks) and heating up, but if you can keep everyone else in check, it might be worth it. I've often cited the Warriors' amazing win percentage whenever Curry posts 10-plus assists (55-17 lifetime, .763), but even when he doesn't get credit for the assist (like the play above), Golden State is tough to beat.
Meanwhile, over the last two seasons (playoffs included), the Warriors are 75-35 (.682) when Curry attempts fewer than 20 field goal attempts and only 27-32 (.45
when he attempts 20 or more. We used to see teams take this same strategy against Steve Nash: take away his playmaking, make him exclusively a scorer.
Memphis Grizzlies: Attack OKC's size disadvantage
When the Thunder go small, with Serge Ibaka at center and Kevin Durant, Caron Butler or even Nick Collison at power forward, they flourish. Yet for some reason, Thunder coach Scott Brooks has an affinity for running a traditional lineup with Kendrick Perkins at center.
Much of Oklahoma City's fourth quarter (including its decisive 13-1 run) featured Butler, Durant and Ibaka along the front line. Memphis, in turn, responded by fielding its own small lineup, which of course plays to OKC's strength and Memphis' weakness. In Game 2, the Grizzlies need to force OKC out of small lineups by punishing them under the boards.
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In the above screenshot, Collison is attempting to defend a Zach Randolph post-up, while Durant is matched up against Kosta Koufos. Randolph's prowess on the block, along with his marked size advantage on Collison, attracts the attention of all five OKC players (notice how open Beno Udrih is in the corner and how easily Tony Allen can screen off Butler, who has lost track of Mike Miller). Koufos has a height and weight advantage on Durant, but he has something else that Durant doesn't: the instincts of a big.
Although you can critique his timing, by aggressively ducking in on Durant, Koufos has done two things: he's sealed excellent position in the paint for a drop-off, and he's screened off the help defense from the baseline (you can also argue that because of Reggie Jackson's gamble, he's also created the open look for Udrih). Durant's slender frame makes it tough for him to prevent this sort of cut by Koufos, but more importantly, his reaction time is slower because, as a wing, he's not as accustomed to having to fight that cut. It's a small adjustment, but it changes the tenor of the big vs. small lineup matchup.
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In this screenshot, Collison is matched up against Randolph again and the rookie Steven Adams is defending Marc Gasol. While this isn't technically a small lineup, it serves as a great illustration of how Memphis can take advantage of the size differences. As Randolph drives, Adams sags to the front of the rim to help. Gasol knows this and gives a well-timed shove, thrusting Adams under the basket, preventing him from effectively contesting Randolph's shot, but also removing him as a rebounding threat. Gasol obviously profited from the inexperience of Adams, but this is something that can easily be done against smaller, more alert opponents.
Both of these examples show how Memphis can punish OKC for going small, and force Brooks to make the type of substitution he's already pining for: to put Perkins back in the game, even though that plays in the Grizzlies' favor.
