2016 MLB thread. THE CUBS HAVE BROKEN THE CURSE! Chicago Cubs are your 2016 World Series champions

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Cuddyer retiring is big for the Mets, saving about $12.5M right?

Why the incredible Class of 2018 will change MLB as we know it

Teams have committed about $1.3 billion to free agents this offseason, and that’s before Chris Davis and Justin Upton and Yoenis Cespedes and Alex Gordon and Johnny Cueto by themselves push the total to nearly $2 billion. All said, baseball is going to smash its free agent record of around $1.9 billion set in 2013 by many hundreds of millions of dollars.
All of this is merely a placeholder in the record book, because the revolution is coming, and people across front offices are equally excited and horrified by it, even though it’s not for another three years. There is a historic confluence of talent and money coming, and it’s going to influence every single move of consequence made not just today but following the 2016 and ’17 seasons, too.

The free agent Class of 2018, as it stands, is a collection of players so good it seems impossible one market could absorb them all at once. Both MVPs from this season, Bryce Harper and Josh Donaldson, will hit free agency after the 2018 season. So can the greatest pitcher of this generation, Clayton Kershaw, along with the current American League Cy Young winner (Dallas Keuchel), two of the finest arms in the big leagues (Jose Fernandez and Matt Harvey) and the pitcher who just signed the biggest-money contract ever for a pitcher (David Price).

Like Kershaw and Price, Jason Heyward in 2018 can opt out of the deal he agreed to Friday for $185 million. Don’t like him in the outfield? Andrew McCutchen and Adam Jones will be available. Prefer an infielder? Manny Machado will be there and, like Harper and Fernandez, will be just 26 years old. If Heyward gets multiple $200 million offers at 26, three years from now, with revenues growing by nearly $1 billion a year, Harper, Machado and Fernandez may get a billion combined themselves.

And that’s not even including those likely to come off options that offseason. The Indians’ deal with Michael Brantley ends in 2018 at latest, as does the Red Sox’s with Craig Kimbrel. And if you need a closer and don’t like him, there will be Zach Britton, Trevor Rosenthal, Andrew Miller, Jeurys Familia, Glen Perkins, Kelvin Herrera, A.J. Ramos, Carter Capps, David Robertson and plenty more.

Why bother with closers when so many more starters are available? Prefer a veteran? Adam Wainwright can be had. Young power arm? Garrett Richards is a potential ace, Patrick Corbin and Shelby Miller at the core of the Diamondbacks’ attempted resurgence, and Drew Smyly central to the Rays’ plans. If J.A. Happ is worth $12 million a year now, imagine what someone of his ilk – a back-end type – will fetch among the multi-billion-dollar madness of the 2018 offseason.

Need bats? Nelson Cruz, Hunter Pence and Adrian Gonzalez are the sorts of veterans who could cash in once more. A.J. Pollock and Charlie Blackmon could strike gold for the first time. Dee Gordon is the sort of player every team wants. Ditto Brian Dozier. Yasmani Grandal and Derek Norris provide two attractive catching options, Adeiny Hechavarria and Jean Segura the same at shortstop. Joe Mauer and Victor Martinez have the sort of swings that looks like they’ll never falter.

There are more, plenty more, maybe 50 players altogether that could cram into the top 25 this season, and many evaluators consider this year’s the best in at least a decade. And none of this includes the international stars from Japan and Cuba and Korea who happen to chose 2018 to join the major leagues.

Now, of course, comes a point that should’ve been obvious already: A lot can happen in three years. Some of the potential free agents will sign. The idea of Wainwright or catcher Yadier Molina, another Cardinal for life, leaving the organization seems far-fetched. Pollock and Gordon have talked contract extension with the Diamondbacks and Marlins, respectively, and may take themselves off the market.

Other teams could see what’s coming – and understand this: If any of the 30 aren’t preparing for it, they’re well behind the majority of the industry – and attempt to pre-emptively lock up their players to contract extensions above the typical market value of extensions but below the money handed to free agents. At the winter meetings, one official with a keen knowledge of baseball’s financial market suggested that as teams attempt to redistribute their money to younger players, the smartest ones could start offering better than the pittance most do when attempting to buy out arbitration and free agent years.

Teams prey on players’ desire for security, and it’s an acute and intelligent play; some players shrug when asked the difference between $20 million and $30 million. Rich is rich, they say, and that’s well past the threshold of rich. Of course, depending on the contentiousness of collective bargaining that’s about to ramp into high gear, the players’ union could well adopt a more cynical view of the ownership with which it’s about to butt heads and target the 2018 offseason as a bellwether.

Because if players banded together and vowed to hit free agency in one giant attack, the consequences would be fascinating: teams would either reach deep into their coffers to pay the market price for the talent deluge or tighten their purse strings and court all sorts of problems, from ill will to collusion claims. If the players have a trump card, the Class of 2018 may well be it.

A few teams find themselves in the catbird’s seat, too. The Philadelphia Phillies – in recent years among the top 5 spending teams in the game – have not a single penny on the books for the 2019 season, according to Baseball Prospectus. Considering the disastrous contracts they’ve let fall off the books, their rebuilding effort has quietly turned into a tremendous advantage. Even with the Braves and Cubs and Dodgers and Red Sox boasting the farm systems they do, the Phillies’ huge base of talent – and their ability to spend around $200 million a season at that point thanks to their TV contract – make them among the scariest teams in the game.

The Colorado Rockies’ books are also clear that season, though they’ve been hesitant to spend even $100 million on a team. They’re similar to the Oakland A’s, who have $500,000 on the books, the same as the Houston Astros, whose core of talent and room to spend makes them similar to the Phillies in the AL. Others with clear contract ledgers in 2019: Baltimore ($9 million), Kansas City ($10.95 million) and Pittsburgh ($11.58 million).

Even though the New York Yankees find themselves near the top of the list with $57 million on the books, it’s a fraction of what they’ve had in recent seasons, and the prospect of Harper and Harvey ending up in pinstripes is realistic, particularly if New York dips below the new luxury-tax threshold established in the coming collective-bargaining negotiations.

The number will be higher than $189 million, quite a bit higher potentially, because the union sees the 2018 offseason as the time when bigger markets should unleash their spending power. To wit: If Kershaw does opt out, as almost all players with the ability to choose, the Dodgers have only $3.5 million on their books – and that’s the last payment on Matt Kemp’s contract they dealt to San Diego.

So for all of the complaints about the Dodgers, all of the bellyaching that they’re not as focused on today as they should be, there’s a reason. Today isn’t everything, not to the teams that want a sustainable future, the teams that understand the impact 2018 will have on the course of the sport for the rest of the decade and beyond.

Players will fall off the board, agree to extensions, get their payment, and the list will winnow naturally. Some players will try to jump the market and make sure their money isn’t siphoned away by others. The best, however, are likely to hold course as the best often do, and once 2018 comes and the reckoning is upon baseball, teams really will have one good choice: pay the players the billions upon billions they deserve and keep the booming business of baseball rolling into a new era.

700


Shelby Miller was born to be in Arizona.
 
Derek Fisher taken out and Appel added to the Giles deal :lol

It's actually quite relieving that the Astros are accosting defeat on Appel instead of continuing to tell us how great he's gonna be :lol
 
anyone down for some Winter Meetings in the NT Keeper league Bobby runs 8o

Got a bunch of guys I'm willing to trade to recoup some draft picks
 
Access Denied: #MLB commissioner Rob Manfred reportedly decides not to reinstate Pete Rose.

Yet he was apart of the TBS crew for post-season coverage :rolleyes .
 
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The Fascinating Jason Heyward Contract.

On Friday, the Cubs won the bidding for Jason Heyward, convincing the outfielder to come to Chicago despite offers for more guaranteed money from the Nationals, the Cardinals, and reportedly one other team, perhaps the Angels. While Chicago’s offer of $184 million over eight years is certainly a substantial amount, he apparently could have taken $200 million guaranteed by going with one of the other offers. Instead he chose the Cubs, and along with putting him on baseball’s best team in 2016, the fascinating structure of the contract Chicago gave him may end up making this deal a big win for both sides.

The case for the contract being a big win for the Cubs is easy; Heyward is a very good player who will be paid like a decent one during his time in Chicago. To this point, Heyward has put up +28 WAR in six years in the majors; for the Cubs to break even on the total guaranteed moeny in this deal, Heyward would have to only put up about +20 WAR over the next eight years. This is essentially the kind of performance the Cubs are paying for with this deal.


Jason Heyward’s Contract Estimate — 8 yr / $181.9 M
Year Age WAR $/WAR Est. Value
2016 26 3.3 $8.0 M $26.4 M
2017 27 3.5 $8.4 M $29.8 M
2018 28 3.3 $8.8 M $29.1 M
2019 29 3.0 $9.3 M $28.2 M
2020 30 2.8 $9.7 M $27.2 M
2021 31 2.0 $10.2 M $20.9 M
2022 32 1.3 $10.7 M $13.9 M
2023 33 0.5 $11.3 M $6.2 M
Totals 19.9 $181.9 M
Assumptions
Value: $8M/WAR with 5.0% inflation
Aging Curve: +0.25 WAR/yr (18-27), -0.25 WAR/yr (28-30),-0.75 WAR/yr (31-37),-1 WAR/yr (> 37)
To get that number out of the contract estimating tool, I had to start Heyward at +3.3 WAR and choose the pessimistic aging curve, and that’s about as dim a view as one could possibly have of his overall value. Even if you eliminated 100% of his defensive value, projecting him as an average defensive right fielder going forward, he’d still project as a +3.5 WAR player, given his offensive production and quality baserunning. Forget regressing defensive value; for him to be worth only $184 million over the next eight years requires the type of analysis that concludes that defense is completely irrelevant beyond the position a player takes on the field.

Of course, that’s not a particularly rational belief, and every piece of available information suggests that Heyward adds a good amount of value in the field. Based on what they’re paying him, the Cubs are basically getting that value for free, and barring an injury, they’re very likely to come out with a significant bargain during the time Heyward is in Chicago. $23 million a year for a player of Heyward’s value is a very nice value, especially for a team in a competitive division, where the value of adding marginal wins is very high.

But, of course, this contract isn’t a straight eight year, $184 million commitment from both sides. That’s the amount the Cubs guaranteed Heyward as a floor, but because his representatives at Excel negotiated two opt-out clauses into the deal, the likely outcome is that he’s going to end up getting a much better deal than that over the long-term. It was long assumed that Heyward would get an opt-out clause in whatever contract he ended up signing — Excel has a history of getting them included for their clients, and Heyward is the kind of player where getting another crack at free agency has the most upside — with most speculation suggesting it would come halfway through the expected nine or ten year deal he would sign.

Instead, Heyward took a slightly shorter contract, and in doing so, moved up his chances to get back on the market. Since the Cubs gave him opt-outs after the 2018 and 2019 seasons, from his perspective, this is really a three year contract with a one year player option, followed by a four year player option after that. Assuming a normal payout structure with a slight increase in salaries over the life of the deal, this deal is probably going to end up paying Heyward something like $65 million over three years or $88 million over four years before he hits the free agent market again.

At that point, Heyward will probably not be as good of a player as he is now, as we shouldn’t expect him to retain all of his early-career defensive value, and he’s approaching the point where we shouldn’t expect the offense to improve dramatically. If he loses roughly half his defensive value over the next three years, he’d be looking at hitting the market again as a 29 year old who projected as about a +3.5 WAR player. The most recent comparison of a left-handed hitting corner outfielder with big platoon splits selling his decline phase was Shin-Soo Choo, and he got $130 million over seven years from the Rangers for his age 31-37 seasons. Heyward will be two years younger than Choo was when he landed his deal, and that point, there will have been five years of inflation in MLB since Choo’s deal was signed.

Choo’s deal is probably something like the floor for Heyward’s next contract — again, assuming he stays healthy, which is the primary variable in whether he’ll opt-out or not — and he’d probably only take that deal after the second option, as he’d probably prefer a one year, $23 million pillow contract by picking up his first option to try and have a better walk-year if his 2018 season wasn’t very good. So if we gave him the 7/$130M that Choo got and add that to the roughly $90 million that he’ll get from the Cubs in the first four years of the deal, that puts him right around 11/$220M.

But Choo’s deal is going to be ancient history by the time Heyward actually reaches free agency, and inflation is going to make it likely that he lands a much larger deal than Choo’s deal in a few years. When Choo signed his deal, teams were paying roughly $6 to $7 million per win; when Heyward is deciding whether to use his first opt-out or not, the market will probably be closer to $9 million per win. Here’s what a +3.5 WAR outfielder, selling his age-29 to age-35 seasons, would expect to get in that kind of market.


Jason Heyward’s Contract Estimate — 7 yr / $171.6 M
Year Age WAR $/WAR Est. Value
2019 29 3.5 $9.0 M $31.5 M
2020 30 3.5 $9.5 M $33.1 M
2021 31 3.0 $9.9 M $29.8 M
2022 32 2.5 $10.4 M $26.0 M
2023 33 2.0 $10.9 M $21.9 M
2024 34 1.5 $11.5 M $17.2 M
2025 35 1.0 $12.1 M $12.1 M
Totals 17.0 $171.6 M
Assumptions
Value: $9M/WAR with 5.0% inflation
Aging Curve: +0.25 WAR/yr (18-27), 0 WAR/yr (28-30),-0.5 WAR/yr (31-37),-0.75 WAR/yr (> 37)
If he collects roughly $70 million before the first opt-out, then sees a market where his fair value is around 7/$170M, it’d probably be a pretty easy call for him to hit the market and reset his salaries. At that point, the contract would end up paying Heyward something like $240 million over ten years, or right in line with the mega-contracts that Albert Pujols and Robinson Cano commanded. And this is assuming Heyward declines from a roughly +5 WAR player now to a +3.5 WAR player over the next three years. A total payday of 10/$240M for Heyward isn’t even the optimistic scenario, as he’d probably be able to get another deal worth $200 million deal if he still projected as a +4 WAR player going into his age-29 season.

These opt-outs are why Heyward took only $184 million. As Eno noted after the David Price signing, the opt-out was probably worth something like $10-$15 million for Price, an older pitcher with a significantly higher chance of collapse. For Heyward, each opt-out is probably worth more, and by doubling up on the chances to hit the free agent market again while he’s still in his prime, he’s put himself in a position to end up with something like $250 million over his remaining productive years.

So, yes, the Cubs got a really good value by signing Heyward for 8/$184M, but given that he’s now got a floor of $184 million with a more likely outcome of something like $240 or $250 million, this deal should work out just fine for Heyward as well. He might have left a little bit of guaranteed money on the table, but getting the 2018 opt-out probably should outweigh the value of getting a few million more per year during the part of the contract that is likely to get voided anyway.

While opt-outs are always going to be player friendly clauses, this contract is a perfect example of how including an opt-out in a deal can make a contract a win for both sides. The Cubs get a really good player at a bargain price for the first three or four years of the deal, and as long as Heyward stays healthy, he’ll get another nice contract in a few years. For both the Cubs and Heyward, this is a win-win contract; the losers in this deal are the rest of the teams in the NL Central, who are going to have to figure out how to contend with a juggernaut for the foreseeable future.

Projecting Mark Appel.

Last week, I wrote a piece about Derek Fisher, who was supposedly part of the package going back to Philly in exchange for super-reliever Ken Giles. Now that the dust has finally settled on that trade, we’ve learned that Fisher wasn’t actually involved. So I basically wrote about Derek Fisher for no reason in particular. Instead, the Astros included former first-overall pick Mark Appel. A couple of guys named Arauz — Harold and Jonathan, going to Philly and Houston, respectively — were also included.

It hasn’t exactly been smooth sailing for Appel since he went first overall back in June of 2013. Between 2013 and 2014, he pitched to a 5.93 ERA and 3.86 FIP over 121 innings, with most of his work coming in A-Ball. His ERA and FIP converged last season, when he put up a 4.45 ERA and 4.30 FIP between Double-A and Triple-A. All told, Appel’s struck out 20% of opposing batters, and has walked 8% over the past two and a half years — roughly the same as an average minor leaguer.

Those numbers aren’t terrible when taken at face value. But from a highly-touted college draftee, you almost always see a lot more a lot sooner. For comparison, Aaron Nola and Carlos Rodon were also recent college draftees, are over a year younger than Appel, and posted sub-4.00 ERAs in the big leagues last year. While Appel was putting up mediocre numbers in the minors, those guys were succeeding in the big leagues.

When KATOH looks at Appel, it sees a 24-year-old who’s been consistently mediocre in the minors. Every organization has several of those. So, as a result, KATOH pegs him for just 0.7 WAR through his age-28 season. Appel’s 2014 numbers yield a similar forecast of 1.1 WAR. Of course, stats aren’t everything. And Appel feels like one of those cases where the stats are missing out on some hidden upside. Appel has a mid-90s fastball, along with a plus slider and changeup. Many big league starters have succeeded with similar repertoires, while many more have succeeded with much less. But while Appel has the stuff of a front-line starter, he’s yet to parlay it into on-field performance.

I could just give you a list of Appel’s crappy statistical comps and call it a day. But that wouldn’t be very insightful. Aside from his unspectacular minor league numbers, Appel would have very little in common with most of the pitchers on that list. For example, James Houser would have been Appel’s top comp, and Houser topped out at 86 mph in his lone big league appearance. That’s a far cry from Appel, who can run it up to 95 or 96.

To weed out the James Housers of the world, I filtered the list to include only guys who appeared in Baseball America’s top 100 list at some point. So that leaves us with the pitchers who performed similarly to Appel, but whose stuff was still good enough to win over the folks at Baseball America. Mah Dist denotes Mahalanobis distance. A lower figure represents a more similar comp.



Mark Appel’s Mahalanobis Comps
Rank Mah Dist Name 2015 Age IP WAR
1 0.13 John Maine 34 593 5.7
2 0.18 Clint Nageotte 34 42 -0.1
3 0.43 Homer Bailey 29 1,010 13.1
4 0.43 Jesus Colome 37 426 -0.4
5 0.47 Greg Gohr 47 183 0.5
6 0.50 Christian Friedrich 27 167 1.1
7 0.55 Jeff Granger 43 32 -0.7
8 0.57 Mark Hutton 45 190 -0.2
9 0.61 Ed Yarnall 39 20 0.0
10 0.63 Allen Webster 25 120 -1.1
11 0.63 Julio Santana 42 479 0.3
12 0.67 Albie Lopez 43 841 5.7
13 0.67 Chuck Lofgren 29 0 0.0
14 0.69 Justin Miller 37 376 0.9
15 0.70 Aaron Myette 37 154 -0.3
16 0.70 Wade Davis 29 733 10.7
17 0.70 Matt White 36 0 0.0
18 0.77 Jake Arrieta 29 795 15.0
19 0.77 Kyle Drabek 27 178 -0.3
20 0.78 Wade Miller 38 894 12.6
As these things always are, this list is a mixed bag. It includes guys like Clint Nagoette and Jesus Colome, who had good stuff but never quite pieced it all together in the big leagues. But there are also examples of pitchers who did find ways to make it work. Homer Bailey became one of the better pitchers in baseball. Wade Davis, Jake Arrieta and Wade Miller also didn’t look all that different from Appel in the high minors, and wound up pitching successfully in the show.

This is all to say that it’s not too late for Appel to turn things around. The list above includes examples of pitchers who had good stuff, but mediocre minor league performance, and still succeeded in the majors. Pitchers are fickle creatures, and it’s not at all uncommon for breakouts to occur with little notice. As of this writing, though, we’re still waiting for Appel to break out. The Phillies are hoping this year’s the year it finally happens, and it very well might be. Maybe a change of scenery will help. But considering he turns 25 next summer, Appel’s running out of time.

Henry Owens on His Rookie Season.

The Boston Red Sox didn’t trade Henry Owens during the Winter Meetings. They still might trade him, depending on what kind of offers they receive for the 23-year-old lefty. While there’s no such thing as too much pitching, Boston does have depth in that department, and Dave Dombrowski likes power arms. Owens isn’t necessarily velocity deficient, but he’s more finesse than flamethrower.

Once viewed as untouchable, Owens is no longer looked at as sure-thing stud. He failed to dominate in Triple-A, and his 11 big league starts were a mixed bag. The club’s former top pitching prospect split eight decisions and finished with a 4.57 ERA and a 4.28 FIP.

As expected, Owens showed off an excellent changeup, which he threw 24.7% of the time after being called up in early August. How well he commanded his fastball largely dictated whether he was rock-and-rolling or getting rocked by opposing batters. The fastball averaged 89.1 mph, a tick or two less than in past years.

Owens talked about his first two months of MLB action in the closing days of September.

———

Owens on pitch sequencing: “It’s definitely an evolving process for me. When I came up and pitched against the Yankees and Detroit – the teams I faced early on – I was predominantly fastball. I was trying to establish my stuff and see how it played up here. After a few outings, I started mixing it up more. Not my repertoire, per se, but the sequencing changed. Of course, it can change in any game, and depend somewhat on the lineup.”
On changeups down and in: “One thing I’ve done differently up here is throw changeups inside to lefties. A few of our scouting reports have us doing that. Some guys fly open and have a hole down and in, so we’ll throw changeups low and in. I spent four years in the minors where that was almost a no-no. Up here, we know hitters’ swing paths and we adjust to that.”

On his changeups: “I throw two different changeups. I throw one that I want to start out looking like a fastball and it slowly fades out. I also throw one that starts out like a fastball and darts down. And sometimes I’ll put a little cut on it.

“I don’t really manipulate the ball differently, it’s more location than anything. If I start it a little higher in the zone, it’s not going to have that drop off the table. If I start it as a low heater, it’s going to fade down below the zone.

“I’m not necessarily trying to hit the glove all the time. I’m not saying I’m trying to be effectively wild, it’s more that I have the ability to read a swing pretty decently. I probably throw to a hitter’s swing more than anything.”

On his recently introduced slider: “In my first six starts, I probably threw two sliders. I had a little trouble commanding the fastball, so there really weren’t too many situations where I was comfortable with, ‘Let’s try out this new pitch.’ Gradually, throwing bullpens, I got a better feel.

“I can’t remember which team it was against, but in one outing I threw it about 10 times. I got a lot of swings and misses with it, and was thinking, ‘Maybe it does play.’ My first outing in Yankee Stadium, I got Jacoby Ellsbury a couple of times. The slider is a pitch I want to continue to develop and have in my back pocket as a weapon, and not just as a show-me pitch.”

On stealing strikes: “I don’t want to call anything in my arsenal a steal-a-strike pitch. Even though I’ll steal a strike with my changeup, or steal a strike with my curveball, at the end of the day, I want them all to be two-strike weapons.

“I’ll throw my curveball at different speeds throughout an outing. Same with the changeup. Say if someone jumps a 0-0 fastball and hits it off the wall. Next time up, I might drop a first-pitch changeup in there to give him a different look. That’s stealing a strike, but some people confuse the expression with, ‘He only throws that pitch to steal a strike.’ Some hitters take first-pitch breaking balls, so you can do that, but I want to be able to throw that same pitch later in the count.”

On his velocity: “If I’m 88-92 [mph], and my best heater is 91-92, and I’m getting hit all over the yard, I might be a little concerned. But I get swings and misses with my fastball. I don’t know if it’s deception, or how I’m spinning the baseball, but it’s working for me. I obviously need to locate it, but that’s the case for any pitcher.

“My velocity is down a bit, but 180 innings probably has a little effect on that. I’ll be more in tune with my body next year. I’ll be stronger and another year older, so I think there’s an amount of velocity that will come back.”

On adding and subtracting: “I like to pick the brains of our hitters. I ask them questions all the time. I had a discussion with [hitting coach] Chili Davis about Drew Smyly during one game. He had a good curveball that day and was throwing it a lot, but he would never throw his changeup off of it. We were discussing how even if you stay soft by throwing a changeup off the curveball, the batter will still be out front if you make it look like a fastball. He’s probably going to make contact, because you slowed his bat down with the curveball, but if you locate well it’s probably going to be weak contact.

“I’ve been watching Rich Hill, Wade Miley. Even Eddie Rodriguez — we’re pretty much different pitchers, but there’s still a lot of adding and subtracting to his game. That’s what I hone in on the most – the ability of guys to disturb the timing of a hitter. There’s a lot of adding and subtracting in what I try to do.”

Braves, Padres Trade Uncertain Futures of Bethancourt, Kelly.

The Braves kept working the trade machine on Thursday, as they continue to tear down their team in hopes of building it back up. The club once again directed its attention to the National League West, this time getting the now-limbered-up Padres into the mix. And in doing so, they managed to get a couple of players in Casey Kelly and Ricardo Rodriguez who may have interest in the future for a player — Christian Bethancourt — whose interest probably has died out.

Once upon a time, Casey Kelly was going to be a star. If you’re looking for a player to whom you might point when attempting to characterize the risk inherent in prospects, Kelly would be a great example. As one of the prizes of the Adrian Gonzalez trade, Kelly was thought to be within striking distance of the majors heading into the 2011 season. After all, when the Red Sox had traded him to the Padres, Kelly had 21 starts at Double-A under his belt. That’s plenty these days. Jose Fernandez didn’t make any before he graduated. Neither did Carlos Rodon. Lance McCullers made five, and then graduated. Anthony DeSclafani made 21 in Double-A before graduating to Triple-A, and hit the majors after 13 starts there. I’m cherry picking, but you get the point: at the time of the trade, Kelly was (understandably) thought to be on the cusp.

He wasn’t. He made 27 starts in Double-A in 2011, and didn’t graduate to Triple-A or the majors. At 21, his 3.98 ERA wasn’t exactly blowing people away, nor was his 3.77 FIP or 17.1% strikeout rate. So he opened 2012 in the minors. He started at Triple-A, but he missed most of the season after straining his elbow during his second start of the season. That was probably the red flag for his career. Had he shut it down and had Tommy John surgery right then, he might be working on his second major league season already. But he didn’t. After sitting out from mid-April to late July, he came back and made six starts in the minors — striking out 14 against two walks in the last two, both at Double-A — before making his major league debut.

That debut was a pretty good one — six shutout innings against the Braves, in which he allowed just five baserunners. He would get rocked pretty hard in four of his subsequent five starts, but he struck out 26 batters in 29 innings. The promise seemed clear, until the TJ Reaper pointed its finger at him the following March.

Does Kelly still have that promise? Maybe, and the Braves are going to find out. There’s no reason he can’t immediately compete for a spot in Atlanta’s starting rotation.

The Braves didn’t just get him, though. They also got Ricardo Rodriguez. Not much is known about Rodriguez, as he was just recently signed out of Venezuela. He has only 10 plate appearances stateside, so much of what we do know comes to us from this site’s former prospect analyst Kiley McDaniel — who, as you may have heard, now works for the Braves. We know that he got $800,000 to sign as a 16-year-old, and that it may take him some time for him to climb the prospect ranks. And we know that Kiley has scouted him before. We also know that he showed a good batting eye in the Dominican Summer League during 2015, which isn’t nothing for a 17-year-old who was among the youngest catchers in the league. This season, he’ll start as a 18-year-old, possibly here on U.S. soil, and if he does well… hey, everyone loves a catching prospect.

So much so that it’s hard to let them die. But that’s just what we may need to do with Christian Bethancourt, who ranked 106th on Kiley’s top 200 list last year. When you’re given every opportunity to start on a rebuilding team and instead lose your spot to a decrepit A.J. Pierzynski and an out-of-fashion Ryan Lavarnway that isn’t a good sign for your career. When the Braves demoted Bethancourt to Triple-A last season, he was rocking a .198/.221/.287 line, good for a .218 wOBA and 33 wRC+. It was the result of just 104 plate appearances, true, but the Braves wanted to give him more playing time than that. Certainly, they hadn’t signed the 38-year-old Pierzynski to be their starter. Bethancourt started the team’s first two games, and four of the first five. Atlanta was hoping Bethancourt was the truth, but sometimes the truth hurts.

Now, a quick glance through history says that catchers do hang around with offensive seasons this bad. For his career, Bethancourt now has a 43 wRC+. Were he really Framing Jesus, I suppose you could live with the total and complete lack of offense. But is he really Framing Jesus? The 2015 catching reports from both StatCorner and Baseball Prospectus throw a whole lot of cold water on that theory. By StatCorner’s methodology, he finished 14th from the bottom in total value, and was decidedly in the bottom half in per game stats. And by BP’s, he ranked 86th out of 105 in framing runs — behind, it must be noted, Lavarnway, who has often been said not to have the defensive skills to stick at catcher.

Is this definitive? No. And on the positive side of the ledger, we know thanks to Neil Weinberg’s research of Statcast data in The Hardball Times Baseball Annual 2016 (on sale now!!!) that Bethancourt had the third-best average pop time in the game last season. So he’s not a total zero behind the dish. But hitting like Drew Butera and framing like Ryan Lavarnway is not a great look.

Of further question is how Bethancourt fits on the Padres roster. They already have Derek Norris and Austin Hedges ensconced at catcher — and with Wil Myers seemingly now the first baseman, it seems unlikely that the defensively-limited Norris is about to change positions. So unless the Padres plan to carry a third catcher — often a popular choice for managers who have no idea what they’re doing — it seems that Bethancourt may be in for some more Triple-A seasoning.

Christian Bethancourt has been an interesting player and a top prospect. He might be decent someday, but the early returns show him to be a bust. For him, the Braves got a player who has been interesting and a top prospect, but it’s been awhile since Casey Kelly was anyone of note. Could he be again? We’ll see — he’s been derailed more by injury than poor results. The Braves also got an interesting player who isn’t quite yet a prospect, but could be one soon. The value in Kelly and Rodriguez may be sliver-like at this point, but if the Braves have decided Bethancourt isn’t the solution, slivers are worth acquiring.
 
Madbum, Cueto, Shark, Peavy, Cain
Please be healthy [emoji]128591[/emoji][emoji]127996[/emoji][emoji]128591[/emoji][emoji]127996[/emoji][emoji]128591[/emoji][emoji]127996[/emoji]
 
Buster Olney ‏@Buster_ESPN 4m4 minutes ago
Sources: Johnny Cueto has an agreement with the Giants, pending a physical.
 
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